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Perspectives on Queering Legal Theory
EDITOR'S NoTE
InterSEXionality, the topic of this Fourth Annual Legal Theory
Symposium at the University of Denver College of Law, evokes a num-
ber of important themes. First, the methodology developed by intersec-
tionality theorists lends itself to application in sexual orientation con-
texts. Second, working at the crossroads of queer theory and law offers
both promise and peril, for it entails applying insights directed at decon-
structing sexual identity to a legal analysis that is fundamentally based
on identity categories. Third, interSEXionality may elucidate interrela-
tionships among seemingly separate identity categories, such as gender,
sex, sexuality, race, class, and sexual orientation. In particular, it ques-
tions whether gender subsumes sexual orientation, or vice versa. Ex-
ploring these intersections could be described as "queering legal theory."
The interdisciplinary approach taken in this volume includes an-
thropological, historical, literary, and political science, as well as legal
perspectives on sexual orientation theory. Four channels of inquiry or-
ganized the symposium: Constructing Sex, Gender and Sexual Orienta-
tion; Constructing Heterosexuality; Constructing Marginality; and To-
ward InterSEXionality. The issues raised include who is included (and
excluded) in constructions of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, and
whether minority sexual orientation and gender identities undermine or
buttress the compulsory heterosexuality regime. Additional themes
emerge concerning the role of capitalism in constructing gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender communities and strategies, and the difficulty
of alleviating penalties for feminine behavior without perpetuating tradi-
tional gender roles. Julie Nice sets the tone by summarizing the contri-
butions' strategic implications for an antisubordination agenda, while
Frank Valdes wraps it up by situating the symposium within the larger
discourse of sexual orientation legal theory scholarship and activism.
The Law Review thanks the University of Denver College of Law
for its unflagging support of the annual legal theory symposium, the
Hughes Research and Development Committee for its financial support,
the InterSEXionality Symposium participants who brought originality
and energy to the discussions, and the faculty of the University of Den-
ver and the University of Colorado at Denver for their invaluable partici-
pation in the symposium process. I would especially like to thank Uni-
versity of Denver College of Law Professors Nancy Ehrenreich and
Martha Ertman for working so closely with me during the symposium
planning; their organizational and intellectual prowess was integral to this
symposium's success. Last, but surely not least, I thank Kent Modesitt,
the Editor-in-Chief of the 1998-99 Law Review, who went above and be-






INTERSEXIONALITY AND THE STRATEGY QUESTION
JuLIE A. NICE'
This issue of the Denver University Law Review is the culmination
of the University of Denver College of Law's annual symposium proc-
ess. One of our most distinctive activities at the College of Law is the
Denver symposium. Each year a group of Denver faculty, in collabora-
tion with the Law Review, selects a symposium topic which we think
raises newly identified or persistently difficult issues throughout law and
society. Members of the Denver faculty then meet weekly to discuss
readings on the topic along with our "regulars" who have included law
review editors' and several dedicated interdisciplinary local scholars who
schlep to the law school each Friday afternoon.2 Along the way, we or-
ganize a round-table conference to which we invite both new and estab-
lished interdisciplinary scholars who study the topic. We have been ex-
tremely fortunate in past symposia to have enjoyed participation by su-
perb scholars on Unconstitutional Conditions (1995),' The New Private
Law (1996),' and Coercion and Exploitation (1997).' This year our good
fortune multiplied for our 1998 symposium on InterSEXionality: Inter-
disciplinary Perspectives on Queering Legal Theory. We enjoyed stimu-
lating presentations and engaging exchanges among our local faculty and
our guests, Professors Nan Alamilla Boyd, Patricia Cain, Mary Anne
Case, David Cruz, Karen Engle, Katherine Franke, Jean Love, Ana
Teresa Ortiz, Jane Schacter, Kendall Thomas, and Francisco Valdes. The
contributions collected in this issue represent the written part of this in-
. Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. Thanks to Martha
Ertman and Karla Robertson for their suggestions.
1. The Denver model owes much to the students who helped create it, with a particularly
high standard set by the editors of our first collaborative faculty-student symposium issues. Lisa
Banks, 1995 Symposium Editor, first approached me about her idea of a faculty-student
collaboration. For our 1996 issue, Sue Chrisman, Editor-in-Chief, and Tracy Craige, Symposium
Editor, regularly attended our reading group. They each provided editorial service above and beyond
the call of duty, editing months after they graduated. This year their shoes were ably filled by
Symposium Editor Karla Robertson, who expanded our tradition by being the first student selected
to contribute a Note on the symposium topic.
2. We are extremely fortunate to enjoy the regular participation of Professor Susan Sterett
who teaches political science at the University of Denver and Professor Catherine Kemp who
teaches philosophy at the University of Colorado at Denver.
3. Symposium, The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 857 (1995).
4. Symposium, The New Private Law, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 991 (1996).
5. Symposium, Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 875 (1997).
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terdisciplinary dialogue, which focuses primarily on the regulation of
sexuality and the intersecting relationships between sexuality and sex,
gender, sexual orientation, race, and class.
One broad question emerges from this year's dialogue on Inter-
SEXionality,6 namely, what strategies will best serve to end subordina-
tion, whether based on sexuality or other classifications, such as gender,
race, or class. The common mission assumed by this question, that of
ending subordination, may be subject to challenge. While each of the
commentators here might describe his or her interests differently' their
perspectives share substantial agreement with that purpose. Considerable
disagreement emerged, nonetheless, about the desirability of various
strategies aimed at achieving this end. Let me hasten to add that this dis-
agreement was unfailingly friendly. But the persistence of disagreement
over strategy calls for further analysis, both to make the best selections
of strategy for ending subordination and to create awareness of the
method-based fault lines which could fracture the anti-subordination
community of scholars. Anti-subordination communities have learned
these lessons before. We do not want to leave any stone unturned in our
search for the best strategies for ending subordination. Nor do we want to
throw sticks or stones at one another when we disagree about those
strategies. In these regards, this symposium serves as an excellent model
for respectful but challenging probing of fundamental disagreements and
their implications for future anti-subordination strategy.
Each contribution proposes or critiques various strategies for coun-
tering subordination based on sexuality. I will briefly summarize the
articles, which follow in the order they were presented at the symposium.
Leading off, Katherine Franke's article critiques the characterization
of particular conduct as sexual.' In exploring the concern she shares with
6. As the Denver reading group planned this symposium, we identified several questions
which emerged from literature on the regulation of sexuality: Who is included (and excluded) in
constructions of sex, gender, and sexual orientation? If gender is a residual category, as some
scholars suggest, what are its boundaries? Can law recognize a queer identity based on a belief
system rather than on status or conduct? Do minority sexual orientation and gender identities
undermine or buttress the compulsory construction of heterosexuality? Can legal doctrine
accommodate the insights of queer theory, which generally eschews essentialism, or are concrete
identity categories essential to legal approaches to civil rights and personhood? Can Queer Theory
and Critical Race Theory inform each other? How does capitalism inform the creation of gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered communities? The papers collected here address all these
questions, and many more.
7. Mary Anne Case, for example, argues convincingly that "[tihe constitutional principle that
'[t]here is no caste here' is not cashed out by '[t]here is no subordination' here." Mary Anne Case,
Unpacking Package Deals: Separate Spheres Are Not the Answer, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1305, 1315
(1998). Case urges something more than an end to subordination. She offers a reminder that "the
Constitution guarantees liberty as well as equality; indeed, the constitutional equality norm itself has
regularly been interpreted to guarantee equal liberty." Id. at 1316.
8. Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENv. U. L. REv. 1139 (1998).
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Michel Foucault that sex not be "legally inscribed on the body,"9 Franke
provides three gripping accounts of "putting sex to work," principally
concerning herself with how each practice is marked as sexual and the
ways in which this demarcation masks the deployment of sex "as an in-
strumentality of multiple relations of power."' First, she contends that a
ritual traditionally practiced by a tribe in Papua New Guinea requiring
boys to fellate men so as to ingest semen for masculinization is really not
homosexual, but rather a homosocial custom. Second, she argues that the
anal penetration of a Haitian immigrant with a toilet plunger by two New
York City police officers, if sexual at all, primarily served the interests of
race and gender-based torture. Third, she describes the horrific and sys-
tematic sexual violence waged against Muslim and Croatian men and
women by Serbian soldiers as another example of sex put to work for
racial, ethnic, religious, gender-based, and political persecution. Franke
endorses the United Nations' prosecutorial model which both recognizes
the specifically sexual elements of the assaults without deploying that
demarcation to limit recognition of the broader torturous and genocidal
natures of these violent acts. With this contribution, Franke moves us
beyond the characterization of conduct as sexual toward understanding
sex as an instrumentality of other power relations. One wonders whether
sex is ever free of such instrumental manipulation.
In her contribution, political scientist Susan Sterett explores the
emergence of pension benefits in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, using history to reveal the difficulty of anticipating the effects
of any particular strategy." Sterett explains how the development and
expansion of pensions for civil war veterans, firemen, and policemen
turned on judicial justifications which favored rewarding men who un-
dertook dangerous service to the state and providing charity for their
dependent wives and children. While such benefits might be applauded
for providing greater financial security for many women, Sterett argues
that they reinforced both traditional gender roles for men and women and
normative heterosexuality. Through analysis of appellate opinions de-
ciding the constitutionality of government pension spending, Sterett sug-
gests that pension law structured what it meant to be a proper (coura-
geous/masculine) husband and proper (dependent/feminine) wife, and
also what it meant to be a proper (heterosexual) family. Like other com-
mentators, Sterett never asserts that either gender roles or heterosexual
norms would have been destabilized if the events she studied, the devel-
opment of pension benefits, had not occurred as they did.
Martha Ertman endorses the use of a traditionally conservative set
of tools-market constructs and commercial law-to serve progressive
9. Id. at 1179.
10. Id. at 1143.
11. Susan Sterett, Husbands & Wives, Dangerousness & Dependence: Public Pensions in the
1860s-1920s, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 1181 (1998).
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ends. 2 In her article, Ertman expands on her strategy of employing com-
mercial law tools as a means to reconstruct marriage. Ertman argues that
traditional marriage is a credit relationship in which a primary home-
maker extends credit to a primary wage earner in the form of homemak-
ing services and lost opportunity costs. If the marriage endures, the pri-
mary wage-earner will discharge the debt by sharing his ideal worker
wages with the primary homemaker. If not, Ertman's proposed premari-
tal security agreement will govern, allowing the homemaker/creditor to
collect on her loan by using the designated collateral to satisfy the debt.
Ertman anticipates how queer legal theory will receive her proposal to
commercialize marriage, arguing that commercializing marriage with
premarital security agreements will serve the interests of queer theory by
revealing the constructed nature of heterosexual marriage, allowing for
gender performativity, intervening in conflations of sex, gender, and sex-
ual orientation, and creating space for same-sex marriage. Who can know
for sure whether Ertman's commercial tools will reconstruct traditional
marriage, or merely ratify it?
Jane Schacter offers commentary on both Martha Ertman's proposal
for premarital security agreements and Susan Sterett's historical analysis
of pension benefits.'3 Schacter reminds us that particular strategies may,
or may not, have their intended effects once they are "received, under-
stood, and shaped in the diffuse, collective social processes that give
meanings to these strategies over time."'" Schacter argues that legal
change without cultural change is not likely to alter underlying inequali-
ties, and thus fears that Ertman's proposed premarital security agree-
ments may be more likely to reinforce the gendered status quo of hetero-
sexual marriage given the dominant cultural context that makes marriage
nearly compulsory. Schacter notes that Sterett's historical analysis of
pension benefits shows how those financial incentives reinforced the
gendered status quo. Rather than risk reinforcement of marriage and all
that it entails, Schacter urges us to think more deliberately about how
best to achieve "a genuine pluralism of affiliative structures."'5 While
Schacter carefully articulates her well grounded fears, she claims no easy
method for determining when a strategy is likely -to do more good than
harm.
Karen Engle focuses directly on strategy, criticizing that used by
gay rights proponents to counter their opponents' charge that gay rights
are special rights.'6 Engle first differentiates the meanings of special
12. Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75 DENV. U.
L. REv. 1215 (1998).
. 13. Jane S. Schacter, Taking the InterSEXional Imperative Seriously: Sexual Orientation and
Marriage Reform, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1255 (1998).
14. Id. at 1256.
15. Id. at 1259; see also id. at 1264.
16. Karen Engle, What's So SpecialAbout Special Rights?, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1265 (1998).
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rights as used by gay rights opponents, noting their general conflation of
civil rights and special rights. She then criticizes gay rights proponents
generally for not adequately responding to special rights critics, and spe-
cifically for perpetuating a negative view of civil and special rights.
Engle relies on Holmes's definition of special rights as those legal con-
sequences attached to a group based on the special facts which uniquely
make up the group. Calling for gay rights advocates to argue for special
rights because the "facts" call for them,'7 Engle thus provocatively em-
ploys a formalist distinction between fact and law to argue against gay
rights proponents' "very liberal (read conservative) understanding of
civil rights."'" The question remains whether this formalist tool can serve
Engle' s progressive ends.
Mary Anne Case continues to defy queer theory fashions by openly
wearing the liberal label and urging strategies aimed at achieving "liberal
individualism and universalism."'9 Her article responds to Frank Valdes's
use of the berdache as a model of successful disaggregation of sex from
gender.' Case makes the point that, although the berdache depart from
norms requiring alignment of male sex and gender by being biologically
sexed male and socially gendered feminine, they still occupy a separate
sphere in Native American culture. Even if their separate sphere enjoys a
purportedly equal status, she argues that the berdache still reify the sepa-
rate categories of masculinity and femininity and enforce a gendered
package, albeit a different one. Case compares the separate sphere en-
joyed by the berdache to that afforded their counterparts in the docu-
mentary movie Paris is Burning, the novel and movie Midnight in the
Garden of Good and Evil, and the play and movie Tea and Sympathy.
Because creating separate spheres based on any distinctions between sex
and gender perpetuates the dangers of castes, Case urges discarding any
distinction between sex and gender, much as the distinction between
"noble" and "base" was discarded. As she urges unpacking all package
deals, Case leaves you wondering whether any ties bind traits within a
person or among people.
Patricia Cain explicitly employs the feminist consciousness raising
method to better understand transsexual people, sharing some of her own
experiences as a lesbian and retelling the stories of several female-to-
male (FTM) individuals as well as those of people who are intersexed
(meaning that they combine both male and female biological traits) or
are intergendered (meaning that they combine both feminine and mascu-
17. Id. at 1266-67, 1302-03.
18. Id. at 1302.
19. Case, supra note 7, at 1319.
20. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation " in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995).
113519981
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line traits).2' Cain's stories bridge the gap of understanding between les-
bian women and FTM individuals, serving as a model for continuing
exploration of the experiences of people who are sex or gender minori-
ties. On a doctrinal level, Cain suggests a strategy for incorporating sex
and gender minorities into existing legal protections by reconceptualizing
anti-discrimination jurisprudence. No doubt, telling the little known sto-
ries of marginalized sex and gender minorities is an important first step.
In her paper, historian Nan Alamilla Boyd explores the queer com-
munity's focus on visibility politics as its primary means of achieving
civil rights.' Boyd "challenges the liberal equation that visibility realized
through mainstream marketplace accommodation equals or reflects en-
hanced political strength for queers."23 She cites the recent rise of adver-
tising targeting gay and lesbian consumers as enhancing mainstream
visibility, but suggests that this neither reflects nor creates increased
hope of legitimacy or civic recognition. She then juxtaposes the experi-
ences of the Tavern Guild of San Francisco in the 1950s and 1960s,
showing how a marketplace activity successfully transformed one gay
bar subculture into a social movement for the primary purpose of pro-
tecting the bars from police harassment, though never becoming main-
stream. After exploring both disadvantages of mainstream visibility and
alternatives to visibility politics, Boyd concludes that some queer mar-
ketplace activity holds the presumably greater promise of encouraging
queers to be subversive rather than to assimilate. Boyd does not predict
that more subversive activity will lead to enhanced civil rights for queer
people. Somehow one doubts that is her only goal.
Karla Robertson's Note focuses on deconstructing marriage by us-
ing bisexual orientation as the lens through which to view the legal
regulation of marriage. ' Because Congress and the courts allow people
of bisexual orientation to legally marry opposite sex spouses, Robertson
argues that neither heterosexual orientation nor even love or companion-
ship is necessary, or even very relevant, to be eligible to legally marry.
Through her analysis of cases and statutes, Robertson instead reveals that
family law treats the spouses' capacities for penis-vagina penetration as
the determinative criterion for validation of marriage. In doing so, Rob-
ertson reveals that the many legal, financial, and social benefits attached
to marriage are conditioned on the capacity to engage in this specific
sexual conduct. While Robertson exposes an enormous gap between the
romanticized rhetoric surrounding marriage and the actual sexual test for
21. Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-Discrimination
Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1321 (1998).
22. Nan Alanilla Boyd, Shopping for Rights: Gays, Lesbians, and Visibility Politics, 75
DENV. U. L. REv. 1361 (1998).
23. Id. at 1362.
24: Karla C. Robertson, Note, Penetrating Sex and Marriage: The Progressive Potential of
Addressing Bisexuality in Queer Theory, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1375 (1998).
1136 [Vol. 75:4
FOREWORD
marital fitness imposed by family law, she leaves open the question of
the best strategy for closing the marital gap.
As these papers demonstrate, the strategy question is open to debate
among scholars who study the regulation of sexuality. At the broadest
level, the pieces address how we can best reconstruct law and society so
that they honor both equality and liberty, sexual and otherwise. More
specifically, they engage a number of elements of the strategy question.
For example, should we seek to mark sexuality, as well as sex, gender,
sexual orientation, race, class, and the like? While many scholars are
busily marking previously unmarked sexuality, Franke urges caution,
particularly when the sexual label masks enforcement of other oppressive
norms, such as those based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion. Yet
Cain forges ahead with the marking project, telling and seeking to under-
stand the stories of sex and gender minorities as instances of sex dis-
crimination.
What models should we follow to transcend the limitations of norms
related to sexuality, sex, gender, sexual orientation, race, class, and the
like? Valdes previously offered a model of the berdache for our study
and emulation. Case argues that such a package model of different sex
and gender combinations will perpetuate existing categories and castes.
What about the sameness/difference debate? Are civil rights for gay
people special or not? Proponents argued that gay rights are not special,
but Engle thinks they erred and should argue instead that the special facts
of anti-gay discrimination justify special rights.
Can traditionally conservative tools be used for progressive ends?
Case urges adoption of liberal means and ends, while Engle refers to one
liberal conception of civil rights as conservative. Yet Engle also employs
a formalist distinction between fact and law to justify special rights for
gay people. Also, Ertman employs tools of the commercial market to
reconstruct marriage. Yet Sterett's pension example and Schacter's
analysis urge caution, both about whether these tools are likely to recon-
struct marriage, and whether marriage perhaps should be deconstructed
instead of reconstructed. On the market question, Boyd weighs in some-
what ambivalently, endorsing market activity, but only for purposes of
subversion, not assimilation. On the marriage question, Robertson fo-
cuses on deconstruction, but leaves open the possibility of reconstruc-
tion.
Should scholars concern themselves with the strategy question? For
an impassioned answer to this question, read Frank Valdes's Afterword.25
Valdes offers a tour of the history and contemporary challenges of queer
legal theory, exhorting social justice scholars to a multidimensional dis-
25. Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory:
Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship, or Legal
Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409 (1998).
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course that leaves out no experience in constructing both the details and
the larger mosaic of human sexuality.
In addition to providing insights on the strategy question, the par-
ticipants in this Denver symposium employ a variety of tools for decon-
structing or reconstructing sexuality and its legal regulation. While some
focus on understanding the experiences of a particular class of people,
such as Engle on gays and lesbians and Cain on transsexuals, others em-
phasize classifications, such as Case's ongoing deconstruction of gender.
Various commentators explore the intersectional relationships between
one classification and others, such as Franke's exploration of sex and
gender, race, etc. Whereas some follow an inter-doctrinal approach, such
as Ertman's incorporation of commercial law into family law, others use
interdisciplinary approaches, especially Boyd's and Sterett's uses of
history. These examples do not exhaust the approaches used by any of
the contributors, most of whom wield multiple tools to challenge or sub-
vert the legal status quo. By contesting fundamental presumptions about
classes of people, classifications of traits, and intersections among these
classes and classifications, as well as by questioning the validity of any
categorization, all of these approaches "queer" legal theory.26
Sexuality is a rich and complex part of the human experience. As
our symposium participants discovered, its study certainly provides for a
lively discourse. The contributions collected here offer a little of every-
thing for the scholarly connoisseur, from Boyd's bar culture, Cain's
transsexual stories, Case's movies, Engle's legal texts, Ertman's inter-
doctrinal borrowing, Franke's globe-trotting, Robertson's sexual de-
scriptions, Schacter's caution, Sterett's history, to Valdes's passion. Our
hope is that you will read them with a mind both open to understanding
new ideas and eager to challenge them in the dialogue that moves for-
ward in this fourth annual Denver symposium.
26. For a further discussion of queering legal theory, see Ertman, supra note 12, at 1240-42.
[Vol. 75:41138
PUTING SEX TO WORK
KATHERINE M. FRANKE*
I. INTRODUCTION
When I was living in New Haven a number of years ago, a miracle
happened that drew people by the thousands to witness evidence of the
Divine. A crucifix had been found to appear in the body of an oak tree in
the middle of Worchester Square. I went-after all, how often do you get
to see that kind of thing? Not surprisingly, at first I couldn't see anything
but the usual trunk and limbs of a tree. Yet a believer took the time to
show me what was really there, something that my untrained eye could
not at first see: the cross upon which Jesus Christ had been crucified.
Well, maybe there was something there.'
To the believers, the shape of the oak tree was evidence of some-
thing that was really there-a corporeal manifestation of an omnipresent
Divine Being. For them, once you've seen the crucifix, you really can't
not see it, you can't un-see it.
For most people, sex is like the Divine Being: It is an obscure and
powerful domain that reveals itself in expected and unexpected places,
and which is immediately visible to the trained eye. Indeed, once you see
it, it's hard to look away. Like the tree in Worchester Square, the human
body is an "inscribed surface"2 which is discursively marked in such a
way that renders certain body parts and particular behaviors essentially
sexual.
What are we seeing when we recognize something as sexual? How
do we know what makes a practice sexual in nature? That is, how do we
distinguish a practice which is fundamentally sexual from one which is
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I presented an earlier
version of this article at the University of Denver College of Law symposium on InterSEXionality in
February 1998. Many thanks to the participants in that conference, as well as to Ana Ortiz, Tracy
Higgins, Kendall Thomas, Robin West, and Ren6e Romkens for challenging conversations about the
issues I raise in this piece. The students in my Feminist and Critical Race Theory workshop also
provided valuable comments on an earlier draft. My gratitude to Emily Alexander who provided
superb research assistance on this project.
1. The Blessed Virgin Mary seems to appear all the time in Queens. In fact, there are ads in
the subway announcing a phone number you can call, for only $1.50 a minute, to receive
information about the most recent sightings of the BVM. Of course, I have always wondered, why
Queens of all places? Carol Rose recently answered this question for me: Lots of Catholics, of
course.
2. MICHEL FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND
INTERVIEWS 148 (Donald F. Bouchard ed. &.Donald F. Bouchard & Sherry Simon trans., 1977)
[hereinafter FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE].
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not? I ask these questions in order to beg two more normative questions:
Why do we do so, and what happens to what we "know" once we have
done so? My curiosity derives from a concern that to call something sex-
ual is at once to say too much and not enough about the meaning of a
practice so named.
When men in a workplace make life intolerable for their female co-
workers by calling them sexual names, putting up pictures of naked
women, and touching their breasts and behinds, their conduct-unwel-
come conduct of a sexual nature-is legally described as sexual harass-
ment. When a group of male police officers viciously assault a man in
their custody by shoving a toilet plunger up his anus, those cops are
charged with aggravated sexual abuse. When an adult male forces a ten-
year-old boy to fellate him, this man is arrested for having sexually mo-
lested a minor. These offenses receive special legal regulation by our
civil and criminal laws as sexual misconduct. Yet the use of excessive
violence when placing handcuffs on a suspect, the aggressive use of
choke-holds, or chaining a stranger to a pipe in the basement-whatever
crimes these are, they are not sex crimes.
By focusing, often exclusively, on what we regard to be the sexual
aspect of conduct of this kind, we tend to ignore or eclipse the ways in
which sex operates "as an especially dense transfer point for relations of
power"3 -often gender, race, or sexual orientation-based power. For a
complex set of reasons, we almost intuitively label some behavior as
sexual-take workplace sexual harassment for instance. Yet, if pressed,
most people would not be able to either identify or defend a set of criteria
they apply in such nominalist moments. To uncover a satisfactory and
stable definition of sex is, to borrow an expression from Abraham Lin-
coln, like undertaking to shovel fleas: "You take up a shovelful, but be-
fore you can dump them anywhere they are gone."' It is the initial regu-
latory move, the marking of behavior as fundamentally sexual, that I
want to interrogate. If it is in fact true that "there is not some ahistorical
Stoff of sexuality, some sexual charge that can be simply added to a so-
cial relationship to 'sexualize' it in a constant and predictable direction,
or that splits off from it unchanged,"' then it is worth asking what we are
doing and what we are missing when we assume that such Stoff exists.
The questions I ask directly here are ones I first considered in my
earlier work on sexual harassment. In What's Wrong With Sexual Har-
assment?, I explored how workplace sexual harassment could be a spe-
3. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 103 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage
Books 1990) (1976) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY].
4. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 389 (1995). To be sure, in using this phrase, Lincoln
was not referring to sex but to the difficulty he was having in filling out the ranks of the Union Army
in 1862.
5. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, BETWEEN MEN: ENGLISH LITERATURE AND MALE
HOMOSOCIAL DESIRE 6 (1985).
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cies of sex discrimination.6 I criticized both courts and commentators
who identified the wrong of sexual harassment to lie in the sexual nature
of the conduct.7 Rather, I argued, sexual harassment must be understood
as a technology of sexism, that is, as a tool or instrument of gender
regulation which feminizes women as sexual objects and masculinizes
men as sexual subjects.8
In this article, I will push these insights about the use of sex as a
technology of sexism one step further by probing two more fundamental
questions: first, why certain practices get labeled as sexual, and second,
what flows from their being so designated. I will explore the ostensibly
denotative practice of naming particular behavior as primarily sexual in
nature by examining two contexts in which the label "sexual," under-
stood as erotic, occludes the way in which sex mediates other social re-
lations of power. In each setting, I argue that we make a grave mistake
when we interpret certain behavior as primarily erotic in nature. This
mistake, I will argue, is amplified in the legal treatment of these practices
as sex crimes, or sexual offenses. In Part II, I will look to ritualized prac-
tices in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea where boys as young as
seven are forced to fellate older men for a period of up to eight years as
part of the process of becoming a man. At first impression, most non-
native interpreters of ritualized man/boy fellatio conclude, without hesi-
tation, that this conduct is fundamentally erotic in nature9-how can it
not be so? In fact, Western anthropological readings of these practices
first described them as sodomy,' ° while today the behavior is most com-
monly referred to as ritualized or institutionalized homosexuality." I will
provide an alternative reading of the ritualized semen practices of the
Sambia that illustrates the way in which ingestion of semen is undertaken
primarily in the service of teaching and reinforcing the cultural power
and supremacy of both men and masculinity, while at the same time
teaching and reinforcing the cultural subordinancy and inferiority of
women and femininity. In this regard, semen practices play a role in Sam-
bia culture similar to that played by workplace sexual harassment in ours.
6. See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691
(1997).
7. Id. at 730-47.
8. Id. at 762-72.
9. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., F.E. WILLIAMS, PAPUANS OF THE TRANS-FLY 158 (1936).
11. See, e.g., GILBERT H. HERDT, GUARDIANS OF THE FLUTES 1 (1981) [hereinafter HERDT,
GUARDIANS OF THE FLUTES] ("Why should a society of manly warriors believe that a boy must be
orally inseminated to become masculine? What happens when this conviction is implemented
through prolonged ritualized homosexuality?"); Gilbert H. Herdt, Ritualized Homosexual Behavior
in the Male Cults of Melanesia, 1862-1983: An Introduction, in RITUALIZED HOMOSEXUALITY IN
MELANESIA 1 (Gilbert H. Herdt ed., 1984) [hereinafter Herdt, Ritualized Homosexual Behavior];
Gerald W. Creed, Sexual Subordination: Institutionalized Homosexuality and Social Control in
Melanesia, 23 ETHNOLOGY 157, 158 (1984).
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Next, in Part III, I examine the assault of Abner Louima, a black
man who was attacked by white New York City police officers in August
1997. Louima sustained serious injuries after several police officers se-
verely beat him, then forced the wooden handle of a toilet plunger into
his rectum, and then removed it and forced the soiled handle into
Louima's mouth. The sexual nature of the police conduct animated
much of the outrage expressed by the public, the press and legal authori-
ties in the weeks following the assault. Prosecutors initially charged the
white police officers arrested in connection with the assault of Louima
with sex crimes." Two aspects of this case are worthy of examination.
First, why should we consider this assault to be a sex crime? Secondly,
by reading the assault as being primarily sexual, important insights about
the way that sex is used as an instrument of gender- and race-based hu-
miliation and injury are elided or at least minimized.
Do these examples instruct that we best desexualize crimes like rape
and forced sex with children? There are compelling arguments in favor
of such a reformation of the laws regulating behavior traditionally treated
as sex crimes. Indeed, Michel Foucault made such an argument in the
mid-1970s.'4 Surely, the problems that inhere in the project of differenti-
ating sexual assault from a punch in the face suggest that one should give
serious consideration to the position that "there is no difference, in prin-
ciple, between sticking one's fist into someone's face or one's penis into
their sex."" Ultimately, however, I reject such a wholesale move given
that the material experience of sexual assault by its victims instructs that
"they cannot afford to jump into the realm of the ideal and pretend
that... sex (the genitals) is the same as other parts of the body."'6
Rather, I suggest a solution more retail in nature drawn from the experi-
ence of the prosecution of sex-related violence by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal has exer-
cised jurisdiction over the individual and mass rapes and sexual assaults
of women and men in the former Yugoslavia as violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law. Due in part to the provisions of international
law within the enforcement authority of the Tribunal, as well as to the
way in which sex-related violence was used to torture, humiliate, and
degrade civilians in Bosnia, the Tribunal has chosen not to focus exclu-
sively upon the sexual nature of these crimes." Instead, it treats sex-
12. E.g., Merrill Goozner, NYC Cut in Crime Has a Brutish Side, CHI. TRiB., Aug. 16, 1997,
at 1.
13. See id.
14. See discussion infra Part IV.
15. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE: INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1977-1984, at 200 (Lawrence D. Kritzman ed. & Alan Sheridan et al. trans., 1988)
[hereinafter FOUCAULT, POLITICS].
16. Vikki Bell, "Beyond the 'Thorny Question"': Feminism, Foucault and the Desexualisation
of Rape, 19 INT'L J. Soc. L. 83, 89 (1991).
17. See discussion infra Part V.
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related violence as the actus reus of torture, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. Thus, the Tribunal prosecutors have the ability, on a case-by-
case basis, to fashion their arguments in such a way that highlights the
gendered nature of these crimes, where appropriate, without perpetuating
the essentialization of certain body parts and human behaviors as funda-
mentally sexual. In this way, the Prosecutor has resisted the pull to char-
acterize the wrong of these violent acts as predominantly sexual in na-
ture, but rather, has demonstrated how sex can be used as a tool in the
service of race, ethnicity, or religion-based war crimes.
Through these examples, I hope to illustrate the productivity of sex;
that is, how sex gets put to work in the service of myriad power relations.
Sometimes sex is used to satisfy erotic desire. Sometimes sex accom-
plishes reproduction. Sometimes it does both. But, as Robin West re-
cently pointed out to me in conversations about this topic, "much repro-
ductive hetero-sex is non-erotic." Sometimes sex pays the rent. Some-
times it sells cars, cigarettes, alcohol, or vacations in Mexico. Sometimes
sex is used to subordinate, or has the effect of subordinating, another
person on the basis of gender or race, or both.
To understand sex as a fundamentally erotic drive, and as a "natural
given which power tries to hold in check [e.g., the prosecution of sex
crimes], or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to
uncover"'" (e.g., anthropological discoveries of primitive homosexuality),
is to risk two grave errors. First, once something is classified as sexual
we understand its meaning primarily in erotic terms and lose sight of the
ways in which sex is easily deployed as an instrumentality of multiple
relations of power. Second, we are likely to understand the erotic to be
present in too few human behaviors insofar as we deny or ignore the role
of the erotic in behavior less susceptible to being read as "sexual."
II. SEMINAL/SEXUAL PRACTICES
In Guardians of the Flutes,9 anthropologist Gilbert Herdt provided
an initial monograph of what he terms "ritualized homosexuality" among
the Sambia, a tribe in the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea.' For
the Sambia, the process of becoming a man is not one that may be left to
nature, as is the case with girls, but must be accomplished by the ritual-
ized intervention of culture.' Thus, beginning at around age seven, boys
18. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3, at 105.
19. HERDT, GUARDIANS OF THE FLUTES, supra note 11.
20. Herdt provides the name "Sambia" as a pseudonym for the tribe's true name, in order to
"protect the identities of those who trusted [him] and to guard the community's ritual cult, which
still remains a secretive way of life in the strict sense of the term. Sambia men explicitly stipulated
that no part of [his] originalmaterial be allowed to circulate within Papua New Guinea." Id. at xvi.
21. Herdt summarized the Sambia beliefs as follows:
Femininity is thought to be an inherent development in a girl's continuous association
with her mother. Masculinity, on the other hand, is not an intrinsic result of maleness; it
is an achievement distinct from the mere endowment of male genitals. Masculine
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commence a process of ritualized masculinization that is completed only
when a young man fathers a child." This process begins with a series of
ritualized practices designed to purge the polluting and feminizing ef-
fects of contact with women from the male body. Herdt terms these
"egestive rites" designed to "remove internal, essentially 'foreign' mate-
rial believed acquired through intimate, prolonged contact with one's
mother (and other females)."23
Boys are first required to undergo cane-swallowing," whereby canes
are forced down their throats so as to induce vomiting and defecation,
thereby purging food belonging to the mother from the male body-a
necessary prerequisite for masculinization. Secondly, nose-bleeding is
undertaken to remove the pollution of menstrual blood remaining in the
male body. Stiff, sharp grasses are thrust into the boy's nose until blood
flows, thereby removing the "bad blood" from his body. 6 It is a matter of
"urgent concern that the mother's contaminated blood be removed from
boys; otherwise male biological development is impeded." 7 Men alone
conduct these rituals, keeping them hidden from women in the commu-
nity; to effectuate this, the boys are sworn to secrecy."
Next follow the "ingestive rites";29 this is where all the attention is
paid by those intrigued by the practices of this culture. "The most im-
portant early ingestive rite of all," according to Herdt, is that of fellatio.
Sambia men believe that without the daily ingestion of semen, a boy's
body will not mature into that of a man, and he may likely wither and
die.' Thus,
[r]epeated inseminations create a pool of maleness: the boy, it is
believed, gradually acquires a reservoir of sperm inside his semen or-
gan .... The semen organ changes from being dry and hard to fleshy,
moist, and then fir..... Semen gradually transforms the initiate's
body too. It internally strengthens his bones and builds muscles.
reproductive maturity must be artificially induced, by means of strict adherence to ritual
techniques.
Id. at 160.
22. Id. at 204-05.
23. Id. at 223.
24. Herdt observes that cane-swallowing was abandoned sometime around 1964 because it
was too painful. See id. at 223 & n.29.
25. See id. at 224.
26. Id. at 224-25.
27. Id. at 226.
28. Id. at 262-65.
29. "Ingestive rites" involve the practice of swallowing and absorbing substances believed
essential in effectuating masculine growth. See id. at 227.
30. Id. at 232.
3 1. Id. at 234.
32. Id. at 236.
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According to these beliefs, boys must avoid all interaction with women,
including their mothers, and must fellate older men on a daily basis until
they reach adolescence, about the age of fifteen, at which time they
switch roles and are fellated by younger boys.33 These bachelors, as Herdt
calls them, are fellated by initiates until the woman they marry begins
menstruation. ' At that point, Sambia culture dictates that they cease
same-sex seminal practices and engage only in heterosexual coitus.3
Again, males closely hold these ingestive rites as secret; indeed, the men
threaten the boys with death should they reveal any of this information to
women.
36
Thus you have what Herdt describes as "ritualized homosexuality."
Herdt is careful not to describe the Sambia as homosexual. 7 In fact, it is
the distinction between homosexual practices and homosexual identity
that constitutes the central conundrum of Sambia culture for Herdt. How
is it that "[s]even-to-ten-year-old Sambia boys are taken from their
mothers when first initiated into the male cult, and thereafter experience
the most powerful and seductive homosexual fellatio activities," yet
"they emerge as competent, exclusively heterosexual adults, not homo-
sexuals"? 38 The boys "experience [ritualized fellatio] as pleasurable and
erotically exciting. Yet, in spite of this formidable background, the final
outcome is exclusive heterosexuality ... It is precisely because "ho-
mosexual behavior" amongst the Sambia men can be explained neither
by genetic determinism nor social learning theory, that Herdt finds the
Sambia so fascinating.' According to what theory of sexual identity ac-
quisition can "normal" adult heterosexuality evolve out of ritualized
childhood same-sex sex?
Initial accounts of Sambia culture by Western anthropologists sim-
ply failed to mention the same-sex seminal practices described above."
Herdt, among other anthropologists, attributed this omission to a larger
refusal within anthropology to regard sexuality as a legitimate subject of
ethnographic inquiry. 2 In Papua New Guinea, this oversight quickly
33. Id. at 252; see also id. at 281-82 (noting an interim stage when boys approaching puberty
take an active role in motivating younger boys to join them as fellators).
34. Id. at 252.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 233.




40. See id. at 8.
41. See Herdt, Ritualized Homosexual Behavior, supra note 11, at 2 (citing a number of early
Melanesian studies that ignored same-sex seminal practices).
42. See id. at 3 (recognizing that, as of 1984, "sex remains one of the 'taboo' subjects in
anthropology"); Kath Weston, Lesbian/Gay Studies in the House of Anthropology, 22 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 339, 339 (1993) ("Throughout the first half of the century, most allusions by
anthropologists to homosexual behavior remained as veiled in ambiguity and as couched in
judgment as were references to homosexuality in the dominant discourse of the surrounding
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yielded to revulsion and condemnation by Western anthropologists, ac-
companied by aggressive efforts by missionaries to dissuade the locals
from such perversion."3 Indeed, many of the practices Herdt observed in
his early field work no longer persist in Sambia culture.' Herdt, however,
was one of the first Western observers to encounter the Sambia practices
and declare: Look, homosexuality. Hallelujah, we are everywhere! Thus,
with The Guardians of the Flutes,4" his edited collections,' and subse-
quent writings on the Sambia,'7 Herdt has "established a framework for
the study of homosexualities cross-culturally."" Through the scientific
lens of anthropology, Herdt has, therefore, undertaken the task of shed-
ding light upon the "obscure domain" of the homo-sex drive in New
Guinea.
From virtually all vantage points, commentators have interpreted
Sambia semen practices as both erotic and homosexual, that is, as homo-
erotic.49 How could one deny the sexual nature of fellatio? Or the homoe-
rotic nature of fellatio between men? It is this way of knowing these
practices that I want to contest. From the perspective of the fellated, fel-
latio involves arousal, penile erection, ejaculation-surely this practice is
about the bachelors "getting off." Herdt's field work documents the fact
that the bachelors truly enjoy and seek out sex with boys.Y0 Similarly, the
boys seem to enjoy, to varying degrees, their "erotic relationships" with
society."). Herdt attributed three additional factors to this failure: (1) a lack of data; (2) "the
tendency for writers still to view homosexual behavior as universally deviant, unnatural, or
perverse;" and (3) the use of authorities viewing only heterosexuality as "normal." Herdt, Ritualized
Homosexual Behavior, supra note 11, at 3.
43. See Gilbert Herdt, Representations of Homosexuality: An Essay on Cultural Ontology and
Historical Comparison Part I1, 1 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 603, 607 (1991) [hereinafter Herdt,
Representations of Homosexuality] (addressing the negative response of white missionaries,
government officers, and Western agents to the "boy-inseminating man").
44. See id. at 607-08 (1991). One must wonder how Herdt's published work may have
contributed to the extinction of the very practices he set out to document.
45. HERDT, GUARDIANS OF THE FLUTES, supra note 11.
46. RrrUALIZED HOMOSEXUALITY IN MELANESIA, supra note 11 (collection of articles
addressing same-sex sexual practices within different societies in the South Pacific region); RITUALS
OF MANHOOD: MALE INITIATION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1982) (analyzing male
maturation rites in Papua New Guinea).
47. GILBERT HERDT, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT CULTURES: GAYS AND LESBIANS ACROSS
CULTURES 81-88, 112-23 (1997) [hereinafter HERDT, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT CULTURES].
48. Deborah A. Elliston, Erotic Anthropology: "Ritualized Homosexuality" in Melanesia and
Beyond, 22 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 848, 848 (1995).
49. See, e.g., Herdt, Representations of Homosexuality, supra note 43, at 606-07.
50. Herdt observes: "[M]en are not simply biding time by fooling around with initiates. Boys
were their first erotic partners. For this reason, and other personality factors, bachelors are
sometimes passionately fond of particular boys." HERDT, GUARDIANS OF THE FLUTES, supra note
11, at 288.
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the bachelors.' For this reason, Herdt is willing to characterize some of
these unions as "lover relationships."52
Herdt finds Sambia culture an interesting subject of ethnographic
study because of its exotic manifestation of the erotic, while others
would, no doubt, be aghast at the way in which adult men sexually ex-
ploit young boys. The ritualized nature of the practice merely compounds
the sexual violation. Just as I have cautioned against understanding
workplace sexual harassment as a fundamentally sexual activity,53 so too
there is danger in interpreting Sambia semen practices as fundamentally
erotic. Deborah Elliston has argued that "[t]o identify the man-boy 'ho-
mosexual' practices as 'ritualized homosexuality' imputes a Western
model of sexuality to these Melanesian practices, one that relies on
Western ideas about gender, erotics, and personhood, and that ultimately
obscures the meanings that hold for these practices in Melanesia. '
Among the interesting questions to be posed in analyzing semen
practices among the Sambia are those regarding the purpose of these
practices. Is the fellatio undertaken in the service of satisfying individual
erotic desire, or in the service of advancing broader cultural norms which
have, no doubt, a sexual component? Herdt poses this question,"5 and
ultimately determines to maintain the centrality of the erotic in his inter-
pretation of Sambia initiation rituals.56 He expresses concern about eth-
nographies that tend to "ignore, dismiss, trivialize, or even invalidate the
actor's homoerotic meanings and desires."57 He is determined not to "de-
odorize the erotic and peripheralize the homoerotic ontology."58 Herdt is
not alone in this concern. Gerald Creed, while expressing some criticisms
with respect to Herdt's interpretations of Sambia culture, echoes a com-
mitment to keep a focus on the erotic: "[T]he actual physical and erotic
aspects of homosexuality ... are often overlooked when it is treated as
institutionalized behavior. Institutionalized homosexuality is still sex and
it may still serve a pleasurable function. Analyses that neglect this fact
are incomplete." 9
It is exactly this "homoerotic ontology" that concerns me. Why
should we assume that the central meaning of Sambia initiation practices
51. See id. at 282, 319; Herdt, Representations of Homosexuality, supra note 43, at 611
(discussing the protections and bonds that may develop between bachelors and boys).
52. Herdt, Representations of Homosexuality, supra note 43, at 611.
53. See Franke, supra note 6, at 729-47.
54. Elliston, supra note 48, at 849.
55. See Herdt, Representations of Homosexuality, supra note 43, at 603 ("[D]o boy-
inseminating relationships, one must wonder, express erotic desire?").
56. Herdt recognizes and rejects two interpretative trends which largely dismiss the erotic
nature of Melanesian homosexuality. The first trend treats such practices as "purely customary ritual
practice." Id. at 606. The second approach acknowledges the erotic element, but interprets it as a
form of bisexuality. Id. at 607.
57. Id. at 606-07.
58. Id. at 607.
59. Creed, supra note 11, at 160.
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is sexual, that is, erotic? To ask this question thoughtfully requires the
category "sexual" to be broken down into constitutive parts. To describe
the semen practices as homoerotic, as Herdt and Creed insist, is to col-
lapse several important concepts that deserve disaggregation. For Herdt,
one must understand the male erection as the product of arousal, and
arousal must be defined in erotic terms.' Yet men can become aroused
such that they achieve penile erections for a spectrum of reasons inde-
pendent of an erotic response to another person or situation.6' It has been
well documented that men can have erections associated with non-sexual
fear, sleep, full bladders, violence, and power." Alfred Kinsey observed
that for boys, erection and ejaculation are easily induced by "non-sexual"
sources such as carnival rides, fast bicycle rides, sitting in warm sand,
setting a field afire, war motion pictures, being chased by police, hearing
the national anthem, and my personal favorite, seeing one's name in
print.'3 Kinsey concluded, however, that by the late teens males have
been conditioned to respond primarily to "direct physical stimulation of
the genitalia, or to psychic situations that are specifically sexual."' Not-
withstanding this general conditioning, "a romantic context is not a nec-
essary condition for sexual arousal, in either men or women."' 5
Therefore, there is reason to question interpretive strategies that
tend to essentialize certain bodily responses, such as the male erection, as
fundamentally erotic or romantic in nature. To the extent that "Herdt
posits a tautologous ordering of eroticism that makes penile erection
contingent on a kind of arousal that is by definition erotic,"' he is mak-
ing just this mistake in interpreting Sambia culture.
Similarly, I want to resist the inclination to essentialize certain sex-
ual practices as undertaken principally to satisfy erotic desire. Of course,
60. See Herdt, Representations of Homosexuality, supra note 43, at 613 ("It is a necessary
redundancy to say that without sexual excitement-as signified by erections in the inspirer and
bawdy enthusiasm in the inspired boy-these social practices would not only lie beyond the erotic
but, more elementarily, would not exist.").
61. As noted by Thorkil Vanggaard:
It appears, then, that emotions and impulses other than erotic ones may cause
erection and genital activity in men; just as, in the baboon, mounting and penetrating to
show superiority, or sitting on guard with legs apart and penis threateningly exposed
show erection of an asexual origin .... The same will probably have been the case with
the Bronze Age people of Scandanavia-or of northern Italy for that matter-since they
equated phallic power with the power of the spear, the sword and the axe, as we can see
from their petroglyphs.
THORKIL VANGGAARD, PHALL6S: A SYMBOL AND ITS HISTORY IN THE MALE WORLD 102 (Thorkil
Vanggaard trans., Int'l Univs. Press, Inc. 1972).
62. See, e.g., RON LANGEVIN, SEXUAL STRANDS: UNDERSTANDING AND TREATING SEXUAL
ANOMOLIES IN MEN 8 (1983); Joost Dekker & Walter Everaerd, Psychological Determinants of
Sexual Arousal: A Review, 27 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 353, 361 (1989).
63. ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 164-65 (1948).
64. Id. at 165.
65. Dekker & Everaerd, supra note 62, at 361.
66. Elliston, supra note 48, at 854.
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this issue arises in what I have elsewhere described as "the ongoing in-
tramural debate within feminism about whether rape should be under-
stood as a crime of violence or sex."67 Rather than consider the question
of sex and power in relation to rape in antinomous terms, consider the
following examples. In ancient Rome, when a husband caught another
man in bed with his wife, it was acceptable punishment for the husband
and/or his male slaves to orally or anally rape the male offender.68 So too,
oral and anal rape were used as a punishment in medieval Persia for
various crimes.' While it is possible that the person administering the
punishment in these circumstances derived some erotic satisfaction from
these practices, to characterize them as fundamentally erotic in nature is
to radically pervert their meaning. Of course, I don't mean to imply that
practices of this kind are subject to "correct" interpretations, since they
do not possess meaning independent of interpretation. However, I do
think some interpretations better reflect the ways in which the practices
are understood by the participants, the significance they hold in the cul-
tures in which they take place, and the unique ways in which sex can be a
powerful tool to inflict myriad forms of harm."
Thus, I want to challenge the inclination to declare man/boy fellatio
in Melanesia a principally homoerotic practice. Rather, I prefer that we
understand these activities not as homoerotic or homosexual, but as ho-
mosocial. Like Eve Sedgwick, I believe that the descriptor homosocial
provides better purchase on the relation between and among men in
Sambia society.7' Rather than reduce that relation to the erotic, to de-
scribe it as homosocial leaves room for the role of the erotic while rec-
ognizing the "range of ways in which sexuality functions as a signifier"72
for and instrument in the enforcement of power relations. The work that
sex does can be and often is at once symbolic and material, productive
and reproductive, pleasurable and dangerous. Close examination of the
Sambia male initiation rituals reveals that semen practices function sym-
bolically, metonymically, and literally in the transmission of an ideology
of gendered power.
67. Franke, supra note 6, at 740.
68. See AMY RICHLIN, THE GARDEN OF PRIAPUS: SEXUALITY AND AGGRESSION IN ROMAN
HUMOR 215, 256 (rev. ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1983).
69. See VANGGAARD, supra note 61, at 101 ("'A favourite Persian punishment for strangers
caught in the Harem or Gynieceum is to strip and throw them and expose them to the embraces of
the grooms and Negro slaves."' (quoting RICHARD BURTON, THOUSAND NIGHTS AND A NIGHT,
Terminal Essay X, at 235 (1885))).
70. As Michel Foucault noted: "Sexuality is not the most intractable element in power
relations, but rather one of these endowed with the greatest instrumentality: useful for the greatest
number of maneuvers and capable of serving as a point of support, as a linchpin, for the most varied
strategies." FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3, at 103.
71. See SEDGWICK, supra note 5, at 5 (recognizing that aspects of the Sambia culture fit
within her "homosocial continuum").
72. Id. at 7.
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Rather than evidencing the expression of man-boy love or desire,
ritualized semen practices amongst the Sambia must be understood rela-
tive to their location to larger gender norms in their society. Sambia cul-
ture is fundamentally sexually polarized and sexually segregated.7 Strict
divisions of labor and ritual taboos regulating physical contact between
the sexes are in evidence throughout the culture.74 From the time when
boys are first isolated from all women at about seven years old, they are
taught to disparage women as dangerous creatures whose body fluids can
pollute men and deplete their masculine substance.75 Women are fre-
quently referred to as-"dirty polluter," 6 and men engage in purification
rites after coitus, such as nose-bleeding, so as to rid their bodies of fe-
male contamination.7 So dangerous is the threat of pollution from
women that public" and private79 spaces are strictly sex-segregated.
During the initiation process, men teach boys the reality of the threat that
women pose to both maleness and masculinity.
Accompanying the notions of female danger for Sambia are con-
comitant beliefs about the tremendous material and symbolic power and
value of semen. According to Herdt and Stoller, "[s]emen is the most
precious human fluid[,] . . . more precious than even mother's milk." 80
Semen is related to human reproduction and growth in several ways.
First, men orally inseminate their wives prior to conception, believing
that the semen prepares the wife's body for making babies, as well as for
lactation when the semen is converted into milk.81 After oral insemina-
tion, the couple engages in repeated vaginal insemination, depositing
semen into the woman's womb where it is transformed into a fetus. Mul-
73. One clear example of this polarization is found in the many spatial segregations evidenced
by the Sambia culture. The male "clubhouse," site of many of the masculinization rites, is off limits
to women. See HERDT, GUARDIANS OF THE FLUTES, supra note 11, at 74-75. Similarly, female
"menstrual huts" are strictly avoided by men. See id. at 75. This spatial segregation operates in many
other areas including domiciles and footpaths. See id. at 75-76.
74. See id. at 28-29.
75. HERDT, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT CULTURES, supra note 47, at 113.
76. HERDT, GUARDIANS OF THE FLUTES, supra note 11, at 162.
77. Id. at 244-45.
78. Herdt observed that, in the Sambia culture:
Men hold that women may pollute them by simply "stepping over"..., above, or beside
them, or by touching persons, food, or possessions. During their menstrual periods
women leave their houses and retire to the menstrual hut, which is situated slightly below
the hamlet. Men and initiates completely avoid the area of the hut. Likewise, women
must not walk near the men's clubhouse or look inside.
Id. at 75.
79. Domestic arrangements are also organized around the danger of male pollution by women.
Upon entering a house, women immediately must squat near the doorway to the house, thereby
reducing the possibility of transferring her polluting fluids to men in the house. See id. at 75-76.
80. GILBERT HERDT & ROBERT J. STOLLER, INTIMATE COMMUNICATIONS: EROTICS AND THE
STUDY OF CULTURE 60 (1990).
81. Id. at 62.
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tiple inseminations are necessary for this evolution to come off since the
creation of a baby requires a critical mass of semen.82
Semen is also necessary for human growth. Thus, "[ilnitial growth
for every fetus occurs through semen accumulation."83 Babies grow from
the ingestion of breast milk-the Sambia believe women's breasts trans-
form semen into milk.' After weaning, young girls continue to grow on
their own due to the presence of female blood in their systems. Growth in
boys however, requires daily ingestion of semen in order to develop their
skin, bones, and male features. 5
Thus, the Sambia is a highly sex-stratified culture in which men are
superior to and vilify women and in which men exclusively possess the
elixir necessary for human reproduction and growth. In light of the cen-
tral role that semen plays in the Sambia gender-based belief system, it
would be careless to understand the transmission of semen, either be-
tween males or between males and females, solely or even primarily as
an erotic practice. Given that fellatio between men and boys is explicitly
undertaken to effect the transformation of boys from a feminized to a
masculinized state, and is part of a larger indoctrination process whereby
the boys learn of and internalize gender norms premised upon male supe-
riority, the integrity of an interpretation of these practices that under-
stands them as primarily erotic in nature is quite questionable. In effect,
semen practices are both the lubricant that facilitates and the glue that
adheres the representational ideal of male superiority and female inferi-
ority.
In his later writings on the Sambia, Herdt reflects a sensitivity to the
critique that he has made the most grave of ethnographic errors-the
imposition of his own notions of sexual identity on his subjects:
But what is it-attraction to the boy, excess libido, power, exhibi-
tionism, fantasies of nurturance, and so on-that arouses the adult
male? And is his younger partner also aroused? Should we represent
the nature of these desires as homoerotic, not homosexual-that is, as
form of desire and not just of social conformity to a sex role? 6
Yet even here, in interrogating the "meaning" of same-sex semen prac-
tices among the Sambia, Herdt's gaze remains transfixed by what he
regards as the brute fact of homoerotic arousal. Again, he rejects any
interpretation that "peripheralizes the homoerotic ontology."87
82. See id. at 63. Interestingly enough, more semen is necessary to make a girl than a boy. See
id. at 64.
83. Id. at 65.
84. Id. at 62.
85. Id.; see supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent nature of female
maturation versus the artificial nature of male maturation in the Sambia belief structure).
86. Herdt, Representations of Homosexuality, supra note 43, at 605-06.
87. Id. at 607.
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To be fair, Herdt does acknowledge the role that "ritualized homo-
sexuality" plays in the masculinization of boys as they become initiated
into "the whole male sexual culture."88 But he fails to see the indispensa-
ble relation masculinity bears to misogyny and gender hierarchy within
Sambia culture. Herdt's insistent focus on Sambia homoeroticism denies
him the opportunity to appreciate the degree to which notions of the su-
periority of men and the inferiority of women are mutually constitutive
within the Sambia culture. Deborah Elliston describes these practices as
traumatic lessons in social hierarchy for the initiates .... [R]itual
teachings about men's and women's differences inculcate among men
a generalized suspicion and fear of women while simultaneously ex-
alting men's abilities and supremacy; together these teachings instan-
tiate a gender hierarchy. 9
To represent their man/boy semen practices as being only about male
sexuality or only about men elides the systemic nature of sex and gender
norms as regulatory ideals amongst Sambia men and women.
Rather than homosexual in nature, Sambia man/boy semen practices
are better understood as homosocial. Sedgwick would term them the
product of male homosocial desire rather than male homosexuality.' The
drape of male homosociality extends beyond the domain of the erotic to
other bonds and norms of social identity that regulate inherited privilege,
patriarchal power structures, and the enduring inequality of power be-
tween women and between men. Lauren Berlant made a similar observa-
tion in her reading of Nella Larson's Passing,91 a story about the intimate
and intense interactions of two light-skinned women of African descent.'
Berlant resisted a reading of the text that characterized it as "a classically
closeted narrative, half-concealing the erotics between Clare and Irene."'93
Rather, according to Berlant, "there may be a difference between want-
88. HERDT, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT CULTURES, supra note 47, at 121.
89. Elliston, supra note 48, at 855.
90. See SEDGWICK, supra note 5, at 1. As Sedgwick describes:
"Male homosocial desire" is intended to mark both discriminations and paradoxes.
"Homosocial desire," to begin with, is a kind of oxymoron. "Homosocial" is a word
occasionally used in history and the social sciences, where it describes social bonds
between persons of the same sex; it is a neologism, obviously formed by analogy with
"homosexual," and just as obviously meant to be distinguished from "homosexual." In
fact, it is applied to such activities as "male bonding," which may, as in our society, be
characterized by intense homophobia, fear and hatred of homosexuality. To draw the
"homosocial" back into the orbit of "desire," of the potentially erotic, then, is to
hypothesize the potential unbrokenness of a continuum between homosocial and
homosexual.
Id.
91. Nella Larson, Passing, in QUICKSAND AND PASSING 135 (Deborah E. McDowell ed.,
1986).
92. See id. at 149-61.
93. Lauren Berlant, National Brands/National Body: Imitation of Life, in COMPARATIVE
AMERICAN IDENTITITES: RACE, SEX, AND NATIONALITY IN THE MODERN TEXT 110, 111 (Hortense
J. Spillers ed., 1991).
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ing someone sexually and wanting someone's body." For the women in
Larson's story, and for the Sambia boys, perhaps the best way to under-
stand their desire for a more privileged person of the same sex is as "a
desire to occupy, to experience the privileges of [the other's] body, not to
love or make love to her [or him], but rather to wear her [or his] way of
wearing her [or his] body, like a prosthesis, or a fetish."9s The concealed
erotics that mediate the race-envy in Passing are made literal among the
Sambia: the swallowing of semen is necessary for the boy to become a
man-for the initiates to occupy adult male bodies. Thus the homosocial
as a frame accommodates both the erotic and the gender-generative sig-
nificance of the Sambia ritualized semen practices. To label the desire
underlying the semen practices homosocial rather than homosexual is to
situate desire within these interlocking social bonds in such a way that
the erotic does not eclipse other relations of power.
Herdt observes the Sambia and represents the same-sex semen
practices as fundamentally homoerotic, thereby neglecting the role these
practices play in both the creation and maintenance of male supremacy in
Sambia culture. If it is true across cultures that "[t]he body requires in-
cessant ritual work to be maintained in its sociocultural form,"' then we
must acknowledge the ways in which sexual practices produce not only
sexual identity, but corporal and social identity as well. "[T]he sutures of
[social identity] become most visible under the disassembling eye of an
alternative narrative, ideological as that narrative may itself be."' Thus,
the man/boy semen practices of the Sambia, while astonishing at first,
provide an instructive opportunity to challenge the inclination to essen-
tialize certain practices as erotic. I turn next to a less exotic, although no
less astonishing, incident which further illustrates the danger in essen-
tializing certain behavior as sexual/erotic. The Sambia and the assault of
Abner Louima both illustrate how the classification of practices as sexual
holds the danger of obfuscating how sex "both epitomizes and itself in-
fluences broader social relations of power."'98
I1. ANAL/SEXUAL PRACTICES
On the night of August 9, 1997, Abner Louima was leaving the
Rendez-Vous, a nightclub in Brooklyn popular among Haitian immi-
grants in New York, when the police arrived to break up a fight that had
broken out between club patrons." "The white cops started with some
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. T.O. BEIDELMAN, THE COOL KNIFE: IMAGERY OF GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND MORAL
EDUCATION IN KAGURU INITIATION RrruAL 244 (1997).
97. SEDGWICK, supra note 5, at 15.
98. Id. at 13.
99. E.g., Goozner, supra note 12, at 1.
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racial stuff," Louima later reported."" "They said, 'Why do you people
come to this country if you can't speak English?' They called us nig-
gers.""'' One police officer believed Louima had knocked him down
during the altercation.' 2 The officer later declared, "No one jumps me
and gets away with it.""'3 Officers pushed Louima to the ground, hand-
cuffed him, and delivered him to the 70th Precinct-beating him se-
verely on the way." Louima was charged with disorderly conduct, ob-
structing governmental administration, and resisting arrest."'5
Once at the stationhouse officers strip-searched Louima in a public
area, and with his pants down,"6 took him into the men's room where
they brutally assaulted him:
My pants were down at my ankles, in full view of the other cops.
They walked me over to the bathroom and closed the door. There
were two cops. One said, "You niggers have to learn to respect police
officers." The other one said, "If you yell or make any noise, I will
kill you." Then one held me and the other one stuck the [wooden
handle of a toilet] plunger up my behind. He pulled it out and shoved
it in my mouth, broke my teeth and said, "That's your s-t, nigger."
Later, when they called the ambulance, the cop told me, "If you ever
tell anyone... I will kill you and your family."' 7
Louima was then taken to a jail cell, and only after other prisoners
complained that he was bleeding did the police call for an ambulance."'8
Louima required surgery to repair a pierced lower intestine and a torn
100. Mike McAlary, The Frightful Whisperings from a Coney Island Hospital Bed, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 2 (quoting Abner Louima as Louima lay in his hospital bed four days after
the attack).
101. Id.
102. See Richard Goldstein, What's Sex Got To Do With It? The Assault of Abner Louima May
Have Been Attempted Murder. But It Was Also Rape., VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 2, 1997, at 57; Tom
Hays, Haitian's Beating May Have Been Case of Mistaken Identity, Punch, ARIZ. REPuBLIC, Aug.
22, 1997, at All (reporting that witnesses claimed another individual, not Louima, threw the punch
against Officer Volpe).
103. Report: Officer Boasted After Attack, UPI, Aug. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File (reporting the alleged statement of Justin Volpe, New York City police officer).
104. David Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at BI ("[Tihe officers became furious when he protested his arrest, twice
stopping the patrol car to beat him with their fists."); McAlary, supra note 100, at 2.
105. Kocieniewski, supra note 104, at Bi.
106. Louima recounted the incident to a newspaper as follows:
"The cops pulled down my pants in front of the desk sergeant."... "They marched you
naked across the precinct?' "Yes." "There were other cops around?" "Yes. There was the
sergeant and other cops. They saw." "And they said nothing?" "I kept screaming, 'Why?
Why?' All the cops heard me, but said nothing." "What they said to me I'll never forget.
In public, one says, 'You niggers have to learn how to respect police officers."'
Mike McAlary, Victim and City Deeply Scarred, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 14, 1997, at 4 (quoting
interview with Abner Louima).
107. McAlary, supra note 100, at 2.
108. Kocieniewski, supra note 104, at B1.
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bladder."w He remained in the hospital for two months recovering from
the injuries he sustained from the police officers at the 70th Precinct. 0
It took a short while for the media to learn of this vicious assault,
yet once they did the headlines screamed: Police Sodomize Suspect;.'
Suspect Claims Police Raped Him with Plunger;.. Officer Accused of
Sexually Brutalizing Suspect Arrested."3 Members of the Haitian com-
munity marched in protest against this outrageous form of police brutal-
ity, waving toilet plungers and carrying signs declaring the cops to be
"Criminals," "Perverts," "Rapists.' '. l A retired transit police officer who
attended the march exclaimed: "That's a foul and sordid act they per-
formed on that man.""' 5 Mayor Giuliani exclaimed that the attack inside
the 70th Precinct station was "personally repulsive to him""' 6 and that the
cops charged with the assault were "perverted.""' 7 Immediately after, the
assault, several police officers who were associated with Justin Volpe,
one of the officers charged with assaulting Louima, claimed that the
Rendez-Vous was a gay club and that Louima's injuries stemmed from
violent anal sex he had engaged in while at the club."8 When the two
police officers arrested in connection with the assault appeared for their
arraignment, courthouse protesters taunted the cops by calling them
"faggots." 19 The district attorney charged the officers with aggravated
sexual abuse and first-degree assault, both class B felonies for which
they could receive a maximum sentence of 24 years. Only later was the
109. See Tom Hayes, Officer Accused of Sexually Brutalizing Suspect Arrested, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 13, 1997, at 1 (as reproduced by a number of newspapers).
110. See Louima Starts on Long Road Back, NEWSDAY, Oct. 12, 1997, at A39.
111. J. Zamgba Browne, Police Sodomize Suspect: The Tale of Torture at 70th Precinct, N.Y.
AMSTERDAM NEWS, Aug. 20, 1997, at 1.
112. Suspect Claims Police Raped Him with Plunger, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 14, 1997, at A13.
113. Hayes, supra note 109, at 1; see also New York Officer Surrenders in Sexual Assault on
Immigrant, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at A18; Cop Surrenders on Sexual Brutality Charges, SAN
DIEGO UNION & TRIE., Aug. 14, 1997, at A12.
114. See Vinette K. Pryce, A Week of Outrage, Pain and Celebration, N.Y. AMSTERDAM
NEWS, Sept. 10, 1997, at 1 (containing photograph of protester at march shown holding sign saying
"Criminals, Perverts, Rapists").
115. Charles Baillou, Marchers Blast Police Barbarism at City Hall, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS,
Sept. 10, 1997, at 8.
116. David Firestone, Giuliani's Quandary: Mayor Who Linked Name to Police Success Is Now
Facing a Very Ugly Police Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at Al.
117. The press reported that, during the assault of Louima at the 70th precinct, one of the
officers said: "This is Giuliani time, not Dinkins time." Eleanor Randolph, In Police Abuse Case,
Giuliani's Balance Tested, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1997, at Al. But see Carolina Gonzalez & Bill
Hutchinson, Sharpton Promises He'll Defend Louima, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 1998, at 8
(reporting that Louima now is unsure of whether the officer actually made this statement). Mayor
Giuliani provided a quite interesting response to reports of the officer's alleged comment: "The
remark is as perverted as the alleged act." Randolph, supra, at Al.
118. John Sullivan, New Charges Filed in Police Brutality Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at
B3.
119. Goldstein, supra note 102, at 57.
120. See Goozner, supra note 99, at 1; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1998)
(first degree assault); id. § 130.70 (first degree aggravated sexual abuse).
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indictment amended to include aggravated harassment, a racial bias
crime for which the maximum sentence is, interestingly enough, only
four years.2
It was precisely the sexual aspect of this assault that provoked jour-
nalists to grant Louima the moniker: "America's most famous victim of
police brutality since Rodney King."'22 Sure, the police get carried away
from time to time," shoot at fleeing suspects when deadly force isn't
called for,24 choke a suspect to death with a choke hold," or even rape
female prostitutes in a brothel they had raided.'26 But, as Village Voice
journalist Richard Goldstein observed, "None of these documented cases
arouse the outrage of this 'barbaric' act, which . . . is only supposed to
happen in the Third World. Here in the land of the free, when it comes to
police brutality, we draw the line at raping a man."'2
That this crime is heinous cannot be denied, but is it best character-
ized as a sex crime? What exactly was sexual about this assault? As
Goldstein asked: "What's Sex Got To Do With It?'' " Virtually every re-
port of the case mentions early in the article that Louima is married and
has children, and nightly news broadcasts regularly showed pictures of
Louima and his family in the days following the assault.9 What is more,
the assailants were portrayed as healthy heterosexuals by the media.
So why call it a sex crime? The easy answer is tautological: The
allegations fit the description of crimes so labeled."' But what is a sex
crime? There are several ways in which to differentiate a sexual assault
from an assault simpliciter: (i) it is motivated by the erotic desire of the
perpetrator; (ii) it involves contact with the perpetrator's or the victim's
121. See 2 NYC Officers Get New Charge in Haitian's Beating, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1997,
at A8; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (first degree aggravated harassment).
122. Mike McAlary, Home Sweet Heartache: Love Alone Won't Aid Louima in Brooklyn, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 1997, at 3.
123. A New York City commission report provides two examples:
One officer from a Brooklyn North precinct told us how he and his colleagues once threw
a bucket of ammonia in the face of an individual detained in a precinct holding pen.
Another cooperating officer told us how he and his colleagues threw garbage and then
boiling water on a person hiding from them in a dumbwaiter shaft.
CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE
ANTI-CORR UPrON PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, COMMISSION REPORT 47 (1997)
[hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT].
124. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 37-54 (1996).
125. See id. at 26.
126. See id. at 47.
127. Goldstein, supra note 102, at 57 (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Charles Baillou, Angry Haitians March at the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, N.Y.
AMSTERDAM NEWS, Aug. 27, 1997, at 1; Nightline: The Blue Wall, Police Brutality and Police
Silence (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 22, 1997).
130. See, e.g., infra note 136 (providing the N.Y. Penal Code's definition of first degree
aggravated sexual abuse).
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sexual body parts (e.g., vagina, breasts, or penis) or involves acts which
are typically regarded as sexual (e.g., kissing, fellatio, sexual inter-
course); or (iii) it is experienced as sexual by the victim.
The New York Penal Law defines criminal sexual offenses"' to be
rape,3 ' sodomy, 33 sexual misconduct,' 3' sexual abuse,3 aggravated sexual
abuse, 36 and course of sexual conduct against a child.' 37 Two of these
crimes explicitly anchor the crime's sexual nature, in whole or in part, in
the satisfaction of sexual desire: criminal sexual abuse and course of
sexual conduct against a child. The Penal Law defines criminal sexual
abuse as sexual contact with another person by force or when the person
is incapable of granting consent. 138 Course of conduct against a child is
committed when, among other things, a person engages in aggravated
sexual contact with a child less than 11 years old.'39 As a foundation for
these two violations, the Penal Code defines "sexual contact" as "any
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to
the actorfor the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party.""
131. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.00-.85 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1998) (listing New York's
sex offenses).
132. Id. §§ 130.25-35.
133. Id. §§ 130.38-50.
134. The New York Penal Law defines sexual misconduct as:
1. Being a male, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female without her consent; or
2. He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person without the latter's
consent; or
3. He engages in sexual conduct with an animal or a dead human body.
Id. § 130.20. "Deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as "sexual conduct between persons not
married to each other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and penis, or
the mouth and the vulva." Id. § 130.00(2).
135. Id. §§ 130.55-.65. As set forth in the New York Penal Law, first degree sexual abuse
occurs when:
[A person] subjects another person to sexual contact:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or
3. When the other person is less than eleven years old.
Id. § 130.65.
136. First degree aggravated sexual abuse occurs when:
[A person] inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis or rectum of another
person causing physical injury to such person:
(a) By forcible compulsion; or
(b) When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically
helpless; or
(c) When the other person is less than eleven years old.
Id. § 130.70(1).
137. First degree course of sexual conduct against a child occurs when "over a period of time
not less than three months in duration, [a person] engages in two or more acts of sexual conduct,
which includes at least one act of sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or aggravated sexual
contact, with a child less than eleven years old." Id. § 130.75; see also id. § 130.80 (second degree
course of sexual conduct against a child).
138. Id. § 130.65.
139. See supra note 137.
140. N4.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(3) (emphasis added). In its entirety, "sexual contact" means:
[A]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor
for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. It includes the touching of the
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But since the satisfaction of sexual desire must be accomplished by
touching sexual or intimate parts, it must be those parts that make this
conduct a sex crime. Yet what are sexual or other intimate parts? Courts
have found the chest,'' the upper leg,12 the leg,'4 3 the mouth,'" and the
navel'4 5 to be "sexual or intimate parts" for purposes of the criminal sex-
ual abuse statute. Further, it has been established that "'intimate parts' is
much broader than the term 'sexual parts"' and that "intimacy ... must
be viewed within the context in which the contact takes place .... [A]
body part which might be intimate in one context, might not be intimate
in another."'" So really, any body part could be considered a sexual or
intimate body part depending upon the context. Thus, it appears that it is
the perpetrator's erotic desire that sexualizes the body part, thus making
contact with that body part a sex crime.
But it cannot be the perpetrator's desire that sets some crimes apart
as sex crimes. Sexual misconduct, rape, sodomy, and aggravated sexual
abuse are all premised upon penetration of the vagina, rectum, or
mouth.' 7 The satisfaction of sexual desire is irrelevant to these crimes.
So, at least for purposes of the criminal law, these body parts are essen-
tially sexual, thus rendering crimes involving them, ipso facto, sex
crimes.
The Sex Offender Registration Act,' 8 New York's version of "Me-
gan's Law,"'4 9 provides a salient example of the power of law to label or
mark certain behavior as sexual exogenously. In New York, persons who
have been convicted of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, aggravated sexual
abuse, incest, sexual performance by a child, unlawful imprisonment, or
kidnapping of a person under 17 years old are subject to the notification
and registration provisions of the New York Sex Offender Registration
Act.' The last two categories, unlawful imprisonment and kidnapping of
actor by the victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or
through clothing.
Id.
141. See People v. Cammarere, 611 N.Y.S.2d 682, 684 (App. Div. 1984).
142. See People v. Gray, 607 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1994).
143. See People v. Graydon, 492 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (Crim. Ct. 1985).
144. See People v. Rondon, 579 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320-21 (Crim. Ct. 1992); People v. Rivera, 525
N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
145. See People v. Belfrom, 475 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
146. Rivera, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
147. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 1998) (necessary element of sexual
misconduct is sexual intercourse which is defined as "its ordinary meaning and occur[ing] upon any
penetration, however slight" pursuant to id. § 130.00(1)); id. § 130.35 (necessary element of rape is
sexual intercourse as defined supra); id. § 130.50 (necessary element of sodomy is sexual
intercourse as defined supra); id. § 130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse requires "insert[ion] of a foreign
object in the vagina, urethra, penis, or rectum of another person").
148. N.Y. CORRECr. LAW §§ 168-168-V (McKinney Supp. 1998).
149. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995 & 1998).
150. New York law requires the registration of "sex offenders." N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-b.
The statute defines "sex offender" as a person convicted of certain enumerated offenses. See id. §
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a person under 17 years old, in no way require the crime to have been
sexual in nature, yet the law labels persons convicted of these crimes sex
offenders.'"' What is more, parents of the person imprisoned or kidnapped
are specifically exempt from the notification law'52-the presumption
being that no parent would kidnap or imprison their own child for sexual
reasons. This is, of course, a demonstrably false premise.
This brief tour through the New York penal law illustrates that those
behaviors labeled sex crimes bear, at best, a family resemblance to one
another. The answer to the question-What makes something a sex
crime?-is not revealed in the positive law itself. Instead, a complex set
of interpretive moves are required to ascribe a sexual nature to the be-
havior. Some of the symbolic work is done endogenously by one or both
of the parties involved, and some of it is done exogenously by those who
act as public interpreters of the behavior-prosecutors, judges and juries.
But in all cases, that which makes the crime sexual "is a discursive for-
mation ... not a fact or property of the body."'53
So what rendered the assault of Abner Louima a sex crime? Of
course, the penetration of his rectum. But why? Surely we would not
want to ground the sexual nature of the crime in the erotic pleasure, la-
tent or otherwise, that the officers received from performing this act. Mr.
Louima certainly did not experience this assault as erotic. Nor would we
want to say that the violent insertion of a wooden handle in a person's
rectum is intrinsically a sexual act, or that any act involving a rectum is
to be so construed.
Nevertheless, most people would want to say that there was some-
thing particularly wrong with this assault that distinguishes it from an
equally violent punch in the face or a kick in the ribs. Justin Volpe, the
police officer charged with principal responsibility for Louima's injuries,
was quoted as having said to other cops on the night of the assault: "I had
to break a man. '' "M In this comment lies the key for understanding the
power and the wrong of the assault on Louima. I suggest that the power
of the assault principally lies not in its sexual nature, simpliciter, but in
the unique way that it humiliated Louima as a black man. For white men,
168-a(1) (referencing the offenses listed in section 168-a(2), (3)). These enumerated offenses consist
of those crimes listed in the text accompanying this note. See id. § 168-a(2), (3).
151. Under the New York penal code, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree occurs
when "[a] person ... restrains another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.05. First degree unlawful
imprisonment must meet this definition plus "expose the [victim] to a risk of serious physical
injury." Id. § 135.10. Kidnapping in the second degree occurs when "[a] person.., abducts another
person." Id. § 135.20 First degree kidnapping must meet this definition plus include one of a number
of other circumstances including: death, intent to extract a ransom, or restraint for more than twelve
hours with intent to "[i]nflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually." Id. §
135.25.
152. Id. § 135.15 (unlawful imprisonment); id. § 135.30 (kidnapping).
153. Bell, supra note 16, at 86 (attributing this argument to Michel Foucault).
154. See Goldstein, supra note 102, at 57.
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particularly white police officers, to assault a black man anally is one of
the most powerful ways to assault black masculinity. Tragically, Louima
is not the first man to experience this kind of assault. At least six black
men, all immigrants, have complained that a white police officer ab-
ducted them, took them to an isolated place in Queens, and anally raped
them at gunpoint.' The victims and witnesses report that the cop threat-
ened them with death if they spoke to the authorities about these
assaults.' What distinguished Louima's assault from other incidents of
police violence was not that it was sexual, but that the police officers got
caught.
A preoccupation with the supposedly sexual nature of these assaults
deflects attention away from the gender and race-based nature of this
crime. Here we have an example of what is commonly thought to be a
sexual act being used as an instrument of gender- and race-based terror.'"
One cannot understand the meaning of this conduct without taking into
account its gender- and race-based significance. To view it as primarily
sexual is to make the same mistake as that made by Herdt in Melane-
sia-it is to essentialize certain conduct and body parts as sexual, and to
occlude the ways in which "the sexual" can be deployed as the instru-
mentality by which other forms of power and supremacy are cultivated.'58
After all, the Louima incident began with a police officer telling him,
"You niggers have to learn to respect police officers."'59
What is more, hyper-sexualizing the Louima assault carries the ad-
ditional danger of normalizing other violent police practices because they
aren't sexually barbaric. Recall Richard Goldstein's observation:
"[W]hen it comes to police brutality, we draw the line at raping a man.""
Other non-sexual forms of police violence may be regrettable, but many
155. Earl Caldwell, Police Sodomy in Queens: The Column the Daily News Killed, N.Y.
AMSTERDAM NEWS, Aug. 27, 1997, at 12 [hereinafter Caldwell, Police Sodomy in Queens]. The
"black" newspapers in New York reported these incidents at great length, but none of the "white"
papers have mentioned them. See Earl Caldwell, Earl Caldwell to the Daily News... 'I warned you.
You fired me.', N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Aug. 27, 1997, at 1 ("The major papers seemed to have a
blackout of the story. The [New York] Daily News had published nothing. The New York Times had
published no story either.").
156. Caldwell, Police Sodomy in Queens, supra note 155, at 12.
157. In a characteristically laconic passage in BELOVED, Toni Morrison depicts the acrid
humiliation suffered by African American men on a chain gang who are forced each morning by
white male guards to put on their own chains, kneel down in a row and fellate the guards on demand.
See TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 107-08 (1987). I read this passage not to be principally about the
expropriation of sex from African American men, but rather about the routine ways in which sexual
practices were used to degrade these prisoners.
158. See supra Part HI (discussing and rejecting Herdt's representation of seminal/sexual
practices in Papua New Guinea as primarily a function of homoeroticism).
159. See McAlary, supra note 100, at 2 (quoting Abner Louima's recollection of an officer's
statement just prior to the insertion of a plunger into Louima's anus).
160. See Goldstein, supra note 102, at 57.
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may view this behavior as a kind of police-based droit du seigneur.'61 In
fact, it may well be the case, as Goldstein argues, that there is a kind of
sadist satisfaction that accompanies the use of handcuffs, choke holds, or
other excessive methods of police restraint, such as hog-tying suspects.'62
To regard the Louima assault as the exception, where perverted cops
acted completely beyond the pale, "prevents us from imagining that cops
who specialize in [violent] tactics might find them exciting."'63 To over-
eroticize the treatment of Louima carries the danger of under-eroticizing
police tactics that do not involve penetration of a "sexual or intimate
body part."'" After all, since Kinsey suggested that young men can get
aroused by being chased by police," why shouldn't police get aroused
when running after suspects? Recent misconduct charges filed against a
police officer in Seattle lay bare the erotic potential of routine police
practices."'
Which, of course, prompts the most fundamental of questions: Is it
the sexual/erotic nature of any of these practices that makes them wrong?
For the most part, I think not. It seems to me that these incidents should
be analyzed in order to uncover the way in which the sexual/erotic oper-
ates as a particularly efficient and dangerous conduit with which to exer-
cise power. Thus, to say that the Louima assault was sexual is at once to
say too much and not enough about it. As Ana Ortiz has explained so
eloquently, this simple construction of the injury of Louima's assault
occludes the particularly gendered and raced salience of anal penetration
for a Caribbean Black man. "They have always taken us for this frail
and vulnerable community," said Tatiana Wah, a Haitian activist who
was one of the organizers of the march protesting the police assault of
Louima.'" The anal assault of Louima, performed not in private, but in
front of an audience of white cops on their turf, effectively enacted the
perceived frailness and vulnerability of Haitian men.
How best to avoid the erasure of racial- or gender-based subordina-
tion by and through the invocation of the sexual? In the section that fol-
161. Droit du seigneur, or "right of the lord," historically referred to "a supposed legal or
customary right at the time of a marriage whereby a feudal lord had sexual relations with a vassal's
bride on her wedding night." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 633 (1993).
162. Goldstein, supra note 102, at 57.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text (discussing the New York Penal Law's
definition, and subsequent judicial interpretations, of the term "sexual contact").
165. See KINSEY Er AL., supra note 63, at 164.
166. After flirting with a female bartender while on his break, a male police officer followed
her when she drove home from work, pulled her over and teasingly said, "Now you know what it's
gonna be like to be arrested." Ronald K. Fitten, County Officer Faces Charges of Misconduct,
SEArrtLE TimS, Oct. 24, 1998, at A7. "He then took her out of the car, handcuffed her, grabbed her
hair and pulled her head back and began to fondle her sexually." Id.
167. See Ana Ortiz, Remarks at the InterSEXionality Symposium, University of Denver
College of Law, Feb. 6, 1998 (transcript on file with Denver University Law Review).
168. Richard Goldstein & Jean Jean Pierre, Day of Outrage, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 9, 1997, at
44 (quoting Tatiana Wah).
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lows, I will consider the desexualization of sodomy, rape, and other as-
saults labeled sex crimes.
IV. THE DESEXUALIZATION OF VIOLENCE
Beginning with The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault devel-
oped a theory of the discursive truth of sex'" and, for present purposes, a
critical analysis of the means by which certain forms of knowledge-based
power are deployed such that sexuality gets anchored in certain parts of
the body.7 The examples I provide above from the New York Penal Law
illustrate quite well Foucault's point: The Penal Law does not merely
pick out the set of practices which are truly sexual in nature, but rather,
certain body parts or practices become sexual by virtue of their regula-
tion by law.'"' As a result, different parts of the body become attached to
different fields of knowledge: When we interrogate practices involving
the genitals we are, by definition, learning something sexual.
Shortly after the publication of The History of Sexuality, Foucault
entered into a set of discussions with feminists about rape.' 2 Given his
concerns about the dangers of punishing sexuality, Foucault poses the
question: "What should be said about rape?"'' In these conversations, he
urges the position that "when one punishes rape one should be punishing
physical violence and nothing but that.... [Ilt may be regarded as an act
of violence, possibly more serious, but of the same type, as that of
punching someone in the face.""'  Well, Foucault is unequivocally
weighing in on the violence side of the sex vs. violence debate among
feminists about the meaning of rape."
In response to the women who objected to his insistence upon de-
sexualizing rape, Foucault reveals his true concern. By making rape a
"sex" crime, we are once again anchoring sexuality in certain parts of the
body, and in so doing, "the body is discursively marked [thereby] con-
struct[ing] certain parts of the body as more important than others.""' 6 By
bestowing this "special" status upon parts of the body marked sexual,
"sexuality as such, in the body, has a preponderant place, the sexual or-
gan isn't like a hand, hair, or a nose. It therefore has to be protected, sur-
169. See FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3, at 57-63.
170. See id. at 152 ("Is 'sex' really the anchorage point that supports the manifestations of
sexuality, or is it not rather a complex idea that was formed inside the deployment of sexuality?").
171. See supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text (disscussing the New York Penal Law's
treatment of sex offenses).
172. See FOUCAULT, POLITICS, supra note 15, at 200-04; Bell, supra note 16, at 84-87.
173. FOUCAULT, POLITICS, supra note 15, at 200. Foucault sets up the discussion with the
provocative declaration that "in any case, sexuality can in no circumstances be the object of
punishment." Id.
174. Id. at 200-01.
175. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 6, at 740-44 (discussing the debate among feminists
concerning the proper meaning of rape-as a crime of violence or sex).
176. Bell, supra note 16, at 92.
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rounded, invested in any case with legislation that isn't that pertaining to
the rest of the body.""'
Many feminists would respond: So what's wrong with that? Sexual
assaults are different. Foucault's concern derives from the way in which
the deployment of sex in this fashion occludes the way in which power
operates on the body, "ordering it as it studies, organizing its movements
as it observes, categorizing as it probes. In this way, power, or
power/knowledge, produces our understanding of the body."'78 Thus, for
Foucault, sex is not a thing we have or do, but is instead a regulatory
ideal. Judith Butler expresses a similar interest in the ways in which
"sex" "produces the bodies it governs"'79 and in so doing, produces bod-
ies that matter, and bodies that don't. Wendy Brown pushes these Fou-
caultian insights in yet another direction, illuminating the danger of a
rights-based politic that is built upon the naturalization of identity which
is, in fact, the result of a regulatory ideal: "[D]isciplinary productions of
identity may become the site of rights struggles that naturalize and thus
entrench the powers of which those identities are the effects."'"
It is the regulatory power of sex that Foucault seeks to interrupt by
questioning the need to treat rape differently from a punch in the face. To
his mind, we stand to gain much and lose little by punishing the physical
violence of rape "without bringing in the fact that sexuality was in-
volved."''
For the most part, I find myself in agreement with Foucault's theo-
retical point, yet I think Monique Plaza is right when she argues that
women, in particular, cannot afford the jump into the realm of the ideal.' 2
While in principle, there is much to Foucault's suggestion that we treat
rape and "non-sexual" assault as crimes of violence, to recommend such
a change in the positive laws at this moment means that rape victims will
bear the transition costs of this representational reform. That is, rape vic-
tims will continue to experience rape as an assault to their sexual body
during the period in which the withdrawal of regulation by sex crime
laws transforms the way we know the body.
In order to reconcile the tension between the damage done by laws
that perpetuate "the sexual" as a regulatory ideal, and the cost to rape
victims of demanding that the law not recognize a sexual aspect to their
177. FOUCAULT, POLITICS, supra note 15, at 201-02.
178. Bell, supra note 16, at 87.
179. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATrER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 1 (1993).
In addressing Foucault's "regulatory ideal," Butler notes: "[S]ex not only functions as a norm, but is
part of a regulatory practice.., whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power,
the power to produce-demarcate, circulate, differentiate-the bodies it controls." Id.
180. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 120
(1995).
181. FOUCAULT, POLITICS, supra note 15, at 202.
182. Monique Plaza, Our Costs and Their Benefits, in MIF: A FEMINIST JOURNAL 28, 35
(1980).
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injury, I now turn to what I regard to be an example of a compromise
position-the recognition of sex-based violence as a violation of interna-
tional humanitarian law.
V. RAPE AND TORTURE
Between 1991 and 1995 an inter-ethnic, inter-religious war devas-
tated the country that had been known as Yugoslavia. Rape and sexual
assault have always been a part of war, but what happened "in Bosnia
and Herzegovina to Muslim and Croatian women seems unprecedented
in the history of war crimes. Women [were] raped by Serbian soldiers in
an organized and systematic way, as a planned crime to destroy a whole
Muslim population, to destroy a society's cultural, traditional and relig-
ious integrity."'' 3 Serbian soldiers were not the only ones accused of us-
ing rape and other sexual assault as an instrument of war in the former
Yugoslavia. Muslim and Croat soldiers as well have been found to have
engaged in sex-based atrocities in manners similar to those used by the
Serbs.' Never has this seemingly inevitable aspect of war been granted
the degree of international attention and consternation as have the atroci-
ties committed in the former Yugoslavia. In what came to be called eu-
phemistically as "ethnic cleansing," Serbs established camps that were
"set up for the purpose of rape [of Bosnian Muslim women] .. .to im-
pregnate the women."'" Furthermore, they detained pregnant women
until abortion was no longer an option.'" A U.N. Commission character-
ized this pattern of rape 8' as "part of a policy of 'ethnic cleansing."""
While mass executions of civilians also characterized the inhumanity that
lay at the core of this conflict, it was clear that both women and men
183. Slavenka Drakulic, Rape After Rape After Rape, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1992, §4, at 17.
184. See Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T (ICTY Nov. 16, 1998)
[hereinafter Celebici Judgment]. Seventy-eight suspects have been indicted by the tribunal. See
Charles Tmueheart, Bosnian Muslims, Croat Convicted of Atrocities Against Serbs, WASH. POST,
Nov. 17, 1998, at A34. The majority of those charged with committing war crimes are Bosnian
Serbs, and most of the tens of thousands of victims of the 1991-95 war were Croats and Muslims.
See id. However, "most of those indicted who have surrendered or been arrested are Muslims or
Croats; the tribunal's two convictions to date involved a Bosnian Serb and a Croat, and one Bosnian
Serb has confessed." Id. The indictment of Slobodan Milosovic, the Bosnian Serb leader, has yet to
result in his arrest.
185. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780,49th Sess. 248, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994)) [hereinafter Final Report].
186. Id.
187. The Final Report identified five patterns of rape, of which the rape camp for the purposes
of ethnic cleansing was one. Id. 244-45. Four other patterns were recognized: (1) rapes occurring
in conjunction with looting and intimidation, (2) rapes occurring in conjunction with fighting in the
area, (3) rapes at detention facilities, and (4) rapes at detention facilities established for the "sole
purpose of sexually entertaining soldiers." Id. gj 245-47, 249.
188. One Muslim woman was told that "she would give birth to a chetnik boy who would kill
Muslims when he grew up." Id. 249.
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were victims of sexual assault, as sex-related violence became "a weapon
of war"'89 in ways never seen before.
In response to enormous pressure placed upon the United Nations
from its member states as well as from international media, in May 1993
the U.N. Security Council established the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 ("ICTY" or the "Tribunal") with the "power to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991."'" Pursuant to the Statute of the International Tribunal ("Tribunal
Statute"), the Tribunal has authority to prosecute individuals who have
committed, among other things, (i) Grave Breaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949,'"' (ii) Violations of the Customs of War,'" (iii) Geno-
cide,'93 and (iv) Crimes Against Humanity.'" The Tribunal Statute spe-
cifically enumerates rape as a Crime Against Humanity when committed
in armed conflict and directed against any civilian population.'9" In his
report elaborating the specific grounds for Tribunal jurisdiction, the Sec-
retary General set forth that Crimes Against Humanity includes "torture
or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious
grounds."'" Specifically, the Secretary General declared that "[i]n the
conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, such inhumane acts
have taken the form of so-called 'ethnic cleansing' and widespread and
systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault, including forced pros-
titution."'9 7 Thus, in this Tribunal, rape and sexual assault were for the
first time to be prosecuted as serious violations of international
humanitarian law.9
189. Rape Becomes a Weapon of War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1993, § 4, at 4.
190. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, art. 1, at 36, U.N. Doc. S25704 (1993), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1163, 1192 (1993), available at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/i-bencon.htm> (visited Sept. 2,
1998) [hereinafter Tribunal Statute] (setting forth the Statute of the International Tribunal in the
annex), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th. Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993). Many documents from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
including the indictments and opinions discussed infra, are available from the ICTY homepage,
<http://www.un. org/icty/> (visited Sept. 20, 1998).
191. Tribunal Statute, supra note 190, art. 2, at 36.
192. Id. art. 3, at 37.
193. Id. art. 4, at 37.
194. Id. art. 5, at 38.
195. See id. art. 5(g), at 38.
196. Id. 148.
197. Id.
198. See Justice Richard Goldstone, The United Nations' War Crimes Tribunals: An
Assessment, 12 CONN. J. INr'L L. 227, 231 (1997) ("The ICTY is setting an important precedent in
respect to gender related crimes because it is the first time that systematic mass rape is ever being
charged and prosecuted as a war crime."); Jennifer Green et al., Affecting the Rules for the
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Since its creation in 1993, the Tribunal has investigated and prose-
cuted extreme forms of human cruelty and brutality, some of which were
sexual in nature. In interesting ways, the manner in which sexual vio-
lence is characterized by the Tribunal, as well as the particular provisions
of international human rights law that it has invoked to prosecute sex-
based violence, has evolved over this period. The changes occurring
within the Tribunal in this regard reflect an increasingly sophisticated
approach to the role that sex can play in the degradation, humiliation,
torture, and great suffering experienced by the victims of this horrible
war.
In May 1992, Serb forces were alleged to have rounded up and sent
to the Omarska Prison Camp roughly 3,000 Muslims and Croats, in par-
ticular intellectuals, professionals, and political leaders.'" Of these pris-
oners, approximately forty were women.m Conditions in Omarska were
horrible, and soldiers subjected many civilians "inside and outside the
camps to a campaign of terror which included killings, torture, sexual
assaults, and other physical and psychological abuse.""nl In February
1995, the Tribunal Prosecutor issued two separate indictments, the
Meakic indictment' and the Tadic indictment, 3 in connection with
atrocities committed by Serbian forces against Croat Muslims at Omar-
ska. Both indictments, commonly referred to as the Omarska indict-
ments, contained allegations of sexual violence-in the Meakic case
primarily by men against women, ' and in the Tadic case by men against
Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 173
& n.5 (1994). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, a sister United Nations war crimes
tribunal to the ICTY, has undertaken prosecution of similarly heinous sex-based atrocities
committed in 1994 during the ethnic war in Rwanda. On September 2, 1998, the Rwanda War
Crimes Tribunal issued a final judgment in which it determined that Jean-Paul Akayesu, a Hutu
official, was guilty of nine counts of genocide and crimes against humanity for having incited the
rape and sexual assault of Tutsi women. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T (ICTY Sept. 2, 1998), available at <http://www.un.org/ictr/englishljudgments/
akayesu.html> (visited Dec. 21, 1998).
199. See Prosecutor v. Meakic, Indictment, Case No. IT-95-4, I 1 (ICTY Feb. 13, 1995)
[hereinafter Meakic Indictment], reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1013, 1014.
200. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Second Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 2.3 (ICTY
Dec. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Second Amended Indictment], reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 915.
201. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 377 (ICTY May 7,
1997) [hereinafter Tadic-Opinion], excerpts reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 (exerpting paragraphs 1-12,
557-765 of the Opinion and paragraphs 1-14 of the Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute).
202. Meakic Indictment, supra note 199.
203. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Initial Indictment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (ICTY Feb. 13, 1995),
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1011, 1028 [hereinafter Tadic Initial Indictment]. The Tadic Initial Indictment
was amended twice. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, First Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (ICTY
Sept. 1, 1995); Tadic Second Amended Indictment, supra note 200; see also Tadic Opinion, supra
note 201, 36. Given the posture of the following argument, subsequent citations will be to the
initial indictment with pertinent alterations provided when necessary.
204. Meakic Indictment, supra note 199, 2.6, 22.1, 25.1, 26.1, 30.1.
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both women and men.'u The allegations of rape and sexual violence in
both cases are absolutely horrifying, yet as was typical for indictments
filed early in the Tribunal's tenure, the Prosecutor's juridical treatment of
these atrocities differed depending upon the sex of the victim.
In the Meakic indictment, the Prosecutor charged Serbian soldiers
with a number of violations of international humanitarian law. Among
them were charges that, between May and December 1992, Serbian sol-
diers had repeatedly raped female prisoners at Omarska.' Croatian
women were forcibly removed from their beds at night, taken to a room
downstairs, thrown on a table or on the floor and repeatedly raped, night
after night.' Young women between the ages of 12 and 19 were the most
vulnerable. A prisoner with medical training who was assigned to treat
and counsel many of the rape victims, testified before the Tribunal:
The very act of rape, in my opinion-I spoke to these people, I ob-
served their reactions-it had a terrible effect on them. They could,
perhaps, explain it to themselves when somebody steals something
from them, or even beatings or even some killings. Somehow they
sort of accepted it in some way, but when the rapes started they lost
all hope. Until then they had hope that this war could pass, that eve-
rything would quiet down. When the rapes started, everybody lost
hope, everybody in the camp, men and women. There was such fear,
horrible. 20'
For this conduct, the Prosecutor charged Serbian soldiers with,
among other things, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949
under Article 2(c) of the Tribunal Statute (wilfully causing great suffer-
ing or serious injury to body or health),2" Violations of the Laws or
Customs of War under Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute,"' and Crimes
Against Humanity under Article 5(g) (rape)."1 Contrast this construction
205. Tadic Initial Indictment, supra note 203, In 4.1, 5.1. The charges associated with
paragraph 4.1 were ultimately withdrawn at trial. See Tadic Opinion, supra note 201, 1 37 (noting
the withdrawal of the charges associated with paragraph 5 of the Second Amended Indictment which
corresponds to paragraph 4.1 of the Initial Indictment).
206. Meakic Indictment, supra note 199,E 922.1-22.16, 25.1-25.4, 26.1-26.4,30.1-30.4.
207. See id. 122.1; see also Tadic Opinion, supra note 201,91 165 ("Women who were held at
Omarska were routinely called out of their rooms at night and raped. One witness testified that she
was taken out five times and raped and after each rape she was beaten.").
208. Tadic Opinion, supra note 201,1 175.
209. Meakic Indictment, supra note 199, V 22.2, 22.5, 22.8, 22.11, 22.14, 25.2, 26.2, 30.2.
Article 2(c) of the Tribunal Statute, entitled Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
authorizes the International Tribunal to prosecute individuals for "wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health." Tribunal Statute, supra note 190, art. 2(c), at 36.
210. Meakic Indictment, supra note 199, 1 22.3, 22.6, 22.9, 22.12, 22.15, 25.3, 26.3, 30.3.
Article 3, Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, provides a non-exclusive set of violations
relating to suffering or destruction imposed upon civilians or civilian property. See Tribunal Statute,
supra note 190, art. 3, at 37.
211. Meakic Indictment, supra note 199, W91 22.4, 22.7, 22.10, 22.13, 22.16, 25.4, 26.4, 30.4.
Article 5(g), Crimes Against Humanity, authorizes the prosecution of rape. Tribunal Statute, supra
note 190, art. 5(g), at 38.
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of the nature of the injury with the charges filed in connection with the
torture of men at the Omarska camp. According to the indictment, Serb
soldiers fatally beat male prisoners for using Muslim expressions," '
stripped male prisoners to their underwear, kicked them in the testicles,
and beat them in the ribs until they became unconscious."3 Soldiers or-
dered other prisoners to drink water like animals from puddles on the
ground and later discharged a fire extinguisher into the mouths of those
prisoners."' Like the prosecutions involving female victims, the Prose-
cutor charged offending soldiers with Grave Breaches under Article 2(c)
(wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health)," '
and Violations of the Law or Customs of War under Article 3.216 But in-
stead of charging a violation of Article 5(g) (rape), the Prosecutor alleged
a Crime Against Humanity for "other inhumane acts" under Article
5(i).
217
Thus, the torture and humiliation of female prisoners by raping them
was prosecuted as "wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health" and rape, but the torture and humiliation of male prison-
ers, even when it involved the genitals, was prosecuted as "wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" and the resid-
ual category for "other inhumane acts." This differential is even greater
exemplified by the indictment in the Tadic case.
The Tadic prosecution relates to the well-publicized atrocities
committed against Muslim Croats at Omarska. As in the Meakic indict-
ment, the Tadic indictment includes allegations of sexual and non-sexual
violence against civilian prisoners in the camp. Just as in the Meakic
indictment, in the allegations relating to the rape of a woman "F" at
Omarska, the defendant is charged with committing a Crime Against
Humanity under Article 5(g) (rape) of the Tribunal Statute. ' However,
the charges associated with sexual violence involving men exemplifies a
different approach. The Tribunal found that the defendants beat a male
prisoner named Harambasic, after which they ordered two male prisoners
212. Meakic Indictment, supra note 199, 27.1.
213. Id. 129.1.
214. Id. 31.1.
215. Id. V 29.2, 31.2.
216. Id. 71 29.4, 31.4.
217. See id. 91 29.4, 31.4. Article 5(i), Crimes Against Humanity, authorizes prosecution for
"other inhumane acts." Tribunal Statute, supra note 190, art. 5(i), at 38.
218. Compare Tadic Initial Indictment, supra note 203, 11 4.1-.4 (charging violations of
Article 2(c) (wilfully causing great suffering), Article 3, and Article 5(g) (rape)), with Meakic
Indictment, supra note 199, H1 22.1-.4 (charging the same violations). The amended Tadic
indictments substituted a violation of Article 2(b) (inhuman treatment) for the initial Article 2(c)
(wilfully causing great suffering) charge of the Tadic Initial Indictment. See Tadic Second Amended
Indictment, supra note 200, 1 5, count 2. The charges associated with this rape of a woman were
eventually dropped at trial. See Tadic Opinion, supra note 201, 1 37 (noting the withdrawal of the
charges associated with paragraph 5 of the Second Amended Indictment which corresponds to
paragraph 4.1 of the initial indictment).
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to lick his buttocks and suck his penis, and then to bite his testicles."9 As
stated by the Tribunal:
Meanwhile a group of men in uniform stood around the inspection pit
watching and shouting to bite harder .... Witness H was threatened
with a knife that both his eyes would be cut out if he did not hold Fi-
kret Harambasic's mouth closed to prevent him from screaming; G
was then made to lie between the naked Fikret Harambasic's legs
and, while the latter struggled, hit and bit his genitals. G then bit off
one of Fikret Harambasic's testicles and spat it out and was told he
was free to leave. . . . Harambasic has not been seen or heard of
since.'2
For this conduct, the Prosecutor charged Tadic with a Grave Breach un-
der Article 2(b) (torture or inhuman treatment),2 2 ' a Violation of the Laws
or Customs of War under Article 3 (cruel treatment),222 and a Crime
Against Humanity under Article 5(i) (other inhumane acts) of the Tribu-
nal Statute. 3 Although the Presiding Judge at turns referred to the above-
described conduct as a sexual assault ' and sexual mutilation,2" Tadic
was not charged with violating Article 5(g) of the Statute (rape), even
though the conduct included forced fellatio and other sex-based violence.
Five months after issuing the indictments in the Tadic and Meakic
cases, the Tribunal issued five more indictments,2" three of which con-
tained allegations of sex-related violence. 7 These indictments evidence
an evolution in the form in which the Prosecutor's office drafted its
219. Tadic Initial Indictment, supra note 203, 5.1; see also Tadic Second Amended
Indictment, supra note 200, 6.
220. Tadic Opinion, supra note 201,91206.
221. Tadic Initial Indictment, supra note 203,19i5.29, 5.32.
222. Id. U 5.21, 5.24.
223. Id. (1 5.31, 5.34. In the amended indictments, Tadic was charged with, among other
things, violations of Article 2(b) (torture or inhuman treatment), Article 2(c) (wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body and health), Article 3 (cruel treatment), and Article 5(i)
(inhumane acts). See Tadic Second Amended Indictment, supra note 200, 1 6, counts 8-11. Tadic
was eventually found guilty of violating Articles 3 and 5(i) of the Tribunal Statute, but the Tribunal
found the evidence did not overcome the reasonable doubt standard for the Article 2 charges. See
Tadic Opinion, supra note 201, 9i 237, 719-30.
224. See Tadic Opinion, supra note 201, 1 222, 231.
225. See id. 945,231.
226. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5 (ICTY July 25, 1995); Prosecutor v. Martic,
Case No. IT-95-1 1 (ICTY July 25, 1995); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Indictment, Case No. IT-95-8, 1 19
(ICTY July 21, 1995) [hereinafter Karaterm Indictment]; Prosecutor v. Miljkovic, Indictment, Case
No. IT-95-9, 91 31 (ICTY July 21, 1995) [hereinafter Bosanski Samac Indictment]; Prosecutor v.
Jelisic, Indictment, Case No. IT-95-10 (ICTY July 21, 1995) [Brcko Initial Indictment], amended by
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-95-10-PT (ICTY Mar. 3, 1998) [hereinafter
Brcko First Amended Indictment] and Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Second Amended Indictment, IT-95-10-
PT (ICTY Oct. 19, 1998).
227. See Karaterm Indictment, supra note 226, IN 19, 20 (forcing victims to engage in fellatio);
Bosanski Samac Indictment, supra note 226, 91 31 (forcing two individuals to "perform sexual acts
on each other"); Brcko Indictment, supra note 226, 91 33 (forcing two brothers to "perform sexual
acts on each other").
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pleadings, as well as a shift in the substantive manner in which atrocities
involving rape, forced sex, and other forms of sex-related torture were
prosecuted. These changes better represent, to my mind, the complex
ways in which sex figured in the torture, humiliation, and inhumane
treatment of both women and men in the war in the former Yugoslavia.
What is more, the approach now used by the Prosecutor's office in deal-
ing with sex-related violence, shaped in no small part by the work of
Tribunal adviser for gender-related issues, Patricia Sellers,"8 provides a
helpful model as an alternative to the more essentializing and static ways
in which the New York Penal Law, for instance, categorizes certain be-
havior as a sex crime. 9
While sex-related atrocities make up a significant part of the Prose-
cutor's docket, they are not prosecuted as sex crimes per se, but instead
as the actus reus of other crimes, such as Crimes Against Humanity,
Grave Breaches, Genocide, or Violations of the Laws and Customs of
War. This mode of charging these crimes, together with the Tribunal's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence that reflect a sensitivity to the unique
issues that arise in the prosecution of sex-related violence,230 make for a
juridical structure that at once acknowledges the way in which sex oper-
ates as "an especially dense transfer point for relations of power '2 ' with-
out over-sexualizing rape and other sexual violence.
In the indictments issued in July 1995, the Prosecutor's office for
the first time adopted the use of headings within which various counts
were organized, such as, "Genocide," "Killing of [X]," "Torture of [Y],"
"Beatings of [Z]," and "Sexual Assault. ' 2 These headings represent not
only a change in form, but an evolution in the substantive manner in
228. Formerly Legal Advisor for Gender-Related Crimes at the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and now ICTY prosecutor in the Hague.
229. See supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text (discussing New York penal law's
treatment of sex crimes).
230. See INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991: RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 96, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.13 (1998) [hereinafter TRIBUNAL RULES OF PROCEDURE], reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 484, 535
(1994), available at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/revl3e.htm> (visited Sept. 2, 1998). Rule 96
of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure, "Evidence in Cases of Sexual Assault" states:
In cases of sexual assault:
(i) no corroboration of the victim's testimony shall be required;
(ii) consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim
(a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence,
duress, detention or psychological oppression, or
(b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so
subjected, threatened or put in fear;
(iii) before evidence of the victim's consent is admitted, the accused shall satisfy the Trial
Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible;
(iv) prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence.
Id.
231. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SExUALITY, supra note 3, at 103.
232. See, e.g., Brcko Indictment, supra note 226.
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which the Tribunal prosecuted sex-based violence. The Brcko indict-
ment, for instance, charged that Ranko Cesic forced two brothers at gun-
point, "to beat each other and perform sexual acts on each other in the
presence of others, causing them great humiliation and degradation." '233
For this conduct, the Prosecutor charged Cesic with a violation of Article
2(b) (inhuman treatment), Article 3 (humiliating and degrading treat-
ment) and Article 5(g) (rape, which includes other forms of sexual as-
sault) of the Tribunal Statute.2" Two important changes are worth noting
in this indictment. First, Crimes Against Humanity as set forth in Article
5(g) was interpreted for the first time to include not only rape, but also
"other forms of sexual assault."235 Second, the sexual assault of a man by
a man was determined to constitute a sexual assault within the meaning
of Article 5(g) rather than a generalized inhumane act under Article 5(i).
36
In a separate indictment issued in July 1995, in connection with
atrocities committed in the town of Bosanski Samac, Serbian soldiers
were charged with forcing two male prisoners "to perform sexual acts
upon each other in the presence of several other prisoners and guards.2 37
For these allegations the Tribunal indicted the accused under the same
violations of humanitarian law as the Brcko defendants-among other
things, Crimes Against Humanity under Article 5(g) (rape, which in-
cludes other forms of sexual assault).238
In two indictments issued in 1996, the Prosecutor developed an even
more refined approach to the prosecution of conduct that included some
233. Id. 133.
234. Id. 1 33, counts 50-52. The Amended Indictment, issued March 3, 1998, eliminated the
Article 2(b) charge. See Brcko Amended Indictment, supra note 226, 32, counts 34-35.
235. Brcko Initial Indictment, supra note 226, 33, count 52 (charging a "Crime Against
Humanity recognized by Article 5(g) (rape, which includes other forms of sexual assault) of the
Tribunal Statute").
236. The reform of indictment policy evidenced in the Brcko indictment, however, was not
consistently implemented by the Prosecutor's office. Compare id. (charging violation of Article 5(g)
(rape, which includes other forms of sexual assault) when defendants allegedly forced two brothers
to perform sexual acts on each other), with Tadic Initial Indictment, supra note 203, E 5.1, 5.31,
5.34 (charging violation of Article 5(i) (other inhuman acts) when defendants forced two individuals
to "lick [a victim's] buttocks and genitals and then to sexually mutilate [the victim]"). In another
indictment issued the same day as the Brcko indictment, the Prosecutor charged several Serbian
soldiers with forcing a man to engage in "degrading, humiliating and/or painful acts, such as lying
on broken glass, repeatedly jumping from a truck, and engaging in fellatio." Karaterm Indictment,
supra note 226, 19. For this conduct, the defendants were charged with committing great suffering
under Article 2(c), cruel treatment under Article 3, and inhumane acts under Article 5(i), but not rape
or sexual assault under Article 5(g). See id. 19.2.1-.2.3. Male soldiers were similarly charged in a
separate count for forcing a male prisoner to run while carrying a heavy machine gun and to engage
in fellatio. Id. 1 20. The Karaterm indictment did not contain the subject headings contained in the
Brcko and other indictments issued in July 1995.
237. Bosanski Samac Indictment, supra note 226, 1 31.
238. Like the Brcko defendants, the Bosanski Samac defendents were charged with a Grave
Breach under Article 2(b) (inhuman treatment), Violation of the Laws or Customs of War under
Article 3 (humiliating and degrading treatment), and a Crime Against Humanity under Article 5(g)
(rape, which includes other forms of sexual assault). Id. 31, counts 36-38; see supra note 234
(describing the charges against the Brcko defendants, including subsequent amendments).
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degree of sex-related violence. Continuing the use of subject headings in
the indictments, in March 1996, the Prosecutor issued an indictment in
connection with atrocities committed in a camp in the village of
Celebici."' One allegation charges that Hazim Delic, the commander of
the Celebici camp, forced a female prisoner to repeated forcible sexual
intercourse, sometimes in public and other times by more than one
rapist."' In a separate allegation, he was charged with raping another
female prisoner during her first interrogation, and then every few days
for the next six weeks.2 ' For these actions, Delic was charged with a
Grave Breach under Article 2(b) (torture), and Violations of the Laws
and Customs of War under Article 3 (torture) and (cruel treatment)." 2
This is the first time that the ICTY Prosecutor characterized sex-related
violence against either a man or a woman, as torture, not rape.'"
Further, the Tribunal issued an indictment in June 1996 in which
rape, sexual enslavement, and other forms of sexual assault made up the
central focus of the charges.2 In the Foca indictment, the Tribunal de-
scribed how, between April and July 1992, soldiers detained young and
adult Muslim women of the town of Foca in houses, athletic fields, the
local high school, detention centers, apartments, and houses. " Both indi-
viduals and groups of Serbian soldiers systematically raped, tortured, and
humiliated these women.2" On several occasions, the soldiers told
women, while raping them, that they would give birth to Serbian
babies," and in one case, that her body "would be found in five different
countries if she told anyone that he had raped her."' In addition, the
indictment describes how many Muslim women were enslaved in houses
and apartments converted into "rape camps," and were subjected to




242. Id. 24, counts 18-20; id. 25, counts 21-23.
243. It is very possible that the Prosecutor did not include a charge of Crime Against Humanity
under Article 5(g) (rape) because she did not feel that she had sufficient evidence to prove that the
rapes were committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on
national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.
244. Prosecutor v. Gagovic, Indictment, Case No. IT-96-23 (ICTY June 26, 1995) [hereinafter
Foca Indictment].
245. Id. (N 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 9.1, 10.1, 11.1, 12.1.
246. One victim was gang-raped for three hours by at least fifteen men, then sexually abused in
"all possible ways," including having a soldier threaten to cut off her breast with a knife. Id. 9.10.
Another victim was gang-raped by at least eight men, during which time one man bit her nipples to
the point of bleeding, and then another squeezed and pinched her breasts while he raped her. She
then lost consciousness from the pain. Id. 1 9.11. While one other victim was being raped by a male
soldier, the soldier threatened to cut off her arms and legs and take her to church to be baptized. Id.
9.15.
247. Id. IN 9.3, 9.13.
248. Id. 8.1.
249. For the use of the term, see AMNESTY INT'L, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: RAPES AND SEXUAL
ABUSE BY THE ARMED FORCES 10-12 (1993); Roy Gutman, Rape Camps: Evidence Serb Leaders in
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rape and other sexual assaults continually." ° These women were also
forced to perform domestic duties for the Serbian soldiers such as cook-
ing, laundry, and cleaning,"l and were bought and sold by Serbian and
Montenegrin soldiers."
The Prosecutor indicted eight Serbs for these crimes.53 Where
women were alleged to have been raped and tortured individually, rather
than in "rape camps," the Prosecutor placed the allegations under the
heading "Torture and Rape" and charged the defendants with Grave
Breaches under Article 2(b) (torture), Violations of the Laws or Customs
of War under Article 3 (torture) and Crimes Against Humanity under
Article 5(f) (torture) and 5(g) (rape).' Allegations of rape, with no addi-
tional allegations of actual or threatened violence, such as cutting or bit-
ing, appeared under the heading "Rape" and the defendants were charged
only with a Crime Against Humanity under Article 5(g) (rape), but not
with a Grave Breach (torture). 5 Finally, allegations involving "rape
camps," appeared under the heading "Enslavement and Rape," and the
Prosecutor charged the defendants with Crimes Against Humanity under
Article 5(c) (enslavement) and 5(g) (rape), Grave Breach under Article
2(b) (inhumane treatment), and Violations of the Laws and Customs of
War under Article 3 (outrages to personal dignity)."s Why this conduct
was not characterized as torture is curious. Similarly puzzling is the
prosecutor's decision in the Foca indictment to abandon the descriptions
of acts charged under Article 5(g) as "rape, which includes other forms
of sexual assault."
Finally, in the Kovacevic indictment, 7 the Prosecutor charged two
Serbian officials with Genocide in connection with the torture of Muslim
men and women in the towns of Prijedor and Banja Luka." While the
indictment enumerated the rape and torture of women and girls by sub-
ordinates of the named defendants, they were not charged with rape un-
der Article 5(g), but rather with Genocide under Articles 4 and 7.9 The
indictment was later amended to charge the defendants with crimes
Bosnia OKd Attacks, NEWSDAY, April 19, 1993, at 5; Maggie O'Kane, Bosnia Crisis: Forgotten
Women of Serb Rape Camps, GUARDIAN, Dec. 19, 1992, at 9; Tom Post, A Pattern of Rape,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 32.
250. Foca Indictment, supra note 244, 10.1-7, 12.1-4.
251. Id. (H 10.6, 12.1.
252. Id. 12.5.
253. Id. U 2.1-.8 (discussing the accused).
254. See id. T 8.1-.2, counts 32-35; id. f 9.1-9.26, counts 36-55.
255. See id. T 11.1-3, count 60.
256. See id. U 12.1-12.6, counts 61-62.
257. Prosector v. Drijaca, Initial Indictment, Case No. IT-97-24-I (ICTY Mar. 13, 1997)
[hereinafter Kovacevic Initial Indictment] (naming Drljaca and Kovacevic as defendants), amended
by Prosector v. Kovacevic, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-97-24-I (Jan. 28, 1998) [hereinafter
Kovacevic Amended Indictment].
258. Kovacevic Initial Indictment, supra note 257, 9-16, count 1.
259. Id.
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Against Humanity, Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, and
Grave Breaches.26" In this case, rapes and other forms of sexual assault
comprised the predicate acts of Genocide, but not a substantive violation
of international humanitarian law.
Thus, over time, the manner in which the ICTY Prosecutor's office
framed sex-related violence has shifted. At the outset, the Prosecutor
interpreted sex-related violence to amount to a Grave Breach, a Violation
of the Laws and Customs of War, and a Crime Against Humanity.26'
However, violence suffered by women was pled as rape under the Stat-
ute's Crimes Against Humanity provisions,262 whereas sex-related vio-
lence suffered by men was prosecuted under the provision reaching other
inhumane acts.263 After a period of time, rape, a crime specifically enu-
merated as a Crime Against Humanity in the Statute, was interpreted
broadly to mean sexual assault, "an 'umbrella phrase' that refers to...
forcible sexual penetration, indecent assault, enforced prostitution, sexual
mutilation, forced impregnation, and forced maternity."2 Thus, charges
now brought under Article 5(g) are frequently described as "rape which
includes other forms of sexual assault."2 5 This expanded term has been
applied to the rape of women as well as to men who were forced to per-
form sex acts, whether it be forced sexual intercourse or forced fellatio."
What is more, the ICTY Prosecutor has come to regard sex-related
violence as not only a sexual assault under Article 5(g), but as a form of
torture and genocide-whether committed against men or women. "This
is done by prosecuting sexual assaults not as enumerated crimes in and of
themselves (such as under Article 5(g)), but rather as elements, usually
the actus reus, of the crimes." 67 Thus, borrowing the definition from
other conventions on torture, the ICTY Prosecutor defines torture, in
relevant part, as:
260. "Kovacevic Amended Indictment, supra note 257, 33-57, counts 3-15.
261. See Meakic Indictment, supra note 199, In 22.1-22.16, 25.1-25.4, 26.1-26.4, 30.1-30.4;
Tadic Initial Indictment, supra note 203, in 5.1, 5.29-.34; see also discussion supra notes 206-17,
218-25 and accompanying text (discussing the Meakic and Tadic charges).
262. See Meakic Indictment, supra note 199, H 22.4, 22.7, 22.10, 22.13, 22.16, 25.4, 26.4,
30.4; Tadic Initial Indictment, supra note 203, I 4.1-4.4; see also discussion supra notes 206-11,
213 and accompanying text (discussing the Meakic and Tadic charges as applied to female victims).
263. See Meakic Indictment, supra note 199, 29.4, 31.4; Tadic Initial Indictment, supra note
203, U 5.31, 5.34; see also discussion supra notes 213-17, 219-25 accompanying text (discussing
the Meakic and Tadic charges as applied to male victims).
264. Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru Okuizu'ni, Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & COMTEMP. PROBS. 45, 51 (1997); cf TRIBUNAL RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra
note 230, at Rule 96 (use of "sexual assualt" in Rule 96, as opposed to "rape," indicates Tribunal's
intent to interpret Artilce 5(g) broadly).
265. See, e.g., Brcko Indictment, supra note 226, 33, count 52; see also discussion supra note
235.
266. See, e.g., Foca Indictment, supra note 244, IN 11.1-.3, count 60 (applying Article 5(g) to
rape of four women); Brcko Initial Indictment, supra note 226, 33, count 52 (applying Article 5(g)
to men forced to perform sexual acts on each other).
267. Sellers & Okuizumi, supra note 264, at 57-58.
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[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . . punishing
him for an act that he or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third per-
son, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.268
Sexual assault is therefore regarded as an element of the crime of
torture-as an act by which severe pain and suffering, whether physical
or mental, is inflicted upon a person for a prohibited purpose. This view
mirrors that of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture, who called rape
"an especially traumatic form of torture."2" Thus, evidence of rape or
other sexual assault "only partially satisfies the elements of tor-
ture ... which in turn only partially satisfies the elements required to
establish a grave breach.""27 The evolution in the manner in which sex-
related violence is charged before the ICTY has culminated in two judg-
268. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 1, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984); see C.P.M. Cleiren & M.E.M. Tijssen, Rape and Other Forms of Sexual
Assault in the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Legal, Procedural, and Evidentiary Issues,
5 CRIM. L.F. 471, 492 (1994).
269. Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992/32, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess. 19, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/34. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, which now constitute the core rules of
international humanitarian law applicable in international armed conflicts, do not enumerate rape as
a grave breach. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of August 12, 1949, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 388 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention] (including "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment . . . wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health" as grave breaches). However, the International
Commission of the Red Cross and the U.S. State Department have declared that Grave Breach under
Article 147 (relating to "torture or inhumane treatment") encompasses rape. See Simon Chesterman,
Never Again.. . and Again: Law, Order, and the Gender of War Crimes in Bosnia and Beyond, 22
YALE J. INT'L L. 299, 331 & n.199 (1997) (citing Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Rape as a
Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 426-27 (1993) (quoting
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, AIDE-MEMOIRE (Dec. 3, 1992)) and Final Report, supra note 185,
1105).
270. Sellers & Okuizumi, supra note 264, at 62. The Trial Chamber has determined that the
elements of torture in an armed conflict require that torture:
(i) consists of the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental; in addition
(ii) this act or omission must be intentional;
(iii) it must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating,
humiliating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at discriminating, on any ground,
against the victim or a third person;
(iv) it must be linked to an armed conflict;
(v) at least one of the persons involved in the torture process must be a public official or
must at any rate act in a non-private capacity, e.g. as a de facto organ of a State or any
other authority-wielding entity.
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-PT, 162 (ICTY Dec. 10, 1998)
[hereinafter Furundzija Judgment]; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief, Case
No. IT-94-I-T (ICTY Apr. 10, 1995). To prove a Grave Breach, the Prosecutor must show (1) that
the act was undertaken during "armed conflicts of an international character," and (2) that the victim
was a person "regarded as 'protected,' in particular civilians in the hands of a party to a conflict of
which they are not nationals." Tadic Opinion, supra note 201,91559.
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ments issued by the Tribunal's Trial Chamber in cases involving charges
of rape and other forms of sexual assault. In the Celebici case,"' three
military officials, two Muslims and a Croat, were convicted of having
committed a number of war crimes, including rape of female prisoners,2
placing burning fuses around the genital areas of male prisoners,"3 and
forcing brothers to perform fellatio on one another.27 In the Furundzija
case, 5 the trial chamber convicted the defendant of aiding and abetting
the rape and sexual assault of a female prisoner by a soldier in Furund-
zija's command while he looked on and did nothing.276
In both these cases, the judges were careful to thoroughly discuss
the manner in which sexual assaults, including rape, were used as a form
of torture. In order to make out a claim of torture, the prosecutor must
show the intentional infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suf-
fering undertaken for a prohibited purpose." According to the Celebici
panel, "it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which rape ... could
be considered as occurring for a purpose that does not, in some way,
involve punishment, coercion, discrimination or intimidation." ' With
regard to the specific sexual assaults with which the defendants were
charged, the panel concluded that "the violence suffered by [female pris-
oners] in the form of rape, was inflicted upon her by Delic because she is
a woman. [T]his represents a form of discrimination which constitutes a
prohibited purpose for the offence of torture." '279 Similarly, the Furundzija
panel concluded that the Prosecutor had proved that the rape of the fe-
male prisoner was a form of torture because they inflicted this form of
severe physical and mental suffering in order to obtain information from
her during an interrogation.28 It is worth noting that the man who raped
the victim in the Furundzija case had warned another soldier "not to hit
her as he had 'other methods' for women, methods which he then put to
use."' Thus, the Furundzija panel could have concluded that the rapes
and other sexual assault of the female prisoner were conducted for a dis-
criminatory purpose as well as for the purpose of extracting information.
271. Celebici Judgment, supra note 184.
272. Id. [ 925-65, counts 18-23.
273. Id. ( 1035-48.
274. Id. 1060-66, counts 44-45.
275. Furundzija Judgment, supra note 270.
276. Id. in 264-75. The man accused of assaulting the female victim in this case was charged
with "rubb[ing] his knife on the inner thighs of [the victim] and threatened to cut out her private
parts if she did not tell the truth in answer to the interrogation." Id. 264. Subsequently, she was
vaginally, anally and orally raped by the same man as part of the interrogation while Furundzija
watched and interrogated her as well as other prisoners. Id. 266-67.
277. See Celebici Judgment, supra note 271, E 452-97; Furundzija Judgment, supra note 270,
[ 165-86.
278. Celebici Judgment, supra note 271, 495.
279. Id. 941.
280. Furundzija Judgment, supra note 270, 267.
281. Id. 1 87 (footnote omitted).
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This shift to treating sex-related violence, including rape, as torture
under Article 2(b) pertaining to Grave Breaches, is a position that Profes-
sor Rhonda Copelon has urged to the Prosecutor both directly in corre-
spondence282 and indirectly in her scholarly publications.283 Her reasoning
for doing so is threefold. First, Copelon argues, it is most appropriate to
classify rape and other sexual assault as a Grave Breach, because
"[u]nder the Geneva Conventions, the most serious war crimes are des-
ignated as 'grave breaches."'" Second, to prove a Grave Breach, one
need not show that the conduct was systematic or took place on a mass
scale; "one act of rape is punishable," 5 just as one act of murder or tor-
ture would be. Finally, crimes classified as Grave Breaches are conferred
universal jurisdiction, thereby providing authority for the prosecution of
such crimes before an international tribunal.2 86 Thus, Copelon and others
urge the prosecution of rape and other sex-related crimes as a form of
torture in order to remove any ambiguity as to the seriousness of the of-
fense. 7 The Prosecutor and the Trial Chambers have adopted this strat-
egy not as a matter of amendment of the Statute, but as a matter of inter-
pretation: The Grave Breach provisions of Article 2(b) pertaining to tor-
ture have now been interpreted by the Trial Chamber to include the rape
of women in the Lasva River Valley88 and at Celebici."9
What the ICTY Prosecutor has devised, in effect, is a strategy to
evaluate on a case-by-case basis what role sex-related violence plays in
the context of violations of international humanitarian law, in so far as it
"shock[s] the conscience of humankind to such a degree [that it has] an
international effect."2" Rather than rely upon special laws that isolate
rape and/or sexual assault as a privileged kind of injury, the Tribunal's
Prosecutor and judges have chosen to tailor the construction of these
crimes to the way in which sex-related violence figured in the physical or
mental destruction of a people or person. Where sex-related violence
takes place on a mass scale, or is the subject of orchestrated policy, then
it is appropriately prosecuted as a Crime Against Humanity, which re-
quires a showing that the accused's actions were part of a widespread or
282. See Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in
Humanitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 243, 253-54 & n.46. (1994) (describing
communications between Rhonda Copelon and the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY).
283. See id. at 248-57 (arguing for the prosecution of rape as a Grave Breach under Article 2(b)
of the Tribunal Statute (torture)).
284. Id. at 249.
285. Id. at 250.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Chesterman, supra note 269, at 327; Copelon, supra note 282, at 248-57;
Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 685 n.108
(1996); Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the
Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 29 AMER. U. L. REV. 793,
818 (1997).
288. Furundzija Judgment, supra note 270, Il9 264-69.
289. See Celebici Indictment, supra note 239, 124-25, counts 18, 21.
290. Goldstone, supra note 198, at 228.
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systematic attack against a civilian population.29' Where it operates as
part of a campaign to destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group, it should be prosecuted as Genocide.2" Yet, as ICTY Judge Eliza-
beth Odio Benito observed, "it will be difficult to compile sufficient evi-
dence to prosecute persons individually responsible for . . . crimes
against humanity or genocide." '293 Thus the Tribunal can and should in-
voke its Statute's provisions relating to Grave Breaches and Violations of
the Laws and Customs of War in cases involving sex-related violence as
well.
All of these formulations are clearly preferable to the treatment of
rape as a spoil of war, as a crime of passion or lust, or as a crime against
honor, modesty, or dignity, as international humanitarian law has in the
past.2" While it is true that rape and other sex-related violence was un-
dertaken in the former Yugoslavia systematically as part of a campaign
of ethnic- and religious-based persecution,295 it was also undertaken as
part of a systematic campaign of gender-based persecution. International
humanitarian law has begun to recognize the significance of gender-
based persecution insofar as rape has been treated as a form of sex dis-
crimination within the context of torture prosecutions. The ICTY Trial
Chambers construction of rape as torture made a tremendous step beyond
the view that "rape and other sexual assaults have often been labeled as
'private,' thus precluding them from being punished under national or
international law.2'
The same interpretative advance must be undertaken with respect to
the meaning of Crimes Against Humanity. "The women victims and sur-
vivors in Bosnia are being subjected to crimes against humanity based on
both ethnicity and religion, and gender. It is critical to recognize both and
to acknowledge that the intersection of ethnic and gender violence has its
own particular characteristics.""29 Thus, persecution based on gender must
be recognized as its own class of crimes against humanity. It is important
to be clear, however, that to do so is a quite different interpretive strategy
than focusing on the role of sex in war.
291. See Tadic Opinion, supra note 201,1 626; Sellers & Okuizumi, supra note 264, at 57 n.47;
Elizabeth Odio Benito, Rape and Other Sexual Assaults as War Crimes Prohibited by International
Humanitarian Law 22 (Mar. 8, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
292. See Kovacevica Initial Indictment, supra note 258, 9-16; Tribunal Statute, supra note
190, art. 4, at 37.
293. Benito, supra note 291, at 12.
294. See Geneva Convention, supra note 269, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. at 3516, (declaring that women
"shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault"); Rhonda Copelon, supra note 282, at 249.
295. See Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission, U.N.
Comm'n on Human Rts., 50th Sess., Agenda Item 11 (a), 268, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (1994).
296. Celebici Judgment, supra note 271, 471.
297. Copelon, supra note 282, at 261.
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The ICTY has for the first time treated sex-related violence as a
serious, and often grave, breach of international humanitarian law, while
avoiding the mistake of essentializing sexual conduct as a special kind of
injury that deserves to be "protected, surrounded, invested""29 with a
unique legal response. The Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence
reflect a sensitivity to the particularities of sex-related violence with re-
spect to the corroboration of sexual assault victim's testimony, evidence
of prior sexual conduct, and complexity of the notion of consent.' In-
deed, the Trial Chamber rested its conviction in the Celebici case on the
uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim."w Thus, the prosecution of
sex-related violence before this Tribunal stands a good chance of being
done in such a way that recognizes the way that sex was used as a
weapon of war, yet avoids many of Foucault's concerns with respect to
the ways in which sex is legally inscribed on the body. At the same time,
this method of prosecution remains sensitive to particular meanings of
sex-related violence for the people who suffered it, as well as for the
larger culture in the former Yugoslavia.
VI. CONCLUSION
Of course, all cultures sexualize different body parts and behaviors
in myriad ways. In a sense, I am urging a reverse sociology of the erotic.
Rather than study the ways in which fingers, toes, lips, ears, penises,
vaginas, or anuses become eroticized across cultures, I am concerned
with the way in which body parts and practices, once sexualized, cannot
escape a signification process by which contact with those body parts
and the enactment of those practices are always, already, and exclusively
understood to be sexual. In this sense, I want to question whether the
sexual is a satisfactory lens of analysis by which to understand the
meaning of interpersonal practices such as sexual harassment, seminal
practices in Melanesia, the assault of Abner Louima, or sex-related vio-
lence in the former Yugoslavia.
In the Tadic case, the Tribunal found that Suada Ramica, a Muslim
woman who was three to four months pregnant as a result of being raped
by a Serbian soldier in a camp, was
taken to the Prijedor police station by a Serb policeman with whom
she was acquainted through work. On the way he cursed at her, using
ethnically derogatory terms and told her that Muslims should all be
killed because they "do not want to be controlled by Serbian authori-
ties." When she arrived at the police station she saw two Muslim men
298. FOUCAULT, POLMCS, supra note 15, at 202.
299. TRIBUNAL RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 230, Rule 96 (providing strict rules for the
admission of testimony and limiting the defense of consent in cases of sexual assault); see supra note
230 (providing the full text of Rule 96). The Celebici defendants were convicted.
300. Celebici Judgment, supra note 271, 1 936.
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whom she knew, covered in blood. She was taken to a prison cell
which was covered in blood and.., raped again and beaten .... 30'
This evidence supported a finding by the Tribunal that Tadic was guilty
of religious persecution-a Crime Against Humanity. 2 This evidence
sounds eerily similar to Abner Louima's recount of the conduct and
comments of the police officers who verbally and physically assaulted
him on the night of August 19, 1997. Recall, the white police officers are
accused of saying:
"You niggers have to learn to respect police officers." The other one
said, "If you yell or make any noise, I will kill you." Then one held
me and the other one stuck the [wooden handle of a toilet] plunger up
my behind. He pulled it out and shoved it in my mouth, broke my
teeth and said, "That's your s-t, nigger." Later, when they called the
ambulance, the cop told me, "If you ever tell anyone ... I will kill
you and your family."30 3
If what Suada Ramic experienced was sexual violence in the service
of religious persecution, surely what Abner Louima suffered was sexual
violence as a form of racial persecution. In both cases, the victims suf-
fered a form of gender-based violence as well. Hopefully, international
humanitarian law will one day recognize gender-based crimes as being
on a par with crimes that are racial, religious, ethnic, or political in na-
ture. But in either case, it would be a mistake to reduce the wrong of the
atrocities they suffered to the fact that they were sexual. So too, when
observers object to the ritualized semen practices of the Sambia because
they amount to intergenerational sex, we lose sight of the power those
practices have to teach boys important gender-based lessons. In all these
cases, it is paramount that we keep our focus on how sex is put to work
to construct men, masculinity, and nations, and to destroy women, men,
and a people.
301. Tadic Opinion, supra note 201, 470.
302. Id. 718.
303. McAlary, supra note 100, at 2.
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HUSBANDS & WIvEs, DANGEROUSNESS & DEPENDENCE:
PUBLIC PENSIONS IN THE 1860s-1920s
SUSAN STERET*
I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone needs a wife. That is, we all could use a person in our
lives who fits the once-idealized image of a wife: doing the laundry,
cooking, caring for children, arranging medical appointments, managing
a social life, and attending to emotional needs. In this list of what makes
one a wife in a marriage, the most established of heterosexual institu-
tions, I have not included heterosexual intercourse. Heterosexuality en-
tails much more than who is sexually involved with whom, and anyone
who has ever said she needs a wife knows that.
The purpose of this article is to discuss meanings of heterosexuality
in the context of state benefits, focusing on the emergence of benefits in
the nineteenth century. Not only did the late-nineteenth century engender
the emergence of state benefits alongside expanding state employment,
but that period also fostered an understanding of heterosexuality or ho-
mosexuality as a characteristic of individuals, rather than a description of
behavior. Appellate courts, when determining who could receive bene-
fits, considered proper family roles in deciding whether people had
earned state payments or could only gain them as a matter of charity.
Because an understanding of fixed sexual identities was just being
created in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it is anachronistic to
impose categories of heterosexuality on the state's evaluation of wife and
husband. However, I am not trying to understand distribution of state
benefits on its own terms, but rather as a way of addressing state defini-
tion of marriage.
Benefits programs merit examination for two reasons. First, by the
1890s federal civil war pensions comprised over forty percent of the fed-
eral budget.' Second, pensions premised upon post-retirement payment
for services rendered constitute the ongoing model for pensions many
workers today receive through employers and for old age social security
payments. The latter part of the nineteenth century saw a significant re-
constitution of governance, with states expanding civil service employ-
ment and changing from a format of segmented politics, in which those
* Professor of Political Science, University of Denver. I wish to thank Eric Heinze and the
participants and organizers of the InterSEXionality Symposium.
1. See Megan J. McClintock, Civil War Pensions and the Reconstruction of Union Families,
83 J. AM. HIST. 456, 458 (1996).
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who specifically benefited paid for the benefits, to a system that assumed
that state payments, when justified, benefit society as a whole.2 As a re-
sult, states began to seriously and more explicitly examine the values of
work and state benefits, which illuminated what it meant to serve society
by emphasizing qualities of masculinity.
This article first discusses ambiguities in understanding what signi-
fies heterosexuality and homosexuality. This article then examines the
administration of Civil War pensions in the late-nineteenth century. The
article closes with an analysis of decisions concerning the constitutional-
ity of pensions.
II. STRAIGHT AND QUEER
Adrienne Rich, in her generative article on compulsory heterosexu-
ality,3 argues that there is a lesbian continuum: that many women live
rather closely with other women.4 Women have friendships with other
women, work with other women, gossip with other women, live with
other women, share child care with other women, and are sometimes
sexually involved with other women. It is only the latter that guarantees
that one will be counted as lesbian; everything else is simply what we
expect of all women in this culture. Rich's work implies two possible
explanations for the fact that women's lives closely revolve around other
women though most women identify as heterosexual. First, pressure to
be heterosexual is so overwhelming that we simply cannot know how
women would understand and define their sexuality without such pres-
sure! Alternatively, women are naturally and essentially lesbian, and that
cultural heterosexuality requires the apparatus of social pressure and
coercion to keep women from primarily sharing our lives with other
women.6 The latter reading suggests an essential sexuality, that there is
no ambiguity and uncertainty in how one sexually identifies. Rich leaves
unanswered the question of whether this structure is biologically or so-
cially created: who wouldn't want to live with women? Rich argues that
given the range and magnitude of social pressure to be straight, com-
bined with the varied penalties for living primarily with other women,
heterosexuality is compulsory. Therefore, historically we can not know
what sexual identity women would have chosen in the absence of wage
2. See generally ROBIN EINHORN, PROPERTY RULES: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHICAGO
1833-1872 (1991) (discussing the evolvement of Chicago's economic policy).
3. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN AND
GAY STUDIES READER 227 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
4. See id. at 239.
5. See id. at 229.
6. See id. at 235.
7. See id. at 241.
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disparities between men and women, societal discrimination, witch
burnings, and patriarchal control of law, theology, and science.8
Recently, queer theory has attempted to shift the focus of sexual
identity analysis away from an examination of the people for whom one
feels sexual desire-which could include many different people-and
those with whom one is sexually involved-which at any particular time
could be no one.' The people we sexually desire or with whom we are
sexually involved do not define or exhaust our whole lives. In recent
popular culture, the wide variety of indicators of straightness or gayness
have been noted, particularly with regard to gay men. In a radio broad-
cast, Dan Savage discussed going to his first workshop on adoption after
he and his boyfriend had decided to adopt." The workshop began by
urging couples to deal with their infertility, a problem common to many,
but not all, heterosexual couples seeking adoptive children. 2 Savage
noted that he and his boyfriend could have skipped this part of the ori-
entation. 3 They had always accepted as fact that they could not biologi-
cally have children, rather than as something that ran counter to their
expectations and visions of what their lives would be.' Both straight and
gay couples could not conceive children without becoming entangled in a
complicated arrangement with a third party to make one of the partners a
biological parent. The language of the seminar about infertility, Savage
argued, was the language of coming out." Couples were urged to tell
their friends and family of their situation, to accept what they could not
change, and eventually see it as a positive, new way of making a family. 6
Just as the straight couples shared in an element of gayness, Savage ar-
gued he and his boyfriend were appearing a little bit straight by adopting
a child and creating a nuclear family. Savage argued against seeing the
desire to have children as gay or straight. 7
If straight and queer are sometimes difficult to define, and if they
blur, it might be useful to examine where and how the terms are made
explicit. What is it that makes people straight or queer? How have legal
8. See id. at 231.
9. Cf. Judith Butler, Imitation & Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) (discussing the impossibility of defining "les-
bian"); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-
Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1599-1601 (pointing out the limitations of defining homosexu-
ality by sexual desire).
10. See, e.g., IN AND OUT (Paramount 1997) (exploring the implications of stereotypically gay
behavior); see also Ellen (ABC television broadcast, 1997) (drawing attention to lesbian existence).
11. All Things Considered: Gay Adoption (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 19, 1997)
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institutions categorized sexuality? When these questions are addressed, it
is usually in terms of homosexuality. Andrew Koppelman argues that
discrimination against gays and lesbians should count as gender dis-
crimination on two grounds. 8 First, this kind of discrimination rests upon
the belief that it is wrong for a man to do things with a man that it would
be acceptable to do with a woman.'9 This reasoning has worked, to the
benefit of gays and lesbians, in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), °
which has recently held that discrimination against transsexuals is pro-
hibited by the sex discrimination provisions of the Equal Treatment Di-
rective. According to the ECJ, a person who is fired because she is un-
dergoing or has undergone gender reassignment is being treated unfa-
vorably in comparison with people of the sex to which she was born.2'
English courts have subsequently referred a case to the ECJ involving
discrimination against a gay man based on the belief that the case re-
garding transsexuals almost certainly outlaws all discrimination on the
basis of sexual identity."
Second, Koppelman argues discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation should also be considered gender discrimination because gay
men are often the victims of discrimination for behavior that is consid-
ered stereotypically female.23 They are discriminated against as though
they are women, although perhaps more aggressively because behavior
that might be accepted for women is unacceptable for men. Similarly,
lesbians are discriminated against for behavior that would seem appro-
priate for men. ' Koppelman also argues that "the two stigmas, sex-
inappropriateness and homosexuality, are virtually interchangeable, and
each is readily used as a metaphor for the other."' For example, in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,' a prominent sex discrimination case, a woman
was denied partnership because she needed to go to charm school and did
18. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).
19. Id. at 219.
20. The ECJ is a supranational court that judges disputes arising within the fifteen-member
European Union under European Community law. See SALLY J. KENNEY, FOR WHOSE
PROTECTION? REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AND EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
BRITIAN 78-83 (1992) (discussing the impact of the ECJ on British law). The Council of Ministers,
which includes a representative from each member state, outlines directives that set objectives for
the Union as a whole. See id. at 79-80. Directives allow member states choices in how to meet
objectives. See id. The Equal Treatment Directive was enacted in 1976. See id. at 80.
21. See Case C-13/94, P v. S, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996).
22. See R v. Secretary of State for Defence, exparte Perkins, [1997] I.R.L.R. 297.
23. See Koppelman, supra note 18, at 202-03 (discussing how discrimination against homo-
sexuals is part of the larger gender discrimination).
24. Id. at 245-46.
25. Id. at 235.
26. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (making it unlawful for
employers to classify employees or applicants for employment by race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin in a way that would deprive that person of employment or adversely affect his or her
status as an employee)).
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not wear make-up.' Of course, women can also be discriminated against
for seeming to be too feminine.'
Using the range of behaviors that constitute lesbian and gay identity
as a basis for identifying someone as queer can work to put gay and les-
bian identity at risk.' That is, a person can call herself queer without
paying the public price of being explicitly paired with a same sex part-
ner. Erasure does not have to be the only choice available in dismantling
normative heterosexuality; as Suzanna Walters argues, it should be en-
tirely possible for an individual to have a straight identity while being
politically committed to equality with regard to sexual orientation. De-
spite ambiguities in race and the recognition that race is not a sensible
biological construct, we do not, as a matter of political and analytical
argument, erase the categories of Black, White, Asian, and Latino.3'
Some queer theorists have emphasized "gender bending"32 in sexual play,
arguing that it is possible to have a queer heterosexuality in the sense that
one might be heterosexually active while subverting standard gender
norms of what it means to be feminine or masculine.3 Such an argument
gains strength as we note that an individual's sexuality is indeed marked
in a number of ways in our culture.' Celia Kitzinger and Susan Wilkin-
son argue that the possibility of variety in sexual play does not mean that
many people engage in it, and that few heterosexual women writing
about sexuality believe that it is very possible to play with sexuality in a
way that subverts gender norms. They also argue that an emphasis on
the range of play available to women who lead relatively privileged lives,
who are less subject to financial and social pressures, ignores the com-
pulsory nature of heterosexuality and straight gender norms that pervade
the lives of many women. 6
27. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
28. See id. at 251 (stating that stereotyping puts women in the intolerable position of never
being able to advance).
29. See generally Suzanna Danuta Walters, From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Post-
modernism, and the Lesbian Menace (Or, Why Can't a Woman Be More Like a Fag?), 21 SIGNS 830
(1996) (discussing the definitions of gay/lesbian issues and their effect).
30. See id. at 844-45.
31. See id. at 832-33.
32. Cf. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (illustrating that
how effeminate men are regarded in society impacts the struggle against gender discrimination in
general); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities &
Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WoMEN'S STuD. 25, 30 (1995) (arguing that although the
author is physically excluded from the category of lesbian, he includes himself to "poke at the
sex/gender essentialisms that rigidly and absurdly confine us all").
33. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY
STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 45, 55.
34. See generally id. (discussing the concept of homosexuality through literature and culture).
35. See Celia Kitzinger & Susan Wilkinson, Virgins and Queers Rehabilitating Heterosexual-
ity?, 8 GENDER & Soc'Y 444, 445,457 (1994).
36. See id. at 459.
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We could avoid the problem of erasing gay and lesbian identity by
turning the focus to the markings of heterosexuality. Judith Butler writes
in extraordinarily thought-provoking ways about confounding the fixed
nature of sexual identity, but does not thereby suggest that identity is a
matter of free play or that heterosexuality is not compulsory. 7 Instead,
she argues for the importance of focusing on the masquerade of gender
within heterosexuality rather than on lesbian identity." The claim to a
specific lesbian identity has been a "counterpoint to the claim that les-
bian sexuality is just heterosexuality once removed, or that it is derived,
or that it does not exist."" Claiming lesbian sexuality means accepting
preconceived notions of lesbian identity, so that claiming lesbian identity
is inherently accepting a subordinate status within a dominant hetero-
sexuality, Butler bypasses the question of lesbian specificity, instead
addressing the other half of the problem: the assumed authenticity of
heterosexuality. She argues that "[c]ompulsory heterosexuality sets itself
up as the original, the true, the authentic; the norm that determines the
real implies that "being" lesbian is always a kind of miming .... .," An
important move in queer theory would be to avoid the continued focus on
what makes up a true lesbian identity in favor of trying to understand
how heterosexuality is not natural, true, or essential." If heterosexuality
is not natural, true, or essential, then lesbianism cannot consequently be
the tainted derivative of something true. Similarly, Lisa Duggan argues
that focusing on the construction of gay and lesbian sexuality "tends to
leave heterosexuality in its naturalized place." 2 Therefore, it is important
to analyze the extent of heterosexual privilege established in law and
public policy. 3 These approaches both avoid assuming an essential iden-
tity while at the same time refusing to focus on the range of play possible
within heterosexuality-as Kitzinger and Wilkinson argue queer theory
too often does." Instead, the invitation is to focus on how ordinary het-
erosexuality is understood.
Butler's framework resolves some of the ambiguity in Rich's argu-
ment. It is simply not worth trying to determine if women's authentic
sexuality rests with other women, as one reading of Rich would suggest.
Instead, there is no true and authentic way to be gay, lesbian or straight,
because all sexual identities are assumed. Butler argues:
37. See Butler, supra note 9, at 21.
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id. at 20-21.
42. Lisa Duggan, Queering the State, 39 Soc. TEXT 1 (1994), reprinted in SEX WARS:
SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 179, 185 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter eds., 1995)
(subsequent citations to Queering the State will reference the article as reprinted in SEX WARS).
43. See id. at 186.
44. See Kitzinger & Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 458-59.
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There is no "proper" gender, a gender proper to one sex rather than
another, which is in some sense that sex's cultural property. Where
that notion of the "proper" operates, it is always and only improperly
installed as the effect of a compulsory system. Drag constitutes the
mundane way in which genders are appropriated, theatricalized, worn
and done; it implies that all gendering is a kind of impersonation and
approximation.
If masculine characteristics do not naturally belong to men, and feminine
characteristics do not naturally belong to women, we can attend to the
work that goes into maintaining what are taken to be proper boundaries.
However, analyses of compulsory heterosexuality in law have focused
primarily upon sexual intercourse despite the range of ways sexuality and
identities can be understood.'
Heterosexuality might be best understood by approaching it as a
question of gender norms. Compulsory heterosexuality might not be pri-
marily enforced via law regarding what constitutes sexual intercourse,
but rather by what sets the context in which men and women are under-
stood to be heterosexual. An analysis of the system of early benefit pay-
ments illustrates this point.
III. STATE BENEFITS FOR DANGEROUS PUBLIC SERVICE
This article discusses two major points related to nineteenth-century
state payments' effect on heterosexuality: first, that the practicalities of
gaining state benefits enforced heterosexuality by requiring women to
associate with men, and second, that the law surrounding state payments
articulated and enforced a notion of the "proper." 7 Pension payments
went to men whom courts identified as acting appropriately through
definitions of dangerous work. That this work was a performance is en-
hanced by imagined dangerousness, regardless of whether the Work actu-
ally placed the performer in physical jeopardy.
Analyzing the availability of state benefits clearly involves dis-
cussing compulsory heterosexuality: women had to associate or live with
men in order to receive payments. 8 Whatever room for complexity there
might have been in one's living arrangements, as a matter of legal recog-
45. Butler, supra note 9, at 21.
46. See generally Richard Collier, "The Art of Living the Married Life": Representations of
Male Heterosexuality in Law, 1 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 543 (1992) (discussing how the law has used
marriage to define a "natural" sexual intercourse); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Repre-
sentation: the Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality,
49 VAND. L. REv. 869 (1996) (discussing how society defines rape and its impact on women's
sexuality).
47. See Butler, supra note 9, at 21 (addressing "compulsory" gender norms).
48. Indeed, normative heterosexuality is well-established enough that I doubt it would be
possible to find a case of a man even trying to claim benefits on the basis of his affiliation with
another man, separate from being a son or father; particularly since marriage or something that
mimicked marriage was required to claim benefits and marriage was defined as a heterosexual
union.
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nition, heterosexuality was enforced. However, understanding the mas-
culine characteristics that allowed for the state benefits is a slightly dif-
ferent matter. By focusing on masculinity, we address Butler's point that
gender is appropriated and approximated rather than intrinsic: 9 In ad-
dressing masculinity, we are no longer addressing sexual orientation-at
least in the sense of sexual desire or who must live with whom to get
state benefits. Instead, gender, usually the category we use for discussing
masculinity and femininity, subsumes sexual orientation. In other words,
whom one desires sexually constitutes merely one aspect of a person's
gender. Yet focusing on masculinity and femininity would seem to erase
lesbian and gay identity-an ironic result given that the emergence of
more fixed state regulatory apparatuses in the late-nineteenth century in
part conditioned the emergence of sexual identity.'
The framework of sexual identity, or of queer theory, could as easily
be said to encompass the framework of gender. That is, instead of saying
that all of sexual orientation concerns masculinity and femininity, which
is in turn about gender, we could say that all of gender is about signaling
masculinity and femininity, which is in turn about sexual orientation.
Feminist theory has argued there is no essential human being called
"woman" who shares characteristics across all women.' Where there are
patterns of shared outlooks and characteristics, they are dependent on
race and class position, as well as sexuality.52 The fragmentation of a
subject called "woman" has come from the challenges raised by mem-
bers of marginalized groups, and that includes challenges raised from
queer theory. As Eric Heinze argues, transsexuals, who have been at the
forefront of challenges to discrimination-on the basis of sexual identity in
the European supranational courts, raise the most explicit challenges to
"categories, such as gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion or lan-
guage, as well as non-categories, such as the 'human family' or the ab-
stract individual." 3 If, for example, birth certificates are not changed to
reflect a transsexual's new sex, then marriage for a transsexual is, from
the point of view of the state, same-sex marriage. '
Heinze argues that while it might be analytically useful to separate
out discourses of classical sexology, gender, and sexual orientation, and
while their theoretical bases have different origins, disjoining these
frameworks eventually shows how they overlap.5 When these discourses
49. See Butler, supra note 9, at 21.
50. I am grateful to Eric Heinze for bringing this point to my attention.
51. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1990) (recognizing that West-
em philosophy concerning "womanness" does not consider the vast, inherent differences of women).
52. See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (1991) (centering the
analysis deliberately on African-American women).
53. Eric Heinze, Discourses of Sex: Classical, Modernist and Post-Modernist, 67 NORDIC J.
INT'L L. 37, 72 (1998).
54. See id. at 68.
55. See id. at 40.
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are separated, they are only so in their most polar versions; once one
complicates an understanding of gender, one is quickly in the midst of
discussions of queer theory. As Heinze puts it, "[f]or no sub-discourse
within any of the three sites truly can be understood as irrelevant to the
other two sites. Appearing, perhaps, to bypass ('disjoin') the other two
sites, a disjunctive sub-discourse in fact collapses ('conjoins') these into
itself."56 Rather than this leading to the meaninglessness of the categories,
Heinze argues that it would instead be useful to proliferate categories by
joining them together." He maps the discourse of sexual orientation onto
postmodernist forms of knowledge, which emphasize the fragmentation
of the legal subject. 8 He argues that the feminist project, in contrast,
emerged more from the emphasis on programmatic modernism embodied
in arguments for universal human rights.59 Heinze also argues that the
very artificiality of these conjunctions invites us to proliferate the catego-
ries: that it would be helpful to think about what it might look like to
explore and link liberal, modernist, and postmodernist perspectives about
gender, sexuality, and orientation.'
In a different context, that of understanding the conjunction of local
with global, Donna Haraway also argues for the usefulness of using cate-
gories whose very artificiality is evident: it will keep us from deluding
ourselves that we are discussing something real, concrete, and separable
from everything else.' With these points in mind in the forthcoming dis-
cussion of the enforcement of heterosexuality in pensions law I do not
mean to analyze which assumptions are about gender and which are
about heterosexuality. I am not convinced they are wholly separable,
though for some purposes the distinctions might be important. Instead, I
argue that characteristics we would associate with gender, such as cour-
age for men and dependence for women, concern sexual orientation. In
court cases, the characteristics of socially gendered masculinity or femi-
ninity arose in situations where courts also assumed these characteristics
to be important because men, women, and children were in heterosexual
families, or should be.
In addressing masculinity, femininity, and assumptions about fam-
ily, we do not resolve some questions, such as what it really means to be
"straight," and if heterosexual desire ever authentically belongs to
women. But in keeping with analyses that view sexuality as about much
more than for whom one has sexual desires, we can analyze the mainte-
nance in law of heterosexuality as a set of beliefs about how men and
women should live together. These laws have enforced a normative het-
56. Id. at 48-49.
57. Id. at 40.
58. Id. at 62-67.
59. Id. at 56-60.
60. Id. at 73-75.
61. Donna J. Haraway, Reading Buchi Emecheta: Contests for "Women's Experience" in
Women's Studies, in SIMIANS, CYBORGS AND WOMEN 109,111-13 (1991).
19981 1189
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
erosexuality, formalizing relationships that might have once been infor-
mal and more fluid.
While the law of state benefits enforced a heterosexual and mo-
nogamous version of family, it nonetheless allowed some social space
for making things up as one went along. Legal categories did not regulate
everything. To the extent that homosexuality was not identified as a
quality of individuals until the late-nineteenth century in the United
States," women could and did arrange their lives so that they could live
together with each other, and they could do so under very little public
scrutiny or disapproval.63 D'Emilio and Freedman discuss same sex cou-
ples who lived married lives between the 1850s and 1870s.' In each cou-
ple, one partner took on the position of husband or wife in a way that fit
established heterosexual practices, but also took on a position different
from what might have been signified by biological sex. Butler's notion
that all of gender is a "drag," even if it is not one that people can take
off or put on at will, makes it difficult to say that the partnerships
D'Emilio and Freedman describe are straight or gay/lesbian. To argue
the latter imputes tremendous significance to biological sex and much
less to what we take seriously in the social world. Furthermore, D'Emilio
and Freedman argue that to impose categories of heterosexuality or ho-
mosexuality is exactly that: an imposition, because such categories were
not common ways of categorizing people until the late-nineteenth cen-
tury.
67
In the nineteenth century, women could very rarely earn enough to
support themselves.' Also, understandings of what it meant to be a
proper wife were enforced even where married women earned their own
wages; they were enforced in a way that made it difficult for women to
protect their earnings from husbands.' Not until 1887 did most states
have statutes protecting married women's access to their own wages.'
62. JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATrERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 121 (1988); see also id. at 128-29 (discussing Walt Whitman as an exam-
ple of nineteenth-century romance between same sex friends).
63. See id. at 121.
64. Id. at 124-27.
65. See id. at 127.
66. Butler, supra note 9, at 18-21.
67. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 121, 123.
68. See id. at 124-25.
69. See Valentine v. Tantum, 32 A. 531, 531-32 (Del. Super. Ct. 1886), cited in Amy Dru
Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM.
HIST. 471, 471 (1988) (outlining the state of women's property rights at common law prior to the
enactment of the "Married Woman's Act" and noting that married women had no right to contract at
common law).
70. See, e.g., Act to Protect the Rights of Married Women, 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 152, 152
("[A]ny married woman, while married, may bargain, sell and convey her personal and real property,
and enter into any contracts in reference to the same as if she were sole."); see also Reva B. Siegel,
Home As Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880,
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Indeed, many courts interpreted the statutes so that women could only
keep their wages if they lived separately from their husbands.7' They
could not keep wages necessary for domestic duties, and where married
couples mingled their incomes, the women lost title to their earnings and
possessions.72 "Taking in boarders, nursing the sick, canning fruit, work-
ing as a seamstress for five dollars a week, running a hotel-such enter-
prises were all deemed part of the domestic labor the wife owed as the
'helpmate of her husband.""' If pensions were any kind of substantial
contribution to earnings, the public enforcement of heterosexuality
through pensions regulations allowed some financial freedom that could
allow women a choice other than remarrying. As early as the antebellum
period, women's rights activists argued that marriage was legalized
prostitution when women had no choice but to marry, given the low
wages working women faced."
Women began working for wages and supporting children in the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries as wage labor replaced agri-
cultural labor, often bringing the work home to children or children to
the work." Some women did have alternatives. Politically engaged elite
women of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries sometimes
arranged their lives so as to live with close female friends. Women such
as Molly Dewson, active in Roosevelt's New Deal, and Eleanor Roose-
velt lived with women, vacationed with women, and strategized about
politics with women. 6 Among social welfare activists, very few of the
white women were married." Possibly these options were much more
available to elite women-just as Kitzinger and Wilkinson note that
playing with sexuality is perhaps more possible for women in relatively
privileged positions today7-in jobs and social settings where they were
103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083-89 (1994) (discussing state Married Women's Acts); Stanley, supra note
69, at 481-82 (discussing state Married Women's Act).
71. See Stanley, supra note 69, at 495-96 & n.58 (citing Burke v. Cole, 97 Mass. 113, 114
(1867), and Brooks v. Schwerin, 54 N.Y. 343, 348-49 (1873)).
72. See id. at 496-97.
73. Id. at 496.
74. See Siegel, supra note 70, at 1120-22, 1127-29.
75. Practices varied by ethnicity and region of the country. For discussions of women at work,
see THOMAS DUBLIN, TRANSFORMING WOMEN'S WORK: NEW ENGLAND LIVES IN THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION (1994) (discussing the effect of the Industrial Revolution on women's work); ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
(1990) (discussing wages as an interpreter and consequence of gender inequality); Elizabeth H.
Pleck, A Mother's Wages: Income Earning Among Married Italian and Black Women, 1896-1911,
in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN (Nancy F. Cott & Elizabeth H. Pleck eds., 1979) (discussing the his-
torical differences in the workplace between women of different ethnic groups).
76. See BLANCHE WIESEN COOK, 1 ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 339 (1992). John D'Emilio and
Estelle Freedman discuss the late-nineteenth-century emergence of educated women who could
afford to live apart from men, and did. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 188-97.
77. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED 43, 113 (1993).
78. See Kitzinger & Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 454-57. However, cities have long had
substantial working class lesbian communities even given the difficult circumstances of discrimina-
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less subject to pressures for gender conformity. It was in the late-
nineteenth century, too, that supervision of morals in the distribution of
Civil War pensions became more entrenched. 9 State benefits were con-
solidated at a time when some women were first able to make their own
livings, which possibly made the enforcement of heterosexual norms
more important. Public policy, though, envisioned women as dependent
and, indeed, employers justified paying women lower wages by the be-
lief that most did not need the money.'
Public pensions were first available to men. As this article later dis-
cusses, public service in the nineteenth century was service which was
regarded as dangerous; typically, military service, service as a volunteer
fireman and, as public employment expanded, service as a policeman.' It
was only after public employment expanded into fields that would em-
ploy women, such as school teaching, that it would include characteris-
tics generally imagined as feminine rather than masculine. Courts imag-
ined these occupations, such as volunteer firemen, in ways that had men
as the central actors and, indeed, they were jobs largely held by men.82
When men holding these jobs died-in the Civil War or, later, in indus-
trial accidents-women could gain access to support payments (meager
though they might have been) without having a man in the house, and
they could gain those payments as a matter of statutory entitlement rather
than as a matter of charity.83 They gained those payments through a nor-
matively enforced public fixing of heterosexuality, yet once the pay-
ments were gained, legal 6fficials might have very little to say concern-
ing their living arrangements. ' Then, if heterosexuality were enforced, it
would have been through gossip and whispers rather than through formal
legal rules.
I next turn to a discussion of some of the cases concerning the con-
stitutionality of soldiers' pensions, firemen's pensions, and workmen's
compensation. These programs were all tested under state constitutional
provisions that either explicitly stated or had read into them limits on
state spending, allowing states to spend only for a public purpose.' In
tion. See ELIZABETH LAPOVSKY KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS
OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY (1994) (studying Buffalo, New York).
79. See discussion infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text (discussing the intrusive super-
vision of Civil War pensions).
80. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 75, at 8-9.
81. See discussion infra Parts IV-VI.
82. See, e.g., Trustees of Exempt Firemen's Benevolent Fund v. Roome, 93 N.Y. 313 (1883).
83. THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 107 (1992).
84. Cf. Susan Sterett, Serving the State: Consitutionalism and Social Spending, 1860s-1920s,
22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 311, 345 (1994) (discussing that indigence was the only consideration when
determining whether or not a mother should receive a pension).
85. See, e.g., Fire Dep't v. Noble, 3 E.D. Smith 440, 451 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1854) (evaluating




addition, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause' was inter-
preted by the Supreme Court to allow spending only for a public pur-
pose.87 Thus, the legitimacy of spending by any state could always be
raised in court, whatever the content of a state's constitutional provi-
sions. The reasoning was that to spend state money for something other
than a public purpose was to spend tax money illegitimately, which in
turn is to take property without due process of law or just compensation."
The requirement that states could only spend for a public purpose was
considered to be a part of the general law, and Thomas Cooley synthe-
sized that notion as such in his 1876 treatise on taxation." Cooley tied the
requirement to constitutional provisions prohibiting states from taking
property without compensation." However, many states also enacted
specific state constitutional provisions after the Civil War prohibiting the
states from giving gifts to private corporations or individuals, in part a
response to the granting of privileges to railroads." States evaluated pen-
sions under these provisions as well.
In addition to examining the constitutionality of pensions and the
way that masculinity and femininity were imagined in the courts, I want
to illustrate the enforcement of heterosexuality through a discussion of
Megan McClintock's work on the administration of civil war pensions. 2
The administration of pensions was not usually addressed as a constitu-
tional matter in appellate courts. As McClintock's work so richly illumi-
nates, the administration of pensions did, however, enforce an under-
standing of what constituted a family, an understanding of the proper
behavior which made one a wife. 3
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PENSIONS
By the time of the Civil War, pensions for military service from the
federal government had been long established.' Federal pensions would
86. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .....
87. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664-65 (1874).
88. See Loan Ass'n, 87 U.S. at 662-67.
89. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 100 (1876).
90. Id. at 73-74, 101.
91. See Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 123-28 (1948) (dis-
cussing the development of state constitutional provisions); see also Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadel-
phia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853) (allowing local governmental investment upon state legislative authoriza-
tion); HARTZ, supra, at 113-23 (discussing Sharpless and noting that this decision provided the
impetus for the amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution). For a discussion of conflicts over
railroads and American economic development, see GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS (1992).
92. McClintock, supra note 1.
93. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the work of Megan J. McClintock on Civil War
pensions to discuss the relationship between pensions and perceived behaviorial patterns within
marriages).
94. See WILLIAM H. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 9-119
(David Kinley ed., 1918) (providing a thorough analysis of military pensions from the colonial times
through the Civil War); WILLIAM H. GLASSON, HISTORY OF MILITARY PENSION LEGISLATION IN
1998] 1193
1194 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4
become a matter for considerable public controversy, but as a legal mat-
ter they were widely accepted as constitutional. At the federal level, pen-
sions were constitutional because they were incident to the federal power
to conduct a war, and pensions provided an inducement to service." At
the state level, their constitutionality was much more open to question,
precisely because conducting a war was a power of the federal govern-
ment. In addressing the constitutionality of soldiers' pensions, many of
the earliest state cases did not address the characteristic of the work; in-
stead, payments to soldiers were addressed as a question of the circum-
stances in which the states could pay people for meeting obligations to
the federal government96-- assisting the federal government in conducting
a war was no responsibility of the states. In later cases, the nature of the
work was addressed. Even as early as 1865, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court allowed the state to pay soldiers as a matter of gratitude for the
service they had given to their country. 7
In United States v. Hall," the Supreme Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of military pensions as a whole while inquiring into the con-
stitutionality of a statutory provision establishing criminal sanctions for
the embezzlement of pension funds by guardians." Justice Clifford found
a specific grant of power in the Constitution allowing pensions: Congress
could declare war,' raise and support armies,'"' and enact laws "neces-
THE UNITED STATES 1-68 (1900) (discussing pre-Civil War pensions); THEDA SKOCPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 105 (1992) (noting the expansion of the the use of pensions
from the time of the American Revolution to the Civil War).
95. See United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 351 (1878) (recognizing the constitutionality of
military pensions, in part, through the government's power to declare war, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
11, and the power to "raise and support Armies," id cl. 12); see also COOLEY, supra note 89, at 74,
99-100.
96. See, e.g., Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341 (1885); Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Pa. 319 (1871);
Hilbish v. Catherman, 14 N.Y. 154 (1870); Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118 (1864);
Tyson v. School Dirs., 51 Pa. 9 (1865).
97. Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 658 (1865). In writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Dixon stated:
I think the consideration of gratitude alone to the soldier for his services, be he vol-
unteer, substituted or drafted man, will sustain a tax for bounty money to be paid to him
or his family. Certainly no stronger consideration of gratitude can possibly exist than that
which arises from the hardships, privations and dangers which attend the citizen in the
military service of his country .... Who will say that the legislature may not, in consid-
eration of such services .. .give to the soldier or his family a suitable bounty after his
enlistment, or even after his term of service has expired? I certainly cannot.
Brodhead, 19 Wis. at 687.
98. 98 U.S. 343 (1878).
99. Hall, 98 U.S. at 345-51.
100. Id. at 351; see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, el. 11 ("Congress shall have power... [t]o declare
War .... ").
101. Hall, 98 U.S. at 351; see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 12 ("Congress shall have power...
[t]o raise and support Armies ....").
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sary and proper" to carry these powers into effect."2 Furthermore, the
long history of pensions was considered evidence of long-standing ac-
ceptance in the United States."3 If long accepted, pensions were unlikely
to be unconstitutional. Indeed, that they had been instituted in the first
Congress showed that the founders had approved of the pensions." Pen-
sions and bounties, the Court reasoned, induced men to serve their coun-
try and were therefore necessary and proper to carrying on a war.' 5 If
bounties and pensions were legitimate, so were laws ensuring they went
to the people who deserved them, including soldiers' heirs.'" Justice Clif-
ford wrote:
Bounties may be offered to promote enlistments, and pensions to the
wounded and disabled may be promised as like inducements. Past
services may also be compensated, and pensions may also be granted
to those who were wounded, disabled, or otherwise rendered invalids
while in the public service, even in cases where no prior promise was
made or antecedent inducement held out.'17
What made pensions from the federal government legitimate was a
loose understanding of exchange; men had served and could be paid,
even if they had not been promised the payment before they served.
Those payments became something akin to property-something they
could pass on to their children. A man's service in war earned him pay-
ments in a way that exempted his children from seeking their payments
as a matter of unearned charity from the state.
The early relationship between obligations of and to the states and
the "general" government emerged in cases discussing public subsidies
to the draft. After 1863, the first year of conscription, localities would
pay money to raise volunteers to meet their towns' obligation to the fed-
eral government for the draft. ' Alternatively, sometimes groups would
pay the money, and the township would reimburse the group."° The obli-
102. Hall, 98 U.S. at 351; see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have power...
[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers....").
103. Hall, 98 U.S. at 346-51. As stated by Justice Clifford:
Power to grant pensions is not controverted, nor can it well be, as it was exercised by
the States and by the Continental Congress during the war of the Revolution; and the ex-
ercise of the power is coeval with the organization of the government under the present
Constitution, and has been continued without interruption or question to the present time.
Id. at 346.
104. Id. at 346, 350-51.
105. Seeid. at 351.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, 119 (1864) (adjudging the constitu-
tionality of using town funds in establishing bounties to assist in satisfying the town conscription
obligations); see also Hilbrish v. Catherman, 64 Pa. 154, 158 (1870).
109. See, e.g., Tyson v. School Dirs., 51 Pa. 9, 10-11 (1865) (discussing Halifax township
legislation establishing a bounty association and finding an act calling for the reimbursement of
funds expended by the bounty association unconstitutional).
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gation to the federal government was an obligation of the individual, not
the locality. Therefore the localities could not constitutionally assist indi-
viduals, reimbursing them for expenses they incurred in meeting their
draft obligations. But if a collectivity paid not just for its members but for
the obligations of the town as a whole, reimbursing the collectivity was
not spending for a private purpose but for the public purpose of assisting
the male citizenry as a whole (usually simply described as the citizenry)
to meet their obligations. State cases in the 1860s turned on these ques-
tions, not explicitly on the virtues of masculinity or concern for feminine
dependency. When Cooley wrote on taxation, he first emphasized the
limits on what the states could do,"' while elsewhere urging the impor-
tance of the federal government's recognizing the importance of danger-
ous service in war."'
The individual quality of service emerged in the later cases, long
after the, Civil War. In 1912 the Connecticut court held pensions were
unconstitutional because they would reward service long ago rendered,
quite possibly in some other state. ' 2 In 1913 the Kentucky court in Bos-
worth v. Harp"3 held that state pensions for Civil War soldiers were con-
stitutional."' In so doing, the court ascribed to men, women and children
their proper roles, with men protecting women and children."' The court
justified payment to Confederate soldiers by arguing that they had fought
for a principle-the principle of state sovereignty." ' Fifty years after the
war, the court resurrected northern criticism of the South and of Dred
Scott.. in Bosworth, holding that such criticism justifiably alarmed Ken-
tucky citizens in the 1850s."' Furthermore, the court referred to John
Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry as an effort to "massacre... the women
and children of the State,""' 9 describing the women and children as "de-
fenseless."'" Pensions depended on masculine service which in turn
rested on a contrast with the intrinsic helplessness of women and chil-
dren. In that context, payment for service was justified. In conclusion,
the court held:
So long as the courage of the battlefield or the risking of one's life for
his country is honored and it is the policy of the State to promote the
110. See COOLEY, supra note 89, at 76-83.
111. Id. at lO0.
112. Beach v. Bradstreet, 82 A. 1030, 1032-34 (Conn. 1912).
113. 157 S.W. 1084 (Ky. 1913).
114. Bosworth, 157 S.W. at 1088 ("[A] tax is levied for public purposes [and therefore satisfies
constitutional requirements] where the money is used to pay a pension granted in consideration of
public services.").
115. Id. at 1086 (discussing John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry).
116. Id. at 1085-87.
117. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
118. Bosworth, 157 S.W. at 1087.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1086 (arguing that John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry "deeply stirred the South,
for the defenseless women and children would be the first to suffer").
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loyalty and patriotism of the people by fostering the martial spirit,
such services constitute a reasonable basis for classification. The
honor due to the true and the brave is not limited to those who are
successful in the struggle.1
2'
The dissenting justice rather mildly pointed out that fighting for a losing
side in a civil war was not service to the state.'
2
The irony of emphasizing the masculinity inherent in the
dangerousness of war is that war puts men in a highly feminized posi-
tion, making the maintenance of masculinity that much more difficult.
Judith Lewis Herman argues that men's psychological troubles resulting
from the trauma of war and women's psychological ills resulting often
from the trauma from domestic violence and sexual abuse lead to the
same complex of disorders. '23 Most poignantly, Pat Barker describes how
men's trauma in World War I resembled poor women's everyday lives:
Rivers [a military psychiatrist] had often been touched by the
way in which young men, some of them not yet twenty, spoke about
feeling like father to their men. Though when you looked at what they
did. Worrying about socks, boots, blisters, food, hot drinks. And that
perpetually harried expression of theirs. Rivers had only ever seen
that look in one other place: in the public wards of hospitals, on the
faces of women who were bringing up large families on very low in-
comes, women who, in their early thirties, could easily be taken for
fifty or more. It was the look of people who are totally responsible for
lives they have no power to save.
One of the paradoxes of the war-one of the many-was that
this most brutal of conflicts should set up a relationship between offi-
cers and men that was ... domestic. Caring. As Layard would un-
doubtedly have said, maternal. And that wasn't the only trick the war
had played. Mobilization. The Great Adventure. They'd been mobi-
lized into holes in the ground so constricted they could hardly move.
And the Great Adventure-the real life equivalent of all the adventure
stories they'd devoured as boys-consisted of crouching in a dugout,
waiting to be killed. The war that had promised so much in the way of
"manly" activity had actually delivered "feminine" passivity, and on
a scale that their mothers and sisters had scarcely known.2
121. Id. at 1088.
122. In dissent, Justice Lassing noted:
I concede that the Confederate soldiers were brave men, and that they fought with a cour-
age and determination that challenged the admiration of the civilized world; but by the
arbitrament of the sword every principle for with they contended was decided against
them. The integrity of the Union was preserved. While theirs was a brave, gallant, and
heroic fight, I cannot bring myself to believe that in their struggle for the lost cause they
rendered either the national or the state government a "public service" within the mean-
ing of these words as found in the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 1088 (Lassing, J., dissenting).
123. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND REcOVERY 7-32 (1992).
124. PAT BARKER, REGENERATION 107-08 (1993).
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Barker is discussing the First World War; the pensions I will discuss are
from the Civil War. But the scarcity that Barker notes, the inability to
care for people for whom one is responsible, also colored the Civil War.
Noting these continuities contributes to the understanding that drawing
rigid distinctions on the basis of gender is a matter of artifice.
V. PENSIONS AND THE NORMATIVE FAMILY
Men were concerned about enlisting for the army during the Civil
War because they did not want to leave wives and children without mate-
rial support.'25 During the first year of the Civil War, the federal govern-
ment received more than enough enlistments,'" but during the second
year, the government did not, and the generally accepted reason was that
men were concerned with what would happen to their families should
they die.' 7 When husbands, sons, and fathers were enrolled in the mili-
tary and they had been the primary earners, their families could get pub-
lic aid.' 8 But public aid was not available if breadwinners died.'29 Facing
the shortage of soldiers, in the summer of 1862 Congress expanded the
money available to support families: it made mothers and sisters eligible
for pensions and increased rates for widows and orphans.'30 In 1866,
Congress made fathers and brothers eligible for pensions as well."'
Pensions also expanded substantially between 1865 and 1890, in
part through relaxing evidentiary standards for proving family relation-
ships. 2 McClintock argues, however, that the pensions laws eventually
125. McClintock, supra note 1, at 456-58.
126. Id. at 460. This changed with the realization that the war would not be ended upon a single
Union victory, but upon the "'complete conquest' of the South." Id. (quoting General Ulysses S.
Grant on his impressions after the Battle of Shiloh).
127. Id. at 461.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 463 & n.15 (citing Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 2, 12 Stat. 566, 567). Section 2 of
the Act of July 14, 1862 stated:
[I]f any officer or other person named in [section one] has died... or shall hereafter die,
by reason of any wound received or disease contracted while in the service of the United
States, and in the line of duty, his widow, or, if there be no widow, his child or children
under sixteen years of age, shall be entitled to receive the same pension as the husband or
father would have been entitled to... to commence from the death of the husband or fa-
ther, and to continue to the widow during her widowhood, or to the child or children until
they severally attain to the age of sixteen years ....
Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 2, 12 Stat. 566, 567; see also id. § 3 (extending pension benefits to
dependant mothers, subject to some constraints, when a deceased serviceman did not leave a widow
nor legitimate children); id. § 4 (extending pension benefits to dependant, orphaned sisters when a
deceased serviceman did not leave a widow, legitimate children, nor a mother).
131. McClintock, supra note 1, at 463 (citing Act of June 6, 1866, ch. 106, § 12, 14 Stat. 56, 58
(amending the Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 4, 12 Stat. 566, 567-68) (extending pension benefits
to dependent fathers and brothers of deceased servicemen)).
132. Id. at 463 (citing Act of June 6, 1866, ch. 106, 14 Stat. 56; Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 234,
17 Stat. 566; Act of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, 26 Stat. 182 (relaxing evidentiary requirements for
proving pension eligibility)).
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instituted morality requirements for widows, making pensions not simply
a matter of entitlement for women via their association with men, but
also subjecting them to supervision by the state.'33
Husbands were presumed to be the primary support, so when moth-
ers needed the pensions they had to explain why their husbands could not
support them.'" Fathers claiming support had to explain why they could
not support themselves.'35 In requiring explanation, the cases implicitly
state what was expected: that men support themselves and their wives.'36
As McClintock states, "the order of family responsibility encoded in
pension policy assumed that women first relied on husbands for support,
then on sons.' 37 When women worked for wages, their wages were gen-
erally lower than those of men, which in turn reinforced the need women
might have had for their sons' support."' Furthermore, parents applied for
pensions sometimes years after their sons had died; for when people aged
it became less likely they could work for wages.'39 With the increase of
time between the death of a son and application for a pension, eviden-
tiary proof of support of the parents became more difficult. 4° Therefore,
the pension expansions during the 1870s and 1880s required a lesser
showing of support by allowing only a showing that a son would have
been willing to support his parents.'41 The government sometimes simply
assumed reciprocal parent/child obligations. For example, one mother
had actually supported her son until he went to war.'42 After that, she be-
came unable to work due to disability. The argument that gained her a
133. Id. at 474-79 (discussing specific examples of state supervision of morality-based pension
requirements).
134. Id. at 467.
135. Id.
136. Cf id. at 467 & nn.25-26 (providing a number of examples of pension file reviews).
137. Id. at 469.
138. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 75; Joellen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy
of Woman Suffrage of the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 135 (1994).
139. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 469.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 468 (citing Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 234, § 13, 17 Stat. 566, 571). As stated by
section 13 of the 1873 act:
[A] mother shall be assumed to have been dependent upon her son.., if, at the date of
his death, she had no other adequate means of support than the ordinary proceeds of her
own manual labor and the contributions of said son or of any other persons not legally
bound to aid in her support; and if, by actual contributions or in any other way, the son
had recognized his obligations to aid in support of said mother, or was by law bound to
such support, and that a father or a minor brother or sister shall in like manner and under
like conditions, be assumed to have been dependent, except that the income which was
derived or derivable from his actual or possible manual labor shall be taken into account
in estimating a father's means of independent support ....
Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 234, § 13, 17 Stat. 566, 571.
For example, one woman received a pension despite the existence of only a single instance of
support by her son in two years because that son wrote a letter evidencing his desire to provide
support. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 468-69 & n.31 (describing the situation of Mary Harth).
142. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 470.
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pension was that surely a son would not have left a mother to rely on
charity once she was disabled.'"
By 1890, Congress eliminated evidentiary requirements by allowing
pensions for all parents, rather than requiring dependence.'" The justifi-
cation was no longer that parents had relied on that support, but instead
that sons owed it to their parents and would have paid it had they not
died in the service of their country.' 5 The pretense, then, was that parents
were not receiving payments from the state, that the state was allowing
men to act in their appropriate masculine role, that of supporting their
parents.
For widows, the evidentiary question was one both of marriage to
the deceased soldier, and her continuing status as a widow.'" Document-
ing marriage was not simple when the records were those of nineteenth-
century localities. 47 Many people were married informally, and slaves
were often forbidden from marrying at all.'" Widows received pensions
as long as they did not remarry; however, the Bureau of Pensions (no
fools they) could see that this established an increased temptation to en-
gage in sexual relations outside of marriage.'" Therefore they wanted to
143. Id. at 470-71.
144. Id. at 471 (citing Act of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, § 1, 26 Stat. 182, 182). Section 1 of the
1890 Act allowed the awarding of pensions to parents of deceased servicemen upon a showing that
no widows or minor children were left and the parents were "without other present means of support
than their own manual labor or the contributions of others not legally bound for their support." Act
of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, § 1, 26 Stat. 182, 182.
145. Id. at 471 (citing Notes of a Conference with Hon. William W. Dudley, Commissioner of
Pensions, H.R. MISC. Doc. No. 48-43, at 24-25 (1884)). William W. Dudley, the Commissioner of
Pensions in 1884, argued:
[S]o far as determining the question of dependence is concerned, the law in its present
form works great hardship in many deserving cases .... Now, I think the spirit of the
pension law ought to reach far enough to provide for a mother who afterwards became
dependent upon the labor of her own hands, or the assistance of others, upon the pre-
sumption that her son would have supported her had he lived.... [A]s the Government
has taken him away I hold that the Government ought to try to make up, to some extent at
least, to the dependent parent for the loss.
Notes of a Conference with Hon. William W. Dudley, Commissioner of Pensions, H.R. MIsc. Doc.
No. 48-43, at 24-25 (1884).
146. McClintock, supra note 1, at 471.
147. Id. at 472. While the Bureau of Pensions preferred marriage records to substantiate mar-
riage claims, they accepted other forms of evidence including witness testimony, child baptism
records, or affidavits by marriage officiating individuals. Id. at 472 & n.39 (citing a number of
congressional documents addressing pension evidentiary standards).
148. Id. at 471-73.
149. Id. at 476-77 (citing Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for the Year 1868, H.R.
EXEC. Doc. 40-1, at 422 (3d Sess. 1868)). The Commissioner of Pensions noted:
Serious abuses of privilege and flagrant violations of morality on the part of claim-
ants under the present system exist, which seem to require that the Commissioner be
clothed with discretionary power to adopt such means as may most certainly vindicate the
purposes of equal justice and good morals.
Widows, in increasing numbers, cohabit without marriage, refusing this solemn legal
sanction for fear of losing their pensions thereby. Others live openly in prostitution for
PUBLIC PENSIONS
supervise the morals of those widows receiving pensions, also contrib-
uting to the artifice that this was not state support but simply in lieu of a
particular man-one who had performed his masculine duty.'"
Given the lack of documentation of marriage, the Bureau of Pen-
sions found themselves accepting evidence of cohabitation as evidence
of marriage.' But they did require evidence of cohabitation, not just its
assertion.'52 Claiming a pension when one had been a slave depended
almost wholly on evidence of co-habitation.'53 Sometimes that evidence
was supplemented with evidence of witnesses or, in one case, the testi-
mony of the son of a former slaveholder that his father had allowed the
applicant and her deceased husband to live together.' In 1864, Congress
allowed pensions to those who were recognized as husband and wife and
who had lived together for two years. '
Allowing pensions to women whose marriages had been informal
meant that the Bureau felt compelled to concern itself with whether a
marriage had been genuine and enduring, or whether it had been a brief
affair.'56 Sometimes relationships fit into neither one nor the other cate-
gory, and indeed, McClintock discusses one instance in which the Bu-
reau of Pensions had to decide to which of two men a claimant had been
married.'57 Annice Morgan was married to Jackson for three years, when
he left to join the navy. "' She claimed to have believed he was dead, and
lived with Lemuel who then left to fight in the army.' Lemuel died,
prompting Morgan to claim a pension as his widow.'" But the Bureau of
Pensions discovered that she had lived with Jackson after the War, caring
for him until he died.'6 ' It was that marriage the Bureau decided had been
the same object. Thus is the government placed unwittingly in the strange attitude of of-
fering a premium upon immorality, of which it should be relieved.
Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for the Year 1868, H.R. EXEC. DOC. 40-1, at 422, 450-51
(3d Sess. 1868).
150. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 476-77 (discussing the perceived need for and early
attempts at restricting pensions to widows on moral grounds).
151. Id. at 472 & n.41 (citing files from the Bureau of Pensions).
152. Id. ("By accepting cohabitation as proof of valid marriages, pension administrators were
following the lead of the antebellum judiciary .... (citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 75, 79-80 (1985))).
153. Id. at474.
154. Id. at 473 (describing the situation of Dilly Bostick).
155. For a fascinating discussion of what constituted evidence of a marriage among slaves, see
Lea Vandervelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J 1033, 1103-10 (1997).
156. McClintock, supra note 1, at 474.
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the genuine one because it was first and because she had lived with that
man longer.162
In making those choices, the Bureau of Pensions enforced a norma-
tive order of monogamy. According to McClintock, part of what per-
suaded the Bureau that someone had been a genuine wife was that the
woman had acted appropriately to the position of a feminine wife.'63 An-
nice Morgan, had nursed the man recognized to be her husband until he
died, which the Bureau of Pensions cited as evidence in its decision.'" In
another case, the claimant had children with the man she claimed to be
her husband, and she nursed him when he was ill.165 Those scripts of what
the Bureau of Pensions would recognize to be a legitimate union empha-
sized an enactment of femininity, one that we need not take to be natural
to marriage or to being a woman." But it was that work of caring, not
farm work or financial support, that pension applicants would cite to
when trying to persuade the Bureau that they were genuine wives. That
anyone was persuading the Bureau that someone was a genuine wife
demonstrates how much it was a script to be performed rather than a
position anyone could make up as they went along. Until 1882, the Bu-
reau of Pensions could only terminate the pension of a widow on her
remarriage, not by virtue of her cohabiting with someone.'67 Despite ef-
forts on the part of the Bureau of Pensions, Congress was reluctant to
allow them to supervise the home lives of pensioners." But after 1882,
the Bureau could terminate a woman's payments for cohabiting with a
man.9 The law of state benefits, as the benefits expanded, codified nor-
mative heterosexual family life.
In a class I taught, students and I had discussed what marriage was.
A student in the class had friends who called themselves married but
because they were lesbian the marriage was not recognized by the state.
The student could not understand what the fuss was about in some Euro-
162. Id. As a result of finding that the Morgan-Jackson union represented the legitimate mar-
riage, Morgan's pension claim, based upon the Morgan-Lemuel relationship, was dropped by the
pension examiner. Id.
163. Id. at 476 ("[B]ecause she acted like a wife, pension administrators restored her pen-
sion.").
164. Id. at 475 & n.46 (citing documents of the Bureau of Pensions and records of the Veterans'
Administration).
165. Id. at 476 (discussing the situation of Kate Staplin, as evidenced in Staplin's pension file).
166. See Butler, supra note 9, at 21.
167. McClintock, supra note 1, at 476-77; see, e.g., Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 247, § 7, 13 Stat.
387, 388 ("[On the remarriage of any widow receiving a pension, such pension shall terminate, and
shall not be renewed should she again become a widow.").
168. McClintock, supra note 1, at 477 & n.50 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 40 Cong., 3d Sess. 678
(1869) (statement of Rep. Perham); id. at 679 (statement of Rep. Boyden); id. at 641 (statement of
Rep. Schenck); id. at 641 (statement of Ebon Ingersoll)).
169. Id. at 477 (citing Act of Aug. 7, 1882, ch. 438, 22 Stat. 345, 345 (stating that "open and
notorious adulterous cohabitation" will be grounds for termination of pension benefits)).
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pean Court of Human Rights cases;17 if people called themselves mar-
ried, they were. Some students tried to define the essential qualities of
marriage, such as monogamy, or living together with affection over the
course of the marriage. Some mentioned that the purpose of marriage
was reproduction, so the capacity for sexual reproduction must be pres-
ent. Other students quickly rejected this, saying reproduction might once
have been the point of marriage but it no longer was. The solution to
some students was to allow anyone who wants to call themselves married
to do so, and to abolish the civil status.
The students are not alone in finding a teleology to marriage. John
Finnis argues that sexuality is only properly deployed when it is open to
the possibility of reproduction; otherwise sexual partners would be using
each other simply for pleasure, not as ends in themselves. 7' Marriage,
according to Finnis, is a non-instrumental communion, offering com-
panionship between two people.' Openness to procreation is "the intrin-
sic fulfillment of [that] communion;"'7 3 because the communion does not
require children, marriage partners can have that communion even if they
cannot have children. That would seem to suggest that gay and lesbian
marriage would fit in his teleology, but it does not. Procreation between
partners is impossible as a matter of biology within gay and lesbian cou-
ples, not just an accident of infertility. Finnis finds this distinction per-
suasive,'4 though possibly infertile heterosexual couples do not, as Dan
Savage's discussion of adoption points out.'75 Finnis's analysis is explicit
about the teleology of marriage;' 6 he might well have approved of the
Bureau of Pensions' effort to decide who was truly married.
I then suggested to students that the criteria of affection and monog-
amy might at times be aspirations, though that was not always the case,
and that the criteria certainly did not describe married reality all the time
for most married couples. Marriage, to be wholly bare bones and pedan-
tic about it, is nothing more or less than a legally recognized status. To
say that it is anything other than that has often implied a teleology along
the lines of what Finnis argues for, one based in procreation. From the
data McClintock provides, marriage has been enforced via state benefits
170. Supranational courts have in recent years addressed what constitutes a marriage. The
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judges disputes under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights that arise in countries that are signatories to the Convention. The Convention includes a
right to family life, and under that right applicants have challenged laws that in effect forbid trans-
sexuals from marrying based on birth registration and prohibitions on same sex marriage. See
Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (1990).
171. John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics &
PUB. POL'Y 11, 27-29 (1995).
172. Id. at 27.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 27-29, 30.
175. See Gay Adoption, supra note 11.
176. See Finnis, supra note 171, at 27-30 (addressing the teleology of marriage in part through
an examination of ancient Greek thoughts on homosexuality).
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to fit with a teleology, and not only based in procreation.'77 There was a
proper way to be a wife and a proper way to be married. Such propriety
involves not just a particular variety of sexual intercourse, but instead
caretaking through illness and long term living together. That too would
seem to suggest that gay and lesbian partnerships could count for the
purposes of state benefits, but the caretaking is taken to be appropriate
for women, not men, and more specifically, to a woman taking care of a
man.
I next address shifts in the evaluation of pensions for firemen, where
the courts turned from evaluating payments as a matter of justified ex-
change between those particular groups who benefited to an evaluation
of public service and its hazards to those who engaged in it. Like evalua-
tion of the constitutionality of state pensions for soldiers, changes repre-
sented shifts in evaluations of the obligations of citizenship and the rela-
tionship between citizen and government.
VI. FIREMEN AND POLICEMEN
Before the mid-nineteenth century, employees were responsible for
only a small percentage of the work done on behalf of the state; even
police were not instituted until the mid to late-nineteenth century.' Ma-
jor cities (such as New York) relied on volunteer firemen and compen-
sated them in two forms: first, firefighters were exempt from military
service,'79 and second, municipalities taxed fire insurance companies and
allocated the money directly to firemen's charities, which often meant
old age homes.'8° The military exemption demonstrates how much this
service was tied to military service in the public characteristics it as-
sumed. To the extent that military pensions rested on a justification that
they induced men to serve by guaranteeing their dependents would be
cared for, and that they rewarded courage and bravery, pensions for
firemen could be understood to rest on the same basis.
The second benefit, allocating money to charities, was challenged,
even before the Civil War. As shown by the following discussion, the
courts addressed what constituted a public purpose. In characterizing
what was a public purpose, courts initially drew on an understanding of
exchange, but not between the general public and the firefighters; in-
stead, the courts noted that the insurance companies benefited from fire-
fighting, so it was equitable to make the insurance companies pay.
177. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 471-79 (discussing mid-nineteenth-century perceptions
of marriage as articulated by Congress and enforced by the Bureau of Pensions).
178. See ERIC MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920, at 31 (1981).





New York had provided for firemen since colonial times, first pro-
viding exemptions from military service for serving as firemen, then
providing public funds for pensions.'8 ' From 1849, the legislature re-
quired that two percent of the premiums collected by foreign insurance
companies in any city be paid to the fire department or corporation of
firemen of the city.'12 In an 1854 case, Fire Department v. Noble,'83 this
tax was challenged as an unconstitutional taking of property for a private
purpose because it benefited a private corporation."" In Noble, the court
held that it did not.' In 1852, Illinois enacted a provision similar to New
York's, in which tax revenues from insurance payments made to compa-
nies incorporated outside Illinois would go to those who were injured
and members of the private firemen's association.' This was immedi-
ately challenged as a violation of public purpose requirements, and in
1859 the Illinois Supreme Court in Firemen's Benevolent Ass'n v.
Lounsbury,'87 upheld it as serving a public purpose.'88
In addressing the constitutionality of these targeted taxes, these
courts did not discuss masculinity and dangers of service; they did not
address the worthiness of beneficiaries at all. Instead, they addressed
taxation as a matter of what historian Einhorn calls "segmented logic":'89
those who benefit should pay, and there is little sense of a more common
general benefit. The courts reasoned that insurance companies were the
direct beneficiaries of firefighting, and therefore states could require
them to pay.' 9 As Robin Einhorn notes, this form of taxation served two
purposes: it raised money for the Firemen's Benevolent Association, but
it did so in a way that gave a competitive advantage to local insurance
companies.'9
The cases addressed by states after the Civil War spoke much more
of general public benefit, and indeed Einhorn argues that the Civil War
brought a sense of common purpose to politics.' 2 It is in this later period
that cases discussed the characteristics required of beneficiaries, empha-
sizing the importance of the courage required for the work and the
181. Id. at 31-32.
182. Act of March 30, 1849, ch. 178, 1849 N.Y. Laws 239. Previously, the state collected two
percent of the foreign insurance premiums, but the collected money was paid directly to the state.
Wilgus, supra note 179, at 32.
183. 3 E.D. Smith 440 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1854); see also Fire Dep't v. Wright, 3 E.D. Smith 453
(N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1854) (utilizing the Noble decision).
184. See Noble, 3 E.D. Smith at 453.
185. Id. at451-52.
186. See Firemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511, 511-12 (1859) (describing the
Act of June 21, 1852).
187. 21111.511 (1859).
188. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. at 515-16.
189. EIm*oRN, supra note 2, at 25-26, 149-50; see Lounsbury, 21111. at 515-16.
190. See Lounsbury, 21 111. at 513; cf Noble, 3 E.D. Smith at 451-52.
191. EIIIoRN, supra note 2, at 149-50.
192. Id. at 224.
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women and children depending on those who risked their lives.9 No talk
of the duty of men or the courage required of them appeared in the early
cases, only a straightforward understanding of the benefits accruing to
fire insurance companies and their concomitant obligations.'" When the
cases began to analyze the courage of men and dependence of women is
when, as Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon argue, the meaning of wage
labor first came to connote masculinity and independence rather than
dependence.'95 The discussion of masculinity appeared as sexual identi-
ties were beginning to be understood as fixed characteristics of human
beings, rather than as descriptions of behavior in which people engaged.
I would not argue that the general intellectual change in perceptions of
sexual identity caused the changes in how the courts understood the
value of pensions. Rather, the Civil War transformed relations of feder-
alism and of politics enough to account for the transformation in focus.
However, the heightened sense of masculinity and femininity in the cases
does fit with the naming and fixing of sexual identities that John
D'Emilio and Estelle Freedman ascribe to the late-nineteenth century.1
96
A touchstone case out of New York in 1883, Trustees of the Exempt
Firemen's Benevolent Fund v. Roome, '" once again challenged a tax on
private insurers to create a pension fund for volunteer firemen.'9 By this
time, localities were beginning to rely on employees for work rather than
on the older system of having direct beneficiaries pay for services. How-
ever, Roome raised a challenge to the older system of pensions. One of
the first and most important civil service cases under the anti-gift provi-
sions in state constitutions, therefore, actually addressed older spending
forms rather than new funding directly from city councils or state legis-
latures to employees. Even so, the court held that the pensions were con-
stitutional, explaining:
With the growth of the city the number of the firemen increased, and
the amount and danger of their service. The old engines, moved with
difficulty and cumbrous and rude in construction, gave place to better
machines, and the service improved as the demand upon it grew. The
dangers of the work were obvious, and a courage and daring which
has gone into history began to leave behind it men who were maimed
193. See, e.g., Trustees of the Exempt Firemen's Benevolent Fund v. Roome, 93 N.Y. 313,
319-20 (1883); see also infra note 197-199 and accompanying discussion (examining Roome).
194. See Lounsbury, 211 II1. at 511 (discussing the constitutionality of benefit legislation, but
failing to discuss the courage of firemen and hazards of service); Fire Dep't v. Noble, 3 E.D. Smith
440 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1854) (discussing firemen's pension issues in a very antiseptic manner).
195. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the
U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNs 309, 316-18 (1994).
196. See D'EMILIo & FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 223-29.
197. 93 N.Y. 313 (1883).
198. Roome, 93 N.Y. at 313.
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and crippled in the public service, and widows and orphans deprived
of their natural protectors and reduced to poverty and want.'99
The tax was therefore not a grant of a special privilege to a private corpo-
ration or association, nor was it a gift from the state to a private under-
taking. The firemen were not state employees and indeed in that sense
they constituted a private organization. But drawing on an older legal
tradition, whether one was in public service or not depended on the
function one served, not the accident of who was an employer or owner.
Roome focused less on the justice of making the insurance companies
pay for the firemen, choosing instead to highlight the needs of depend-
ents and bravery of men. Masculinity implied dangerousness and finan-
cially providing for a heterosexual family.
The world of firemen was actually very male-defined. In the cities,
firemen did not just join together to put out fires. Fire companies were
outgrowths of working men's clubs.' They staged minstrel shows, put-
ting on persona along with blackface that they did not assume in daily
life.2°' Bowery boys, the New York City working class men, some of
whom were volunteer firemen, lived in a very male world, where their
primary identifications were with other men.' Bowery boys also went
out with women, and were known for their rakish ways."3 Defining mas-
culinity may have required dangerousness, but in return the world in
which men spent their time could be very male-defined.
States also began to consider pensions for policemen. In the early-
twentieth century, Illinois considered expanding pensions for police to
police matrons and to police operators, who worked within the police
station.' ° Members of the state legislature threatened a constitutional case
against the expansion; the Chicago Tribune argued that the only police
jobs that deserved pensions were those which were dangerous, thereby
excluding both operators and police matrons. 5 In 1916 the Illinois Su-
preme Court held police pensions to be constitutional, saying that it was
a way of "retiring from the public service those who have become inca-
pacitated from performing the duties as well as they might be performed
199. Id. at 320; see Wilgus, supra note 179, at 33.
200. See ERIC LoTr, LOVE AND THEFr 81-85 (1995); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC
259-61 (1984).
201. LOTT, supra note 200, at 80-85.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 81.
204. See Act of July 1, 1911, 1911 ILL. LAWS 170 (amending the Act of April 29, 1887, 1887
ILL. LAWS 122, by adding section 3a which extended police pensions to police matrons); see also
Lyons v. Police Pension Bd., 99 N.E. 337, 337-38 (111. 1912) (discussing the original Act and the
amendment and finding the amendment constitutional).
205. House Firm on Changes in Police Pension Bills, ILL. ST. J., May 10, 1911, at 1; Police
Pensions Hit Snag, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 1911, at 4.
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by younger or more vigorous men. ' 2 In 1921, the Alabama Supreme
Court also praised the work of the hazardous services as worthy of reward:
[T]he legislature may provide a system, whereby municipalities ... can
increase in efficiency a department designed to protect life and prop-
erty, by providing for the members of its fire departments, their wives
and little ones, after the term of active service has been ended, either by
death or age, to the end that the public may retain in this hazardous
service men of the most faithful and efficient class ... The compensa-
tion thus paid, by whatever name called, is not a gratuity .... 207
Both association in a heterosexual family and proper masculinity
were present in the Alabama court's explanation of what made pensions
allowable. First, state benefits were available as earned to women who
were married to firemen and to their children. °8 Second, masculinity was
characterized as a question of hazardous service; that hazardous service
is what earned a pension.'m Even having earned a pension, a man could
be in a somewhat ambiguous position: they were often paid pensions
because they had been disabled or they were too old to serve. State pen-
sions were a recognition of masculinity but they could shade into com-
pensation for feminizing injuries."'
It would be possible to characterize the cases concerning pensions
for firefighters and policemen as cases concerning gender, rather than
sexual orientation, were one to focus on the distinction. The discussion
of hazardousness--of facing danger-would seem to fit neatly within
what we have long thought of as characterizations of gender. However,
such gender stereotyping operated within a regime of heterosexual fam-
ily life: the state provided pensions for the wives and children.
Dangerousness was masculine in the context of having a wife and child
to care for; women and children were the backdrop against which men
enacted masculinity. The masculine characteristics were difficult to un-
derstand outside a governing system of heterosexual families, just as the
feminine characteristics of caring and nursing were defined as wifely
characteristics in the cases concerning who was a wife for the purposes
of military pensions. Caring and nursing for a man made one his wife;
they did not make one a woman.
Women who were not wives, but rather mothers without husbands,
were forced to rely on other forms of state relief, depending on the rea-
son a woman did not have a husband. Nineteenth-century tort litigation
occasionally compensated women who had lost husbands in industrial
206. People ex rel. Kroner v. Abbott, 113 N.E. 696, 698 (El. 1916).
207. Cobbs v. Home Ins. Co., 91 So. 627, 629 (Ala. Ct. App. 1921).
208. Cobbs, 91 So. at 629.
209. Id.
210. See Seth Koven, Remembering and Dismemberment: Crippled Children, Wounded Sol-
diers, and the Great War in Great Britain, 99 AM. HIST. REv. 1167, 1191-92 (1994) (discussing
injury, war, and feminization in Britain).
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accidents."' Local systems of poor relief and almshouses also sometimes
housed women."2 After 1900, activists argued that women with children
to support should receive payment from the state. While advocates called
these pensions, in line with soldiers' and civil servants' pensions,"3 in the
early-twentieth century states more often considered them unearned
charitable payments. I will outline questions concerning the constitution-
ality of these pensions in the next section.
VII. PENSIONS FOR WIDOWS
Between 1910 and 1920, forty states instituted payments to single
mothers, though the funding in most states meant that very few women
actually received payments."' Some advocates argued that payments
should be seen as something earned, that women were doing a public
service in raising children, and that the polity had an obligation to en-
courage mothers to do a good job of rearing children by paying them for
the work. 5 However, most states enacted the mothers' pensions on the
basis of charity, paid to women who could not otherwise support them-
selves and who proved themselves worthy. 6 In Illinois pensions were
enacted on a more universal basis,"7 but they were quickly changed to a
much more restrictive program."8 In 1914, Arizona also enacted a broad
211. See SKOCPOL, supra note 83, at 290.
212. Cf. ROBERT H. BREMNER, THE PUBLIC GOOD: PHILANTHROPY AND WELFARE IN THE
CIVIL WAR ERA 150-53 (discussing poorhouses and other means of housing the indigent).
213. See MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK: WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE, AND THE STATE,
1890-1930, at 143-48 (1994).
214. See id. at 148 (noting the financial difficulties associated with the mothers' pensions);
SKOCPOL, supra note 83, at 424 (noting the emergence of mothers' pensions in forty states by the
year 1920).
215. See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 213, at 135-36, 143-48; see also SKOCPOL, supra note 83,
at 426 (describing the fears of Mary Richmond, a prominent charity offical, that mothers' pensions
evidenced the "same mixture of motive"-payment of a debt versus charity-as experienced with
soldiers' pensions). Ladd-Taylor differentiates between three groupings of early-twentieth-century
advocates: sentimental matemalists, progressive maternalists, and feminists. See LADD-TAYLOR,
supra note 213, at 7. In discussing women's pensions, she notes that all three groups supported the
pensions, but for different reasons-sentimental maternalists sought to preserve maternal dignity,
assist poor women in fulfilling parental responsibilities, and prevent juvenile delinquency; progres-
sive matemalists viewed the pensions as a means of coping with poverty; and feminists as a means
of renumeration. Id. As a result of these different rationales underlying the groups' support of moth-
ers' pensions, the maternalists sought pension coverage only for those individuals without the "sup-
port of a male breadwinner," while the feminists argued for pension coverage for all mothers. Id.
216. See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 213, at 138.
217. See ILL. REV. STAT. § 175 (Hurd 1912). In pertinent part, the Illinois statute, the first of its
kind, stated:
If the parent or parents of such dependent or neglected child are poor and unable to
properly care for the said child, but are otherwise proper guardians and it is for the wel-
fare of such child to remain at home, the court may enter an order finding such facts and
fixing the amount of money necessary to enable the parent or parents to properly care for
such child, and thereupon it shall be the duty of the County Board ... to pay to such par-
ent or parents... the amount so specified ....
Id.; see also SKOCPOL, supra note 83, at 428.
218. See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 37, 3416(l)-(21) (Callaghan 1913-1916); see SKOCPOL, supra
note 83, at 429. For example, the amended version limits pension disbursements to "[a] woman
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pension plan which included a provision for the elderly.2"9 Two years
later, the Arizona Supreme Court struck down these pensions in State
Board v. Buckstegge,2° because, in part, they did not adhere to a wholly
charitable framework.22' Because the program was not closely enough
means-tested, it gave support to too many women." The Chief Justice
writing for the majority stated:
I think the theory upon which a pension system of this kind
must be sustained is that the state owes a duty to take care of the un-
fortunate members of society who, by reason of age or mental or
physical infirmity, are unable to care for themselves, and are not the
owners and possessors of property sufficient to sustain them from
want and beggary. Certainly a citizen and taxpayer ought not to be
made or required to help pay pensions to those who have enough and to
spare of the world's goods. I can think of no principle of law or jus-
tice that could be invoked to sustain a law that required him to do so.
2
2
In other words, a plea of total dependency was the price of social spend-
ing outside service to the state. Women as mothers and not wives of civil
servants or soldiers were analogous to the ill and disabled rather than to
civil servants or soldiers. By its reasoning in Buckstegge, the Arizona
Supreme Court did not accept that women were serving the state by
raising children.2
In sharp contrast with some of the soldiers' pension cases, courts
addressing mothers' pensions did not provide homage to the work of
mothering as that evidenced in courts addressing the patriotic work of
soldiering. In Buckstegge, the appellants challenged the program as not
whose husband is dead or whose husband has become incapacitated for work by reason of physical
or mental infirmity ... provided such woman has had a previous residence for three years in the
county... and is the mother of a child or children." ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 37, 1 3416(2).
219. See Act of Nov. 3, 1914, 1915 Ariz. Sess. Laws 10, reprinted in State Bd. v. Buckstegge,
158 P. 837, 838 (Ariz. 1916). The Arizona law stated in part:
[Iln order to care for aged people and people incapable of earning a livelihood by reason
of physical infirmities, and widows or wives whose husbands are in penal institutions or
insane asylums, they being mothers of children who are under the age of sixteen (16)
years, a system of pensioning is hereby established.
Act of Nov. 3, 1914, 1915 Ariz. Sess. Laws 10 § 2.
220. State Bd. v. Buckstegge, 158 P. 837 (Ariz. 1916).
221. Buckstegge, 158 P. at 841-42. The court also recognized that the title of the legislation
submitted to voters did not adequately convey that the pension plan would supplant almshouses
currently used to house the poor, in violation of the Arizona Constitution. Id. at 840-41; see ARIZ.
CONST. art. IV, § 13 ("Every Act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected
therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title .....
222. See Buckstegge, 158 P. at 841-42.
223. Id. at 842 (Ross, C.J.).
224. See id.
225. Compare, e.g., id. at 838-42 (addressing mothers' pensions), with Bosworth v. Harp, 157
S.W. 1084, 1085, 1087-88 (Ky. 1913) (addressing soldiers' pensions). For example, the Bosworth
court, in finding that soldiers' pensions applied to soldiers fighting for the Confederacy, ended their
decision with the following statement:
PUBLIC PENSIONS
generous enough, and as replacing almshouses with inadequate pay-
ments. 6 In emphasizing that point, the appellants likened pensions to
leaving a baby on the street with $6 pinned to her (the monthly amount
paid for a child), and saying the father was no longer liable for support.
2 27
That is, the state was directly taking the place of a man. The state could
not meet its obligations with a set monthly payment anymore than a fa-
ther might have.
Women receiving pensions had to conform to an image of hetero-
sexuality, but they need not have a man around. In return for payments,
the state often provided quite intrusive supervision, checking to see if
one had a man in the house (which was unacceptable). Protection had
its price; when one gains protection, one depends on the protector's
rules.'
Pensions law was one arena that structured what it meant to be a
family. What it meant to be a family reinforced heterosexual norms:
women lived with men and were dependent on them, and children were
dependent on fathers' income and mothers' care. Men were independent,
including when they called upon state payments, because they had
earned those payments. The task for this article has been to make some
move toward understanding what has marked straightness, linking that to
the emergence of individualized state benefits in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries. Because we live in a world where straight cul-
ture dominates, we are, on the whole, well aware of these markers. I
simply want to set these characteristics into a different context, one that
highlights their connection to straightness. I would not argue that the
availability of state benefits cause heterosexuality or is a primary reason
for men and women living together. I only want to note how state pro-
grams might reinforce it.
The late-nineteenth century was a time in which sexual identities
were becoming less flexible and more obviously marked, in particular for
gay men. For wealthy women, sexual ambiguity was possible, and in-
So long as the courage of the battle field or the risking of one's life for his country is
honored, and it is the policy of the state to promote the loyalty and patriotism of the peo-
ple by fostering the martial spirit, such services constitute a reasonable basis for classifi-
cation. The honor due to the true and the brave is not limited to those who are successful
in the struggle. Greece still honors the Spartans who defended the pass at Thermopylae.
The names of Wallace and his comrades are yet household words in Scotland. They who
died at the Alamo are honored of all Americans. The state may show that the republic is
not ungrateful to these men not only by erecting monuments to them when dead or plac-
ing flowers on their graves, but it may with equal propriety gladden their hearts while
living and in their infirmnity give them bread.
Bosworth, 157 S.W. at 1088.
226. See Buckstegge, 158 P. at 841.
227. Brief for Appellant, State Bd. v. Buckstegge, 158 P. 837 (Ariz. 1916) (No. 1456) (on file
with author).
228. See SKOCPOL, supra note 83, at 467-68.
229. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY
168-70 (1995) (discussing the state and protection).
19981
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
deed virtually necessary for a career, since it was difficult to care for a
man and children while also being active in, for example, social welfare
work. Linda Gordon notes that many of the white women active in social
welfare in national political networks were unmarried. ' o While the late-
nineteenth century might have provided some flexibility for upper class
women, legal practices were working at fixing identity, and state pay-
ments contributed. Megan J. McClintock argues that the administration
of civil war pensions fixed a normative family, one that had all the trap-
pings of state-recognized legitimacy."1
VIII. CONCLUSION
The late-nineteenth century developed an understanding of homo-
sexuality based on a medical model in which it was a distinctive perver-
sion and a quality of individuals. The effect was to both make people
more reticent in personal letters and, perhaps paradoxically, to make
sexuality more often spoken of as a way of policing it. At the same time,
governing was becoming less a matter of ensuring that those who bene-
fited paid and more a matter of ensuring that what the government did
was a matter of general benefit. The more direct relationship implied in
the revised supervision of public purpose-from whether a tax targeted
on fire companies, or reimbursement to a collectivity for raising draft
substitutes, was public to whether the individual men had earned the pen-
sion from the payments-meant that qualities implied in the work, rather
than only the nature of the exchange, would be examined. Celebrating
qualities required to be a soldier or fireman accompanied, neither causing
nor caused by, changes in political relations more generally.
Clearly, the cases we have seen from the latter part of the nineteenth
and the early-twentieth centuries discuss a marked femininity and mas-
culinity. These markers of dangerousness and dependence would usually
be discussed as markers of gender rather than sexual orientation, and
indeed I have done so in another article."2. Linda Gordon and Nancy
Fraser expand our understanding of what is implied by gender by noting
how dependence and independence have been interpreted in changing
ways historically, arguing that they have been marked as feminine and
masculine. 33
230. GORDON, supra note 77, at 111-13. It was more common, however, for African American
activist women to be married and have children. Id.
231. McClintock, supra note 1, at 479-80; see also discussion supra Part V (addressing pen-
sions and the normative family through a discussion of McClintock's work on Civil War and post-
Civil War pensions).
232. Sterett, supra note 84, at 315-18 (discussing women as dependents of men and recogniz-
ing this as a marker of gender, rather than sexual orientation).
233. Fraser & Gordon, supra note 195, at 316-18.
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Masculinity and femininity were, in the pensions cases, associated
with living in a heterosexual family. Women were dependent-that was
an acceptable feminine characteristic; but they were dependent on men as
"their natural protectors," as the New York Firemen's cases had it. I
would argue we could as easily see these cases as being about sexual
orientation; that is, they concern how to be a heterosexual man or woman
and how to keep one's part in the marriage bargain. Switching frames
from gender to sexual orientation is not a simple substitution of one term
for another, as though neither signifies very much. For as we have seen,
markers of dependence went along with the fact that clients were women,
which in turn went along with their having been dependent on a man-a
man who could no longer be depended upon. Andrew Koppelman argues
that sexual orientation discrimination is "really" gender discrimination,
because gay men and women are discriminated against on the basis of
traits associated with femininity or masculinity. 5 I would argue that
there is no "really," except for the convenience of making a plausible
claim in Title VII.
Gender discrimination cannot be wholly seen as a matter of dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation, because feminine, straight
women are sometimes discriminated against precisely because of their
femininity. But because evaluating sexual orientation is a matter of
measuring "proper" ways to behave, it is about the imposition of gender.
We can choose to highlight or emphasize one framework over another,
but to say something is one or the other implies a preexisting differentia-
tion of the categories I find implausible.
234. Trustees of the Exempt Firemen's Benevolent Fund v. City of New York, 93, N.Y. 313,
320 (1883) ("The dangers of [firefighting] were obvious, and a courage and daring which has gone
into history began to leave behind it men who were maimed and crippled in the public service, and
widows and orphans deprived of their natural protectors and reduced to poverty and want." (em-
phasis added)).
235. See discussion supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
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RECONSTRUCTING MARRIAGE: AN INTERSEXIONAL
APPROACH
MARTHA M. ERTMAN*
The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of
ownership is not constant through the ages. The faggots must be put
together and rebound from time to time.'
INTRODUCTION
Commercialization of heterosexual relations, specifically marriage,
has the potential to further the goals of queer theory by undermining
gender and sexual orientation hierarchies. Focusing on marriage arguably
implements Dorothy Allison and Esther Newton's imperative that queer
theorists "deconstruct heterosexuality first,"2 rather than deconstruct gay,
lesbian and bisexual identity while paradoxically leaving unchallenged
constructions of heterosexuality as natural, essential, superior, or inevita-
ble. One way to deconstruct (and reconstruct) marriage is to attach value
to labor done by homemakers for their families. While homemaking la-
bor could be commodified using various market-based models,3 I have
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., Wellesley College; J.D.,
Northwestern University School of Law. This essay benefited considerably from comments from the
University of Denver InterSEXionality Symposium participants, including Nan Boyd, Pat Cain,
Mary Anne Case, Alan Chen, Fred Cheever, Roberto Corrada, David Cruz, Nancy Ehrenreich,
Karen Engle, Katherine Franke, Sheila Hyatt, Cathy Kemp, Jean Love, Julie Nice, Ana Ortiz, Karla
Robertson, Jane Schacter, Susan Sterett, Kendall Thomas, and Frank Valdes. The University of
Denver College of Law supported this essay by funding the InterSEXionality Symposium, the
InterSEXionality reading group, and the research for this essay.
1. BENJAMiN CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928). Another
commentator on the reinvigoration of alimony used this quotation as an epigram in her comment on
Joan Williams' proposal to redefine family wealth entitlements. See Emily Field Van Tassel,
Rebinding the Sticks: A Comment on Is Coverture Dead?, 82 GEO. L.J. 2291 (1994) (commenting on
Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994)).
2. The danger of queer theorists applying constructionist analysis only to discuss gay and
lesbian issues is that doing so deconstructs homosexuality, leaving heterosexuality in its naturalized,
superior position. Dorothy Allison and Esther Newton foresaw this danger and produced buttons
demanding that queer theorists "Deconstruct Heterosexuality First." Lisa Duggan, Queering the
State, in SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 179, 185 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D.
Hunter eds., 1995) [hereinafter SEX WARS].
3. Other commentators have suggested partnership models as appropriate vehicles to justify
post-divorce income sharing. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs
and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2454-60 (1994); Cynthia
Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership
Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 71 (1993). A recent article
analyzes premarital agreements by exploring how U.C.C. Article 2, by analogy, might govern their
terms and enforcement. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of
1215
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
proposed elsewhere that marriage be commercialized through Premarital
Security Agreements, or PSAs.'
PSAs would establish a debtor/creditor relationship between
spouses in order to quantify and value homemaker contributions to fam-
ily wealth. Governed by the same rules as Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, PSAs would arise at the beginning of the marriage,
and would recognize homemaker contributions to family wealth by
treating the primary homemaker as a creditor in relation to her' primary
wage-earning spouse. The debt is based on the primary homemaker's
contributions to the joint marital enterprise. Specifically, the primary
wage-earner would be indebted to the primary homemaker for the value
of the homemaker's domestic labor and lost opportunity costs, which
enable him to attain "ideal worker" status.' If the marriage endures, the
primary wage-earner pays his debt to the homemaker by sharing with her
the stream of income he enjoys by virtue of his ideal worker status. If
instead the spouses divorce, the divorce would constitute default on the
loan, entitling the primary homemaker to foreclose on collateral (desig-
nated as 50 percent of marital property) in order to get the expected re-
turn (continued sharing of the primary wage-earning spouse's income)
on her loan of homemaking services and lost opportunity costs. The
amount of the debt would be calculated as an annual payment equal to 30
percent of the difference between the spouses' income at the time of di-
vorce. These payments would continue for a period of years equal to half
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145, 188-89
(1998).
4. For a fuller analysis describing how PSAs could commercialize marriage, see Martha M.
Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work Through Premarital
Security Agreements, 77 TEx. L. REv. 17 (1998) [hereinafter Ertman, Commercializing Marriage].
5. This essay uses female pronouns to refer to primary homemakers and male pronouns to
refer to ideal workers, since women and men are likely to play these respective roles in typical
heterosexual marriages. The adjective "primary" reflects the wage labor of many people who also
have primary responsibility for homemaking. In 1996, 70 percent of married mothers participated in
the wage labor force. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 404 tbl. 631 (117th ed. 1997). But many of these women tailor their work
force participation to accommodate caregiving responsibilities. They might, for example, work part
time, only part of the year, or near home. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
EQUALITY 41, 60 (1988). Consequently, women on average earn less than men. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at 26-27 tbl. 7
(1997). This gendered wage gap occurs in all racial groups, but is less pronounced between men and
women of color than between white men and women. Id. Regardless of their employment status,
women in heterosexual relationships do most of the housework. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE
SECOND SHIFT 8 (1989). These patterns suggest the accuracy, on average, of using female pronouns
to describe primary homemakers and male pronouns to describe primary wage-eamers. However,
there is nothing in the proposed Premarital Security Agreements that requires that gender or sex
determine which role a spouse plays, or even that there be a primary homemaker and an ideal
worker. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 75-76.
6. Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227,
2255-56 (1994) ("A wife who shoulders childrearing and other domestic responsibilities allows her
husband... to perform as an ideal worker.").
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the duration of the marriage plus the difference between 18 and the age
of the youngest minor child.
Set out as a formula, the calculation looks as follows:
Annual Payment Duration
(.3(high income - low income)) (length of marriage + (18 - age of youngest minor child))
7
2
PSAs are the latest contribution in a wave of recent scholarship
which has sought to create a theory of alimony to alleviate the twin
problems of displaced homemaker indigency and the general devaluation
of women's work in both the home and market. Most analysis regarding
reinvigorating alimony falls into four categories: legal economic and
liberal, cultural, or radical feminist. Perhaps due to ideological divides
between these approaches, no single proposal has generated broad-based
support. Commercializing marriage through PSAs has the potential to
achieve this cross-over appeal by satisfying much of what these disparate
proposals seek to achieve.8 In Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for
Valuing Women's Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, I
explain how PSAs would operate, and contend that PSAs have the po-
tential to appeal to legal economic as well as liberal, cultural, and radical
feminist approaches.
This essay further develops the crossover potential of PSAs, ex-
ploring whether commercializing marriage through PSAs has the poten-
tial to queer marriage doctrine.'" If so, such commercialization would
doctrinally implement some of the insights of intersectionality theory, as
it implicates (to a greater or lesser extent) sex, gender, class, and sexual
orientation." Consistent with the theme of this Symposium, this approach
could be described as InterSEXional."
7. For further discussion of the amount of the marital debt secured by the premarital security
interest, see Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 43-50.
8. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 63-97.
9. Id.
10. "Queer" is increasingly used as a verb to describe the application of queer theoretical
insights to various contexts. See, e.g., CARL F. STYCHIN, LAW'S DESIRE: SEXUALITY AND THE
LIMITs OF JUSTICE 150 (1995) (contending that the majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), "'queers' the statute so that the boundary between acts and identities is muddied");
Duggan, supra note 2, at 179 ("The time has come to think about queering the state."); Jonathan
Goldberg, Introduction to QUEERING THE RENAISSANCE 1, 1 (Jonathan Goldberg ed., 1994) ("[T]he
process of queering the Renaissance has been under way for some time."). While the definition of
the term "queer" is deliberately left open to minimize essentialist dangers, when used as a verb it
generally connotes applying the insights of queer theory to new contexts, such as law, activism, or
history. To queer something is often to turn it on its head, show the contingency of its underpinnings,
and perhaps reveal the subversive potential in something that seems to be the very cornerstone of
traditional gender relations.
11. Some theorists might object to describing an analysis that accounts for dominant identities,
such as heterosexuality, as intersectional (or interSEXional). For example, Peter Kwan states:
[S]traight white maleness arguably is a multiple identity, but intersectionality theorists
would resist the claim by straight white males that theirs is an intersectional subjectivity.
Central to intersectionality theory is the recovery of the claims and identities of those
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Part I of this essay briefly describes PSAs and sketches how they
have the potential to appeal to a wide range of ideological positions. Part
II expands this analysis to speculate what various queer theorists might
appreciate and/or object to about PSAs. Specifically, PSAs might interest
queer legal theorists because they could implement the insights of queer
theory by: (1) revealing the constructed nature of heterosexuality and
thus undermining compulsory heterosexuality; 3 (2) accounting for gen-
der performativity and strategic provisionality;"' (3) queering the state;"
(4) intervening in legal conflations of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation; 6 and/or (5) creating social space for same-sex marriage by
focusing marriage doctrine on economic rather than gendered or sexed
aspects of heterosexual marriage." Some queer theorists might object to
the way that PSAs could buttress compulsory heterosexuality, reinforce
race and class hierarchy by treating white, middle and upper-middle class
marriages as paradigmatic, and/or ignore important concerns of many
people of color and poor people by focusing on marriage as the major
who, like African-American women, are pushed to the margins of the racial discourse
because of assumptions of patriarchal normativity, and simultaneously pushed to the
margins of the feminist discourse because of assumptions of racial normativity.
Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1275
(1997). Given the importance of deconstructing unmarked as well as marked categories, and in
particular deconstructing heterosexuality first or at least concurrently with deconstructing
marginalized sexual identities, see supra note 2, this essay describes its methodology as
intersectional (or interSEXional) despite its focus on some privileged categories.
12. InterSEXionality is a term coined by the University of Denver faculty reading group as we
planned this conference. The term is intended to invoke multiple levels of intersectional analysis
while focusing on sexual orientation. First, it explores ways in which legal regulations invoke race,
class, gender, sex, sexuality, and other identity categories, focusing on sexual orientation as the hub
of the analysis. Second, InterSEXionality engages interdisciplinary methods to understand how
various identities interact under legal regulation. In particular, InterSEXionality applies insights of
queer theory (which actively contests identity categories) to legal analysis (which is firmly grounded
in identity categories). Third, and perhaps most ambitiously, InterSEXionality explores
interrelationships among ostensibly separate identity categories such as sex, gender, sexuality, and
sexual orientation.
13. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN
AND GAY STUDIES READER 227 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Rich, Compulsory
Heterosexuality].
14. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 141 (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE]; Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE OUT: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13, 19 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) [hereinafter Butler, Imitation].
15. See supra note 10.
16. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1995); Katherine M.
Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:
Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation' in Euro-American
Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 129 (1995) [hereinafter Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and
Tomboys]; see also Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex,
Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 161, 211 (1996) [hereinafter
Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy].
17. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419,
1494-95 (1993).
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route for gay/lesbian liberation. 8 Finally, Part III briefly explores the
feasibility and some implications of applying PSAs to same-sex relation-
ships. If commercializing marriage through PSAs has at least some of the
effects suggested, PSAs could well contribute to the transformation of
marriage, perhaps reconstructing it into an institution in which the
spouses are more equal than they are currently. PSAs, moreover, would
shift the focus of marriage doctrine away from sex and gender and to-
ward the economic aspects of the relationship. If PSAs could queer legal
doctrine regulating marriage, they would make an important contribution
toward reconstructing marriage. This reconstructed institution would
further the goals of queer theory by subverting the construction of mar-
riage (and heterosexual coupling) as natural. Once heterosexuality loses
its naturalized status, legal regulations that penalize same-sex sexuality
as deviant lose their justification. In short, queer legal theorists could
make significant headway toward their ultimate goals by focusing on the
(often unexamined) legal regulations governing heterosexual marriage.
I. PREMARITAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS DESCRIBED AND APPLIED
A. Defining Premarital Security Agreements
Premarital Security Agreements mirror commercial security agree-
ments. In a typical secured transaction, a creditor extends credit to a
debtor, who grants the creditor a security interest in collateral to secure
repayment of the loan. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code gen-
erally governs secured transactions when the collateral is personal prop-
18. This essay assumes that queer theorists care about race and class. This assumption, like
any other assertion about queers or queer theory is made difficult by queer theory's deliberate refusal
to define "queer." Some people define queer as not fitting in to the mainstream, and define the queer
community as an "oxymoronic community"
of men, women, transsexuals, gay males, lesbians, bisexuals, straight men and women,
African Americans, Chicanos, Asian Americans, Native Americans, people who can see
and/or walk and people who cannot, welfare recipients, trust fund recipients, wage
earners, Democrats, Republicans, and anarchists-to name a few .... Indeed, since
difference from the "norm" is about all that many people in the "gay community" have in
common with each other, these sorts of "gay and lesbian" gatherings, at their best and
worst and most radical, seem to be spaces where cross-sections of the human mulitverse
can gather together to thrash out differences and perhaps to lay the groundwork for
peaceful and productive futures .... In my most naively hopeful moments, I often
imagine it will be the "queer community"-the oxymoronic community of difference-
that might be able to teach the world how to get along.
Lisa Duggan, Making it Perfectly Queer, in SEX WARS, supra note 2, at 155, 163 (quoting Louise
Sloan, Beyond Dialogue, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Mar. 1991, at 3). Suzanna
Danuta Walters offers the following critique of queer theory:
[I]f all that we share is a nonnormative sexuality and a disenfranchisement, then why not
be totally inclusive? This reduces queer politics to a banal (and potentially dangerous)
politics of simple opposition, potentially affiliating groups, identities, and practices that
are explicitly and implicitly in opposition to each other. To link politically and
theoretically around a "difference" from normative heterosexuality imposes a (false)
unity around disparate practices and communities.
Suzanna Danuta Walters, From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian
Menace (Or, Why Can't a Woman Be More Like a Fag?), 21 SIGNS 830, 838-39 (1996).
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erty.'9 The security interest can arise in several ways: the creditor can
take possession of the collateral, the parties can execute a writing (the
security agreement), or the interest can arise as a matter of law." Exe-
cuting a writing is the typical way to create the security interest. Once a
lender has the status of a secured creditor, it can, upon default, repossess
the collateral.' While not without its critics,22 this arrangement has served
both debtors and creditors by facilitating the extension of credit and by
protecting creditors against the risks of default.
I have argued elsewhere that contemporary marriage resembles this
credit relationship in several respects. 3 In many marriages, one spouse is
the primary wage-earner and the other spouse is primarily responsible for
childcare and other homemaking tasks. Joan Williams has dubbed this
marriage between an ideal worker and primary homemaker "the domi-
nant family ecology."' Under this arrangement, the primary homemaker
contributes to family wealth by supporting her spouse's efforts to be-
come an ideal worker. Specifically, the primary homemaker performs
domestic services that enable the primary wage-earner's full-time, year-
round participation in the wage labor force, and in doing so she also in-
curs lost opportunity costs by devoting primary attention to her spouse's
income potential instead of her own. The homemaker thus extends credit
to her primary wage-earning spouse, expecting to be repaid by sharing the
primary wage-earner's income over the course of the wage-earner's career.
Unfortunately for primary homemakers and their children,' distribution of
family assets and liabilities at divorce does not reflect these homemaker
contributions to family wealth. Since the major asset in most divorces is
19. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1995) ("[T]his Article applies ... to any transaction .. .which is
intended to create a security interest in personal property.").
20. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (1995) (describing how security interests arise under Article 9 by
either possession of collateral or a signed writing describing the collateral); U.C.C. § 9-310 (1995)
(recognizing statutory liens).
21. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1995) (allowing a secured creditor to take possession of collateral without
judicial process if repossession can be accomplished without breach of the peace).
22. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in
Commercial Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 550-51 (1997) (suggesting that Article 9 be amended to
define specific actions which constitute breach of the peace).
23. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4.
24. Williams, supra note 6, at 2229. The paradigmatic marriage in which women are
financially dependent on men may be most prevalent among white middle and upper middle class
marriages. See Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege and Dependency in the Search for Theory,
82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2486-89 (1994). In African American marriages, in contrast, there is less of a
wage gap between men and women, and women are likely to contribute 40 percent of household
income, compared to the 29 percent contributed on average by white wives. Dorothy A. Brown, The
Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 787, 793, 795-96 (1997).
25. Mothers are much more likely to be awarded custody of children of the marriage upon
divorce. Williams, supra note 6, at 2227 n.144 (stating that "fathers gain sole physical custody in
less than 10% of divorces" (citing ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE
CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 112 (1992))).
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the primary wage-earner's stream of income,26 it is particularly unfair that
this asset is usually allocated entirely to the primary wage-earner.
One reason that homemaker contributions to the wage-earner's in-
come stream have not been valued at divorce is the difficulty encoun-
tered in precise quantification of the homemaker's contribution. Precise
valuation is elusive because the value of homemaking can be calculated
in at least three different ways: the cost of replacing a homemaker's
services with market labor; the lost opportunity costs borne by the
homemaker; and/or econometric methods based on economic theory and
statistical analysis. 7 While the lost opportunity cost model is popular
among some commentators," it also has been criticized by feminists be-
cause it focuses only on costs borne by homemakers and fails to account
for the benefits primary wage-earners enjoy as a result of traditional gen-
dered divisions of domestic labor. 9 Rough figures for quantifying the
way that primary wage-earners benefit from their spouses' homemaking
are suggested by two studies indicating that men whose wives do not
participate in the wage labor force earn 20-25 percent more than men
whose wives work for wages.0 I propose a formula for calculating the
debt that accounts for this research. The debt is calculated as annual
payments of 30 percent of the difference between the spouses' incomes
at the time of divorce, paid for a period equal to half the marriage plus
the time until the youngest child turns 18. This formula accounts for pri-
mary homemakers' decreased wages due to their focus on homemaking
rather than wage labor,3' for the contributions custodians of young chil-
dren make to their former spouses' post-divorce income, and also for the
pre-divorce contributions of primary homemakers in marriages that end
after the children are grown. While inexact, this valuation of homemaker
26. Williams, supra note 6, at 2229.
27. See C.C. Fischer, The Valuation of Household Production: Divorce, Wrongful Injury and
Death Litigation, 53 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 187 (1994) (examining valuation of overall "household
production" by applying methods of forensic economics).
28. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1,54-55 (1989).
29. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 3, at 2444-47.
30. Joy A. Schneer & Freida Reitman, Effects of Alternative Family Structures on Managerial
Career Paths, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 830, 831 (1993) (finding that male MBA degree holders with
homemaker spouses and children made 20 percent more than men whose spouses worked for
wages); Linda K. Stroh & Jeanne M. Brett, The Dual-Earner Dad Penalty in Salary Progression, 35
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 181, 195 (1996) (study showing that managers whose wives did not work
enjoyed 11 percent more in salary increases over five years than managers whose wives worked for
wages); see also Tamar Lewin, Men Whose Wives Work Earn Less, Studies Show, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1994, at Al.
31. Remunerating primary homemakers for their contributions to family wealth through
homemaking services and lost opportunity costs makes particular sense in light of the second shift
that most women work in order to make up for their male partner's more modest involvement with
household management. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 5, at 8.
32. For further discussion of the formula, see Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note
4, at 43-50.
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contributions to family wealth improves on the current default rule, which
fails in most circumstances to place any value on home-making.33
In short, PSAs would quantify the primary wage-earner's debt to the
primary homemaker and designate 50 percent of all marital property as
collateral securing the debt. ' Dissolution of the marriage would be the
equivalent of default on a commercial loan, giving the primary home-
maker, like any other secured creditor, the right to repossess and dispose
of the collateral to satisfy the debt. 5
PSAs, like commercial security agreements, can arise in two ways:
either through a writing conveying the security interest, or as a matter of
law. If PSAs are created through a signed writing, that writing should
describe the collateral. In either case the debtor must have an interest in
the collateral and the creditor must give value.36 Creating the PSA
through a signed writing would be simple, since fianc6es could sign the
security agreement when they execute other documents necessary to ob-
tain a marriage license. In the alternative, PSAs could arise as a matter of
law, either through common law or statute. Statutory liens, for example,
grant an auto mechanic a security interest in the automobile to secure
payment for repair services." Society should have at least as strong an
interest in valuing homemaker contributions to family wealth as it does
in protecting the auto repair business. There are advantages and disad-
vantages to each method of creating PSAs, but on balance a signed writ-
ing is preferable for purposes of both record keeping and allowing
spouses to tailor their conduct during marriage to achieve desired results
in the event of divorce.38 To the extent that queer theorists have a stake in
how PSAs are created, they might prefer a PSA created through a signed
33. Alimony is awarded in a minority of divorces. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1989) (describing United States Census Bureau data
indicating that 9.3 percent of women were awarded permanent alimony between 1887 and 1906,
15.4 percent in 1916, 14.6 percent in 1922, compared to Lenore Weitzman's data indicating that in
1968 less than 19 percent of divorcees were awarded alimony and, in 1977, only 16.5 percent of
divorces included alimony awards).
34. It is important to note that the debt and the collateral are separate. Fifty percent of marital
property is collateral securing the loan. Because the most important asset in most divorces is the
post-divorce stream of income, my proposal designates part of post-divorce income as marital
property. The debt, or actual loan, is considerably smaller. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage,
supra note 4, at 52-53. Commercial creditors typically oversecure a loan with collateral worth more
than the loan amount to ensure full repayment of the debt.
35. Tangible marital property could be repossessed and sold pursuant to U.C.C. §§ 9-503 and
504 (1995). Intangible property, such as stream of income, could be accessed through garnishment
proceedings. Garnishment is already used to satisfy child support and maintenance obligations. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-14-111.5 (1997) (authorizing income assignment to collect child
support and maintenance).
36. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1995).
37. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-20-106 to -116 (1997); see also COLO. REV. STAT. §
42-9-104(11) (1997) (establishing liens on property such as motor vehicles upon which repair work
has been done but not paid for).
38. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 55-57.
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writing to one arising as a matter of law because executing the writing
could destabilize gender hierarchies by making the spouses aware of the
way that PSAs alter power differentials between spouses, and also could
increase the possibility of men doing more homemaking in order to avoid
the security interest in their post-divorce income. 9
Whether PSAs are created by a signed writing or by operation of
law, they would dramatically improve the financial situation of many
primary homemakers. Women, on average, suffer a marked decrease in
standard of living after divorce, while men enjoy a marked increase in
post-divorce standard of living. ' The Displaced Homemaker Network
has reported that 57 percent of all displaced homemakers live in or near
poverty, and that divorced women of color disproportionately suffer from
impoverishment."1 This gendered disparity in post-divorce standards of
living could be due at least in part to statutory provisions which discour-
age long-term alimony. 2
39. Queer theorists also might prefer consensual security agreements because they do not turn
on the status of the parties in the same way that repair and mechanics' liens do. See U.C.C. § 9-102
cmt. 2 (1995). On the other hand, statutory liens become common knowledge after sustained use in
the community, so that PSAs could affect the gendered nature of marriage even if they arose as a
matter of law. Some queer theorists might, moreover, contest the distinction between the two ways
of creating a security interest, arguing that the consensual nature of an executed security agreement
is largely illusory given the state monopoly on recognizing marriage and allocating benefits based on
it, paired with the forces of compulsory heterosexuality that push many people into marriage.
40. Lenore Weitzman's famous data suggested that, upon divorce, women's standard of living
decreases 73 percent while men's standard of living increases 42 percent. See LENORE J. WErrMAN,
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 338-39 (1985). Subsequent studies indicate that divorced women suffer a
financial penalty (albeit less of one than that claimed by Weitzman). See, e.g., Richard R. Peterson, A
Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 528, 530-33 (1996)
(replicating Weitzman's research on the same data and finding a 27 percent decrease in women's
standard of living and a 10 percent improvement for men); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Econmic
Consequences of Divorce Are Still Unequal: Comment on Peterson, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 537, 537-38
(1996) (contending that original data no longer exist but conceding a sample weighting error); see also
Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25
DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988) (finding that women suffer an approximately 30 percent drop in their standard
of living in the first year after divorce).
41. Starnes, supra note 3, at 79-80 (citing the Displaced Homemakers Network 1990 Status
Report which states that 61 percent of African American and 62.3 percent of Hispanic displaced
homemakers are poor, compared to 27.8 percent of white displaced homemakers).
42. Section 308 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (U.M.D.A.) provides that a court should
order maintenance
only if... the spouse seeking maintenance: (1) lacks sufficient property to provide for
his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through appropriate
employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it
appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
UNIF. MARRIAGE& DIVORCE Act § 308(a) (amended 1973), 9A(I) U.L.A. 446 (1998). U.M.D.A. § 308
further directs courts to take into account six factors in determining the amount and duration of
maintenance, including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance ... ; (2) the time necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment; (3) the standard of living established during the marriage; (4)
the duration of the marriage; (5) the age and physical and emotional condition of the
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In commercial terms this pattern suggests a market failure in current
divorce doctrine: Homemakers are extending credit to enable their
spouses to become ideal workers, but many are not getting repaid. By
allocating the risk of loss to the primary homemaker, current alimony
doctrine both discourages people from being primary homemakers and
gives primary wage-earners a windfall by allowing them to walk away
from marriage with family wealth attributable to homemaker contribu-
tions. While numerous scholars bemoan the current divorce standards
which devalue homemaking (reflecting and perpetuating the general de-
valuation of women's labor), no single proposal for remunerating home-
making has won support across the ideological spectrum.
B. Premarital Security Agreements' Crossover Potential
Commentators have suggested divorce reforms that could correct
this market failure. Proposals include reinstituting fault-based divorce (or
at least strengthening fault-based alimony), 3 redefining family property
to include the primary wage-earner's post-divorce income, ' reconceptu-
alizing family as a mother and child unit and supporting this unit through
the public fisc," and using partnership and contract principles to divide
gains and losses due to gendered divisions of wage labor and primary
homemaking.' While all of these proposals share the insight that home-
making should be valued at divorce, none of the proposals has garnered
universal support. This lack of consensus is largely due to ideological dif-
spouse seeking maintenance; and (6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
ld § 308(b). Although the U.M.D.A. uses the term "maintenance" to describe post-divorce payments
from one spouse to another, this essay generally uses the term "alimony," as do most of the participants in
the theoretical debate about post-divorce income-sharing. While practice distinguishes sharply between
alimony and property division, experts have faltered when pressed to distinguish clearly between the two.
See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 592-93 (2d ed.
1987). Accordingly, while this essay focuses on alimony, the PSA could as easily be classified as a
division of property.
43. See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage Contract,
8 BYU J. PUB. L. 91, 93 (1993).
44. See Williams, supra note 6, at 2258.
45. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230-31 (1995).
46. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and
Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REv. 855, 885 (1988) (stating that no-fault "alimony, like contract damages,
emphasizes restitution," and that the law analogizes marriage to a business partnership); Lloyd
Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi-Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. LEG.
STUD. 267 (1987) (comparing the marriage contract to a commercial contract); Ellman, supra note
28, at 9-10 (criticizing the application of contract and partnership concepts to alimony and
proposing a lost opportunity cost model); Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal
Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 252, 255-71 (1989) (exploring
various theories upon which to fashion practical distinctions between property division entitlements
and spousal support obligations); Singer, supra note 33, at 1114 (suggesting an investment
partnership model of marriage); Starnes, supra note 3, at 108-09 (proposing a business partnership
model for valuing homemaking).
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ferences among the proposals. As I have argued elsewhere, PSAs have the
potential to attract the cross over appeal that has eluded other proposals."'
Most of the proposals for reinvigorating alimony are either legal
economic or cultural feminist.8 Legal economic approaches tend to focus
on efficiency and deterring opportunism in marriage. Some legal eco-
nomic approaches are also traditionalist, and make normative and posi-
tive claims about gendered specialization in marriage.'9 Cultural feminist
approaches seek to value homemaking contributions to family wealth,
and in doing so protect women and their children from indigency and
near-indigency" Liberal feminist approaches, in contrast, take the formal
equality position that both men and women should be encouraged to
share equally in wage and homemaking labor. Liberal feminist scholars
thus worry that generous alimony rules would encourage women to adopt
traditional gender roles and remain dependent on men." Finally, radical
47. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 63-97.
48. These labels are inevitably reductionist and do not (nor are they intended to) reflect the
full range of feminist or legal economic thought. They do, however, give a sense of the ideological
variation in approaches to divorce reform. For further discussion of these ideological approaches, see
id. at 66, 74-75, 76-79, 88-92.
49. Legal economic approaches include Kristian Bolin, The Marriage Contract and Efficient
Rules for Spousal Support, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 493, 501 (1994); Brinig & Carbone, supra note 46,
at 901-02; June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L.
REV. 359, 414-15 (1994); June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology,
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 958-61 (1991); Cohen, supra note 46, at
303; Ellman, supra note 28, at 11; Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouses' Education:
Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REv. 379, 416 (1980); Elisabeth
M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 35, 62 (1978); Parkman, supra note 43, at 93;
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REv. 9, 94 (1990).
50. Feminist approaches can be described in different ways. See, e.g., MARY BECKER ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 67-118 (1994)
(excerpting six feminist approaches, including the dominance critique of formal equality, a defense
of formal equality, hedonic feminism, pragmatism, socialist feminism, and postmodern feminism).
This essay and Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, define liberal feminism as an approach
which supports legal rules that treat men and women similarly in most situations, cultural feminism
as an approach that seeks to value the work that most women do in the home (and workplace), and
radical feminism as an approach that seeks to deconstruct the dualities of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation that inform the discourse of gender and sex equality. Ertman, Commercializing
Marriage, supra note 4, at 27-28.
Cultural feminist approaches include ideas suggested in FINEMAN, supra note 45, at 232; Ann
Lacquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient?, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1-2 (1996); Ann Lacquer Estin,
Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CM. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 519-20 (1995); Ann
Lacquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 989, 1086 (1995); Ann Lacquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family
Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 803 (1993); Singer, supra note 3, at 2423; Singer, supra note 33, at 1121;
Starnes, supra note 3, at 71-72; Williams, supra note 6, at 2227.
51. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 291,319 (1987); Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault Divorce: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 36 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna Hill Kay eds., 1990);
Herna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U.
CtN. L. REv. 1, 90 (1987); Krauskopf, supra note 46, at 277-78; Perry, supra note 24, at 2519; J. Thomas
Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1102-03 (1990); Barbara Stark, Burning
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feminist analysis (at least the current, poststructural, version of radical
feminism) rejects the dualism of male/female roles and fixed identity
generally. Instead of freeing women to be women (cultural feminism) or
from being women (liberal feminism), 1990s radical feminism suggests
inverting the categories to undermine gender and sex duality and create
thepossibility of an equalitarian model of marriage that does not depend
on male and female roles.5
I have argued that PSAs might cohere with these four ideologically
disparate schools of thought, or in the alternative that PSAs could be a
procedural tool for implementing one of the other proposals. 3 PSAs'
commercial origins and their power to efficiently deter wage-earner op-
portunism further the goals of legal economics. The way PSAs increase
the value of caretaking might appeal to proponents of cultural feminism.
While liberal feminist concerns are likely to arise around PSAs' potential
to create incentives for women to adopt traditional gender roles, liberal
feminist scholars might appreciate PSAs' parallel potential to create in-
centives for more equal distribution of homemaking and wage labor.
Finally, PSAs also serve the interests of radical feminism by transform-
ing the cultural category of economically vulnerable housewife into that
of a powerful market player, the secured creditor. In sum, PSAs may
have cross-over analytical appeal as a solution to the problems of dis-
placed homemaker indigency and the general devaluation of women's
work.
This essay extends the ideological crossover analysis to queer the-
ory, exploring whether PSAs might also cohere with queer legal theory.
In doing so, this essay breaks new ground in its application of queer
theoretical insights to heterosexual family law problems, a considerable
extension beyond the usual focus of queer theory on gay/lesbian/ bisex-
ual/transgendered issues.
II. PREMARITAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS' APPLICABILITY TO QUEER
LEGAL THEORY
Queer legal theory builds on the insights of poststructuralism, femi-
nist and critical race theory, as well as critical legal studies to critique
Down the House: Toward a Theory of More Equitable Distribution, 40 RurGERS L. REV. 1173, 1207
(1988).
52. Radical feminist scholars have been largely silent in this discussion, with notable
exceptions. See, e.g., Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodern
Account of Gender, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1973 (1995) [hereinafter Patriarchy Is Such a Drag]. Some
approaches combine cultural and radical feminist elements. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE ILLUSION OF EQUAITY 47, 176 (1991); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: MARKET WORK
AND FAMILY WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY (forthcoming 1999); Martha L.A. F'meman, Masking
Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REv. 2181, 2215 (1995); Williams, supra
note 6, at 2229.
53. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 63-97, 110-11.
1226 [Vol. 75:4
1998] RECONSTRUCTING MARRIAGE 1227
legal theory and doctrine based on their impact on gay people.' In doing
so, queer legal theory focuses on issues of identity, specifically how legal
regulations turn on identity. Still in its infancy (some would argue, still
gestating), queer legal theory remains in a state of flux. At this moment,
one of its key challenges is to theorize the legal relevance of intersecting
identities." Queer theory thus builds on intersectionality theory,56 striving
to account for the ways that legal theory and doctrine can account for
each person's multiple identities (such as gender, sex, race, class, and
sexual orientation).5" Queer theorists have coined various terms to de-
scribe this post-intersectional approach, including interconnectivity,58
54. I use the term "gay people" rather than "queers" because most queer theory scholarship
focuses on gay men and lesbians. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1462 (1992); Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 161.
55. Two other fora also have addressed these issues. This topic was the subject of a program
sponsored by the Sections on Gay and Lesbian Issues and Minority Groups titled Race, Ethnicity and
Sexual Orientation: Crossing New Intersections in Law and Scholarship at the 1998 Annual Meeting
of the Association of American Law Schools. The Hastings Law Journal also sponsored a
symposium titled Intersexions: The Legal & Social Construction of Sexual Orientation, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 1101 (1997). Most relevant for purposes of the present symposium on
InterSEXionality are the Hastings Law Journal symposium articles focusing on intersections of race,
ethnicity, class, gender and sexual orientation. See Paisley Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and
Gender Non-Conformity in the Civil Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1363
(1997); Ruth Colker, Sexual Orientation: Militarism, Moralism, and Capitalism, 48 HASTINGS L.J
1201 (1997); Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a
Restroom Labeled "Other, " 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1997); Kwan, supra note 11; Francisco Valdes,
Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and
Politics of "Sexual Orientation," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1997) [hereinafter Valdes, Queer
Margins].
It is important to note that not all queer theorists contest all categories. See, e.g., DAN
DANIELSEN & KAREN ENGLE, AFTER IDENTITY at xv (1995) ("Post-identity scholars articulate a set
of strategies that acknowledge our simultaneous and ambivalent desire both to affirm our identities
and to transcend them."); Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of
Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 43, 56, 65 (1994) (suggesting that, unlike the category
woman, the category lesbian is a coherent basis for lesbian legal theory because (1) "[tlhe category
lesbian is too young to be destabilized," and (2) lesbians share a "core experience" of experiencing
and understanding "that transformative moment [of] realiz[ing] . . . personal erotic attraction to
another woman").
56. The ground breaking piece on intersectional theory is Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: lntersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 1241 (1991).
57. Jane Schacter has argued that the anti-gay "discourse of equivalents" compares different
groups in order to decide who is entitled to civil rights protections, thus missing both commonalties
and differences between different forms of subordination. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights
Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 314
(1994) ("While all struggles for social justice must be waged with these links in mind, being
connected and being identical are not the same thing.").
58. Valdes proposes interconnectivity as a theoretical approach which he describes as
an inter-group ethic in legal scholarship that values and promotes sex/gender
inclusiveness in critical endeavors-projects that interrogate not only the way in which a
construct like "gender" affects various groups, but that also interrogate the way in which
sites of oppression are structured, deployed, and operated under the conflation in inter-
connected ways.
Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 211; see also Valdes, Queer Margins, supra
note 55, at 1341 ("[Slecond stage theorizing must go beyond a mere application of conventional
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multidimensionality,59 and cosynthesis. The Denver University Law
Review's InterSEXionality Symposium is one more attempt to theorize
legal approaches to these fundamental problems.
A. Compulsory Heterosexuality and Gender Subordination in Marriage
Exposing legal regimes that constitute and enforce compulsory het-
erosexuality can be viewed as a key function of queer legal theory.'
Thus, queer theorists might support PSAs to the extent that PSAs reveal,
contest, and undermine compulsory heterosexuality. '2 If PSAs contribute
to exposing, challenging, and eroding compulsory heterosexuality, they
both queer legal theory and reconstruct marriage doctrine."
intersectionality to race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.... [A] simple extension... is unworkable
because the doctrinal potency of intersectionality depends on the formal illegality of all biases under
inspection.").
59. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian
Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REv. 561, 640 (1997) (defining
multidimensionality as "a discursive project aimed at unveiling the complexity of subordination and
identity and reshaping legal theory to reflect and respond to this complexity"); see also Berta
Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, Building Bridges: Bringing International Human Rights Home, 9 LA
RAZA L.J. 69, 71 (1996) (pointing out that multidemensionality incorporates many categories and is
not limited to race and ethnicity). Pragmatism might offer a way to understand differences and
similarities between and among groups. Scott Brewer et al., Afterword: Symposium on the
Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1911, 1928 (1990)
(providing transcription of remarks by Jean C. Love, February 23-24, 1990, University of Southern
California Law Center) ("Pragmatism has encouraged us to create a common language and in this
way has helped us move toward a common understanding of the problem [of oppression based on
sex, race, religion and sexual orientation].").
60. See Kwan, supra note 11, at 1281 ("By paying attention to the cosynthesis of categories,
one opens up spaces for conceptualizing identities that do not prioritize one category over others.").
61. By explicitly identifying the compulsory nature of social systems that comprise
heterosexuality, Adrienne Rich could be described as the grandmother of queer theory. But two
considerations call this genealogy into question. First, Rich might object to lumping together
lesbians and gay men, let alone all stigmatized sexual minorities. See Rich, Compulsory
Heterosexuality, supra note 13, at 239 (distinguishing lesbian existence from male homosexuality).
Rich, however, has softened her stance since writing Compulsory Heterosexuality, suggesting in a
1986 annotation to the essay that both lesbian identity and "the complex 'gay' identity we share with
gay men" are relevant. Id. at 253 n.47. Second, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has been accorded the
honor of being dubbed the mother of queer theory. See Duggan, supra note 2, at 182. Moreover,
Rich's statements in Compulsory Heterosexuality likely rankle many a contemporary queer theorist
as essentialist. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 55, at 1329 ("Queer values, sensibilities and imperatives
are .. .suspicious of all essentializing categorization."). Despite these potential difficulties, this
essay persists in understanding Rich's contribution as an absolute prerequisite to the insights of
queer theory. Designating Rich as the grandmother of queer theory emphasizes the generational
specificity of much of queer theory (i.e., the relative youth of many of its proponents), and places
some distance between her and contemporary queer theorists while still recognizing her unique
contributions to queer theory's basic precepts.
62. Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 170 (discussing compulsory
heterosexuality in terms of hetero-patriarchy).
63. But PSAs paradoxically could also support compulsory heterosexuality. This essay
addresses each possibility in turn.
RECONSTRUCTING MARRIAGE
1. Premarital Security Agreements Could Undermine Compulsory
Heterosexuality
PSAs could undermine compulsory heterosexuality in both theoreti-
cal and practical ways. On a theoretical level, PSAs undermine compul-
sory heterosexuality by framing marriage as a political and economic
institution. As a practical matter, PSAs subvert compulsory heterosexu-
ality by making many women in marriage more economically powerful
(and thus expanding female exit options).
First, PSAs undermine compulsory heterosexuality by revealing the
political and economic aspects of marriage. Adrienne Rich emphasizes
that "[w]e need an economics which comprehends the institution of het-
erosexuality, with its doubled workload for women and its sexual divi-
sions of labor, as the most idealized of economic institutions."' PSAs
have the potential to affect both the political and economic aspects of the
"doubled workload for women and [the] sexual divisions of labor" within
marriage. Economically, PSAs make the primary homemaker a secured
creditor with the right to collect the debt upon dissolution. Thus PSAs
make her an economically powerful party in the marriage, a secured
creditor in relation to her debtor/primary wage-earning spouse. PSAs
also reveal and improve the political implications of marriage for
women. As a secured creditor, the primary homemaker enjoys a powerful
role, particularly in relation to her primary-wage earning spouse. The
PSA tempers the weakness of the homemaker role (gendered female and
associated with domestic concerns) by adding to it the powerful role of a
secured creditor, one associated with the market (and thus gendered
male). By importing a commercial model into marriage and assigning the
primary homemaker a powerful commercial role, PSAs thus lessen
power imbalances in the home by adding power to the homemaker's role
and taking some away from the wage-earner's role. In doing so, PSAs
treat marriage as an economic institution, and destabilize the political
and economic power of the traditional marital roles.
Second, PSAs could undermine compulsory heterosexuality to the
extent that they alleviate the economic dependence of many wives on
their husbands, thus expanding homemakers' exit options. Rich defines
compulsory heterosexuality as, among other things, "a means of assuring
male right of physical, economic and emotional access" to women. ' As
long as many women have few reasonable alternatives to marriage, and
social and legal forces penalize them from exiting marriage, marriage
remains compulsory.
64. Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality, supra note 13, at 245.
65. Id. at 238.
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Rich identifies some social forces that push women to marry:
Women have married because it was necessary, in order to survive
economically, in order to have children who would not suffer eco-
nomic deprivation or social ostracism, in order to remain respectable,
in order to do what was expected of women, because coming out of
"abnormal" childhoods they wanted to feel "normal" and because
heterosexual romance has been represented as the great female ad-
venture, duty and fulfillment.6
A queer legal analysis of the compulsory nature of heterosexuality might
build on this analysis by focusing on exit options. If a legal doctrine fa-
cilitates (rather than frustrates) a woman's exit from marriage, that doc-
trine undermines compulsory heterosexuality.
The current legal rule, which provides for only minimal post-
divorce income sharing, reinforces compulsory heterosexuality by pe-
nalizing homemakers who exit marriage. The primary homemaker loses
her share of the primary wage-earner's income because legal doctrine
disregards homemaking contributions to that income. Consistent with
Rich's analysis of compulsory heterosexuality's corrosive effects on
women's freedom, this rule keeps women (particularly women in tradi-
tional gendered roles) in marriages by economically penalizing them for
leaving. Replacing the current standard with PSAs could undermine
compulsory heterosexuality by valuing homemaking labor, and remedy-
ing the injustice of the current rule. PSAs, unlike contemporary divorce
doctrine, allow a traditional wife to exit marriage without substantial
financial penalty. As such, PSAs arguably serve queer theory's agenda of
countering compulsory heterosexuality.
A third way to understand PSAs' potential to undermine compul-
sory heterosexuality turns on the sex discrimination embedded in legal
doctrine governing marriage. Andrew Koppelman has suggested that
heterosexual marriage is grounded on (white) male supremacist ideals, so
that the ban on gay marriage is sex discrimination.67 He, like Nancy Cho-
dorow, reasons that traditional gender roles in marriage perpetuate sex-
ism by creating a family environment in which women are primary
caretakers and men must individuate from their mothers in order to de-
velop a mature sense of self.6" Thus a legal rule which encourages men to
play primary caretaking roles might incrementally alleviate sexism by
undermining this tension between boys and their mothers (and thus be-
tween men and women). PSAs have the potential to further these ends in
two ways. They create an incentive for men to increase caretaking, either
66. Id. at 242.
67. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 201 (1994).
68. See Nancy Chodorow, Family Structure and Feminine Personality, in WOMAN, CULTURE,
AND SOCiETY 43, 66 (Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo & Louise Lamphere eds., 1974).
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by being primary caretakers (because doing so is economically and so-
cially valued through PSAs), or by more evenly dividing caretaking re-
sponsibilities than they do now (to minimize the debt and thus evade the
security interest in post-divorce income). In sum, by creating incentives
for male homemaking, treating marriage as an explicitly economic and
political institution, and increasing exit options for traditional women in
marriage, PSAs have the potential to undermine compulsory heterosexu-
ality.
2. Premarital Security Agreements Paradoxically Might Support
Compulsory Heterosexuality
While PSAs have the potential to undermine compulsory hetero-
sexuality, PSAs also could support compulsory heterosexuality in at least
three ways: (1) PSAs' focus on marriage may contribute to compulsory
heterosexuality by perpetuating the invisibility of lesbian existence;69 (2)
even if more men became the primary caretakers due to the effect of
PSAs they could remain in power;" and/or (3) PSAs could strengthen
traditional marriage by creating incentives for spouses to embrace tradi-
tional gender roles and tying a homemaker's economic situation to that
of her husband. These considerations suggest PSAs could have a more
complex interaction with compulsory heterosexuality than suggested
above.
The first reason that queer theorists might see PSAs as supporting
compulsory heterosexuality is their complicit erasure of same-sex possi-
bilities. This criticism recognizes the problems of attempting to alleviate
the effects of compulsory heterosexuality by reforming marriage, an in-
stitution both closed to gay men and lesbians and historically a corner-
69. See, e.g., Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality, supra note 13, at 227.
70. Id. at 232.
71. A fourth consideration suggests that the current alimony doctrine is not always a tool of
compulsory heterosexuality in that it provides that alimony be terminated or decreased if the
recipient remarries or cohabits with a romantic partner. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 316(b),
9A(1l) U.L.A. 102 (1998) ("Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree,
the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the ... remarriage of the party receiving
maintenance."). Sections 5.08 and 5.10 of the Proposed Final Draft of the ALl DRAFT PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1997) provide that post-
divorce income sharing terminates when the recipient remarries or cohabits (whether the
cohabitation is opposite-sex or same-sex). As discussed above, the general rule disfavoring alimony
supports compulsory heterosexuality by penalizing primary homemakers for leaving the marriage.
But the U.M.D.A. provision cutting off alimony upon remarriage discourages some heterosexual
coupling. PSAs could similarly have complex interactions with compulsory heterosexuality. On one
hand, the stream of payments under PSAs would continue even after the primary homemaker
remarried, so that PSAs arguably might discourage less heterosexual coupling than the current
regime. On the other hand, a divorcee could remarry without affecting her entitlement to a share of
her former husband's income, making remarriage more a matter of choice (and thus less
compulsory). Moreover, because PSAs increase homemakers' exit options in marriage, and few
women are awarded or collect alimony under the current regime, the net effect of PSAs could be a
decrease in the compulsory nature of heterosexuality.
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stone of female and racial subordination.72 But perhaps queer theorists
have been overly shy about addressing heterosexual marriage reform.
Given the commonly accepted construction of heterosexuality as natural,
queer theorists should deconstruct heterosexuality first, or at least con-
currently with marginalized sexual orientations." By deconstructing and
reconstructing heterosexuality, PSAs have the potential to highlight eco-
nomic aspects of marriage, and thus alter the legal understanding of mar-
riage to center more on financial aspects of the relationship than on the
gender or sexual identity of the spouses. Once legal regulation of mar-
riage is less sexed and gendered, the notion of lesbian and gay marriage
becomes socially comprehensible. While same-sex marriage is not capa-
ble of making all gay people full legal subjects,74 it would increase the
cultural visibility of gay men and lesbians generally. Some feminists
even argue that remunerating homemaking labor facilitates lesbian exis-
tence in that it enables women to come out as lesbians by giving them the
economic opportunity to do so."
The second reason queer theorists might question PSAs' ability to
undermine compulsory heterosexuality focuses on whether PSAs have
sufficient power to change gender and sexual dominance, even if they
have the power to create incentives for men to be more gendered female
and redefine the role of homemaker to make it more gendered male by
associating it with market power. Men could retain their superordinate
72. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 53-69 (2d ed. 1980)
(describing the rise and fall of miscegenation doctrine); Koppelman, supra note 67; Reva Siegel,
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997) (describing nineteenth-century doctrinal developments which preserved
gender hierarchies in marriage by eliminating overt hierarchical arrangements but retaining gendered
rules governing domestic labor and domestic violence); see also Lea Vandervelde & Sandhya
Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033 (1997) (analyzing how the Dred Scott case
might have come out differently had Harriet Robinson Scott been the focus of the case rather than
her husband, and in doing so revealing profound racial and gender implications of nineteenth century
marriage doctrine).
73. See Duggan, supra note 2, at 182 (noting the danger of deconstructing homosexuality
without similarly deconstructing heterosexuality).
74. Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 589-90 (noting that social and economic forces would still
function to oppress many gay people even if same-sex marriage were legalized). In a similar vein, I
have argued that the process of gay people attaining full legal personhood may be gradual, stopping
in contract along the way from public condemnation to full legal protections under doctrines such as
marriage. See Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but
Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1107, 1110 (1996) [hereinafter Ertman, Contractual
Purgatory].
75. See Lesbian Women, Power of Women Collective, Lesbian Women: Love and Power, in
ALL WORK AND No PAY: WOMEN, HOUSEWORK, AND THE WAGES DuE 46, 48 (Wendy Edmond &
Suzie Fleming eds., 1975). As one commentator noted in Lesbian Women: Love and Power:
We are fighting for Wages for Housework because this struggle will enable millions of
other women to join us-to identify our struggles and our lives with their own, and, in
many cases, to become lesbian. Thousands of lesbian women are shut behind doors with
their children, only waiting for a bit of power to be able to come out.
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social and economic position even if they were primary caretakers,"6
leaving women subordinate in their new, market role as primary wage-
earners.77 Gendered hierarchies may be so entrenched that one gender
will always be on the bottom. But this possibility should not discourage
all efforts to realign gendered power differentials. The gender status quo
hurts women (as well as gay people), so there is reason to chance a re-
form even if doing so carries the risk of unintended consequences. Per-
haps PSAs would lead some men to become increasingly gendered fe-
male, and others to remain primarily gendered male. Such a mixture of
responses would preclude a monolithic redistribution of male power to
homemaking from the market. Indeed, PSAs could have a range of dif-
ferent consequences and therefore appeal to a broad ideological spectrum
of people.78 If PSAs affect different people in different ways, then they
are not a monolithic solution, but rather one way to destabilize traditional
constructions of sex, gender, and sexual orientation and to create a more
eclectic set of domestic arrangements and social views thereof.
The third and most serious reason that queer legal theorists might
object to PSAs stems from PSAs' potential to encourage both men and
women to play traditional gender roles. By compensating women who
play traditional gender roles in marriage, PSAs arguably buttress com-
pulsory heterosexuality. As I have argued elsewhere, some traditionalist
legal economists might appreciate the way that PSAs cohere with what
they see as biologically determined traditional gender roles by providing
disincentives for wage-earning husbands to opportunistically abandon
their homemaking wives. 9 If PSAs keep women and men in marriage (in
traditional marriages, no less), then PSAs arguably strengthen rather than
undermine compulsory heterosexuality. As Jane Schacter points out, this
may well be the case.'" But there are good reasons to suspect that PSAs
are at least as likely to redefine traditional marriage as they are to rein-
force it.8' Given that the status quo of legal doctrine governing marriage
is already hostile to gay people (through, for example, the ban on same-
sex marriage) and women generally, it seems worth the risk to tinker
76. See Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality, supra note 13, at 232.
77. For a version of this scenario, see If Men Could Menstruate, in GLORIA STEINEM,
OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 366 (2d ed. 1995). Steinem suggests that power
differentials might remain even if male and female biological traits were reversed, satirically
predicting that if, for example, men could menstruate,
[glenerals, right-wing politicians, and religious fundamentalists would cite menstruation
("men-struation") as proof that only men could serve God and country in combat ("You
have to give blood to take blood"), occupy high political office ("Can women be properly
fierce without a monthly cycle governed by the planet Mars?"), be priests, ministers, God
Himself ("He gave this blood for our sins"), or rabbis ("Without a monthly purge of
impurities, women are unclean").
Id. at 367.
78. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 96.
79. Id. at 72-73.
80. See Jane S. Schacter, Taking the Intersexional Imperative Seriously: Sexual Orientation
and Marriage Reform, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1255, 1257-58 (1998).
81. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 75-76, 92-97.
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with it. If nothing else, even a change that turns out to operate to the dis-
advantage of women and gay people creates a precedent for further
changes, some of which might be more successful. 2
In sum, queer theorists may justifiably suspect that PSAs could un-
intentionally strengthen compulsory heterosexuality by furthering gay
people's invisibility and supporting traditional heterosexual marriage.
Because of this dual possibility that PSAs could strengthen or undermine
compulsory heterosexuality (or do both), further exploration is necessary
to evaluate whether PSAs are appropriate tools to further the goals of
queer legal theory.
B. Premarital Security Agreements As Instruments of Gender Perfor-
mativity and Strategic Provisionality
Judith Butler's revolutionary theory of gender performativity (and
her related proposal that radical reforms be strategically provisional)
informs nearly every queer theory discussion. PSAs further the goals of
queer legal theory by accounting for gender performativity and being
strategically provisional.
1. Gender Performativity
In Gender Trouble, Butler suggests that gender is performative, and
that drag has the subversive potential to reveal this performativity.8 3 Drag
reveals that there is no such thing as a prepolitical, essential, or natural
gender, but rather that representations of gender are an attempt to enact a
mythical ideal. ' PSAs could implement Butler's theory of gender per-
formativity by intervening in the constructed female gender role of wife,
adding economic and social power to the wifely accoutrements of de-
pendence and powerlessness, thus simultaneously undermining the natu-
ralized hierarchies of market/family and male/female that currently con-
struct heterosexuality as biological, imperative, and necessarily hierar-
chical.
Repetition is key to Butler's theory of gender performativity. Butler
identifies the "critical task for feminism" as "locat[ing] strategies of sub-
versive repetition enabled by those [constructed identities], to affirm
82. While I am sympathetic to Schacter's insight that "[r]etrenchment can be pretty bleak,"
Schacter, supra note 80, at 1258, this risk might be balanced by the tremendous promise in altering
naturalized constructions of marriage. The no-fault revolution in divorce might not have uniformly
helped women, but it did go a long way toward desanctifying the legal regulation of marriage, thus
contributing to a climate in which PSAs are conceivable.
83. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 14, at 136-39.
84. Id. at 137-38. Butler has clarified that she does not see gender as a free choice, akin to the
way one chooses to wear a dress or trousers each morning. To the contrary, gender norms are part of
what determine the subject, and thus constrain the range of choice one can exercise in performing a




local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those
practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the
immanent possibility of contesting them."8 In other words, Butler sug-
gests that feminists identify opportunities for subversive repetition of
identity constructions, repeat those identity constructions, and in doing
so reveal identity to be socially constructed rather than natural.86
In this same vein, Butler points out that "heterosexualized genders"
are "a kind of imitation for which there is no original; in fact, [they are] a
kind of imitation that produces the very notion of the original as an effect
and consequence of the imitation itself."8 Within Butler's analysis "het-
erosexuality is always in the process of imitating and approximating its
own phantasmatic idealization of itself-andfailing."'8 Legal rules which
expose heterosexuality's perpetual, always unsuccessful, attempt to enact
a mythical ideal demonstrate the performative nature of both gender and
heterosexuality. Since heterosexuality is constructed as the original sexu-
ality (rendering alternatives such as homosexuality poor copies thereof),
queer theorists should welcome any legal interventions that undermine
the naturalized status of heterosexuality.
By inserting an economic creditor/debtor model into heterosexual
marriage, PSAs do just this. Redefining primary homemakers as secured
creditors and primary wage-earners as debtors reveals the economic na-
ture of the transaction between these two players and inverts existing
power dynamics. It moreover subverts the dichotomous hierarchy of
market over family by importing market roles to the family relationship.
Investing politically and economically weak players (here, homemakers)
with the powerful attributes of a market player also erodes the hierarchy
of male power over women (sometimes masked as protectiveness) by
blurring the very boundaries between public and private, male and fe-
male, and market and family, that legitimate the hierarchy. By injecting
this economic model (and giving the homemaker the more powerful
role), PSAs also demonstrate that the complementary roles of gendered
domestic life are neither natural, essential, nor inevitable. Instead, they
are economic, and subject to regulation and change just as any other eco-
nomic institution.
PSAs further undermine the naturalized status of marriage by re-
vealing the performative nature of both gender and of heterosexuality.
85. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 14, at 147.
86. The repetition is endless, since
[glender is a complexity whose totality is permanently deferred, never fully what it is at
any given juncture in time. An open coalition, then, will affirm identities that are
alternately instituted and relinquished according to the purposes at hand; it will be an
open assemblage that permits of multiple convergences and divergences without
obedience to a normative telos of definitional closure.
Id. at 16.
87. Butler, Imitation, supra note 14, at 21.
88. Id.
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Traditionally homemaker is constructed as married, female, and working
for love rather than remuneration. PSAs intervene in the perpetual repe-
tition of this homemaker role, adding the twists that the homemaker's
domestic labors are commodified and that she is a secured creditor.
Combining the (feminine) domestic role with the (masculine) market
accoutrements of a secured creditor, the creditor/homemaker role reveals
the constructed nature of domestic roles. Like a drag queen, the credi-
tor/homemaker "juxtapos[es] gender norms and gender deviance to de-
stabilize the whole structure." '89 The homemaker thus destabilizes the
symbiotic hierarchies of male/female and market/family. This new
creditor/homemaker identity contributes to a radical redefinition of both
male and female gender, and also demonstrates that there is nothing natu-
ral, biological, or essential about either gender or heterosexuality.
PSAs also could reflect the performativity of masculine gender roles
and have the practical impact of creating incentives for heterosexual men
(perhaps unwittingly) to further some objectives of queer theory. If
homemaking labor came with the security and status of a premarital se-
curity interest, perhaps more men would be interested in the job. PSAs
thus might contribute to the erosion of gender hierarchy by undermining
gendered specialization of labor in marriage. Once marriage strays from
gendered specialization, marriage is less gendered, and thus can more
easily accommodate same-sex couples. Feminists and queer theorists
have long recognized marriage's deeply patriarchal characteristics.' If
PSAs made men more likely to participate in homemaking (either pri-
marily or equally with their wives), then PSAs could further the queer
theoretical goal of undermining the cultural meaning of marriage (and
heterosexuality generally) as the only natural sexuality, grounded in
biologically based complementarity of sexual and gender roles.
89. Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 52, at 2004.
90. These inequalities in marriage are deeply rooted. Claude Levi-Strauss described marriage as
the exchange of women, a process in which women are gifts men give to one another to solidify male-
male alliances. See Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157, 173 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975) ("[M]arriages are a most
basic form of gift exchange, in which it is women who are the most precious of gifts." (articulating Levi-
Strauss's theory of marriage as a form of gift exchange)). Under this analysis of marriage rituals, women
are conduits to relationships between men rather than participants in the transaction, objects rather than
subjects. Id at 174 ("if it is women who are being transacted, then it is the men who give and take them
who are linked, the woman being a conduit of a relationship rather than a partner to it.") While Levi-
Strauss builds his argument that all kinship is based on men exchanging women from data gathered on
non-industrial societies, rennants of the exchange model persist in contemporary America. Many
married women do not participate in the wage labor force, marriage enhances men's market
potential, and women do the lion's share of housework even when they do work outside the home.
FUCHS, supra note 5, at 60, 83; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 5, at 8. The view of marriage as an
exchange between men is further supported by elements of contemporary marriage such as the bride
exchanging her father's last name for her husband's, and the father giving the bride to the husband
during the wedding ceremony.
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In sum, PSAs account for gender performativity by adding market
accoutrements to the domestic roles of primary homemaker and primary
wage-earner, and in doing so reveal that constructions of gendered labor
specialization (and attendant power differentials) in marriage are malle-
able rather than natural or essential. PSAs thus deconstruct and recon-
struct marriage by undermining doctrines which allocate family wealth at
divorce in a way that values only market labor and thus perpetuates both
homemaker dependency on primary wage-earners and the general de-
valuation of work deemed feminine. Remunerating "women's work"
would go a long way toward queering legal doctrine that currently re-
flects and constitutes hierarchies in which masculinity and heterosexual-
ity subordinate femininity and gay/lesbian existence.
2. Strategic Provisionality
In addition to incorporating gender performativity, PSAs are strate-
gically provisional. The fundamental instability of identity is central to
Butler's theory of gender performativity (and other poststructural ap-
proaches), and also central to queer theory. Yet legal theory relies heav-
ily on notions of identity, posing serious impediments to importing queer
theory into legal doctrine. A corporate officer's rights and duties, for
example, are dictated by her officer status. Other legal rights and obliga-
tions often turn on sexual orientation status: Marriage, for example, has
wide-ranging legal ramifications.9' Queer theorists have criticized legal
distinctions based on sexual orientation status as incoherent and illegiti-
mate.92 But it remains difficult to see how the law might recognize the
personhood of gay people without invoking the very identity categories
that queer theorists contend are instrumental to sexual orientation subor-
dination. If, for example, Congress passed the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
include sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for employment deci-
sions, this doctrinal change would simply add sexual orientation identity
to the list of other identities that are protected against employment dis-
crimination. PSAs might similarly graft creditor status onto the legal
construction of homemaker and reify gendered specialization of labor in
marriage."
Some theorists suggest that selective use of identity categories, re-
ferred to as strategic essentialism, accommodates pragmatic political
constraints while recognizing the power of queer theoretical deconstruc-
91. For a list of marital rights, duties, and entitlements, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 66-70 (1996).
92. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers
v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1747-48 (1993).
93. Kwan, supra note 11, at 1276-77 (warning against the dangers of reifying marginalized
identities through intersectional theory).
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tion of identity categories.' But most queer theorists warn that strategic
essentialism plays into power dynamics that disserve gay liberation' "
Butler suggests that strategic essentialism risks its own violence, because
in defining the members of any class who deserve protection against
discrimination, inevitably someone will be left out.' As an alternative to
strategic essentialism, Butler proposes strategic provisionality.97
Strategic provisionality involves using a sign in a way that does not
foreclose future uses of the sign.9" In other words, it recognizes the politi-
cal necessity of using particular terms to describe identity, but anticipates
that the identity's construction will change. In this way strategic provi-
sionality counteracts the set of exclusions inherent in any identity-based
classification by creating a status which is perpetually in flux. The ques-
tion is whether the deep-seated essentialism in legal theory and doctrine
can accommodate a changeable identity, one that is strategically provi-
sional.
Janet Halley persuasively contends that legal theorists must tran-
scend the impasse between essentialism and constructivism, and suggests
focusing instead on the common ground between the essentialist and
constructivist positions." In pointing out that both essentialist and con-
structivist positions can be used to argue for either pro-gay or anti-gay
94. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Histioragraphy, in
SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIEs 3, 13-15 (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Spivak eds., 1988). Judith Butler
anticipates a more hostile response to identity deconstruction in a series of questions:
But politically, we might argue, isn't it quite crucial to insist on lesbian and gay identities
precisely because they are being threatened with erasure and obliteration from
homophobic quarters? Isn't the above theory complicitous with those political forces that
would obliterate the possibility of gay and lesbian identity? Isn't it "no accident" that
such theoretical contestations of identity emerge within a political climate that is
performing a set of similar obliterations of homosexual identities through legal and
political means?
Butler, Imitation, supra note 14, at 19 (emphasis in original).
95. Richard Delgado offers an example of such a warning:
The price of strategic essentialism is not only that you get away from your agenda and
your heart-of-hearts goals. You'll develop what Antonio Gramsci calls false
consciousness. You'll forget who you are and what your original goals and commitments
were.... Spending time with Republicans means you will inevitably take on the mindset
of a Republican. A Black man active in a white-dominated civil rights organization will
eventually take on the traits and concerns he finds there. A Black woman working in a
male-dominated group will risk losing her identity as a Black feminist. Some social
scientists call this "alienation."
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social
Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639, 653 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
96. Butler, Imitation, supra note 14, at 19 ("[A]ny consolidation of identity requires some set
of differentiations and exclusions.").
97. Id. ("In avowing the sign's strategic provisionality (rather than its strategic essentialism),
that identity can become a site of contest and revision, indeed, take on a future set of significations
that those of us who use it now may not be able to foresee.").
98. Id.
99. Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994).
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policies,'" Halley urges that pro-gay legal advocates abandon biological
determinism and focus instead on "legal strategies that emphasize the
political dynamics that inevitably attend sexual orientation identity-no
matter how it is caused."'' °
In simultaneously entertaining identity and mutability, Halley's
argument employs strategic provisionality. She proposes a "weak be-
havioral constructivism" which accommodates both essentialist and con-
structivist approaches:
Those pre-committed to same-sex contacts might be pederasts, sodo-
mites, mollies, berdache, inverts, homosexuals, gay men, lesbians,
queers and so on. People's subjective experience of sexuality, and the
behavior they undertake to support it, would be radically contingent
on the identity offered by their culture for persons of their object
choice and on their own opportunities for altering or shaping the op-
tions on offer.'°2
In other words, Halley's behavioral constructivism and Butler's strategic
provisionality both seek to focus on political implications of culture
rather than an essential, fixed identity to counteract gendered and hetero-
sexualized power dynamics.
PSAs recognize some of these insights. They are deliberately ag-
nostic about gender and seek to alter the construction of heterosexuality.
In Butler's terms, PSAs do not foreclose "the future uses of the sign"'' 3
homemaker. Instead, they intervene in the current construction of gen-
dered labor specialization in marriage as natural, transforming home-
maker into a hybrid of domestic and market elements. Because PSAs
anticipate that the reallocation of power and wealth in heterosexual
families might change the allocation of domestic and market labor in
marriage, they deliberately anticipate a fluctuating construction of
homemaker.
In Halley's terms, PSAs make "[p]eople's subjective experience of
sexuality, and the behavior they undertake to support it ... [here, gen-
dered specialization of labor in marriage] radically contingent on the
identity offered by their culture for persons of their object choice."'"
Here, PSAs offer the cultural debtor/creditor roles to supplement the
traditional wage-earner/homemaker roles. If homemaker has the cultural
meanings associated with domesticity in which one labors for love rather
than remuneration, then the subjective experience of heterosexual mar-
riage is one of complementary roles in which market and home are both
100. Id. at 517 (pointing out that "[n]either essentialism nor constructivism is necessarily gay-
affirmative") (emphasis added)).
101. ld.at506.
102. ld. at 561.
103. Butler, Imitation, supra note 14, at 19 (emphasis omitted).
104. Halley, supra note 99, at 561.
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necessary, but market is culturally superior because labor there is re-
warded with pay. If, however, homemaker is supplemented with some
market characteristics by making the primary homemaker a secured
creditor in relation to her primary wage-earning spouse, then the mean-
ing of homemaker changes dramatically. This switch demonstrates that
there is nothing natural, essential, prepolitical or inevitable about home-
making being unremunerated and less powerful. As such, PSAs treat
gender and (heterosexual) sexual orientation as radically contingent on
cultural forces.' 5
In sum, PSAs have the potential to queer marriage doctrine by both
reflecting the insights of gender performativity and by being strategically
provisional. By dressing homemakers as secured creditors and primary
wage-earners as debtors, PSAs reveal the constructed nature of both gen-
der roles and of traditional heterosexual marriage itself. They thus inter-
vene in the current constructions of both gender and heterosexuality to
undermine naturalized constructions. PSAs moreover implement Butler's
strategic provisionality and Halley's behavioral constructivism in their
simultaneous use of the categories homemaker and creditor in relation to
the same subject and their refusal to essentialize any particular under-
standing of sex, gender, or sexual orientation (or, for that matter, debtor
or creditor).
C. Premarital Security Agreements Might Queer the State
Lisa Duggan's influential essay Queering the State urges queer
theorists to engage on both theoretical and practical levels by importing
the insights of queer theory into mainstream debate, emphasizing that
"we need.., to be both transformative and effective."'" As Duggan ac-
knowledges, though, there are significant barriers to direct importation.
She illustrates this point by imagining a Nightline panel with prominent
queer theorists discussing the military's ban on gay service members:
105. Another level of strategic provisionality turns on PSAs' deliberate agnosticism about
essentialist or constructivist understandings of sex and gender. As I describe at length in
Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, PSAs have the potential to either encourage or discourage
traditional gender roles in marriage. Part of the reason that PSAs enjoy this flexibility (or, to put it
negatively, indeterminacy) is that their predicted effects are determined by assumptions about sex
and gender. If, for example, traditional gender roles are biologically determined (perhaps as a matter
of sociobiological determination to maximize the chances that one's genes will be replicated in
future gene pools), then women should play traditional roles regardless of legal incentives to do
otherwise. Traditionalist legal economists take this position. If, on the other hand, gender is socially
constructed and thus can be restructured based on legal incentives (as most feminists contend), then,
given the right incentives, women might venture out into the wage labor force in a more focused way
than many currently do. PSAs are malleable enough to accommodate both of these positions. Gender
may be determined or not, and PSAs will protect the people (male or female) who play caretaking
roles in marriage and family life. Thus, although Butler might object to PSAs' ability to
accommodate essentialist notions of gender, she might appreciate their ability to serve both
essentialist and constructionist notions of gender, thereby destabilizing either side's claim to truth.
106. Duggan, supra note 2, at 193.
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It is not that these figures would have nothing interesting or useful to
say. They would simply have a great deal of trouble making them-
selves understood (as many of us in the field of queer studies would).
The problems are on the levels both of cultural legibility and political
palatability. Imagine Bersani: "As I argue, Ted, in my article 'Is the
Rectum A Grave?' . . . The ensuing discussion of heteromasculinity's
terror of penetration might put Ted in his grave."' '
Because, as discussed above, PSAs import the insights of queer theory
and also are mainstream in their focus on the value of homemaking,
PSAs bridge this gap between theory and practice. PSAs might turn out
to be both transformative and effective: transformative in the way they
cohere with queer theory insights about gender performativity and strate-
gic provisionality, and effective in their practical redistributive effects.
PSAs, in short, appropriate liberal discourses toward radical ends.
As an example of appropriating liberal discourse to serve radical
ends, Duggan suggests that queer activists borrow the liberal discourse of
disestablishmentarianism in order to divert homophobic assaults on gay
men and lesbians. Specifically, she suggests queer theorists and activists
appropriate liberal arguments against a state-established religion to sug-
gest that the state similarly separate itself from "the religion of hetero-
normativity."' Duggan explains that this strategy (which she dubs "No
Promo Hetero"') is "not a broad solution, but only a local tactic embed-
ded in a larger strategy of destabilizing heteronormativity. It is one
among many conceivable tactics.""0 Like Duggan's No Promo Hetero
proposal, PSAs focus on heterosexuality, and apply queer theory to legal
doctrine regulating heterosexuality. As such, they deconstruct heterosexu-
ality first, attacking its naturalized position directly rather than by decon-
structing gay and lesbian identities that are already marked as marginal."'
Duggan suggests that appropriating liberal discourse with a queer
theory twist answers the need for "a less defensive, more politically self-
assertive set of linguistic and conceptual tools to talk about sexual differ-
ence."' 2 PSAs respond to the need for offensive rather than defensive
approaches. Duggan urges queer theorists to apply high theory strategi-
cally, and activists to think beyond formal equality, in both cases bor-
rowing from liberal discourses to redirect the debate about queer human-
107. Id. at 183.
108. Id. at 189.
109. Id. at 188. Nan Hunter coined the phrase "No Promo Homo" to describe and critique
"state-imposed penalties on identity speech--or speech that promotes or professes homosexuality."
Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech and Equality, in SEX WARS, supra note 2, at 140. Duggan takes
Hunter's insights a step further, suggesting that the state should adopt a policy of No Promo Hetero
instead of merely refraining from suppressing the promotion of homosexuality.
110. Duggan, supra note 2, at 191-92.
111. See id. at 185.
112. Id. at 192. However, while Duggan focuses on the differences between heterosexuals and
gay people, PSAs focus on the different situations of men and women in marriage.
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ity's subject status."3 Duggan is not suggesting that liberal discourse is
the key to replacing heteronormativity with queer sensibilities, but rather
that it is one way to translate the often arcane language of queer theory
into mainstream discourse:
The question is: At this historical moment, can we transform any lib-
eral rhetoric in the interests ultimately of going beyond liberal catego-
ries and solutions? Or, given the difficulty of translating our most
radical insights and arguments into effective discourse, can we afford
not to try?"'
PSAs similarly are not everything to everyone, but they have the poten-
tial to radically restructure the way we think about marriage and gender
roles, and thus make some headway toward queer theory's goal of de-
constructing "the natural and preferred status of heterosexuality.""'5
D. Premarital Security Agreements Are Doctrinal Interventions in Con-
flations of Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
A trilogy of recent articles similarly strives for an understanding of
legal theory and doctrine that is both effective and transformative. In
these articles Mary Anne Case,"6 Katherine Franke,"7 and Frank Valdes"'
have made important contributions to legal theoretical understanding of
the intersections (or inter-connections) between sex, gender and sexual
orientation."9 Given that PSAs, too, strive to transform legal theory and
doctrine as well as to achieve practical change benefiting marginalized
people, the approaches of Case, Franke, and Valdes offer a yardstick for
evaluating PSAs' relevance for queer legal theory. The depth and com-
plexity of each scholar's approach justify a full article exploring the re-
lationship among them, but such detail is beyond the scope of this essay.
The purpose of this essay is instead to engage in a brief, inevitably re-
ductionist, examination of how PSAs might cohere (or conflict) with
Case's, Franke's, and Valdes's approaches to intersectionality.
One can read the Case, Franke, and Valdes trio of articles as advo-
cating for an expanded understanding of sex discrimination law to in-
clude gender and/or sexual orientation discrimination. At this level, there
is reason to believe that all three approaches may resonate with PSAs.
113. Duggan, supra. note 2, at 181-86.
114. Id. at 193.
115. Id. at 190.
116. Case, supra note 16.
117. Franke, supra note 16.
118. Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys, supra note 16.
119. While there is substantial overlap between their approaches, each can be said to focus on a
different point in the triangle of sex, gender, and sexual orientation: Case on gender, Franke on sex,
and Valdes on orientation. Case, supra note 16, at 105 n.39.
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While Case, Franke, and Valdes all promote an expansive under-
standing of sex discrimination law that protects people from gender and
sexual orientation as well as sex discrimination, each scholar takes a
unique approach. The crux of Case's argument is that femininity (ex-
pressed by men or by women) should be protected." Franke argues for
an expanded understanding of sexual identity that goes beyond biology
to include "a more behavioral or performative conception of sex."'2 ' Val-
des contends that the law tolerates a great deal of sex and gender dis-
crimination by labeling it sexual orientation discrimination.22 A synthesis
of Case's, Franke's and Valdes's approaches suggests that anti-
discrimination law inaccurately perceives overlap and separation among
sex, gender, and sexual orientation, and that it should instead understand
sex discrimination to include protection for effeminate men, people
whose gender does not match their sex, and gay people. PSAs share
some commonality with all three approaches.
Case favors protecting those who exhibit feminine behavior from
discrimination, reasoning that the world will be safe for women in "frilly
pink dresses" when it is safe for men in dresses."n PSAs protect men as
well as women who engage in homemaking, an activity which is argua-
bly as feminine as wearing a dress.' PSAs moreover add a masculine
(market) element to feminine homemaking conduct to remedy the fman-
cial straits of displaced homemakers and to increase the social value of
women's work generally. Not unlike Case's proposal for protecting ef-
feminate men in order to increase the social value ascribed to
femininity,"n PSAs alter the social meaning of homemaking by quanti-
fying its contribution to family wealth and protecting the primary home-
maker's interest in that investment with a security interest. If the in-
120. Case contends that Title VII "correctly applied, already provide[s] the necessary protection
to both effeminate men and feminine women, as well as their masculine counterparts." Case, supra
note 16, at 4.
121. Franke, supra note 16, at 8.
122. Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys, supra note 16, at 17.
123. Case, supra note 16, at 7 ("It is my contention that, unfortunately, the world will not be
safe for women in frilly pink dresses-they will not, for example, generally be as respected as either
men or women in gray flannel suits-unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as well.").
124. One could argue that dresses are unambiguous markers of femininity, while homemaking
is behavior that both women and men engage in, albeit in varying degrees. In other words, a married
father could leave the practice of law to teach secondary school in order to have more time with his
children, and retain social ascriptions of masculinity. If, however, this same man substituted a golf
skirt for khakis, or started sporting pearls, he would be subject to social penalties for transgressing
sex/gender norms. This comparison may illustrate the differential penalties for various types of
demasculinazation. The former lawyer may suffer economically for his family-driven career change,
but also benefit socially both from the deeper relationship with his family and from social value
ascribed to those men who demonstrate dedication to their families. The cross-dressing man,
however, suffers both socially and economically, indicating that the sartorial elements of gender
normativity may be stronger than those associated with participation in homemaking and wage-
labor. See MARJORtE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING AND CuLTuRAL ANxtETY 52-
66 (1992) (analyzing historical examples of cross-dressing).
125. See Case, supra note 16, at 4.
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creased economic and social valuation of homemaking induces some
men to increase the time they devote to caring for their families, then
PSAs could further contribute to the valuation of so-called women's
work because more men would be doing it.'" Thus, reforms which make
the world safe for people (men or women) in aprons share the spirit of
reforms that make it safe for anyone who wants to wear a frilly dress. In
both cases, social roles that are stigmatized as feminine are redefined as
at least partly masculine, and thus more valuable both socially and eco-
nomically.
While Case seeks to value femininity by protecting men who exhibit
it, Franke seeks to expand (and perhaps replace) the understanding of sex
to include what we commonly think of as gender.'27 She contends that
biological notions of sex allow considerable gender discrimination to go
unchecked because "most, if not all, differences between men and
women are grounded not in biology, but in gender normativity."'' ' Franke
prefers an understanding of sex discrimination that protects, in addition
to transgendered people, "the male senior associate in a law firm who
wants neither to be ridiculed by his male colleagues nor penalized when
he comes up for partner because he requests time off from work to care
for his newborn child."'" Thus, Franke wants the law to account for gen-
der performativity by protecting against discrimination based on gender
normativity.3 °
Just as PSAs cohere with Case's argument that sex discrimination
law should protect effeminate men, PSAs are consistent with Franke's
suggestion that sex discrimination law should remedy injuries suffered as
a result of hostility to gender non-conformity. 3 As discussed above,
PSAs are consistent with Butler's theory of gender performativity, a the-
ory which also informs Franke's approach.'32 PSAs account for the per-
formativity of gender in the context of a traditional marriage. Under a
PSA the primary homemaker's contributions to family wealth are recog-
126. While it is not clear whether "the feminine tend[s] to be devalued because it is associated
with women, or... women [are] devalued because they manifest feminine characteristics," Case
mines cross-cultural evidence to suggest that the "the stronger line of causation runs from a
disfavoring of women." Case, supra note 16, at 33. Thus "feminine characteristics are devalued
relative to masculine ones, to the detriment not only of men displaying those feminine characteristics
but of women generally." Id. at 28.
127. Franke, supra note 16, at 3 ("[S]exual identity-that is, what it means to be a woman and
what it means to be a man-must be understood not in deterministic, biological terms, but according
to a set of behavioral, performative norms.").
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id. at 8-9.
130. Franke makes the important clarification that gender performativity does not mean that
one dons a gender in the morning like an outfit; to the contrary, Butler's theory of gender
performativity "regards gender norms as part of what determines the subject. As such, construction
is a constitutive constraint." Id. at 50-51 n.211.
131. Id. at 1-3.
132. Id. at 51-58.
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nized and remunerated by making the homemaker a secured creditor and
her primary wage-earning spouse a debtor. This change reveals that the
homemaker/wage-earner dyad is not natural, but rather economic and
changeable. When homemakers are also secured creditors, heterosexual-
ity itself is reconstructed as an economic, rather than natural, relation-
ship. By combining these market and domestic roles, PSAs offer a way
of thinking about marriage that is gendered rather than sexed, and in do-
ing so support sex and gender equality. PSAs thus cohere with Franke's
focus on a performative notion of sex and gender.
Just as PSAs are consistent with Case's focus on femininity and
Franke's focus on gender performativity, PSAs also cohere with Valdes's
focus on sexual orientation discrimination. Valdes argues that gender and
sex discrimination often go undetected and unpunished when they seem
to take the form of sexual orientation discrimination.'33 He proposes a
triangular model in which sex, gender, and sexual orientation interact,
and suggests that the legs of this triangle reveal legal and social confla-
tions between the categories.' Valdes's point is that the law perpetuates
compulsory heterosexuality through these conflations.'3
Valdes's approach presupposes the desirability of legal doctrines
which destabilize androsexism and heterosexism.'36 PSAs do just that.
PSAs reconstruct the category wife, which currently is sexed woman,
gendered female, and presupposes a heterosexual orientation. Under
PSAs, wife becomes less gendered female when it is merged with the
gendered male (market) category of secured creditor, because home-
making work is no longer done for only love but receives remuneration
just as market labor does. Once wife becomes less gendered female, per-
haps men will be less reluctant to engage in caretaking behavior, and
wife may even come to represent the activities of caretaking rather than
the sex of the person doing the homemaking. Finally, if wife ceases to be
constructed as sexed and gendered female, then marriage itself undergoes
a reconstruction. It would no longer be defined as requiring one gen-
dered/sexed male and one gendered/sexed female, instead requiring two
people engaged in wage labor and homemaking, perhaps equally and
perhaps in a specialized way.
The reconstruction of marriage through PSAs could ultimately
benefit many gay people. If PSAs replaced the current gendered focus of
133. See Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys, supra note 16, at 17.
134. Id. at 13; Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 165.
135. Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys, supra note 16, at 42; Valdes, Unpacking
Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 169 ("[T]he conflationary status quo represents a regime of
compulsory hetero-patriarchy.").
136. See Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16 at 162-63 (contending that the
critique of the Euro-American sex/gender system as neither ahistorical nor universal allows "critical
reconsideration of the legal value of human desire and intimacy," and that such a critique could
contribute to "chang[ing] law from an instrument of sex/gender oppression to an engine for
sex/gender liberation").
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marriage with an economic one, then PSAs also could contribute to a
social climate in which same-sex marriage is no longer oxymoronic. In
other words, if marriage is an economic relationship in which two people
align to pool their economic and emotional resources (rather than pri-
marily to beget and raise children in traditionally gendered roles),'37 then
the ban on same-sex marriage loses much of its purpose. Thus PSAs of-
fer a legal doctrine that intervenes in the conflation of sex, gender, and
sexual orientation that Valdes posits is key to the subordination of
women and sexual minorities.'38
In sum, PSAs may queer legal theory by intervening in law's cur-
rent conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. By treating pri-
mary homemakers as secured creditors, they alleviate the indigency of
displaced homemakers and value women's work. Moreover, PSAs co-
here with Case's, Franke's, and Valdes's theoretical and doctrinal ap-
proaches to sex discrimination by counteracting economic penalties cur-
rently exacted on those who perform the feminine labor of homemaking,
understanding gender as performative, and intervening in the construc-
tion of wife as sexed and gendered female and heterosexual. These ef-
fects are largely gender-related, but PSAs also contribute to a social and
legal construction of marriage that could include same-sex marriage.
E. Premarital Security Agreements Could Contribute to the Push for
Same-Sex Marriage
William Eskridge has articulately made the case for same-sex mar-
riage.'39 If PSAs focus on economic aspects of marriage (and downplay
its gendered aspects), then they may contribute to creating a social cli-
mate capable of recognizing same-sex marriage. Mainstream opposition
to same-sex marriage stems from a belief that it undermines the natural
order of things, which is taken to be the state recognizing only those re-
lationships between men and women entered into for the primary pur-
137. The legislative history of the Defense of Marriage Act (D.O.M.A.) illustrates this
construction of traditional heterosexual marriage. The House Report in support of the D.O.M.A.
included the following statement: "Marriage is the central cultural recourse for reconciling men and
women's separate natures and different reproductive strategies. Indeed, the most important purpose
of marriage is to unite men and women in a formal partnership that will last through the prolonged
period of dependency of a human child." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14 n.50 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2918 n.50 (quoting Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The War Between the
Sexes, 7 Am. ENTERPRISE 26 (1996)). Hadley Arkes, Edward Ney Professor of Jurisprudence and
American Institutions, Amherst College similarly testified:
[Slexuality [is] imprinted on our very natures-in the obdurate fact that we are, as the
saying goes, "engendered." We are, each of us, born a man or a woman .... Our
engendered existence, as men and women, offers the most unmistakable, natural signs of
the meaning and purpose of sexuality. And that is to say the function and purpose of
begetting.
Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. of the House CommL on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 99-100 (1996) (testimony of Hadley Arkes).
138. Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 16, at 163.
139. ESKRIDGE, supra note 91; Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1419.
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pose of begetting and raising children.'" As long as marriage is con-
structed in this highly sexed and gendered way, same-sex marriage will
remain oxymoronic.'" If PSAs contribute to a legal regulation of mar-
riage that focuses on economics rather than traditional gender roles,
however, same-sex marriage makes more sense. Thus PSAs, despite their
potential to reward wives in traditionally gendered marriages,' could
paradoxically have the effect of contributing to social conditions that
would allow for social recognition of same-sex marriage. While gay mar-
riage is one of the most prominent items on the national agenda for gay
rights, given the possibility that some states might lift the ban on same-
143sex marriage, numerous commentators have suggested that there are
significant pitfalls with putting gay marriage at the top of a gay rights
agenda.
F. Queer Theory Qualms About Same-Sex Marriage
Darren Hutchinson is one of many queer theorists to suggest that
same-sex marriage may not be everything it is cracked up to be.'"
140. See supra note 137 (describing the legislative history of the Defense of Marriage Act).
141. Same-sex marriage may make more sense in many people's minds as the baby boom in the
gay and lesbian community (dubbed the "gayby boom") takes hold in primary schools, emergency
rooms, family law courts, and other arenas around the country. The idea of gay couples having
children has penetrated the popular imagination through celebrity couples such as Melissa Etheridge
and Julie Cypher, who demonstrated generous openness when they had publicly discussed their
decision to have a child together. See Mark Miller, We're a Family and We Have Rights,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1996, at 54 (interviewing Melissa Etheridge and Julie Cypher). Once a critical
mass of run-of-the-mill gay and lesbian couples begin interacting with PTA boards, school teachers,
hospitals, and other social actors, parenthood may cease to be understood as unique to opposite sex
couples. For further discussion of the way that the gayby boom could influence PSAs' applicability
to same-sex couples, see infra Part Il.
142. See Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4.
143. This possibility became remote when Hawaii voters amended their constitution to
authorize the state legislature to ban same-sex marriage. Sam Howe Verhovek, The 1998 Elections:
The States-Intitiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at 1. Alaska voters similarly intervened in
marriage litigation by amending their constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a
woman. Id. However, same-sex marriage litigation continues in Vermont. See Gustav Niebuhr, Laws
Aside, Some in Clergy Quietly Bless Gay "Marriage," N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1998, at Al.
144. See Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 586-602; see also Ruth Colker, Marriage, 3 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 321, 326 (1991) ("[W]e should work to change the definition of family and the
exclusive class-based ways that our society provides privileges, rather than encourage more
people-gay or straight-to enter the institution of marriage."); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Marriage
Is Not the Answer, HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REv., Fall 1997, at 34 (arguing that "the battle for legal
marriage is too narrow and too limited for our own community's interests, and that in pursuing it as
our primary political objective we will rob ourselves of an important opportunity to challenge
heterocentric sexual and family hierarchies"); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For:
Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in
Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REv. 1535, 1536 (1993) ("[T]he desire to marry in the lesbian and gay
community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently
problematic institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical
feminism."); Charles R. P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequality,
7 TEMPLE POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 363, 370 (1998) ("The extension of same-sex marriage will
cloak gay and lesbian couples in the traditions of patriarchy and heterosexism. Heterosexual norms
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Hutchinson makes a powerful argument that focusing on marriage ig-
nores the interests of many gays and lesbians of color and those who are
poor. In other words, claims that gay people are "virtually normal,"
needing only marriage to bring them into the mainstream, misapprehend
and further marginalize the experiences of many gay people.145
Hutchinson argues that upper middle class white men would benefit
more from marriage than many gay people of color and gay poor people.
Specifically, he notes that the paradigmatic model of family as two
spouses and their biological children overlooks the fact that "Africans,
American blacks, and other non-white cultures place tremendous impor-
tance on 'extended families,' rather than rigid nuclear bodies."'" Moreo-
ver, he points out that poor gay people would not be able to take advan-
tage of many economic benefits of marriage. 4 ' Thus PSAs' focus on
middle and upper middle class couples, coupled with some queer theo-
rists' lack of enthusiasm about PSAs' potential to contribute to paving
the path toward legal recognition of same-sex relationships, could pre-
vent a number of queer theorists from embracing PSAs.
There is good reason to suspect that PSAs might exacerbate rather
than alleviate the marginalization of poor people and many people of
color. PSAs are based on a paradigmatic marriage comprised of a pri-
mary wage-earner and a primary homemaker where the wage-earner
earns considerably higher wages than the homemaker. This model ap-
plies best in white middle and upper-middle class marriages, and has less
applicability in communities of color where wage differences between
men and women are less extreme than those between white men and
women. 148 Moreover, women of color (both historically and currently) are
more likely to participate in the wage labor force than white women,
often doing domestic labor for wages.' 9 Finally, poor women are more
likely to marry poor men, making the redistribution of wage-earner in-
come from men to women largely illusory for many women. For these
reasons, there is reason to question whether PSAs can be said to be inter-
SEXional given their modest interventions in (and possible support of)
class and race hierarchies.
These concerns merit serious consideration. While PSAs may work
best in white middle and upper-middle class marriages, they may also
improve ,on current legal treatment of many people of color and poor
people. First, the race and class critique applies to any post-divorce in-
will become the standards applied to lesbian and gay relationships, and the development of queer
cultural constructions of intimate relationships will be stunted.").
145. Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 597-98.
146. See id. at 592 (footnote omitted).
147. See id. at 593.
148. Brown, supra note 24, at 795-96; Perry, supra note 24, at 2486; see also Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 104-05.
149. Perry, supra note 24, at 2487-98; Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997).
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come sharing proposal, suggesting that if these considerations prevent
PSAs from queering legal theory then they would also prevent much
privatized divorce reform from reconstructing marriage. Such an ap-
proach might overlook substantial benefits of PSAs that could outweigh
these problems.
First, marriage likely has beneficial as well as marginalizing impli-
cations for poor people and many people of color. It might, for example,
benefit some poor people who currently do not avail themselves of it.
Cynthia Bowman has argued, for example, that common law marriage
should be revitalized to protect the interests of poor women and many
women of color who would not otherwise be entitled to enjoy state bene-
fits such as Social Security and worker's compensation death benefits.5
PSAs also could benefit middle, upper-middle, and working class women
of color since women of color are much less likely to be awarded ali-
mony than white women."' Moreover, PSAs could benefit many low-
income women who would otherwise bear more than their share of
marital debt upon divorce. If PSAs were treated as securing a debt of the
primary wage-earner (or the non-homemaker if neither spouse is fully
employed) to the primary homemaker, this marital debt could off-set the
primary homemaker's liability for other marital debts.' 2 Finally, on a
macro level, PSAs could benefit the many poor women who perform
domestic labor in other people's homes by increasing the social and eco-
nomic value of that labor. 3 If PSAs increase the overall value of domes-
tic labor, then they could result in an increase in the wages of domestic
workers.
This survey of selected queer theoretical approaches suggests that
PSAs have the potential to queer existing doctrine through an interSEX-
ional approach. They have the potential to undermine compulsory het-
erosexuality, reflect a performative understanding of gender, queer the
state, intervene in legal conflations of sex, gender, and sexual orientation,
and contribute to the social and legal fight for same-sex marriage. While
they may also inadvertently be manipulated to support compulsory het-
erosexuality by rewarding women in traditional gendered marriages and
ratifying race and class hierarchies, these drawbacks should not prevent
queer theorists from seriously considering PSAs as one doctrinal tool for
150. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage,
75 OR. L. REv. 709, 762 (1997). Bowman discusses the racialized history of the repeal of common
law marriage, including Louisiana's treatment of common law marriage in order to discourage
manumission of slaves through liaisons between white men and female slaves. See id. at 737.
151. Perry, supra note 24, at 2483 (describing 1987 Census Bureau statistics that 18 percent of
white women were awarded alimony, compared to less than 8 percent of African American women).
152. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 105. Nancy Staudt similarly proposes
to tax housework and create a household income tax credit. Nancy Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84
GEO. L.J. 1571, 1630-31 (1996).
153. Achieving this goal would require that PSAs also intervene in the dichotomy between
spiritual and menial housework, so that all homemaking would be commodified and valued. See
Roberts, supra note 149.
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queering legal theory by reconstructing marriage. Even if queer theorists
reject PSAs, queer theorists should consider other proposals which aim
to alter the unmarked, heterosexual categories prior to (or contemporane-
ously with) deconstructing gay/lesbian/bisexual, transgendered, and
transsexual identity categories.
IIIH. PREMARITAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS IN SAME-SEX
RELATIONSHIPS
Perhaps the most practical question for queer theorists who examine
PSAs is whether PSAs would apply to same-sex relationships. While
PSAs are modeled on heterosexual marriages (and traditionalist ones at
that), they could be tailored to remunerate homemaking in gay and les-
bian families. Differences between same-sex and heterosexual partner-
ships, however, suggest that PSAs might function better as the exception
than as the rule in same-sex relationships.
One problem with directly importing PSAs to same-sex relation-
ships is that PSAs are premised on a model of gendered specialization of
labor in marriage. If lesbians and gay men are less specialized in their
domestic roles, PSAs may have less applicability for gay and lesbian
relationships than they do in heterosexual relationships. Empirical re-
search suggests that same-sex relationships do tend to be less gendered
than heterosexual ones,"' so remunerating homemaking through PSAs
simply might not reflect the typical same-sex relationship dynamic.
Research on how couples divide household chores indicates that
lesbian and gay households tend to be less gendered in this way than
heterosexual ones. This pattern is not surprising given the fact that, by
definition, neither partner in a same-sex relationship is "the" man or
"the" woman, so that tasks cannot be divided on those grounds. Perhaps
because of this dynamic (coupled with many lesbians' feminism), lesbian
154. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX
148-51 (1983) (suggesting that "same-sex couples cannot assign housework on the basis of who is
male and who is female"); Lawrence A. Kurdek, The Allocation of Household Labor in Gay,
Lesbian, and Heterosexual Married Couples, 49 J. SOC. ISSUES, Fall 1993, at 127, 138 (finding that
gay and lesbian couples allocate household labor on bases other than gender); see also Janet Lever,
Lesbian Sex Survey, ADVOCATE, Aug. 22, 1995, at 22. The Advocate survey indicates:
There is very little evidence that images of masculinity or femininity relate to who takes
the role of sexual aggressor within relationships. Who does the cooking is also unrelated
to relative butch-femme ratings, but there is a strong correspondence to who does more
driving--even being just somewhat more masculine than a partner puts one behind the
wheel far more often.
Id. at 28. This data from the Advocate survey should, however, be taken in the context of
respondents' demographics: The average age was 34; 86 percent of the respondents were white
(compared to 8 percent Hispanic/Latina, 2 percent African American or black, 1 percent Native
American, 1 percent Asian, and 2 percent "other"); nearly two-thirds had at least a college degree
and more than 25 percent had a graduate degree (compared to 14 percent of American women
holding a bachelor's degree and 6 percent having an advanced degree); and the average personal
income was $32,000. Id. at 25.
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and gay couples tend to "strive for egalitarian relationships," and are less
marked by power imbalances than heterosexual relationships.' This
situation is further facilitated by the fact that same-sex partners tend to
have similar options for wage labor, and thus are relative financial
equals. As a result of these factors, housework is negotiated rather than
sex-based, and same-sex partners tend to compensate one partner who
expends more time on homemaking labor."6
A related difference between heterosexual and same-sex couples is
that same-sex couples generally expect both partners to be self-
supporting.'57 While gay men seem somewhat more tolerant of playing
the provider role than lesbians are, same-sex couples generally are more
stable when both partners contribute equally or proportionately to the
household.' Although same-sex couples tend to share homemaking and
wage-earning tasks more equally than heterosexual partners, in both
kinds of relationships there is a direct relationship between hours worked
in the wage labor market and the amount of homemaking a partner does.
In other words, the partner who works more does less homemaking. 9
This common pattern suggests that PSAs might be most justified in the
same-sex relationship context where one partner is less than fully em-
ployed for a significant period of time. Raising a child could be one of
the circumstances in which this type of pattern might emerge in same-sex
relationships.
However, having children seems to be more the exception than the
rule in same-sex relationships.'" As such, assuming that childcare (actual
155. See Michelle Huston & Pepper Schwartz, The Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, in
UNDER-STUDIED RELATIONSHIPS: OFF THE BEATEN TRACK 89, 108-11 (Julia T. Wood & Steve
Duck eds., 1995). But see Nancy E. Murphy, Note, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of
Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335, 340 & nn.34, 36 (citing CLAIRE M.
RENZETTI, VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS (1992) in asserting
that domestic violence in same-sex relationships occurs with the same frequency and in a similar
manner as domestic violence occurring in opposite-sex relationships).
156. Huston & Schwartz, supra note 155, at 108-11.
157. In particular,
Both gay and lesbian partners will engage in the provider role, but they each prefer a co-
provider situation. Gay men, like other men, do not expect that a provider will take care
of them. When one gay partner is the provider, the partner who is being provided for
tends to be more dissatisfied with the situation. In contrast, lesbians do not expect to
support another person financially, except temporarily. Lesbians are not socialized, as
many men are, to take pleasure in a paternalistic provider role. A lesbian who finds
herself in the role of provider is likely to be the more dissatisfied partner with the
situation.
Virginia Rutter & Pepper Schwartz, Same-Sex Couples: Courtship, Commitment, Context, in THE
DIVERSITY OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 197, 209 (Ann Elisabeth Auhagen & Maria von Salisch eds.,
1996).
158. Id.
159. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 154, at 148-49.
160. Given the legal and social hostility to gay people caring for children, it is difficult to
calculate the number of gay and lesbian parents. Certainly the number of same-sex couples with
children seems to be on the rise. See supra note 141. But even if gay parenting is becoming
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or anticipated) is a major reason that many married women devote pri-
mary attention to homemaking, perhaps it makes sense for PSAs to be
the rule in heterosexual marriages and the exception in same-sex rela-
tionships. In either situation the spouses could contract around the rule
(either by earning equivalent wages or through an express waiver of the
PSA). Given that PSAs are firmly grounded in gendered allocations of
homemaking and wage labor in most marriages, this differential applica-
tion of PSAs makes more sense than applying them to all couples in the
same way.'6 ' In any case, PSAs would not make much of a difference for
most same-sex couples because the partners earn roughly equivalent
wages, so that the formula for calculating the debt due to one partner as
remuneration for specializing in homemaking would yield modest, if
any, payments.
An additional barrier to applying PSAs to same-sex relationships is
that, unlike heterosexual marriage, no state currently provides rules for
either creating or dissolving gay or lesbian relationships (let alone the
distribution of property or payment of alimony). States would have to
recognize same-sex relationships before they could administer break-ups
and apply the PSA as appropriate. Some states are moving in that direc-
tion with marriage litigation6' and reciprocal beneficiaries legislation,
163
and other states, including Colorado, are exploring what kind of legisla-
tion should govern same-sex relationships.'" It is important to note that
state recognition of same-sex marriage (or domestic partnerships or re-
ciprocal beneficiary relationships) does not dispose of the issue of
whether such relationships should be governed by PSAs. Given the
above discussion of the relative equality of partners in same-sex relation-
ships, perhaps reverse default rules should govern heterosexual and
same-sex marriages, at least regarding PSAs. However, even if PSAs
were applied across the board, to both same-sex and heterosexual cou-
ples, much of the potential inapplicability of PSAs to same-sex relation-
increasingly prevalent, it seems likely that a higher percentage of heterosexual couples (particularly
those who are married) have children than same-sex couples.
161. For another gay-affirmative argument favoring differential treatment of same-sex and
heterosexual couples, see Pouncy, supra note 144, at 370.
162. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
(enjoining the state from denying marriage licenses "solely because applicants are of the same sex").
While the Hawaii legislature may exercise its recently acquired power to ban same-sex marriage,
Vermont's litigation continues apace. See supra note 143.
163. HAw. REV. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 1997).
164. Peggy Lowe, Same-Sex Registrations Endorsed, DENV. POST, July 9, 1998, at BI;
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSIHPS,
STATE OF COLO., REPORT, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1998) (copy on file with the author).
As a member of the legal subcommittee of Governor Romer's Commission on Rights and
Responsibilities of Same-Sex Relationships, I participated in numerous spirited and nuanced debates
about optimal state regulations of same-sex relationships. Like Jane Schacter, I prefer a legal regime
which recognizes a "pluralism of affiliative structures." Schacter, supra note 80, at 1259. However,
given the gendered divisions of labor upon which PSAs rest, PSAs might be more justified under a
marriage model than within an alternative such as domestic partnership.
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ships would be mooted by the partners' ability to contract around the
PSA terms by conduct.
Finally, same-sex partners can resort to private law by contractually
creating PSAs until such time as the state recognizes same-sex relation-
ships. Courts tend to enforce same-sex relationship contracts, even when
state statutes ban same-sex marriage or criminalize same-sex sexual ac-
tivity.'" Since gay couples must contractually create most family law
rights, they (or their lawyers) could incorporate a PSA into cohabitation
agreements.'" For those couples with children, or who otherwise choose
to specialize in wage and domestic labor, such contracting makes par-
ticular sense.
One final objection to adopting PSAs in same-sex relationships sug-
gests that perhaps the gendered division of labor is not the best template
to mimic.'' But if couples are engaging in such specialization, the advis-
ability of doing so is beside the point.
CONCLUSION
Queer legal theorists should be interested in commercializing mar-
riage through Premarital Security Agreements. PSAs recognize home-
maker contributions to family wealth (specifically, primary-wage-earner
income) by making the homemaker a creditor in relation to her primary
wage-earning spouse. The amount of the wage-earner's debt could be
calculated based on the difference between the spouses' income at di-
vorce, the duration of the marriage, and the age of any minor children.
This debt would be secured by 50 percent of all marital property. In the
event of divorce, the primary homemaker, like any other secured credi-
tor, could foreclose on that collateral in order to obtain her fair share of
marital property.
In addition to deconstructing heterosexuality before, or at least con-
currently with, deconstructing marginalized sexual orientations, PSAs
queer legal doctrine governing marriage in a number of ways. First, they
undermine compulsory heterosexuality. Second, they account for gender
165. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory, supra note 74, at 1137-40 (discussing same-sex
cohabitation contracts and the remarkable case Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992), in
which the Georgia Supreme Court invoked the parol evidence rle to exclue evidence that a
cohabitation contract between two women was based on "illegal and immoral" consideration). The
Florida Court of Appeals similarly enforced a same-sex cohabitation contract, reasoning that:
[E]ven though the state has prohibited same-sex marriages and same-sex adoptions, it has
not prohibited this type of agreement.... Even though no legal rights or obligations flow
as a matter of law from a non-marital relationship, we see no impediment to the parties to
such a relationship agreeing between themselves to provide certain rights and obligations.
Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see also Silver v. Starrett, 674
N.Y.S.2d 915, 918 (Sup. Ct. 1998) ("In non-marital breakups, the law largely leaves the post-
relationship consequences to such agreements as its parties may work out.").
166. This point also holds true for PSAs as applied to heterosexual couples. See Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage, supra note 4, at 110.
167. See supra text accompanying note 79.
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performativity and strategic provisionality. Third, they queer the state by
using liberal constructs toward radical ends. Fourth, they intervene in
legal conflations of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. Finally, by
changing the focus of marriage doctrine from sex, gender, and sexual
orientation to economics, PSAs could contribute to a social climate
which recognizes same-sex marriage. Queer theorists could object to
PSAs on the ground that PSAs could unintentionally support traditional
gender roles or further marginalize poor people and/or many people of
color, but the benefits of experimenting with divorce reform (and recon-
structing marriage) outweigh inevitable risks that the reform might have
unintended consequences.
As a doctrinal tool to implement some of the most radical insights
of queer theory, PSAs have the potential to be both effective and trans-
formative. But even if they do not achieve everything suggested in this
essay, they could contribute to other, perhaps more effective and/or more
transformative, measures changing the law of heterosexual marriage. The
question is not whether PSAs resolve all the issues raised by queer legal
theory, but rather whether we can afford not to seriously consider PSAs
or other proposed reforms of marriage law.'"
168. Duggan, supra note 2, at 193 ("The question is: At this historical moment, can we
transform any liberal rhetoric in the interests ultimately of going beyond liberal categories and
solutions? Or, given the difficulty or translating our most radical insights and arguments into
effective public discourse, can we afford not to try?").
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TAKING THE INTERSEXIONAL IMPERATIVE SERIOUSLY:
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND MARRIAGE REFORM
JANE S. SCHACTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
When we think about the construction of heterosexuality, we are
always, if only implicitly, thinking too about the construction of alterna-
tive sexualities and of sexuality itself. The articles in this symposium by
Professors Sterett and Ertman enrich our thinking about this fundamental
inquiry in important ways. Professor Sterett, with her nuanced and tex-
tured historical analysis of the emergence of pension and other benefits,
draws our attention to how the legal creation, regulation, and justification
of state-sponsored benefits helped to shape and reinforce normative con-
ceptions of gender and sexual orientation.' Professor Ertman, with her
bold proposal for rectifying the longstanding, gendered economic ine-
qualities associated with divorce, suggests that altering the terms on
which marital relationships are conducted and severed might be part of
re-constructing heterosexuality in significant ways.'
As I thought about these two articles, and particularly as I thought
about them in juxtaposition to one another, they raised for me a question
inspired by the idea of "interSEXionality" that is the organizing topic of
this symposium. I take the intersexionality imperative, if we can speak of
one, to include at least the notion that in assessing proposed legal inter-
ventions or reforms, we should consider the likely intersexional effects, if
you will, of such proposals. How are particular legal strategies likely to
affect not only the explicit problem to which they are immediately ad-
dressed, but the wider range of problems that are implicated by the com-
plex links between and among related areas of concern? What, for exam-
ple, might Professor Ertman's suggestion of a move to a regime of pre-
marital security agreements mean for the construction of alternative-
that is, non-dominant-sexualities? This is a subject that Ertman herself
addresses in considering how queer theorists might receive her proposal.!
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to Juliet Brodie for her comments on an
earlier draft, and to the participants in the InterSEXionality Symposium for many thought-provoking
discussions.
1. See Susan Sterett, Husbands & Wives, Dangerousness & Dependence: Public Pensions in
the 1860s-1920s, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1181 (1998).
2. See Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75 DENV.
U. L. REv. 1215 (1998) [hereinafter Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage]. For a more extended
exploration of Ertman's proposal, see Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal
for Valuing'Women's Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998).
3. See Ertman, Reconstucting Marriage, supra note 2, at 1216-17, 1219-26.
4. See id. at 1228-34.
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In thinking about difficult questions like these, I want to consider
more generally the problem of how to conceptualize and predict the in-
tersexional effects of proposed legal reforms. This problem is, I think,
part of a large and difficult set of questions for progressive legal schol-
ars: How will particular strategies be received, understood, and shaped in
the diffuse, collective social processes that give meaning to these strate-
gies over time? Is it possible to maintain progressive "ownership" of
particular strategies once they become part of these collective processes
and thus become subject to appropriation by diverse forces and to do-
mestication in ways that are sometimes hard to predict or control?
Professor Sterett's article provides a rich point of conceptual de-
parture from which to pursue these questions, illuminating as it does how
the legal device of the pension, and its doctrinal grounding, emerged
within, and functioned to reinforce, a system of starkly gendered rela-
tions. By tracing the ways in which pension benefits were justified and
grounded in naturalized conceptions of masculinity and femininity, the
article exposes important links between legal and cultural forces.' With
this framework in mind, I will probe potential intersexional effects of,
first, Professor Ertman's proposal for premarital security agreements, and
second, some contemporary advocacy for same-sex marriage. My focus
in terms of same-sex marriage will be on an intersection suggested by the
Sterett and Ertman articles: the nexus between sexuality, gender, and
poverty. I will explore the intersexional implications of some defenses of
same-sex marriage for poor women and, in particular, poor women who
are single mothers.
II. THE PREMARITAL SECURITY AGREEMENT REGIME AND ASSESSING
THE INTERSEXIONAL EFFECTS OF PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS
Professor Ertman proposes to import the commercial law device of
security agreements into the family law realm and to reconceive primary
homemakers (usually women) as creditors and primary wage-earners
(usually men) as debtors. The move to a regime of premarital security
agreements is, of course, motivated in the first instance by gender con-
cerns, and more particularly by concerns for the impoverishing effect of
divorce on women who have Worked extensively or exclusively in the
home, rather than the market. Ertman makes a strong case for how the
effects of such agreements might ameliorate the economic inequities she
identifies, and how, surprisingly, her proposal might even generate an
ideologically diverse coalition of legal economists and feminists of
varying stripes.8
5. See Sterett, supra note 1.
6. See id.
7. See Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage, supra note 2, at 1216-17, 1219-26.
8. See id. at 1225-26.
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I want to focus on the capacity of premarital security agreements to
affect the nature and contours of gender relations, and in turn to partici-
pate in reshaping not only dominant conceptions of heterosexuality, but
of alternative sexualities as well. How should we think about the capacity
of the Ertman legal proposal to affect this broader range of social mean-
ings and practices? On this point, the proposal strikes me as quite para-
doxical in having the potential both to reinforce a deeply gendered status
quo that supports heterosexual normativity and to open some dramati-
cally liberatory paths away from that status quo.
The road to retrenchment lies, I fear, in the incentive structure cre-
ated by the proposal. By attempting to ameliorate the economic inequali-
ties that fall on homemakers, the proposal may also produce an economic
incentive for women to remain or become full or part-time homemakers,
with primary child care responsibilities and all that goes along with that.
Making it financially more attractive to adopt that role may well rein-
force the gendered status quo that is the subject of Professor Sterett's
historical analysis-the status quo that sends more men into the market
(Sterett's world of "danger")9 and keeps more women in the home (Ster-
ett's world of "dependency").'" Reinforcing those gendered patterns, in
turn, may well entrench cultural norms of femininity and masculinity-
the very norms that Professor Sterett traces in her analysis of the
gendered justification of early pension benefits. Doing so, moreover,
might well shore up traditional gender scripts in ways that are distinctly
inhospitable to the gender transgressions posed by non-heterosexuals.
Professor Ertman anticipates these issues in her article. She points
out that her proposal is gender-neutral, and so might be thought to give
men an incentive to abandon the market in favor of the home." But while
the legal proposal is gender-neutral, the world is not; indeed, just this fact
is what moves Professor Ertman in the first instance. Absent cultural
change to accompany legal change-a point I will discuss further-for-
mal equality measures in a world of substantive inequality tend to repro-
duce the underlying inequalities, and to be shaped and driven by existing
social dynamics.'2 Under current social conditions, in other words, pre-
marital security agreements standing alone are more likely to track than
to disrupt the gendered status quo.
Professor Ertman also argues that the additional "exit options"'3 that
the premarital security interest will create may well empower women
financially, and as a result, perhaps even culturally." Here, though, I
9. See Sterett, supra note 1, at 1187-93.
10. See id. at 1198-1204.
11. See Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage, supra note 2, at 1230-31.
12. For further discussion of this point, see Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay
Civil Rights Debate in a Post-Civil Rights Era, 110 HARV. L. REv. 684, 721 (1997).
13. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage, supra note 2, at 1229.
14. Id. at 1229-31.
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think there is an important point to be made about the predictive enter-
prise I am suggesting. When we try to assess the intersexional effects of
legal reforms, we need to think beyond the specific policy results that
particular proposals can induce, such as giving women new financial
advantages. We also need to consider self-consciously the cultural
meaning that reforms are likely to have-that is, the larger public under-
standings that are likely to attach to measures like a premarital security
agreement. Particularly because it may be that only a relatively small or
demographically privileged group would actually use premarital security
agreements," the ways that these new agreements come to be publicly
framed and perceived might prove to be more significant than any con-
crete effects that such agreements may produce for those who enter into
them. And here there is risk, for it seems to me that the measure might
well come to be understood to reflect, although it is surely not motivated
by, a social commitment to gendered role division in heterosexual mar-
riage. Indeed, Professor Ertman acknowledges this risk, yet argues that
even a failed reform can be preferable to a bad status quo by creating the
possibility of future change.'6 I am not so sure. Retrenchment can be
pretty bleak.
There is, however, another way to think about how premarital secu-
rity agreements, if operationalized, might come to be culturally under-
stood, and here is where the paradox that I see arises. Perhaps the path
charted by this proposal might be one that does not reinforce, but rather
contributes to dislodging, the gendered status quo. What I find among the
most conceptually appealing aspects of the proposal is the very act of
importing commercial law into the realm of marriage, a realm that is
conventionally regarded as sanctified and somehow above the nasty
business of commerce. Reconceiving husbands and wives in the lan-
guage of debtors and creditors, and inserting Article 9 security agree-
ments into the cultural domain traditionally inhabited by vows and val-
entines, has the capacity to jolt and to challenge conventional under-
standings about what marriage is, what it does. Professor Ertman's pro-
posal might thus contribute to the project-vital in my view-of demys-
tifying marriage by reconceiving committed heterosexual partnerships in
the frank and unadorned vocabulary of commercial exchange."
Ertman's idea strikes me as one important part of a larger project of
distinguishing the legal rights, benefits, and status of marriage, on the
one hand, from the complex constellation of symbols, rituals, traditions,
and various moral, religious, and social trappings of marriage, on the
other hand. These two elements are conventionally, but unconvincingly,
15. Ertman recognizes this potential limitation. See id. at 1249-50.
16. Id. at 1234.
17. For a historical analysis of the regulation of heterosexuality and a comprehensive
argument in favor of applying a bargaining framework to the politics of heterosexuality, see LINDA
R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX (1998).
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presented as an undifferentiated whole. The sober scrutiny of marriage
that is inherent in a proposal that emphasizes the commercial qualities
and potentialities of marriage offers one way to press that point and to
begin to break apart the contested meanings of marriage as an institution.
Reconceiving and reconstructing marriage in this way, moreover, can
contribute to creating a world that includes and enables what I think of as
a genuine pluralism of affiliative structures. I use this term to describe a
world in which marriage might coexist with a flexible domestic partner-
ship structure that can accommodate partnerships of different sorts, es-
tablished under different conditions, with widely different aspirations
and conceptions of the good in mind. "
Which of these two paths-retrenchment or progress-could we ex-
pect a codified Ertman proposal to go down? It is hard to say, and I do
not think this paradoxical set of potential intersexional consequences is at
all unique to Ertman's proposal. This uncertainty will frequently arise
where progressive legal reforms are concerned, which is just what makes
this sort of inquiry complex. The basic dilemma is that the progressive
roots and motivations of a particular legal reform might not be the forces
that frame and determine that reform's meaning once it is operative.
Worse still, ex ante predictions of this kind are elusive and difficult.
I do not suggest that we can eliminate uncertainty of this kind, but
there a few ways to address and perhaps to ameliorate it. First, we should
simply think about these questions directly. That is, we should ask the
intersexional questions-as Professor Ertman laudably does in her con-
tribution to this symposium-and should embrace and specifically con-
sider the possibility that paradoxical consequences may flow from well-
intentioned interventions. Launching this inquiry means making delib-
erative, though surely imperfect, judgments about how best to steer pro-
posals in their intended direction. Second, we should recognize that legal
strategies alone are often unlikely to be autonomous sources of deep so-
cial change, and have to be paired with cultural and other strategies, and
conceptualized in terms of the dynamic, mutually constitutive relation-
ship between legal and social forces.'9 All of this suggests to me that as
we consider what road a premarital security agreement regime might take
us down, we should think about accompanying strategies that can influ-
ence the outcome. For example, expressly situating the proposal within a
package of comprehensive strategies aimed squarely at reconceiving the
cultural meaning of marriage, or deliberately designing the proposal so
that it might be used by unmarried partners as well, reflect two ideas of
this kind.
18. Indeed, a robust pluralism of affiliative structures would also allow for non-affiliation, and
would rethink fundamentally the linkage of important rights and benefits like health insurance
coverage with long-term interpersonal commitment. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is
Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 6 OuT/LOOK: NAT'L LESBIAN & GAY Q. 9, 16-17 (1989).
19. This point is explored at greater length in Schacter, supra note 12, at 719-23.
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II. INTERSEXIONAL EFFECTS OF CONTEMPORARY SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE ADVOCACY
We can extend this kind of analysis to an issue suggested, though not
addressed, in the panel articles-same-sex marriage advocacy. Professor
Sterett's historical analysis of early welfare state programs, and the con-
ceptions of gender and sexuality embedded within them, invites us to
think about similar issues in the context of the contemporary welfare
state." One way to conceptualize this inquiry would be to ask a question
parallel to Sterett's historical question: How do the legal structures that
today define and govern welfare benefits participate in constructing gen-
der and sexuality?2' Although I will touch on that question, I want to take
a somewhat different perspective here, one that is consistent with my
theme of considering the intersexional effects of particular strategies and
legal interventions.
I will focus on contemporary advocacy for same-sex marriage rights
and explore some of the possible intersexional effects of that advocacy
on issues relating specifically to poor women in the welfare state today.22
In doing so, I suggest that there are some highly problematic intersex-
ional dimensions here, ones that should influence the course of future
advocacy. I do not, in doing so, seek to join here the larger debate among
proponents of gay equality about the wisdom of seeking same-sex mar-
riage rights. That debate has been ably engaged by, among others, Bill
Eskridge,"3 Paula Ettlebrick, ' Nan Hunter, Darren Hutchinson,26 Nancy
20. See Sterett, supra note 1.
21. See generally Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 274. Fineman argues that the welfare system, with its goal of eliminating single motherhood,
favors, and pushes individuals into, a traditional nuclear family structure, with the father as financial
provider and mother as homemaker. Id. at 277-93; see id. at 276 ("[Tlhe ideology of patriarchy is
the most instrumental force in the creation and acceptance of discourses about Mothers in our
society.").
22. Cf Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage, supra note 2, at 1248 (recognizing the potential of
PSA's to "exacerbate rather than alleviate the marginalization of poor people and many women of
color").
23. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 84-85 (1996) (arguing
that claims made by gay "marriage critics are too speculative to overcome the presumption of
equality").
24. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition,
5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 114 (1996) (arguing that gay and lesbian rights advocates should be cautious in
arguing for same-sex marriage and should pursue "more inclusive social and legal policies that
would bestow respect and benefits upon all who assume the responsibility and functions of family-
whether they are married or not"); see also Ettelbrick, supra note 18.
25. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9,
12 (1991) (arguing that "legalization of lesbian and gay marriage and the adoption of domestic
partnership provisions are incomplete unless the other option also exists, and that they need to be
analyzed as part of the feminist inquiry into how both private and public law reinforce power
imbalance in family life").
26. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal
Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REv. 561, 586-602 (1996) (arguing that many same-
sex marriage advocates essentialize the gay/lesbian experience, ignoring vital racial and class
differences among members of the gay and lesbian community).
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Polikoff," Tom Stoddard,2" and Andrew Sullivan.29 My focus will be
much more targeted.
It will break no new ground to recognize that it has been a consistent
strategy of so-called "welfare reformers" to brutally stigmatize single
mothers-that subgroup of mothers who, as Martha Fineman has pointed
out, must be marked as "single" to separate them from unmodified
"mothers," who by definition are to be taken as married." In contempo-
rary political discourse, it passes without much controversy to blame
single mothers, especially poor ones, for a wide array of social ills, in-
cluding, most ironically, poverty itself. Indeed, as Fineman's work has
shown, single mothers are routinely identified as both the cause and the
result of poverty, and inhabit a category that is itself imbued with a
strong dose of moral blame."
Although this long-running rhetorical strategy has powerfully shaped
contemporary discourse, the phenomenon is hardly limited to rhetoric.
Increasingly, the pressure for single mothers to marry is finding its way
into the law. Consider, for example, state experiments with so-called
"bridefare," which create financial incentives to marry.32 Moreover, the
1996 federal welfare reform bill, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,"3 enshrines this view of single
mothers both in its legislative findings and within the law itself. Con-
27. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV.
1535, 1549-50 (1993) (arguing that advocacy of lesbian and gay marriage will "require a rhetorical
strategy that emphasizes similarities between our relationships and heterosexual marriages, values
long-term monogamous coupling above all other relationships, and denies the potential of lesbian
and gay marriage to transform the gendered nature of marriage for all people").
28. Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, 6 OuT/LoOK:
NAT'L LESBIAN & GAY Q. 9, 9 (1989) (arguing that, despite the historically oppressive structures of
the marriage construct, gay rights advocates should seek legal recognition of same-sex marriages
because the economic advantages and legal rights that marriage confers upon individuals will futher
both equal rights and the transformation of the current institution of marriage).
29. ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 178-79 (1995) ("Marriage is not simply a
private contract; it is a social and public cognition of a private commitment. As such, it is the highest
public recognition of personal integrity. Denying it to homosexuals is the must public affront
possible to their public equality.").
30. Fineman, supra note 21, at 291.
31. MARTHA ALBERSTON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 106-18 (1995). See generally Linda J. Lacey, As
American As Parenthood and Apple Pie: Neutered Mothers, Breadwinning Fathers, and Welfare
Rhetoric, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 79, 79 & n.1 (1996) (reviewing FINEMAN, supra, and DAVID
BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM
(1995)) ("Rhetoric about the dangers that single mothers pose to society has reached a fever pitch in
the last decade. Critics blame single mothers for poverty, crime, drug addiction, and the breakdown
of western culture as we know it.").
32. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10-3.4 to 3.7 (West 1993) (repealed 1997) (providing that
children whose parents marry shall have their benefits 'continued); see also Julie Kosterlitz, The
Marriage Penalty, 24 NAT'L J. 1454, 1455-56 (1992) (discussing a similar proposal in Wisconsin).
33. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
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sider, for example, these legislative findings that appear in the congres-
sional preamble to the welfare reform law:
"Marriage is the foundation of a successful society."
"Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society which
promotes the interests of children."
"The negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the
mother, the child, the family, and society are well documented .. "
"The negative consequences of raising children in single-parent
homes are well documented ....34
Beyond making these specific findings, Congress in 1996 enacted a
block grant system, affording states considerable latitude in creating their
own welfare systems, but requiring that federal funds be used in ways
that further the stated purposes of the law-including, as set forth in the
statute, to "encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent
families.""
At the very time that welfare reformers unrelentingly hammer poor
women for not marrying, and at the very time that marriage is so aggres-
sively pressed in law and in political rhetoric as a panacea for poverty
and a magical route to deliverance for poor women, the debate over
same-sex marriage rages. I number myself firmly among those who wish
that the same-sex marriage debate had not been joined at this particular
moment in history-a moment when the forces of so-called family val-
ues wield considerable power, as the passage of the Defense of Marriage
Act36 and its many state law analogues37 painfully reflect. In my view,
however, once the same-sex marriage debate was joined, advocates of
sexual equality were left with little choice but to oppose current marriage
law, which imposes a formal, legal inequality on lesbians and gay men.
Even still, advocates and academics do have crucial choices to make
about what strategies and theories to pursue in advocacy.
I am particularly concerned with strategies that valorize and romanti-
cize marriage, as my earlier discussion might suggest that I would be. In
34. These congressional findings are among those made in connection with the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families program. The findings appear in the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 note (Supp. H1 1996) (Congressional Findings)), reprinted in JULIE A.
NICE & LoutSE G. TRUBEK, POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACIcE 619-20 (1997).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(4) (Supp. I1996).
36. The Defense of Marriage Act denies federal recognition to same-sex marriages and
legislatively authorizes states to deny recognition to same-sex marriages that may be performed in
other states. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. H 1996), and 28 U.S.C.§ 1738C (Supp. II 1996)).
37. State statutory analogues to this federal law generally deny recognition to any same-sex
marriage that may be performed in another state. For an overview of the Defense of Marriage Act
and cognate state laws, see Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 TEx. L. REv. 921 (1998).
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a general sense, I fear that strategies like these will undermine the real
pluralism of affiliative structures that I think we should seek.3" More spe-
cifically, I fear that these strategies draw same-sex marriage advocates-
unintentionally, to be sure-into the lamentable larger dynamics that
sustain contemporary single-mother bashing.39 Various advocates today
argue, for example, that marriage has a uniquely "civilizing" capacity,'
that marriage marks a uniquely "deep" commitment to society and by the
partners to one another," and that marriage should be pursued for the
"social recognition" that it brings. 2 These sorts of arguments can fuel-
in ways that can be as real as they are unintended-the stigmatization
and relentless condemnation of poor single mothers. After all, to
characterize marriage as civilizing is to imply the uncivilized character of
those outside the institution. To posit marriage as marking a unique form
of commitment seems inescapably to devalue other family arrangements.
And, to crave the social recognition that marriage brings is to accept at
face value that very social recognition, rather than to question and resist
its far-reaching effects.
While arguments like these may be shrewd when measured against
the near-term goal of winning more popular support for gay marriage
rights in the current political climate, they are troubling in light of their
pernicious intersexional effects. By validating the conventional wisdom
that posits marriage as society's "very foundation," and by pressing the
good, socially acceptable behavior of many marriage-aspiring sexual
minorities, these strategies become complicitous in the dominant dis-
course that makes marriage a compulsory part of citizenship, and that
penalizes-harshly, as contemporary welfare reform measures suggest-
many who are unmarried.
Here again, there is complexity and uncertainty in attempting to
measure the intersexional effects of a legal strategy. The problems I point
out may be either less or more severe than I have suggested. The prob-
lems may be less severe because I am underestimating the intrinsically
radical potential of same-sex marriage-whatever advocacy strategy is
used-to destabilize gender and convention, and in turn, to transform the
38. Cf. Hutchinson, supra note 26, at 583-636 (arguing that pro-marriage strategies deployed
by gay rights proponents work to erase and obscure the experiences and needs of gays and lesbians
who are poor or of color).
39. By stressing this aspect of the problem, I do not mean to erase other ways in which
advocacy for same-sex marriage may create undesirable effects, such as by creating hierarchies
within the gay and lesbian community that disfavor those who may choose not to marry. See
Ettelbrick, supra note 18, at 16 ("Ironically, gay marriage, instead of liberating gay sex and
sexuality, would further outlaw all gay and lesbian sex which is not performed in a marital
context.").
40. ESKRIDGE, supra note 23, at 8-13.
41. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 182.
42. Evan Wolfson, Same-Sex Marriages: PRO-Two Sides Debate Issue Before Congress and
the Courts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 23, 1996, at 1J.
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institution of marriage 3 into something that cannot be so readily used to
subordinate poor women. (Perhaps this might explain why the same
Congress that passed welfare reform, after all, also passed the Defense of
Marriage Act). Or it may be more severe than I think because my focus
on particular advocacy strategies may be too marginal. Given the current
context, perhaps any social demand for entry into the institution of mar-
riage will inevitably serve to buttress the power of the institution itself
and so to enable and encourage its reactionary political uses. The details
of how the marriage claim is framed may simply be too nuanced and
subtle for the crude collective politics of meaning that help to shape pub-
lic understandings.
True, there are no easy or irrefutable ways to gauge intersexional ef-
fects like these. But, again, we ought to ask the intersexional question
and craft arguments and strategies with intersexional considerations in
mind. In the domain of the marriage struggle, that means disclaiming
strategies that valorize marriage and pursuing strategies that are, instead,
explicitly rooted in a vision of real pluralism and justice, broadly con-
strued. This means accepting a responsibility to participate self-
consciously in constructing and re-constructing heterosexuality and al-
ternative sexualities with careful attention to the broad and diverse range
of interests affected by these processes of construction.
43. See generally Hunter, supra note 25 (arguing that the legalization of gay and lesbian
marriage will potentially destabilize the gender-based definition of marriage, and thus have effects
beyond the gay and lesbian communities).
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WHAT'S So SPECIAL ABOUT SPECIAL RIGHTS?
KAREN ENGLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Common Law,' Oliver Wendell Holmes put forth what Rob-
ert Gordon has considered a "positivist formulation of a legal right":2
Every right is a consequence attached by the law to one or more facts
which the law defines, and wherever the law gives any one special
rights not shared by the body of the people, it does so on the ground
that certain special facts, not true of the rest of the world, are true of
him. When a group of facts thus singled out by the law exists in the
case of a given person, he is said to be entitled to the corresponding
rights; meaning, thereby, that the law helps him to constrain his
neighbors, or some of them, in a way in which it would not, if all the
facts in question were not true of him .... There are always two
things to be asked: first, what are the facts which make up the group
in question; and then, what are the consequences attached by the law
to that group. The former generally offers the only difficulties.'
In this article, I use Holmes's definition of a special right to frame
the debate between gay rights proponents and gay rights opponents over
the issue whether gay rights are special rights. I do so by exploring the
arguments made on behalf and against the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA),' a federal bill prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation, as well as two judicial opinions that consider
gay rights to be special rights.
* Professor of Law, University of Utah. I am grateful to the University of Denver College of
Law and the Denver University Law Review, especially to Nancy Ehrenreich, Martha Ertman, and
Karla Robertson, for hosting and organizing a terrific forum for exchange of ideas. I greatly
appreciate comments on the written and oral presentation of this article from participants of the
symposium, particularly Patricia Cain, Jane Schacter and Kendall Thomas, as well as from Daniel
Greenwood, Morton Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, Gary Peller, Ileana Porras and Mary Westby. Thanks
to Chris Griffin, Barbara McFarlane and Svitlana Tokarenko for their research assistance, and to The
University of Iowa College of Law and The University of Utah College of Law for research funds.
1. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
2. Robert Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV.
719, 723 (1982).
3. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 214 (emphasis added); see also Gordon, supra note 2, at 723-24
(quoting and addressing this portion of Holmes's The Common Law).
4. ENDA was first introduced in 1994 as S. 2288, 103d Cong. (1994) and H.R. 4636, 103d
Cong. (1994). It was subsequently introduced in 1996 as S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996) and H.R.
1863, 104th Cong. (1996) and again in 1997 as S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997).
5. The two opinions are Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) and the majority opinion in Equality Foundation, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
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Through this exploration, I make three arguments. First, opponents
and proponents of gay rights use the term "special rights" in very differ-
ent senses. As a result, ENDA advocates, by arguing that ENDA does
not grant homosexuals special rights, are not responsive to the special
rights critics. Second, not only do ENDA advocates fail to address their
opponents' concerns, they unwittingly buy into a very conservative view
about civil rights. That is, they suggest that economic efficiency should
guide lawmaking, and that affirmative action or other "preferences" are
negative. Third, ENDA advocates perpetuate and even accentuate the
assumption made by critics that special rights for gay men and lesbians,
as well as for other groups, are bad. I question this assumption by calling
for a gay rights advocacy that responds to the critics by arguing for spe-
cial rights, because-in Holmes's sense of the term-the facts call for
them.
In many ways, Holmes's two questions highlight the distinctions
between the ways that special rights are used by opponents and propo-
nents of gay rights. The first inquiry, "what are the facts which make up
the group in question,"6 is largely focused on by proponents. For them,
the group is homosexuals and the argument is that there is nothing spe-
cial about the facts that require special treatment. If anything, the facts-
as they see them-tend to lean toward the opposite result. In Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans,7 for example, homosexu-
als are defined by the conduct that they engage in, conduct that may con-
stitutionally be criminalized and therefore should not be protected.8 Gay
rights advocates, in contrast, rarely talk about the facts that make up the
group. Rather, they tend to focus on the legal consequences attached to
the determination of whether the group is protected. Justice Kennedy's
failure to mention Bowers v. Hardwick in his majority opinion in Evans,
is, as Janet Halley has discussed, an example of the avoidance of the
factual discussion.'" Further, ENDA advocates seem more concerned
with the legal consequences of the bill's passage (no affirmative action,
for example) than the discrimination that calls for a remedy.
In this article, I call for gay rights advocates to focus on the first in-
quiry, by turning to the facts that make up the group "homosexual." The
article proceeds as follows. Part II outlines four distinct meanings of spe-
cial rights deployed by opponents of gay rights. These meanings are
gleaned from judicial opinions and legislative debate and testimony sur-
rounding ENDA. Part III examines legislative arguments in support of
ENDA to demonstrate that gay rights advocates are largely responding to
6. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 214.
7. 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 636.
9. 478 U.S 186 (1986).
10. See Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 429, 429-30 (1997). For
further discussion of Halley's argument, see infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
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a different notion of special rights than any of the four suggested by gay
rights opponents. I contend that gay rights advocates ultimately support a
conservative vision of civil rights. In Part IV, I attempt to understand
what is guiding liberal avoidance of the factual discussion, and suggest
two potential ways that gay rights advocates might respond more directly
to the conservative special rights critique. In doing so, I call for gay
rights advocates to argue the need for special rights for lesbians and gay
men. In particular, I urge the development of and reliance on a thick de-
scription of the special facts to support a claim for special rights.
II. SPECIAL RIGHTS: WHAT Do THE CRITICS MEAN?
When, in Romer v. Evans," the Supreme Court found "implausi-
ble"'2 Colorado's stated defense of Amendment 2" that it did "no more
than deny homosexuals special rights,"'" many gay rights advocates ap-
plauded the Court for "unequivocally stat[ing]" that "[I]aws which pro-
tect people from discrimination . . . provide equal rights, not 'special
rights.""' 5 The special rights/equal rights debate that dominated the dis-
course in campaigns to institute and later to repeal gay rights ordinances
for at least two decades'6 seemed to have come to a halt, at least in fed-
eral courts with regard to referenda that sought to deny sexual minorities,
but no other groups, the opportunity to achieve antidiscrimination pro-
tection from state or local governments.
At the same time that Evans was decided, the Court voted 6-3 to
vacate and remand for reconsideration a Sixth Circuit decision upholding
a ballot-initiative-driven amendment to Cincinnati's Charter that read
strikingly similarly to Amendment 2." Article XII of the Cincinnati
Charter, codifying Issue 3, prohibited the city from granting "special
class status.., based upon sexual orientation, conduct or relationships."'8
Because of the similarities in the two cases and because "every single
11. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
12. Evans, 517 U.S. at 626.
13. Amendment 2 was codified as COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b) (1992) and subsequently
declared unconstitutional and permanently enjoined from enforcement in Evans.
14. Evans, 517 U.S. at 626 (paraphrasing the state's principal defense of Amendment 2).
15. Matt Coles, ACLU Applauds Supreme Court Decision Striking Down Colorado's Anti-Gay
Amendment 2, ACLU NEWS & EVENTS (May 20, 1996) (last visited Dec. 22, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/newsd n052096b.html>; see also Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a
Day: The Subtle Transformation in Judicial Argument Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 893,
955; Rudy Serra, Sexual Orientation and Michigan Law, 76 MIcH. B.J. 948, 949 (1997).
16. For an early expression of the position that gay rights constitute special rights, or at least
are not civil rights, see ANITA BRYANT, THE ANiTA BRYANT STORY 146 (1977) ("[Dade County's]
blundering 'gay' ordinance is no more a civil rights issue than is the arrest of a drunk for disturbing
the peace.").
17. See Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) (Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer for the majority; Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting), vacating and remanding 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
18. CINCINNAn, OHio, CHARTER art. XII (1993), quoted in Equality Found., Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
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anti-gay voter initiative of recent years [had] been rejected by courts,"'9
"gay rights groups were shocked"'2 when the Sixth Circuit, upon recon-
sideration in light of Evans, continued to find the Cincinnati Charter
Amendment constitutional.2 ' That opinion evinces the continued persua-
siveness of the special rights argument.
Writing for a unanimous panel of the Sixth Circuit, Judge Krupan-
sky distinguished Equality Foundation from Evans on several grounds.
First, Equality Foundation involved a city-wide, not state-wide, action.
Consequently, the effects of the Charter Amendment were not as burden-
some for homosexuals to overcome as the statewide constitutional
amendment that would have been required in Colorado. 3 Moreover, in
applying the rational relation test, the court found that, because of the
local scope of the Charter Amendment, the voters' rights were more di-
rectly implicated than they were in Colorado.24 Hence, the court found
that "the valid interests of the Cincinnati electorate in conserving public
and private financial resources is, standing alone, of sufficient weight, to
justify the City's Charter Amendment under a rational basis analysis.2 5
Finally, the court spent a significant amount of time arguing that, while
the Colorado amendment potentially excluded lesbians and gay men
from the protection of ordinary laws, the Cincinnati Charter was not so
broad.26 Rather, it "eliminated only 'special class status' and 'preferential
treatment' for gays as gays under Cincinnati ordinances and policies. 27
The Sixth Circuit's Equality Foundation opinion has already been
attacked by a number of legal scholars and gay rights advocates for mis-
reading Evans. Only time will tell whether these distinctions will last,
although they have been reinforced by the Supreme Court's recent denial
of the petition for writ of certiorari in Equality Foundation.2 9 Although I
19. David E. Rovella, Gay Groups Are Angry at Sexual Preference Ruling-Cincinnati Law
Contradicts High Court Case, They Say, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 1997, at A9 (quoting Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund).
20. Id.
21. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 301.
22. See id. at 296.
23. See id. at 296-97.
24. See id. at 300.
25. Id. at 301.
26. See id. at 299-300.
27. Id. at 297.
28. See, e.g., J. Mitchell Armbruster, Deciding Not to Decide: The Supreme Court's
Expanding Use of the G.V.R. Power Continued in Thomas v. American Home Prod., Inc. and
Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1387, 1416 (1998); Mark Hansen,
Distinguishing 2 from 3, 6th Circuit Panel Stands by Anti-Gay Rights Initiative Despite Supreme
Court Quashing of Similar Measure, 84 A.B.A. J. 35 (1998).
29. Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998) (denying petition for
writ of certiorari). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, expressly noted that the denial "should not
be interpreted either as an independent construction of the charter or as an expression of its views




mostly agree with the critics as a matter of doctrine, I will use the Equal-
ity Foundation opinion in this article, not for its distinctions from Evans,
but for its blatant acceptance of gay rights as special rights. More im-
portantly, though, the decision reflects a position that all civil rights are
special rights. Since all antidiscrimination law is seen as special by the
court, the primary question seems to be whether special rights are con-
stitutionally required for any given group.
This view of special rights is not new. It can be found in Justice
Scalia's dissent in Evans3" and in, much of the rhetoric in opposition to
gay rights-on the streets, in courts, in testimony before Congress, and
among legislators themselves. Jane Schacter' and Samuel Marcosson32
have pointed out that an almost identical critique can be found in legisla-
tive opposition to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.33 In addition,
Schacter has demonstrated that the "rhetoric of 'special rights' . . . is
laden with corrosive double messages that are hostile to civil rights law
in general."'
When gay rights opponents argue that prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation gives homosexuals special rights, they gener-
ally have one of four connected but distinct positions in mind. These
positions fall roughly into two categories already identified by Samuel
Marcosson in his study of the history and use of the special rights posi-
tion in both the contemporary gay rights context and in civil rights de-
bates in the 1960s."5 That is, they argue either that all civil rights are spe-
cial rights or that gay rights are special because they grant homosexuals
rights that others do not have. Marcosson has done a fine job of docu-
menting these positions but, as I describe below, I do not believe he fully
captures their nuances. Moreover, I believe each of these positions must
be subdivided.
A. Meaning One: Civil Rights Are Special Rights
Samuel Marcosson spends much of his article addressing the equa-
tion of civil rights with special rights. He describes the position as fol-
lows:
[C]ivil rights protections are by their nature "special rights"
and.., sexual orientation is not a valid basis for these rights. This ar-
30. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of
Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 303-07 (1994).
32. Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate over Lesbian and Gay
Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 137, 144-54 (1995).
33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also THE CiVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: OPERATIONS MANUAL ON
FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, PUBLIC ACCOMODATIONS, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 17-22 (1964)
(providing analysis and legislative history on the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
34. Schacter, supra note 31, at 300.
35. See Marcosson, supra note 32, at 140-44.
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gument is twofold: it argues first that the right to be free from em-
ployment discrimination is in some way "special," and second that
while it is valid to confer this "special right" on the basis of race, sex,
or religion, doing so on the basis of sexual orientation is either unjus-
tified or improper.
36
Although I agree with Marcosson that this version of the special rights
argument assumes that all civil rights protections are special, I disagree
with the second part of his description of the argument that gay-rights
opponents necessarily assume that civil rights are justified in other areas.
Marcosson derives this second part of his description from his per-
suasive argument that the contemporary debate about gay rights is a re-
play of the debate around civil rights in the 1960s, only this time applied
to sexual orientation.37 Perhaps his quotation from Senator Hill's state-
ment in opposition to the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963 best summa-
rizes the argument: "Under a misleading banner labeled 'equal opportu-
nity,' proponents ...would have the Congress enact what in fact and
substance is 'the Special Privilege Act of 1963.' For rights won at the
expense of others' 'rights are not rights at all, but special privi-
leges .. . ."' Of course this position relies on another argument, which is
that rights of business owners to run their business as they wish should
not be trumped by civil rights legislation. Marcosson then demonstrates
that the special rights position was defeated in the 1960s, and concludes
that therefore any appeal to such a position is now "discredited."39 Con-
sequently, for Marcosson, gay rights opponents must be assuming that
conferring "special rights"' on the basis of other classifications is valid.
In this section, I suggest that the gay rights debate has opened up the
possibility for such appeals to become credited, not just with regard to
gay rights but to all civil rights. When legislators oppose ENDA, for ex-
ample, they often argue that creating a new special class will only repeat
the sins of the past (with regard to other protections). These opponents
often maintain that prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation
would lead to affirmative action or quotas for homosexuals because em-
ployers would be scrutinized to ensure that their workforces are appro-
36. Id. at 140 (footnote omitted). A second meaning, which Marcosson dismisses as nothing
more than "sloganeering," is "that only a limited group possesses the rights in question; the right is
'special' because it is a right not enjoyed by other groups-and hence ought not to be conferred." Id.
at 144; see infra Part I.B (discussing the second argument).
37. See Marcosson, supra note 32, at 144-45.
38. Id. at 149 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 4760 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hill)).
39. Id. at 147. But see id. at 152 (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROuNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 3-5, 505 (1992) to note that the special
rights/free association argument has not been "completely consigned to the scraphead of yesteryear's
intellectual musing and judicial concurrences," but adding that Epstein acknowledges that in making
the argument he is "swim[ming] against a powerful tide of social consensus").
40. Note that Marcosson puts the term "special rights" in quotation marks. See Marcosson,
supra note 32, at 137.
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priately representative of all sexual orientations. Indeed, the dissent in
Evans, the majority opinion in Equality Foundation, and much of the
congressional opposition to ENDA conflate special rights and civil
rights. In doing so, they either overtly argue that all civil rights are spe-
cial and therefore bad, or they avoid the question whether all civil rights
are bad because special, but insist that special rights based on sexual
orientation cannot be justified.
1. The Overt Argument
The argument that all civil rights are special rights and therefore un-
desirable is most overtly and clearly made in congressional debates about
ENDA. That is, opponents of ENDA portray the legislation as an expan-
sion of what they consider intrusive civil rights laws.
Some legislators use the ENDA debate to express their dissatisfac-
tion with Title VII. A statement by Senator Ashcroft typifies the position.
After stating that he believed there ought to be civil rights protection on
the basis of race and sex (but not sexual orientation), he immediately
belied the statement:
But I remember a situation when I was Governor of Missouri in
which one man operating a laundry fired a black woman from the
laundry. She was one of seven black women working in the laundry.
She was replaced by a black woman. But she sued alleging that she
was fired because she was discriminated against on the basis of both
race and sex.
The truth of the matter is that the establishment of protected classes
makes much more difficult the ability of anyone to even use good
judgment in hiring and firing because there is always this threat of
litigation.41
Taken seriously, this statement suggests that there should be no antidis-
crimination law at all.
This backlash against antidiscrimination law can further be seen in
arguments against creating what many Senators consider a "new" pro-
tected class, or a class with special rights. Perhaps Senator Coverdell
from Georgia put it most succinctly: "At a time when we are, as a soci-
ety, questioning the value and effects of affirmative action programs, we
should not be creating a new special category of citizens, a special class
of citizens that will be a new basis for a new round of quotas and litiga-
tion."" In other words, ENDA opponents often point to the problems
they see with antidiscrimination law as it currently stands in arguing
against adding to the protected classifications. As Senator Hatch stated,
ENDA would "open up an entirely new category of preferences and re-
41. 142 CONG. REC. S 10,000 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (emphasis
added).
42. Id. at S 10,004 (statement of Sen. Coverdell).
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verse discrimination," 3 despite specific language in the bill to the con-
trary. Pointing to the fact that ENDA would be enforced by the EEOC,
he continued: "I think it will lead to the same sort of sets of preferences
that we see today under Title VII that were said could never happen.""
To be fair, these legislators do not explicitly state that all special
protections are bad. But they do rely on the negative connotation of the
term "special" when they refer generally to special classifications other
than sexual orientation. The question they pose is whether we should add
to what they consider the disastrous effects of Title VII by passing
ENDA. Once again, to be fair, they do not argue that antidiscrimination
law is naturally or necessarily bad. Rather, they contend that, due to the
interpretation of the law and the enforcement power of the EEOC, em-
ployers have been forced into granting preferences to avoid lawsuits. Of
course, they ignore in this latter argument both that courts have inter-
preted all the classifications to protect majorities and minorities, advan-
taged and disadvantaged,45 and that an employer's representative "bottom
line" racial, sexual, ethnic or religious composition does not constitute an
absolute defense to Title VII claims." They also ignore the extent to
which courts have invalidated affirmative action plans. Finally, these
legislators do not suggest any way to implement antidiscrimination laws
that would not lead to what they consider special protection.
2. The "Neutral" Argument
The second version of the argument agrees with the first version that
all civil rights are special rights. Although proponents of this position get
rhetorical punch from the negative connotation that special rights has
taken on in the civil rights arena, they appear agnostic on the issue
whether all special rights are impermissible. Rather, their position is that,
regardless of whether special rights are justified in other civil rights
contexts, they are not justified with regard to gay rights. The argument
nevertheless relies on a slippage between civil rights and special rights.
To explore this position, I focus on two judicial opinions: Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Evans and Judge Krupansky's majority
opinion in Equality Foundation. Although the legal issues in these cases
are constitutional, not statutory, the same question is addressed as in the
ENDA debates: Should sexual orientation be treated similarly to race,
43. Id. at S9992 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
44. Id. at S9994.
45. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682
(1983); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (holding that a racially balanced
workforce does not constitute a defense to a disparate impact claim). A bottom line might, however,
provide both a defense to a systemic disparate treatment claim and evidence, though not conclusive
evidence, of nondiscrimination in an individual disparate treatment claim.
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sex, and other "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classifications? And, if not, is
animus against gay men and lesbians sufficient to find that there is no
rational basis for the law?
As already mentioned, the majority of the Supreme Court in Evans
found "implausible" the notion that Colorado's Amendment 2 did no
more than prohibit special rights for gay men and lesbians. '7 Justice
Scalia, in dissent, vigorously disagreed, reading Amendment 2 as "a
modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional
sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to re-
vise those mores through use of the laws."" The heart of Justice Scalia's
dissent is two-fold. First, the voters only increased the hurdle for homo-
sexuals to obtain special rights, or preferential treatment.' 9 Second, there
was a rational basis for the state to prohibit such special protection for
homosexuals, since the state could constitutionally prohibit the "conduct
that defines the class."' I focus here on Justice Scalia's use of the terms
"special rights" and "preferential treatment," although, as we shall see,
his use of these terms in his first argument is not unrelated to his conduct
argument.'
Throughout his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia refers to Amend-
ment 2 as merely precluding special, or preferential, treatment for homo-
sexuals." At one point, he states that "[t]he amendment prohibits special
treatment of homosexuals, and nothing more."53 He uses the term special
treatment here to respond to the majority's suggestion that Amendment 2
could be read to deprive homosexuals even of the protection of general
laws.' Although the majority claims not to rely on that possibility,5 Jus-
47. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996).
48. Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 637.
50. Id. at 641. Although the majority does not make the point, it seems that Colorado's
decision to repeal its sodomy statute could undermine this rational basis claim.
51. For discussion and critique of the conflation of status and conduct, see Dan Danielsen,
Identity Strategies: Representing Pregnancy and Homosexuality, in AFrER IDENTITY: A READER IN
LAW AND CULTURE 39, 39-60 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995); Janet Halley, The
Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identities, 36 UCLA
L. REv. 915, 966-67 (1989); Halley, supra note 10, at 442.
52. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 638 ("They may not obtain preferential treatment without
amending the state constitution."); id. at 642 ("[S]urely it is rational to deny special favor and
protection."); id. at 652 ("To suggest, for example, that this constitutional amendment springs from
nothing more than 'a bare desire .. .to harm a politically unpopular group,' is nothing short of
insulting.") (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
53. Id. at 638.
54. See id. at 629-30.
55. See id. at 630. It is arguable, however, that the opinion in fact relies on this possibility.
Janet Halley argues that the Court responded to the argument that Amendment 2 would deny gay
men and lesbians the protection of general laws by "seem[ing] to reject and then adopt [this] reading
of Amendment 2 offered in the Tribe Brief." Halley, supra note 10, at 430 (referring to an amicus
brief filed by Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland and Kathleen M.
Sullivan).
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tice Scalia argues that Amendment 2 should not be interpreted that
broadly. In doing so, his examples are instructive of what he would view
as neutral--or non-preferential-treatment:
[Amendment 2] would not affect ... a requirement of state law that
pensions be paid to all retiring state employees with a certain length
of service; homosexual employees, as well as others, would be enti-
tled to that benefit. But it would prevent the state or any municipality
from making death-benefit payments to the "life partner" of a homo-
sexual when it does not make payments to the long-time roommate of
a nonhomosexual employee. Or again, it does not affect the require-
ment of the State's general insurance laws that customers be afforded
coverage without discrimination unrelated to anticipated risk. Thus,
homosexuals could not be denied coverage, or charged a greater pre-
mium, with respect to auto collision insurance; but neither the State
nor any municipality could require that distinctive health insurance
risks associated with homosexuality (if there are any) be ignored.
56
At least one fault with both of these examples, of course, is that they
ignore background rules about marriage that affect the ability of same-
sex couples, unlike straight couples, to receive insurance benefits for or
with their partners.57
Later, Justice Scalia uses special treatment slightly differently, ar-
guing that Amendment 2 does not even prohibit giving special treatment
to homosexuals. Rather, it only prohibits giving such special treatment to
them on the basis of their homosexuality.58 In this discussion, he makes
clear what he means by special treatment generally. Homosexuals, he
claims, "can be favored for many reasons-for example, because they
are senior citizens or members of racial minorities."59 As Mark Fajer
has noted, referring to the same language, Justice Scalia "apparently
believes that even anti-discrimination laws focused on race are special
protections."
While other critics have identified this slippage in the argument,
they have done so in a way that assumes the identification of the slippage
is the critique. In a recently published article, for example, Joseph Jack-
son argues that Justice Scalia begs the question by deploying preferential
treatment arguments, stating that "Justice Scalia might just as well have
asserted that civil rights laws guaranteeing the rights of racial minorities
56. Evans, 517 U.S. at 638.
57. For a more elaborate treatment of the first example, see infra note 188 and accompanying
text.
58. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 644.
59. Id.
60. Mark A. Fajer, Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v. Evans, and the Meaning of Anti-
Discrimination Legislation, 2 NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 208, 210 (1996).
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to sit at lunch counters accord them preferential treatment. '6 ' Jackson
then quotes from Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in The Civil Rights
Cases-arguing that the legislation in question sought "to secure and
protect rights belonging to [blacks] as freemen and citizens; nothing
more" 6 -in order to dispense with Scalia's position."3 It seems to me,
though, that Jackson too easily dismisses the argument. Justice Scalia
would likely agree that the right to sit at a lunch counter without regard
to race is a special right. The question would then be whether the special
right is justified. Because of the negative implication that special rights
has become imbued with in recent years, critics tend to assume that say-
ing the analysis would apply to race is a sufficient critique. But it is not,
both because it does not get to the heart of the distinction that gay rights
opponents make between race and sexual orientation, for example, and
because it does not acknowledge that the use of special rights rhetoric to
refer to civil rights protections that we tend to take for granted might not
be merely coincidental. It should come as no surprise that some oppo-
nents of gay rights would be looking, as the legislative debate makes
clear, for some retrenchment of civil rights.'
If Justice Scalia slips into a civil rights-are-special position, Judge
Krupansky, writing for the Sixth Circuit panel in Equality Foundation,
dives in. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit's decision relies on a distinction be-
tween Colorado's Amendment 2 and Cincinnati's Article XII. Although
the court puts some emphasis on the difference between a statewide and
local proscription of the protection of gay rights, the decision rests also
on a distinction between denying the protection of "general'65 laws and
prohibiting laws granting special treatment.' The court reads the Colo-
rado Amendment as doing the former and the Cincinnati Charter
Amendment as doing the latter. 7 In doing so, the court accepts a Scalia-
type definition of special rights, but reads the Colorado Amendment as
more expansive than Scalia admits.
At first glance, Amendment 2 and Article XII look strikingly simi-
lar. Indeed, it was because of their similarities that the Supreme Court
remanded Equality Foundation in light of Evans.' Upon remand, how-
ever, the court insisted that there are crucial differences by relying on the
61. Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal
Protection, 45 UCLA L. REv. 453, 466-67 (1997).
62. Id. at 467 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 61 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
63. Id. ("In short, antidiscrimination laws seek to compel legal recognition of the right to equal
treatment, not to accord preferential treatment to those protected. The special rights rhetoric, and the
argument Justice Scalia derives from it, are simply misleading.").
64. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
65. See Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 296 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
66. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 295-96.
67. See id. at 296.
68. See id. at 301.
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many statements made by the majority in Evans about the potentially
broad sweep of the Amendment to prohibit homosexuals from receiving
the protection of general laws.69 Even though the majority in Evans in-
sisted that such sweep was not necessary for its finding that the Amend-
ment was unconstitutional," and Justice Scalia denied that the Amend-
ment 2 could or should be read so broadly," the Sixth Circuit relied on
such an interpretation to distinguish Article XII. Midway through the
Equality Foundation opinion, the court quotes and "contrasts" the lan-
guage of both initiatives." In doing so, it bolds certain language to em-
phasize what it considers to be the difference between the texts. The dif-
ference seems to rest primarily in the titles of the provisions. Amendment
2 began with "No Protected Status based on Homosexual, Lesbian or
Bisexual Orientation,"73 whereas the Cincinnati Charter provision begins
with "NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED
UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS." 4
Through this emphasis, the court suggests a distinction, then, between
protected and special status. It puts in bold some other language as well.
While Amendment 2 prohibited any law that would make homosexuals,
lesbians or bisexuals entitled to "claim any minority status, quota prefer-
ences, protected status or claim of discrimination,"" the Cincinnati
Charter Amendment prohibits giving the same group "any claim of mi-
nority or protected status, quota preference or other preferential treat-
ment." 7
6
Although the court attempts to distinguish the language using bold-
face, the language is not as distinguishable as the court suggests. Indeed,
the language of the Cincinnati Charter itself belies the claim that there is
any difference between protected status and special status. By adding the
words "or other preferential treatment," the Cincinnati Charter includes
"minority or protected status" and "quota preference" as preferential
treatment. If "preferential treatment" were only to include quota prefer-
69. See id. at 295 ("The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific
legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination .... ") (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 627 (1996))). The Court, again quoting Evans, explained that "the amendment imposes a
special disability upon [homosexuals] alone." Id. (quoting Evans, 517 U.S. at 631).
70. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 630 ("If [deprivation of protection from general laws] follows from
Amendment 2, as its broad language suggests, it would compound the constitutional difficulties the
law creates. The state court did not decide whether the amendment has this effect, however, and
neither need we.").
71. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Sixth Circuit acknowledges this point. See Equality
Found., 128 F.3d at 296 n.6.
72. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 296.
73. Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art 11, § 30b (1992) (held unconstitutional and permanently
enjoined from enforcement in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996))) (emphasis added by the court).
74. Id. (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CHARTER art. XII (1993)) (emphasis added by the court).
75. Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art II, § 30b) (emphasis added by the court).
76. Id. (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CHARTER art. XI) (emphasis added by the court).
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ence (and not minority or protected status), there would likely be an "or"
before the term "quota preference." Moreover, the court continues by
stating that the Cincinnati Charter "merely prevented homosexuals, as
homosexuals, from obtaining special privileges and preferences (such as
affirmative action preferences or the legally sanctioned power to force
employers, landlords, and merchants to transact business with them)
from the City."77 In other words, the court sees preferential treatment, or
special class status, in the same way as Justice Scalia; it not only includes
affirmative action or quotas, but any nondiscrimination provision based
on that status. As such, the only distinction that can be drawn between
the bolded language is the inclusion of the "claim of discrimination"
term in the Colorado Amendment. That difference seems insufficient to
support the court's conclusion that "[i]n stark contrast [to the Cincinnati
Charter], Colorado Amendment 2's far broader language could be con-
strued to exclude homosexuals from the protection of every Colorado
state law." 8 At bottom, then, it seems the difference can only be pinned
on the Evans majority's discussion of that potential read of the Amend-
ment, a reading that it explicitly contended was not essential to its hold-
ing. There is nothing sufficiently different in the language of the initia-
tives to support the Sixth Circuit's distinction. If the Cincinnati Charter
only prohibited special rights for gays-in the Justice Scalia and Judge
Krupansky sense of things-the same would have to be said of the Colo-
rado Amendment.
Another part of the Equality Foundation opinion makes the slippage
between gay-rights-as-special and civil-rights-as-special even more clear.
Working out why the class of homosexuals differs from other classifica-
tions that already receive constitutional protection, the court argues that
invalidating the Cincinnati Charter Amendment would
disenfranchise the voters of their most fundamental right ... to vote
to override or preempt any policy or practice ... to bestow special
rights, protections, and/or privileges upon a group of people who do
not comprise a suspect or a quasi-suspect class and hence are not
entitled to any special favorable legal status. 9
In other words, even nondiscrimination protection given on the basis of a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification would be seen by this court as
special. Although the court suggests that voters would not be able to
override special rights to those groups-at least without a substantial or
compelling interest-the rights are nonetheless considered special.
Using the Evans dissent and the Equality Foundation opinions as ex-
hibits, I would argue that conservatives have for sometime cleverly (if
unconsciously) conflated the notions of special rights and equal rights.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
79. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 298 (emphasis added).
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The opinions show, as Marcosson,' Schacter,"' Jackson,82 and Fajer83 have
all argued, that the term "special rights" is often used by gay rights op-
ponents to refer to any antidiscrimination law whatsoever. The term
"special rights" is not simply referring to, as we might assume, "une-
qual" treatment like affirmative action. Rather, any law that provides
protection for groups based on any (traditionally protected) classification
is seen as special. The only question becomes whether such special pro-
tection can be justified. Since special treatment today generally connotes
inappropriate treatment, at least in the civil rights context, the assumption
might be that it rarely can be justified. Certainly, the congressional
backlash against Title VII is suggestive of that view. Federal judges,
however, might be even more reluctant than some legislators to state
such a view, given the entrenchment of antidiscrimination norms in the
law. They take that entrenchment as a given (even while jabbing at it by
calling the norms "special"), and then aim to distinguish the classifica-
tions upon which such special treatment is based. Their attempt to distin-
guish the classifications leads to the second meaning of special rights.
B. Meaning Two: Special Rights As Rights Not Enjoyed by Other Groups
For Marcosson, a second meaning of special rights would be that
"the right is 'special' because it is a right not enjoyed by other groups-
and hence ought not be conferred."' Marcosson dismisses this argument,
however, as "sloganeering,"85 and therefore does not address it in much
detail. Although I agree with Marcosson that the first meaning is preva-
lent among opponents of gay rights, I do not believe that it can be so
easily separated from this second one. The equation of gay rights and
special rights has made for a successful slogan against gay rights, and the
argument often posed is that antidiscrimination protection based on sex-
ual orientation gives homosexuals rights that others do not have. The
argument is made in one of two ways. The thrust of one argument is that
the proscription of discrimination based on sexual orientation grants ho-
mosexuals rights based on conduct. Those rights are then seen as special:
not only are they different from those attached to other protected classifi-
cations, but they guarantee gays rights that others (presumably straights)
are not guaranteed based on conduct such as political affiliation, dress,
and so forth. The second argument is that preventing discrimination
based on sexual orientation only protects homosexuals and bisexuals, not
heterosexuals.
80. Marcosson, supra note 32, at 158.
81. Schacter, supra note 31, at 306-07.
82. Jackson, supra note 61, at 465-67.
83. Fajer, supra note 60, at 210.
84. Marcosson, supra note 32, at 140. For a discussion of Marcosson's main argument, see
supra Part H.A.
85. Marcosson, supra note 32, at 144.
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1. The Conduct Argument
The main text of Marcosson's article provides only one example of
the meaning of special rights as rights not enjoyed by others. It is an ar-
gument based on conduct: "For example, if gay men and lesbians were
granted the right to commit murder, that would be a 'special right' in the
sense that it is not possessed by heterosexuals."' While it seems pretty
clear that no gay rights proponents would advocate this position, and that
the gay rights laws that opponents sought to repeal in Colorado and Cin-
cinnati did not establish any such rights, the tone and sense of the argu-
ment is very present among gay rights opponents. Indeed, in a footnote to
the above statement, Marcosson acknowledges that this meaning "ex-
plain[s] the Supreme Court's anti-gay decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick... where the Court framed Michael Hardwick's case as if he was
claiming a specific right to engage in 'homosexual sodomy,' rather than
a general right to privacy common to all Americans."8 When Marcosson
published his article, the Supreme Court had not yet decided Evans. By
relying on the same understanding of Hardwick that Marcosson critiques,
however, Justice Scalia's dissent in Evans and Judge Krupansky's deci-
sion in Equality Foundation strongly suggest that, even if nonsensical,
the argument has force. Indeed, this special rights critique offers the
means for distinguishing gay rights from other civil rights.
Justice Scalia and Judge Krupansky might not be phased by the ac-
knowledgment that they treat all civil rights as special rights precisely
because they focus on the extent to which homosexuality differs from
already recognized suspect and quasi-suspect classifications. Once all
such rights are considered special or preferential, the question becomes
why favored treatment is permissible (if not desirable) on the basis of
race (or age) but should not be permissible on the basis of
(homo)sexuality." In addressing this question, Justice Scalia relies heav-
ily on the Court's decision in Hardwick to assert a distinction between
classifications based on status and those based on conduct.89 Homosexu-
ality falls into the latter category for Scalia, as do polygamy, political
party affiliation, adultery, prep school attendance, private club member-
ship, eating habits, sexual harassment, dress habits and sports club pref-
erences. To offer a colorful example of this distinction, Justice Scalia
critiques a regulation of the American Association of Law Schools re-
86. Id. at 140.
87. Id. at 140 n.8 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1996)).
88. I use parentheses here when referring to (homo)sexuality to indicate that although
sexuality, or sexual orientation, is the proper analogy to race, sex, age, etc., both advocates and
opponents of gay rights often use the term homosexuality. This usage suggests that only
homosexuals, not heterosexuals, would have claims under any law prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation. For further discussion, see infra Part I.B.2.
89. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996).
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quiring member schools to prohibit law firms that discriminate based on
sexual orientation from interviewing at their schools, while-Justice
Scalia suggests-the same employers are free to "refuse to offer a job
because the applicant is a Republican; because he is an adulterer; be-
cause he went to the wrong prep school or belongs to the wrong country
club; because he eats snails; because he is a womanizer; because she
wears real-animal fur; or even because he hates the Chicago Cubs."" If it
is rational to discriminate against snail-eaters and fur-wearers, the argu-
ment goes, it is rational to discriminate against those who engage in ho-
mosexual conduct, or roughly (if not exactly) the class of homosexuals.
The thrust of Scalia's dissent, then, is that homosexuality is more like
snail-eating and fur-wearing than it is like race. Consequently, it should
not be afforded the special status of already protected classifications,
which are in fact based on status rather than conduct.
In the Equality Foundation decision, the Sixth Circuit seems to
agree with Justice Scalia's view that conduct defines the class of homo-
sexuals. Since the Sixth Circuit is bound by the majority in Evans, the
court wisely chooses not to quote from Justice Scalia. But because the
majority in Evans did not address the question of the relationship be-
tween status and conduct,9' the court is able to repeat its pre-Evans (pre-
remand) determination, which relied upon other circuit court opinions
that conflated homosexual status and conduct.' That conflation, the court
seems to assume, provides the basis for not treating sexual orientation as
a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.93 In any event, the question the
court addresses is whether sexual orientation should be afforded special
treatment.9 ' Subjecting discrimination based on sexual orientation to "ra-
tional review," as did the Evans majority," the Sixth Circuit finds a ra-
tional basis for the Charter Amendment.' The court explains that the
90. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 652-53.
91. See Halley, supra note 10, at 429 (providing an illuminating discussion of the absence of
Hardwick in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Evans); see also infra notes 149-53 and
accompanying text (addressing Halley's discussion of the Evans dissent focusing on conduct versus
the majority's position aimed exclusively at status).
92. See Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinatti, 128 F.3d 289, 293 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997)
(citing Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th
Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
93. The court uses the Evans majority decision to apply the rational relationship test to
Amendment 2 without acknowledging that Evans did not equate homosexual status and conduct.
94. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 300.
95. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 621 ("If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end.").
96. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 300.
1280 [Vol. 75:4
SPECIAL RIGHTS
Charter passes constitutional muster because saving enforcement and liti-
gation costs could constitute a rational basis for the Cincinnati initiative.9'
This meaning of special rights, then, is in line with the first meaning
discussed-that all civil rights are special rights. It adds bite to the posi-
tion, though, by arguing that rights for homosexuals provide them with
rights that others-fur-wearers and snail-eaters, for example--do not
have. That right is the right not to be discriminated against based on
one's conduct. Perhaps, in this sense, the right becomes extra special.
2. The Conflation of Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality
Another argument that prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation grants homosexuals rights that others do not have suggests a
different idea-that such laws would only protect homosexuals (and bi-
sexuals), not heterosexuals.
Throughout the legislative debates and testimony on ENDA, both
proponents and opponents of ENDA treat the legislation as though it
would protect only the class(es) of homosexuals and bisexuals, rather
than prohibiting discrimination based on the classification of sexual ori-
entation. This focus is not surprising given that the impetus for the bill is
discrimination against homosexuals, just as the impetus for Title VII was
discrimination against blacks. Given the color- and sex-blind course that
antidiscrimination law and Equal Protection analysis have taken, 9 how-
ever, it is puzzling that it is rarely mentioned that ENDA would prohibit
discrimination based on any sexual orientation, or at least heterosexual,
97. See id. In making this finding, the court cites some of the very testimony against ENDA
that I discussed in the previous section. See id. at 300 n.12 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S9992 (daily ed.
Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch)); see also 142 CONG. REC. S 10,004 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Coverdell); id. at S9997 (statement of Sen. Nickles); id. at S9988-89 (statement
of Sen. Kassebaum); supra Part II.A. 1.
The court in Equality Foundation distinguished its facts from Evans by stating that voters in
Cincinnati, unlike many voters throughout Colorado, would be directly affected by any litigation
costs. Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 300-01. Because the Evans Court did not even look into costs
(and certainly the portion of Amendment 2 that prohibits the state-as opposed to local
governments-from preventing discrimination based on sexual orientation could be equally
motivated by costs), the Court found that only animus could explain the impetus behind the
initiative. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 632. It could be argued that the two courts applied "rational
review" in very different ways. The Sixth Circuit in Equality Foundation held the rational
relationship test to mean the "challenged legislation must stand if it rationally furthers any
conceivable legitimate government interest." Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 293. The Court in Evans,
on the other hand, did not consider any conceivable government interest but instead found the
specific purposes argued by the state to be implausible: "The breadth of the Amendment is so far
removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them." Evans, 517
U.S. at 635.
98. I have critiqued this direction elsewhere. See generally Karen Engle, The Persistence of
Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 317 (1997) (identifying and critiquing the ideology of neutrality that pervades Title VII
jurisprudence, even in the area of religion where some accommodation is anticipated by the statute).
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bisexual or homosexual orientation." If homosexuals really constituted a
"powerful minority," as Justice Scalia and others have suggested,"m it
seems that heterosexuals might look forward to the protection offered
them by ENDA. Without ENDA, discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion, including discrimination against straight people, would seem to be
perfectly permissible.
Even though ENDA defines sexual orientation to include hetero-
sexuality, such inclusion is rarely, if at all, discussed. It seems clear,
though, that the inclusion would protect against the very quotas and other
affirmative action that ENDA opponents imagine. Again, Title VII pro-
vides good precedent. Early on in the interpretation of Title VII, the Su-
preme Court made clear that Title VII's proscription on discrimination
because of race prohibited discrimination against whites as well as
blacks.'' That analysis would almost certainly be applied to ENDA, even
if sexual orientation were not specifically defined to include heterosexu-
ality. But by including heterosexual orientation in the definition, the
ENDA authors seem to have taken no chances.
Specific statutory language notwithstanding, some ENDA oppo-
nents view ENDA as guaranteeing rights to homosexuals but not hetero-
sexuals. Senator Ashcroft from Missouri most overtly depicted this
stance during the Senate debates when he stated: "We should be wary of
telling young people that... you can sue someone for failing to hire you
if you can allege that you are a homosexual-you will not be able to do
that, if you have ordinary sexual orientation."'" Others have made the
argument more subtly, by suggesting that ENDA would create a new
protected class (homosexuality) rather than a new protected classification
(sexual orientation).' 3 Senator Nickles voiced this argument, even after
quoting the bill's definition of sexual orientation and discussing other
protected classifications:
We state under the Civil Rights Act there should be no discrimination
on account of gender, on account of race, on account of your ethnic
99. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 2056, 104th Cong. § 3(11) (1996) ("The
term sexual orientation means homosexuality, bisexuality or heterosexuality, whether the orientation
is real or perceived.").
100. See, e.g., Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Employment Non-Discrimination
Act, 1996: Hearing on H.R. 1863 Before the Subcomm. on Small Business, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Robert H. Knight, Daniel S. Garcia, Paul T. Mero) (not included in CIS microfiche
compilation of the hearing; available at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>) ("Homosexuals
display political power far beyond their numbers.").
101. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) ("This conclusion is in
accord with uncontradicted legislative history to the effect that Tite VII was intended to 'cover
white men and white women and all Americans,' and create an 'obligation not to discriminate
against whites."') (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 2579 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler))).
102. 142 CONG. REc. S10,000 (daily ed. Sept 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft). I assume,
for lack of a better guess, that "ordinary sexual orientation" refers to heterosexuality.
103. Id. at S9997 (statement of Sen. Nickles).
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background, or disabilities or age or religion, and now if this amend-
ment becomes law, we would add sexual orientation, and "sexual ori-
entation" would be defined as homosexuality and bisexuality and het-
erosexuality. It actually would elevate homosexuality and bisexuality
as a protected class under the Civil Rights Act. "4
If ENDA would "elevate" homosexuality and bisexuality as protected
classes, however, it would also elevate heterosexuality to such a status.
Perhaps this effect is ignored because it is seen as insignificant. The re-
ality is that few people are discriminated against because of their hetero-
sexuality. Yet, if there is genuine concern that ENDA would put pressure
on employers to give preferences to homosexuals over heterosexuals in
hiring, it seems that ENDA's inclusion of heterosexuality in its definition
of sexual orientation would argue against such a result.
This view of laws (or proposed laws) prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation as granting rights to non-heterosexuals can
be seen in the wording of Colorado's Amendment 2 as well. Although
the Amendment was meant to repeal, among other things, laws in Boul-
der,05 Aspen,' ° and Denver °7 that prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation,"° the Amendment prohibited the enactment of any
laws, regulations or policies "whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or other-
wise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination."'" Indeed, recall that the title of the Amendment reads:
"No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Ori-
entation.""0 Presumably, under Amendment 2, then, protected status
based on heterosexual orientation would have been permissible. In this
sense, only one part of the ordinances would have actually been repealed.
Heterosexuals would presumably have continued to have claims avail-
able under the ordinances."' And although the heading of the Cincinnati
Charter reads that "NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE
GRANTED BASED UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT
OR RELATIONSHIPS," the main text of the Article only prohibits pro-
visions giving that status to "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orienta-
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. E.g., BOULDER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987).
106. E.g., ASPEN, COLO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-98 (1977).
107. E.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE, art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991).
108. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 623-24.
109. COLO. CONST. art. H, § 30b (1992) (found unconstitutional and permanently enjoined in
Evans, 517 U.S. at 635-36).
110. Id.
111. This argument was made by opponents of Amendment 2, but seemed ignored by its
proponents. See Brief for Respondents at 9-10 n. 11, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039).
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tion, status, conduct, or relationship.""' 2 Thus, there is at least a plausible
argument that the Cincinnati. Charter permits special class status based on
heterosexuality.
Perhaps the drafters of Amendment 2 in Colorado and Article XII in
Cincinnati did not understand that, in the absence of the laws they op-
posed, discrimination based on sexual orientation-including quotas for
gays-would be absolutely permissible. They were either unbelievably
clever and sneaky in their wording of the initiatives, or it never occurred
to them that discrimination against heterosexuals would be legal (in the
absence of legislation that they saw as providing the basis for such dis-
crimination). In this way, they used special rights to refer to rights that
they imagined only homosexuals and bisexuals, not heterosexuals, were
receiving. Again,. although it might not have occurred to them that dis-
crimination against heterosexuals was legal because there is little evi-
dence of such discrimination, the same could be said of the lack of fear
of discrimination against whites or men prior to Title VII. Although
those fears primarily arose as a result of the legislation, the judiciary has
made it clear that the statute applies to whites as well as blacks, men as
well as women.
These four positions on special rights, then, are all related and are
made or at least hinted at by most of the opponents of ENDA or of gay
rights more generally. Gay rights opponents have successfully managed
to imbue special rights with negative meaning, even if the slippage in
their arguments suggests that at least some civil rights, though special,
might also be palatable.
There is an amazing dissonance between the arguments that gay
rights opponents make and the responses that proponents give. As the
next Part shows, ENDA proponents respond to yet another meaning of
special rights, one rarely if ever put forward by opponents. Moreover,
unlike ENDA opponents, proponents seldom, if ever, suggest that special
rights might sometimes be justified. Instead, they simply deny that
ENDA would grant special rights.
Ill. SPECIAL RIGHTS: WHAT DO GAY RIGHTS ADVOCATES MEAN?
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act was first introduced in
the Senate in 1994."' Ironically, its best chance of passage came in 1996
when some legislators attempted to add it as an amendment to the De-
fense of Marriage Act ("DOMA").'14 These legislators argued that, even
112. CINCINNATI, OHIO, CHARTER art. XI (1993).
113. S. 2288, 103d Cong. (1994).
114. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); see Eric Schmitt,
Senate Weighs Bill on Gay Rights on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 7, 1996, at Al ("Proponents of the
bill originally intended to offer it as an amendment to a measure barring federal recognition of same-
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if gay men and lesbians should not be entitled to marry, they should not
be discriminated against in employment. Although in the end, as a result
of a compromise, ENDA was offered as a free standing bill shortly after
the passage of DOMA,"' it failed in the Senate by one vote and never
made it to the House.
Aside from the Senate floor debate in 1996, a number of hearings
have been held on ENDA. The Senate Labor Committee held hearings in
July 1994 "6 and October 1997,"' and the House Small Business Govern-
ment Programs considered the bill in July 1996."' Although testimony
against the bill was presented in 1994"' and 1996," there was no voiced
opposition to it in October 1997. In fact, Senator Jeffords, one of the
bill's co-sponsors, opened the 1997 Labor Committee hearings by
claiming that, although he "expected that [he] would have witnesses
yearning to testify in opposition to the bill[,] ... [his] staff scoured the
country for witnesses with differing opinions, to no avail."'2 ' Senator
Jeffords attributed this lack of opposition testimony to changes made to
the bill in response to criticisms of previous versions.'22 Indeed, the bill
has changed in appreciable ways since 1994, all of which have been
noted in subsequent testimony.' 3 Those changes seem largely to have
been an attempt to respond to the "special rights" critics.
In this Part, I study gay rights advocacy by examining congressional
testimony and debate in support of ENDA.24 I use the debate over ENDA
as a laboratory for dissecting the responses that gay rights advocates
have given to what they imagine to be the special rights critique(s).
sex marriages. But Sen. Trent Lott of Mississippi, the majority leader, promised to use a procedural
maneuver to keep the Democrats from amending the marriage bill.").
115. Pub. L. No. 104-109, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
116. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 1994: Hearing on S. 2238 Before the Commn on
Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. (1994) [hereinafter ENDA 1994 Hearing].
117. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 1997: Hearing on S. 869 Before the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter ENDA 1997 Hearing].
Coincidentally, these hearings were on October 23, 1997, the same day the Equality Foundation
opinion was handed down.
118. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 1996: Hearing on H.R. 1863 Before the Subcomm.
on Small Business, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter ENDA 1996 Hearing].
119. See ENDA 1994 Hearing, supra note 116, at 90 (statement of Robert H. Knight); id.
(statement of Joseph E. Broadus, George Mason School of Law) (not included in CIS microfiche
compilation of the hearing; available at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>).
120. See ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118 (statement of Robert H. Knight, Daniel S.
Garcia, Paul T. Mero) (not included in CIS microfiche compilation of the hearing; available at
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>); id (statement of Joseph E. Broadus, Family Research
Council) (not included in CIS microfiche compilation of the hearing; available at <http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/congcomp>).
121. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 2 (statement of Sen. Jeffords, Committee
Chairperson).
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., id. (detailing the changes made to ENDA since 1994).
124. This study is primarily based on the 1996 and 1997 testimony.
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This study reveals that ENDA proponents in fact spend a significant
amount of time responding to the argument that gay rights are special
rights. In doing so, they nearly always treat special rights as a negative
term; they continually claim that they support equal rights, not special
rights. In this sense, they parrot many gay rights opponents. (The group
that organized the Cincinnati Initiative called itself "Equal Rights Not
Special Rights.") Most striking about these arguments, however, is that
they seem to be responding to a meaning of special rights that is rarely
put forth, at least overtly, by gay rights opponents. That is, they tend to
see the special rights critique as suggesting that gay rights advocates are
seeking what is often called "preferential," rather than equal treatment.
They defend ENDA in part, for example, by insisting that it would not
grant or permit quotas or affirmative action for gay men and lesbians.
The special rights critique to which ENDA proponents respond,
then, should be familiar to those who follow affirmative action debates.
There, one argument against affirmative action is that it treats individuals
differently based on race or some other prohibited classification by
granting "preferences" to one or more groups. In that argument, prefer-
ential treatment and special rights are treated as synonymous, much the
way they are by gay rights opponents. In the affirmative action debate,
however, the critique is that individuals both majority and minority
should be free from discrimination because of a particular classification.
In contrast, the special rights critique poised at ENDA and other attempts
at securing gay rights argues against the classification being protected at
all. Of course, as the legislative debates discussed in Part H indicate, gay
rights opponents do sometimes see affirmative action as an inevitable
result of any antidiscrimination law. Even that critique, however, is
rarely addressed by ENDA advocates.
Perhaps the defense of ENDA that it does not grant preferences is
not as unresponsive as it might at first seem. As Jane Schacter has aptly
shown, the term "special rights," when used by gay rights opponents,
"deliberately elid[es three] distinct legal concepts-antidiscrimination
provisions, affirmative action, and quotas."'" Through the deployment of
what Schacter names a "discourse of equivalents,"'" she argues, oppo-
nents of gay rights "create and reinforce antipathy to gay men and lesbi-
ans, in particular, and to civil rights law more generally."'27 Schacter per-
suasively challenges gay rights advocates to move beyond this discourse
by "contesting its potent, if concealed, attack on the legitimacy of all
civil rights law."'" Unfortunately, I argue, ENDA advocates have not
responded to that challenge. Rather than contest the elision of the con-
cepts, they have accepted and perpetuated it.
125. Schacter, supra note 31, at 302.
126. Id. at 285.




This Part will focus on the two most frequent arguments on behalf
of ENDA-that it is economically efficient and that it does not guarantee
special rights. These two principal advocacy positions, I contend, impli-
cate much more than a debate about gay rights. Just as the special rights
critique suggests a retrenchment in civil rights law generally, ENDA
advocacy signals a victory for anti-affirmative action forces. Put more
strongly, the party line supporting ENDA is a conservative one. It sug-
gests that economic efficiency should provide significant guidance in the
determination of whose rights should be protected and that affirmative
action and quotas are negative and are unrelated to "equality." Although
my primary target here is the second argument, I begin with a few com-
ments about the first.
A. Argument One: ENDA Is Economically Efficient
In testifying on behalf of ENDA, representatives of several Fortune
500 Companies, as well as legislators, have continually pointed out that
the bill is good for business. That is, employment discrimination against
lesbians, gay men and bisexuals is inefficient because it keeps otherwise
capable workers out of the workplace. It seems odd that corporations
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation would tip their
hand by giving away a secret to their economic success. To the extent
that nondiscrimination gives them an edge, one would think that a corpo-
ration would exploit that competitive advantage in the marketplace. Cor-
porations that blindly follow their irrational homophobia would lose out.
And, if some economists were believed, discrimination would disappear
as a result.
So why would private companies encourage Congress to mandate
good (efficient) business practice? The argument has obvious rhetorical
power. It displaces the "moral" issues '29 and responds to the concern that
ENDA might improperly infringe upon employer rights. When looking
closely at the ways the argument is articulated, however, a xenophobic
hue appears. Economic efficiency is not merely important for individual
businesses in the United States; it is important for the United States as a
whole because American businesses compete in the global market. As
Raymond Smith, Chair and CEO of Bell Atlantic stated: "No company
can afford to waste the talents and contributions of valuable employees
as we compete in a global marketplace. It is good business, and it is good
citizenship.""'3 His use of the term citizenship is peculiar here. Is he sug-
gesting that to be a good American, one should not discriminate against
other Americans? That argument is familiar, suggesting that we should
129. But see Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57
U. Prrr. L. REV. 237 (encouraging gay rights advocates to begin to address-rather than avoid-
issues of morality).
130. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 11 (statement of Raymond W. Smith, Chairman
and CEO, Bell Atlantic Corp.).
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set aside our internal differences in order to conquer as a whole. Repre-
sentative Torkildsen made a similar statement in opening his Govern-
ment Programs Subcommittee's hearing on ENDA: "[T]he long-term
impact of discrimination has the potential of impeding our nation's prog-
ress in the 21st century global marketplace."' 3 ' And for Senator Kennedy:
Job discrimination is not only un-American-it is counterproductive.
It excludes qualified individuals, lowers workplace productivity, and
hurts us all. For the nation to compete effectively in a global econ-
omy, we have to use all our available talent, and create a work envi-
ronment where everyone can excel.
This view is shared by leaders in both labor and management, who
understand that ending discrimination based on sexual orientation is
good for workers, good for business, good for the economy, and good
for the country. 2
The fact that many large corporations support ENDA (and have their
own nondiscrimination policies) makes for a palatable argument in Con-
gress. What is never suggested, though, is that nondiscrimination might
only be efficient if all businesses are forced to follow it. To the extent
that customers can choose between companies that do and do not pro-
hibit discrimination based on sexual orientation (or provide partner bene-
fits), it seems likely that those companies that prohibit discrimination
would like to avoid the Disney effect.'33
B. Argument Two: ENDA Does Not Provide Special Rights
The second primary argument in defense of the bill is more an apol-
ogy than a point of advocacy. Almost everyone who has testified on be-
half of ENDA has pointed out that its scope is very limited and that it
does not provide special rights."M When proponents argue that ENDA
does not guarantee special rights, however, they seem to have a different
131. ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 2 (statement of Rep. Torkildsen, Subcommittee
Chairperson).
132. ENDA 1994 Hearing, supra note 116, at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy); see
also ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 65, 66 (statement of Mike Morley, Eastman Kodak
Co.) ("Our competitive position will clearly be strengthened by increasing understanding of the
value of people's diverse opinions, on a global basis .... A truly diverse global workforce will be
our greatest strength in a fiercely competitive marketplice.").
133. The Walt Disney Company adopted a domestic partnership policy, leading the Southern
Baptist Convention to stage a boycott against Disney in 1997. The 12,000 delegates approved a
resolution that called for "every Southern Baptist to take stewardship of their time, money and
resources so seriously that they refrain from patronizing The Disney Co. and any of its related
entities." Nancy Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A Marketplace
Innovation and a Less Than Perfect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 337,
345 n.43 (1998).
134. See, e.g., ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 42 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum); id.
at 2 (statement of Sen. Jeffords); id. at 91 (statement of Christopher E. Anders, ACLU).
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idea about the meaning of special rights than those expressed by any of
the four positions taken by the opponents of gay rights.
Perhaps proponents' view of special rights can best be seen in their
arguments about equal rights. For proponents, equal rights would seem to
require that gays, straights, and bisexuals be treated identically with re-
gard to employment. As Chai Feldblum, one of the authors of ENDA
explained: "[T]he bill's language (that individuals should not be sub-
jected to 'a different standard or different treatment') was designed to
clarify that gay people were seeking the right to the same equal treatment
that all other individuals enjoy in the workplace.' 35
If equal rights means identical treatment for ENDA advocates, spe-
cial rights would seem to signal different, or "preferential," treatment.
Affirmative action and quotas would fall into the latter category, as
would benefits for domestic partners. President Clinton wrote to the Sen-
ate Labor Committee in his letter in support of ENDA: "[Y]our bill spe-
cifically prohibits preferential treatment on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, including quotas. It also does not require employers to provide spe-
cial benefits.' 36 The President's sentiments are echoed throughout pro-
ENDA testimony.
Indeed, it is quite common in the testimony for a statement that
ENDA provides equal, not special, rights to be immediately explained by
ENDA's prohibition of quotas or affirmative action. As Senator Jeffords
explained: "Although ENDA helps create equal rights for job opportuni-
ties, it does not create any 'special rights' for gays and lesbians. In fact,
this legislation expressly prohibits preferential treatment based on sexual
orientation.' 37 Another advocate testified: "There is nothing radical or
even questionable in this legislation. It is clear, straightforward, and fo-
cused like a laser beam on an achievable objective-which is equal
treatment in the workplace for everyone. It places no burden on small
business, it imposes no costs, and it dictates no quotas.' 38 Indeed, advo-
cates alternatively describe the legislation not only as not radical, but as
"conservative,' '39  "narrow,' ' 14° "modest,' 4 ' and "moderate."'4 2  When
135. Id. at 37 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum) (quoting section 4 of ENDA).
136. Letter to Senator Edward M. Kennedy on Proposed Employment Non-Discrimination
Legislation, II PUB. PAPERS, WILLIAM J. CLINTON 1632 (Oct. 19, 1995).
137. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 1 (statement of Sen. Jeffords, Committee
Chairperson).
138. ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 77, 78 (statement of Brenda Cole, Board of
Directors, Wainright Bank & Trust Co.); see also id. at 71 (statement of Elizabeth Birch) ("[ENDA]
imposes no costly mandates, dictates no quotas, and specifically prohibits special treatment .... ");
ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 42 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum) ("[ENDA] prohibits an
employer from adopting a quota based on sexual orientation and from giving preferential treatment
to an individual based on the individual's sexual orientation.").
139. ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118 (statement of Debbie Della Piana, Millipore Corp.)
(not included in CIS microfiche compilation of the hearing; available at <http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/congcomp>) ("ENDA is clean,-simple, conservative legislation which does not establish
quotas or impose additional costs.").
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Senator Jeffords noted that no one wanted to testify against the bill be-
fore the Labor Committee, he suggested that the lack of opposition was
due to the changes that were made to the bill after the Senate failed to
pass it in 1996. Those changes included prohibiting employers from col-
lecting statistics based on sexual orientation, clarifying that affirmative
action would be prohibited even as a direct remedial measure in a con-
sent decree, and increasing the exemption for religious organizations.' 3
Even before these changes, advocates insisted that the bill was nar-
row. In addition to pointing to the above limitations, they also repeatedly
reminded opponents that the bill did not require employers to grant do-
mestic partner benefits to gay couples. Although such benefits would
appear to make good business sense, given that a significant number of
the same Fortune 500 companies that have antidiscrimination clauses
based on sexual orientation also include domestic partner benefits, those
testifying on behalf of ENDA have used the bill's failure to require do-
mestic partner benefits as support for the proposition that the bill does
not guarantee special rights, and is limited.'" Why domestic partner bene-
fits would be special or inappropriate is never explained; it is simply
assumed.'
When advocates address the special rights critique, then, they gener-
ally do so by emphasizing that the bill does not require, and now does
not even permit, affirmative action or quotas. There is a certain irony in
this position. As suggested in the previous Part, to the extent that quotas
or other "preferential" treatment for homosexuals are seen as discrimi-
natory, they would currently seem to be permissible, as discrimination
based on sexual orientation is not prohibited by federal law.'" Under this
reading, ENDA could be seen as protecting heterosexuals from discrimi-
nation, particularly if homosexuals are seen as a powerful minority.
140. 142 CONG. REc. S9995 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Senator Kerrey) ("I think
the sponsors of this legislation . . . have done a very good job of trying to draft it in a narrow
way.... "); ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 69 (statement of Paula Alexander, Eastman
Gelatine Corp.) ("IT]he bill also supports business by taking a narrowly tailored approach.").
141. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 91 (statement of Christopher E. Anders, ACLU).
142. 142 CONG. REc. S10,131 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Robb) ("[ENDA] is
moderate, reasonable, and eminently fair.").
143. ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 2 (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
144. See, e.g., ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 128 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum).
145. One individual testifying on behalf of ENDA stated that he favored domestic partner
benefits, but that "there are other ways to approach their provision than through legislation." Id at
56 (opening statement of the Hon. Earl Blumenauer). Further evidence cited in support of the
proposition that ENDA is narrow is that it does not permit disparate impact claims. Although no one
connects domestic partner benefits and disparate impact, it would certainly seem that a company's
policy providing benefits for spouses but not domestic partners would be ripe for a disparate impact
challenge, were one permitted. Oddly, Chai Feldblum argued that the bill does not cover disparate
impact claims because the discrimination to which gay men and lesbians are generally subjected is
of the overt type. See ENDA 1997 Hearing, supra note 117, at 38 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum);
see also ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 56 (opening statement of Hon. Earl Blumenauer).
146. See supra Part l.B.2.
1290 [Vol. 75:4
SPECIAL RIGHTS
The primary point of the above discussion is to show the extent to
which ENDA advocates fail to address the special rights critiques posed
by opponents. Opponents argue that all protections against discrimina-
tion are special. But while such protection might (or might not) be justi-
fied for race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, or age, they main-
tain, it is not justified for sexual orientation. What opponents are asking
for, then, is such justification. To the extent that proponents provide a
justification, they only do so indirectly, with arguments about economic
efficiency or good business practice.
IV. RESPONDING TO THE SPECIAL RIGHTS CRITIQUE
If arguments about economic efficiency and good business practice
do not respond to opponents of gay rights, how should gay rights advo-
cates promote or defend the legal reforms they propose?
Liberals and conservatives both seem to share an inability to distin-
guish sexual orientation from other classifications that are not afforded
protection. Recall Justice Scalia's representative list of those unprotected
against discrimination by the Association of American Law Schools:
Republicans, adulterers, attendees of certain prep schools or members of
certain country clubs, snail-eaters, womanizers, fur-wearers, Chicago
Cubs-haters.' 7 For Justice Scalia, homosexuals should also fall into this
group of the unprotected, presumably because of their conduct. That is,
Justice Scalia's list tends to focus on conduct. Because he sees sexual
conduct as defining the class of homosexuals, he argues that they should
be added to the list of the unprotected.' 8 By eliding conduct and status in
this way, Justice Scalia is able to avoid the question whether special
rights are permissible based on what he might consider status classifica-
tions, such as race and sex, while challenging liberals to justify protec-
tion for those who engage in homosexual conduct.
Janet Halley has shown one way that liberals have avoided Justice
Scalia's, question. If Justice Scalia's dissent in Evans focuses solely on
conduct, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is aimed exclusively at
status. Borrowing from different portions of the opinion, Halley explains:
Romer makes a major departure from this dispute [over the relation-
ship between Hardwick and Amendment 2], a shift from thick to thin
description, from realism to nominalism. It describes and populates
the class under consideration in a self-consciously nominal gesture:
"the named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or
gays and lesbians." This is "a single named group" defined by "a sin-
gle trait." "Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class":
the Amendment "classifies homosexuals to make them unequal to
147. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-
53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
148. For an analysis of other case law that conflates conduct and status but focuses on conduct,
see Danielsen, supra note 51, at 47-49.
19981
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
everyone else"; "It is a classification of persons undertaken for its
own sake" and in that sense it is a "status-based enactment": "[C]lass
legislation ... [is] obnoxious. ... "49
Halley argues that the Evans majority uses the term status in the histori-
cal sense. That is, status does not refer to a type of person, but rather to a
type of relationship-"Not kleptomaniac or drug addict but commoner,
prince, infant.""' Halley concludes that "[f]or purposes of the majority's
analysis, then, the real content of the class is quite beside the point: if the
same discrimination were inflicted on blondes or burglars, the same con-
clusion would follow. '' 51
Halley's analysis highlights the extent to which the Evans majority
has altogether avoided Justice Scalia's challenge. By demonstrating that,
in principle, the majority's analysis would apply to blondes and burglars,
Halley shows how the historical sense of status relied on by the majority
can encompass contemporary notions of both status (blondes) and con-
duct (burglars). In doing so, she undermines Justice Scalia's assumption
that the reason that homosexuality should not be protected is because it is
essentially a category based on conduct. More damaging perhaps,
though, she uncovers the inability of the majority to distinguish homo-
sexuality from any other unprotected classification. By "declining to
know or say anything about the social representational world of sexual
orientation personhoods,"'' 2 the majority is unresponsive to Justice
Scalia' s analogy. '53
.Why is the question posed by Justice Scalia so difficult for liberals
to respond to? Why are gay rights advocates so reluctant to argue that
homosexuals are in need of special rights or even that they are frequent
victims of discrimination?
First, as a strategic matter, polls suggest that it would be political
suicide to argue that gays should be guaranteed special rights. The public
seems more responsive to the suggestion that gays should be given equal
rights than that they be given special rights." Yet, the polls beg the
149. Halley, supra note 10, at 439-40 (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted).
150. Id. at 440. Of course, the use of status to describe a type of person might well coincide
with Justice Scalia's use of conduct. Kleptomaniac and drug addict can refer to conduct in the same




153. For Halley, "this 'speech act of a silence' ... leav[es] the attribution of status on the basis
of conduct and the attribution of conduct on the basis of status to the political sphere whose actions
are under judicial review." Id. (quoting EvE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPIsTIMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET
3 (1990)).
154. See Roderick M. Hills, You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1635 n.70
(1997). When the question is posed as to whether homosexuals should be granted "special
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question, since the meaning of equal rights is as contested as that of spe-
cial rights. Recall that proponents of Amendment 2 in Colorado and Ar-
ticle XII in Cincinnati argued for equal rights (not special rights) for les-
bians and gay men. They succeeded in passing referenda to repeal gay
rights ordinances with that argument.
Second, liberals seem reluctant to focus on discrimination against
gay men and lesbians because they want to avoid what Jane Schacter has
called the "misguided search for sameness."'5 For Schacter, conserva-
tives engage in this misguided search by suggesting that "the entry bar-
rier for civil rights protection can be overcome only if the forms and
phenomenology of discrimination against gay men and lesbians are the
same as for other protected groups."'56 But conservatives are not alone in
this search. No doubt one of the reasons that some gay rights advocates
disavow that they are seeking affirmative action is to avoid suggesting
that sexual orientation should be treated the same as race (or sex), even if
in doing so they deny the utility of affirmative action for any group.
How might gay rights advocates respond to the special rights critics
without falling into the trap of the search for sameness? How might they
respond to Justice Scalia's critique of the American Association of Law
Schools? It seems to me that there are two potential responses.
First, gay rights advocates could argue, as they sometimes suggest,
that no one should be subject to arbitrary discipline in the workplace.
They could join forces with those who argue for changing the back-
ground rule from employment-at-will to a background rule that all em-
ployment decisions be "for cause.""' The second option would be to ar-
gue that, unlike those mentioned in the rest of Justice Scalia's list of the
unprotected, gay men and lesbians are in need of protection because of
the many background legal rules that work against them and because of
the systemic discrimination they suffer.
The first option responds to Justice Scalia's position in much the
way that Janet Halley suggests the majority in Evans treated the issue.' 8
This option concedes that no meaningful distinction can necessarily be
drawn between sexual orientation and other classifications based on con-
protections," the majority of persons oppose the protections. Id. For example, in a Los Angeles
Times Poll, 26 percent support such protection while 66 percent oppose such protection. Id. (citing
Los ANGELES TIMES POLL (July 29, 1994), available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File). In
contrast, between 74 and 83 percent claim to favor equal rights for homosexuals. Id.
155. Schacter, supra note 31, at 296-300.
156. Id. at 296.
157. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967); Paul H. Tobias,
Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiffs Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REV. 178,
181-84 (1988); Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
158. See Halley, supra note 10, at 437-45; see also supra notes 149-53 and accompanying
text).
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duct or status, but that no distinction needs to be drawn because all of the
classifications are irrelevant for job purposes. "9 Or for the Evans major-
ity, no group should be made a stranger to the laws. In fact, this position
is occasionally suggested in the ENDA debate when advocates argue that
everyone deserves the right to "earn a livelihood,"'" although they then
fail to address why many (unprotected) groups do not have such a right.
This approach would require an overt appeal to eliminate employment-
at-will as the background rule. Although I am in favor of changing the
background rule of employment-at-will, my concern with the strategy as
a means to protect gay men and lesbians from employment discrimina-
tion is that it only shifts the terrain, not the substance, of the debate. In-
deed, a recent decision by the Salt Lake City Council to repeal its anti-
discrimination ordinance highlights the potential dangers of this ap-
proach.
In January 1998, the Salt Lake City Council voted to repeal a re-
cently passed ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on race, relig-
ion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or sexual orientation.'6 ' Although
the debate centered on the inclusion of the term sexual orientation, City
Council members voting for the repeal insisted that they were against
any ordinance that listed protected classes because the City should not
discriminate against anyone. As the Salt Lake City Attorney explained:
No one sanctions or approves employment discrimination against
any person, but the majority of the Council felt that there are better
ways of providing protection against discrimination and possible
hostile working environment situations than by dividing employees
into "groups" and defining rights based on an employee's sexual
orientation. 
62
Drafting up a new ordinance protecting everyone proved to be quite dif-
ficult, as the debate then shifted to the issue of what characteristics are
related to job performance. In particular, the City Attorney proposed a
new "generic" ordinance requiring that employment decisions be "ra-
tionally based on job related criteria."''6 3 The letter he wrote to the Coun-
159. There might, of course, be some exceptions. Most would probably agree, for example, that
the GOP ought to be permitted to hire only Republicans. That is, a decision to reject a Democratic
applicant because she was a Democrat would be seen as a decision based on "cause."
160. See, e.g., ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 69 (statement of Paula Alexander,
Eastman Gelatine Corp.) ("This bill is about one simple thing-and that is that all Americans should
be able to earn a livelihood."); 142 CONG. REC. S10,131 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Robb) ("Those of us who support the Employment Non-Discrimination Act have a simple plea-
let's end discrimination in the workplace.").
161. See Rebecca Walsh, S.L Council Repeals Gay-Protection Law, SALT LAKE TRiB., Jan. 14,
1998, at B 1.
162. Letter from Roger F. Cutler, City Attorney, to Salt Lake City Council 2 (March 4, 1998)
(letter on file with Denver University Law Review).
163. The proposed ordinance stated in pertinant part:
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cil in support of the proposal, however, ended with the following telling
footnote: "A possible exception would exist for those members of these
types of classes where the traits or conduct of the individuals can demon-
strably be established as contrary to a bona fide job qualification."'"
Critics of the proposed ordinance, myself included, argued that this foot-
note left the city free to discriminate against homosexuals by suggesting
that sexual orientation could be a job related characteristic.1 65 At best, it
made protection uncertain.'"
Employment decisions and practices in the Salt Lake City Government's classified career
service and civil service are prohibited, if they are not rationally based on job related
criteria.
1. "Job related criteria" includes: (a) personal and professional attributes, such as the
abilities, qualifications, experience, character, integrity, inter personal skills,
education andtraining, which a person must have to successfully perform the job held
or desired, and meet the prerequisites specified in the appropriate written job
description; (b) in disciplinary matters, conduct which: (i) adversely affects job
performance: (ii) disrupts the workplace; (iii) undermines the authority of
management; (iv) impairs close working relationships essential to the efficiency of
the workplace; or (v) otherwise impedes a safe, efficient and effective work
environment; and (c) criteria based on business necessity.
2. Immutable physical or personal characteristics that are irrelevant to successful job
performance or business necessity are not "job related" criteria, as that term is used in
this section.
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, DRAFT ORDINANCE § 2.53.030B. (Mar. 4, 1998). For a discussion of the
proposed ordinance, see Rebecca Walsh, For Now, S.L Council Holds Its Fire in War Over Words;
Council Working on New Discrimination Ordinance, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 20, 1998, at Al.
164. Cutler, supra note 162, at 6 (citing Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11 th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 118 U.S. 693 (1997)).
165. See Walsh, supra note 161.
166. As one Salt Lake attorney put it: "Why make this ordinance seem like something it really
is not? Sometimes having the pretext of protection is more dangerous than being honest about
having no protection at all and letting everyone know it." Id. (quoting Ross Anderson).
On November 17, 1998, after eight months of negotiation spurred by controversy over the
proposed ordinance, the City Council finally adopted an ordinance that some members claimed
would prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. In its definition of characteristics on
which employment decisions could not be based, it included: "The status of having a lifestyle which
is irrelevant to successful job performance; and the status of being in or outside of an adult
interpersonal or a family relationship." SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCE § 2.52.255 (1997). Of
course, the first part of the provision is tautological; it says nothing about what type of lifestyle is
irrelevant to performance. The second part, though awkward, would seem to offer protection to
lesbian and gay employees as well as to many more types of relationships than the council intended
(such as polygamous relationships).
The way this ordinance emerged-merely to avoid including the term "sexual orientation" in
the ordinance-did not go unnoticed. As council member Deeda Seed, the author of the repealed
ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, noted: "The goal for some of my
colleagues clearly was not to say 'sexual orientation.' They didn't. It's not here. If this weren't so
painful, it would be hilarious." Rebecca Walsh, S.L Council to Vote on Calling Sexual Orientation
'Lifestyle,' SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 16, 1998, at Dl (quoting Council Member Deeda Seed). More
importantly, the ordinance is still relatively vague. According to one gay rights advocate:
In their attempts to avoid at all lengths the use of the words 'sexual orientation,' they are
ending up with a very clever ordinance .... The problem with vagueness and ambiguity
in ordinances is people don't know when they're protected and the people who have to
follow the law don't know what to do.
Id. (quoting Jon Davidson, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund).
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The difficulty with the for-cause approach, then, is that it skirts the
issue of whether decisions based on sexual orientation can ever be for
cause. That violence might be more likely in a workplace with openly
gay employees, for example, might lead an employer to concur with the
military that being openly gay is incompatible with the job. Of course, it
could also lead to the conclusion that homophobia is incompatible with
the job. Nevertheless, only the terrain of the debate, not its substance, has
shifted.
A more radical deployment of this first option would be to disrupt
the employment-at-will assumption by demonstrating that such a back-
ground norm gives employers special rights to discriminate. Rather than
putting the burden on gay employees to show that it is irrational to dis-
criminate against them, the burden would be on employers to justify their
special right to discriminate based on sexual orientation.6' This would
not mean, of course, that employers could never justify their decisions,
only that the burden would have shifted. Again, the terrain of the debate
would be similar.
The second option, I believe, is more appealing than the first, al-
though the two are not mutually exclusive. This option calls for an un-
apologetic argument in favor of legal protection for gay men and lesbians
because the protection is necessary. It is similar to Schacter's call for
increasing visibility. ' Moreover, it responds to the search for sameness
by exposing its underlying fallacy: classifications or groups are not pro-
tected because of their inherent similarities. Rather, protected classifica-
tions such as sex, race, disability, and religion each have their unique
characteristics. Advocates for women, racial and religious minorities,
and the disabled have succeeded largely by convincing legislators that
the facts called for their protection. Schacter argues:
What gay men and lesbians share with other groups already protected
under civil rights laws is not the reductive social similarity demanded
by the discourse of equivalents. The common ground can be found at a
higher level of generality: social subordination and stigmatization sub-
Michael McConnell has offered a more generous reading of the Council's actions:
For all its awkwardness the City Council is onto something. Even if we have reservations
about the particular wording it adopted last week, the council deserves credit for
attempting to find a solution to the gay-rights problem that protects the civil rights of gay
citizens without insulting and stigmatizing many other citizens who conscientiously
believe-for religious and other reasons-that homosexual conduct is immoral.
Michael W. McConnell, Salt Lake City Council Deserves Credit for Wrestling with Gay Rights
Ordinance, SALT LAKE TRm., Nov. 22, 1998, at AA6.
167. This result would be akin to heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation in equal protection
analysis.
168. See Schacter, supra note 31, at 313-17. While Schacter sees visibility as a response to "the
gay abstraction," she argues it is deployed by the anti-gay lobby. Id. at 313. Janet Halley shows how
liberals use this same abstraction to counter the thick description of homosexuality put forth by




ject gay men and lesbians-like other subordinated groups-to system-
atic exclusion and disadvantage at the hands of dominant groups.'6
An obvious reason to prohibit discrimination against a group then, would
be that such discrimination is widespread, unlike, say, discrimination
against fur-wearers and snail-eaters. 171 Surprisingly, though, ENDA ad-
vocates do not stress the existence of such systemic discrimination.
While some of those who testify on behalf of ENDA have told the
stories of individual victims of discrimination, 7' few have suggested that
widespread discrimination against homosexuals is prevalent."' Perhaps
this justification is not relied upon because to argue that the discrimina-
tion were widespread might undermine some of the other arguments in
favor of the legislation. If nondiscrimination were rational business pol-
icy, for example, the bill's proponents would have a difficult time ex-
plaining widespread irrationality. Moreover, the more widespread the
problem, the less conservative the bill becomes. Finally, opponents of the
bill often suggest that it would lead to extensive litigation."7 Relying on
data from states with state-wide antidiscrimination policies that include
protection based on sexual orientation, advocates insist that the bill
would do little to increase discrimination claims." They assume that
employers have policed themselves as a result of the law, rather than that
homosexuals might be less likely to bring such claims to avoid publicly
identifying their sexual orientation or that the legislation has been inef-
fective for other reasons. (Perhaps employees do not know that discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation is illegal in the jurisdiction in which
they work.) Moreover, it is not clear to me that the fact that ENDA is
likely to increase litigation in any significant way is a persuasive argu-
ment for those who would like to see an end to such discrimination; it
makes it sound as though the law is unlikely to be enforced.
The second option would require an altogether different strategy
with regard to ENDA. Rather than insisting that the legislation is unre-
markable, gay rights advocates would address the potentially radical im-
pact of the bill on the legal subjectivity of gay men and lesbians. This
position would recognize the extent to which gay men and lesbians suffer
169. See Schacter, supra note 31, at 298.
170. See Fajer, supra note 60, at 210.
171. See, e.g., ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118, at 79 (statement of Ernest Dillon); id at
83 (statement Todd M. Dobson); id. at 157 (statement of Nan Miguel) id. at 163 (statement of
Michael Proto).
172. For an example of the occasional testimony that does emphasize the extent to which such
discrimination is significant, see id at 86 (statement of Michael T. Duffy, Chair Commissioner of
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination).
173. See, e.g., ENDA 1996 Hearing, supra note 118 (statement of Robert H. Knight, Daniel S.
Garcia, Paul T. Mero) (not included in CIS microfiche compilation of the hearing; available at
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>) ("[ENDA] will entangle businesses [in] all types of
expensive litigation."); 142 CONG. REc. S9989 (daly ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum).
174. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S9995 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerrey).
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discrimination, and the ways in which the legal system is both directly
and indirectly implicated in that oppression.
Janet Halley contrasts the thin description of homosexuality prof-
fered by the Evans majority with the thick description set forth by the
Hardwick majority. She notes, "[t]he claim that 'sodomy' is 'the behav-
ior that defines the class' implies a thick description of the sexual orien-
tation categories, and has precipitated a series of legal struggles to con-
trol their description and thus the legal understanding of the real people
inhabiting them." '175 While "Hardwick frankly acknowledge[s] its textual
character by inviting its audience to become engaged in reading it,"'76 the
Evans majority suppresses "this intense, and tense, relationship between
the text and its readers. It invites us to forget ourselves in a way that
Hardwick does not."'" It could be said that ENDA advocates follow the
same course as the Evans majority by refusing to confront the very issues
that guide the debate about whether sexual orientation should be a pro-
tected classification. Two of these issues described by Halley are sex and
hate.' Chai Feldblum, in criticism of her own testimony on behalf of
ENDA, contends that gay rights advocates have also failed to take on the
issue of morality.' 9
Gay rights advocates should seize the opportunity through public
debate, whether surrounding ENDA or local law reform projects, to
counter the thick description of homosexuality equating it with sodomy
and thus moral reprehensibility that conservatives have successfully
propagated. A similar attempt at equating heterosexual sodomy and im-
morality would be laughable, because the majority of the population
would identify with the acts being condemned; they would be engaged in
the text in a way that they are not in the Evans majority or in the defenses
of ENDA.
Holmes's definition of a special right'80 provides a firm basis for
granting special rights-when special facts are true of one group that are
not true of others. Gay rights advocates, then, need to be willing to talk
about the facts. What are the special facts of each group-businesses,
government, homosexuals, maybe heterosexuals-and what legal conse-
quences should attach to them? To this end, it seems worth arguing that
the class of homosexuals, if not created, is maintained by the state, di-
rectly through sodomy laws 8' and marriage laws, to take the most obvi-
175. Halley, supra note 10, at 439 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996)).
176. Id. at434.
177. Id. at 435.
178. See id. at 434-37.
179. See Feldblum, supra note 129, at 299-304.
180. See supra text accompanying note 3.
181. See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1431, 1469-70
(1992); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986). For an argument that the
government's refusal to prohibit discrimination against gay teachers amounts to a condonation of
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ous examples, and indirectly by failing to protect gays against employ-
ment, housing, and other types of discrimination.
Violence against lesbians and gay men has been well documented.
Studies have shown that gays are among the most frequently targeted
groups for hate crimes. ' One study has found that "slightly more than
half of socially active lesbians and gay men.., experience some form of
anti-gay/lesbian violence." '183 Moreover, 89 percent of gay and lesbian
respondents have reported being the victims of verbal harassment." Gay
men and lesbians also suffer discrimination in the workplace, in terms of
wages,"u working conditions and type of employment." To its credit, the
Human Rights Campaign has begun a project to document employment
discrimination against gay men and lesbians, with the plan of "ex-
pand[ing] our program to uncover more specific examples and to better
communicate these stories to lawmakers and their staffs, as well as to the
American public through the media."'87
violence against gay students, see Anthony E. Varona, Setting the Record Straight: The Effects of the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997 on the First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Gay
and Lesbian Public School Teachers, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 25, 34 (1998) ("In fact, the
shortage of gay and lesbian role models in schools implicitly condones homophobic attitudes and
violence against those students who identify themselves, or are identified (whether accurately or
not), as lesbian or gay.").
182. See Varona, supra note 181, at 28 n.19 (citing HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE
AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 7 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Ben'ill eds., 1992) and U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., FED'L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS 1996 7 tbl.l (Jan. 8,
1998) (stating that 11.5 percent of the 8,759 bias-motivated incidents reported to the FBI in 1996
were targeted at individuals because of their sexual orientation)). Varona further reports that,
according to the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, 27 percent of 783
documented hate crimes in 1993 were aimed at gay men, replacing African Americans as the leading
target of those crimes. Varona, supra note 181, at 28 n.19 (citing Errol A. Cockfield, Jr., Crimes of
Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, at B1).
183. GARY DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 37 (1991).
184. See id. at 141-44. Verbal harassment for the purposes of the study included threats of
violence, epithets, and insults aimed at homosexuals by heterosexuals on account of sexual
orientation. Id. at 141.
185. See M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 48 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 726, 728 (1995).
186. For a discussion of discrimination against gay and lesbian lawyers, see Jennifer Durkin,
Queer Studies P An Examination of the First Eleven Studies of Sexual Orientation Bias by the Legal
Profession, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 343 (1998); Executive Summary, The Los Angeles County Bar
Association Report on Sexual Orientation Bias, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 297 (1995).
For a discussion of discrimination based on sexual orientation in other employment contexts, see
Sharon G. Portwood, Employment Discrimination in the Public Sector Based on Sexual Orientation:
Conflicts Between Research Evidence and the Law, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 113 (1995); Thomas
Weathers, Gay Civil Rights: Are Homosexuals Adequately Protected from Discrimination in
Housing and Employment?, 24 PAC. L.J. 541 (1993); Symposium, Developments in the Law - Sexual
Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1575 (1989) (stating that homosexuals face
discrimination in military employment, employment that requires security clearance, and civil
service employment).
187. Human Rights Campaign, Documenting Discrimination, (visited Dec. 22, 1998)
<http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplac/docdis/index.html>.
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Beyond laying out the facts about the lives of gay men and lesbians,
gay rights advocates should zero in on the extent to which legal rules
outside discrimination and criminal law affect gay men and lesbians.
Laws limiting marriage to different-sex couples serve as both a basis and
means for discrimination against gay men and lesbians. Regardless of
where one comes out on the same-sex marriage issue, the denial of the
right to marry to same-sex couples affects the opportunities for those
couples.'88 Although this conclusion might seem obvious, it significantly
undermines the special rights argument that gay rights grant homosexu-
als rights not guaranteed to heterosexuals. Justice Scalia makes such an
argument.
Recall Justice Scalia's discussion of the scope of Amendment 2:
"[I]t would prevent the State or any municipality from making death-
benefit payments to the 'life partner' of a homosexual when it does not
make payments to the long-time roommate of a nonhomosexual em-
ployee."'' 9 This particular example of the effect of the Amendment is at
first blush puzzling. Either Scalia is equating "life partners" with "long-
time [nonsexual] roommates," thereby suggesting that there is nothing
particularly special about same-sex sexual relationships. Or he is equat-
ing life partners of homosexuals and heterosexuals, only without using
the term for heterosexuals while putting it in quotations for homosexuals.
But equating the two immediately exposes a difficulty in the reasoning.
Similarly treating same-sex and different-sex long-term unmarried part-
ners would not, as Justice Scalia suggests, be neutral. The latter have the
option of receiving benefits through marriage, while the former do not.
The only way that straight and gay couples would be treated equally vis-
at-vis benefits attached to marital status would be if they both had the
legal option to marry. For Scalia, though, requiring that benefits be given
to same-sex partners would suggest special treatment. In that sense, mar-
riage is treated specially, and Scalia would have no problems with such
special treatment.
In fact, there is a certain irony in the fact that special rights has
come to be seen as negative in the context of gay rights. In several other
areas, including marriage, special rights are accepted in a matter-of-fact
way. It is common in legal discussions about marriage, for example, to
state that special rights are incurred from it. According to the American
Jurisprudence, for example, "[t]he terms 'service,' 'aid,' 'fellowship,'
'companionship,' 'cooperation,' and 'comfort' have also been employed
188. For a list of some of the benefits that come with marriage, see Martha M. Ertman,
Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, But Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1107, 1146 (1996). Making marriage increasingly lucrative, Congress has recently decided to
amend the existing legislation to relieve married couples of one of the few "penalties" that come
with marriage. See Jackie Calmes & Jeffrey Taylor, Tobacco Legislation Is Revived by Compromise
Attaching Amendment for Marriage Tax Cut, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1998, at A24.
189. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 638 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in defining those mutual and special rights growing out of the marriage
covenant."'"
The term "special rights" is not necessarily derogatory. In fact, judi-
cial opinions of all stripes have, over the last 150 years, generally treated
special rights as rights that the state has chosen to confer upon individu-
als, groups or itself. The assumption is that those rights are to be enjoyed,
without apology. Not only is the Constitution seen to have granted spe-
cial rights to citizens,'9 ' other laws are seen to have accorded special
rights to corporations," railroads, stockholders," property owners,'9"
and parties to treaties" to name a few. Of course, there are often com-
peting special rights claims, but my point is that the term is often de-
ployed in a benign way.
190. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husbands & Wives § 7 (1995); see also Lewis v. Storer Communications,
642 F. Supp. 168, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (explaining that liability to a husband's spouse in a suit
against a broadcasting company for loss of consortium "is strictly deriv[ed] from the right of the
spouse to recover") (citing Smith v. Tri-State Culver Mfg. Co., Inc., 191 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. Ct. App.
1972)).
191. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1872) (outlining some of the
special rights of citizenship). Ironically, the first use of the term "special rights" in federal court was
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). There, Chief Justice Taney considered
special rights to be positive, and only to belong to certain individuals. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
at 412. In particular, blacks did not possess these rights. The court justified this denial of special
rights by looking to the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution: "It is obvious that [blacks]
were not even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were conferring special
rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in every other part of the Union." Id. at 411-12. If
this quotation conveys the meaning of special rights, then special rights are precisely what blacks
were (and are) seeking. Understood in this way, when some individuals are denied the privileges, or
special rights of citizenship, guaranteeing them those same rights is guaranteeing special rights. In
this sense, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments (among others) can be seen as having given
blacks (and others) the special rights that most individuals in the country already enjoy.
192. See, e.g., County of Tipton v. Locomotive Works, 103 U.S. 523, 527 (1880) ("[Tlhe
authority of the legislature to create corporations with special rights and privileges, existed as an
incident of sovereignty .... ).
193. See, e.g., Lucking v. Detroit & C. Navigation Co., 273 F. 577, 582 (E.D. Mich. 1921) ("A
railroad company is clothed by the state with special rights, franchises, and privileges, including
certain attributes of sovereignty itself ....").
194. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fuller, 121 F.2d 618, 625 (3d Cir. 1941) (referring to Pennsylvania
corporate law and stating "that a business corporation may amend its charter ...to increase or
diminish its authorized capital stock, or to reclassify the same, by changing the number, par value,
designations, preferences, or relative, participating, optional or other special rights of the shares").
195. See, e.g., Schwab v. Smuggler-Union Mining Co., 174 F. 305, 310 (8th Cir. 1909) ("It is
hardly necessary to state that any private riparian proprietor upon a stream may obtain, as against
other proprietors, special rights to use the water in the nature of easements or servitudes farther and
greater than those conferred upon him simply as a riparian proprietor.").
196. See, e.g., Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 1929) ("The Attorney
General said: 'The treaty under consideration is a reciprocal one: each party to it covenants to grant
in the future to the subjects and citizens of the other parties certain special rights in consideration of
the granting of like special rights to its subjects or citizens."') (quoting 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 278
(1889)).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has intended not only to show that there is little actual
connection between the arguments of opponents and proponents of
ENDA, but also to suggest that ENDA advocates have, perhaps unwit-
tingly, based their arguments on a very liberal (read conservative) un-
derstanding of civil rights. Their arguments seem to take for granted that
affirmative action, quotas, or any "preferential treatment" are negative,
and that equal rights require identical treatment of all. I have argued
elsewhere that this position, particularly regarding race, is and has been
the mainstream position for some time. '97 And I am not the first to have
made such an argument.'98 If queer (critical) theory has taught us any-
thing, it seems that it has taught us that becoming as mainstream as pos-
sible is unlikely to lead to much change in the status quo.' 99 More im-
portantly, however, it seems that critical theory generally has taught us
that we cannot look at these struggles in a vacuum.' When we argue for
or against gay rights, we necessarily reflect certain understandings about
what we mean by rights, discrimination, equality and justice. And to the
extent that we suggest that affirmative action would lead to "special
treatment" and be inappropriate for a gay-rights bill, we implicate af-
firmative action as special. To the extent the term "special" has become
a trope for negative and inappropriate action generally, we reinforce that
meaning.
In fact, not one person testifying on behalf of ENDA has argued
that any rights considered "special" might ever be appropriate. Or that
equality might sometimes require different treatment. Historical uses of
special rights as well as arguments on behalf of affirmative action or
even for prohibiting pregnancy discrimination" 1 seem to have been for-
gotten.
197. See Engle, supra note 98, at 327-30.
198. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 98-130 (1991);
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (criticizing the
shift from a "victim" to a "perpetrator" perspective in Supreme Court jurisprudence and arguing for
a victim perspective that attends to societal and economic subordination); Gary Pellet, Race
Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 802-08 (1990) (describing the Civil Rights-era struggle
between Black Nationalism and integrationism and how the latter became the dominant paradigm).
199. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a Post-
Civil Rights Era, 110 HARV. L. REv. 684 (1997) (reviewing ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY
NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY (1995); URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY:
THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION (1995)).
200. See generally AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 51.
201. For discussions of the special treatment/equal treatment debate around pregnancy, see
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace
Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1142-63 (1986); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle:
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE
325 (1984-1985).
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The question gay rights advocates should address is not whether
they are advocating for equal rights or special rights, but why gay men
and lesbians need special rights. Even in the absence of antigay initia-
tives, the state makes homosexuals strangers to the laws. Because of
these facts, homosexuals are in need of special rights. It's about time we
admit it.

UNPACKING PACKAGE DEALS: SEPARATE SPHERES ARE
NOT THE ANSWER
MARY ANNE CASE*
In 1995, Francisco Valdes and I each published lengthy and detailed
conceptual analyses of the ways sex, gender, and sexual orientation have
been conflated in American law and the ways in which they ought to be
disaggregated.' Professor Valdes's critique of this conflation in American
law was balanced by a chapter in which he favorably compared Native
American cultural approaches to InterSEXionality2 with Euro-American
ones. According to Valdes:
[T]he Native American example not only disproves the Euro-
American sex/gender system's sense of essentialism, it also can spark
our imagination and expand our horizons as we strive to envision
post-conflationary and non-conflationary relations that, ultimately,
are more in accord with the self-professed ideals and values of this
nation and its laws.3
In this article, I take issue with the suggestion that the Native
American model Valdes describes is a more desirable, more liberatory
alternative, more consistent with the values embodied in American law. I
shall focus my attention on two interdependent aspects of the Native
American sex/gender system Valdes prefers. The first is a division of the
* This article was prepared for the InterSEXionality Symposium at the University of Denver
College of Law and presented at the UCLA Colloquium on Justice. Portions of the article were also
presented at the 1996 Law and Society conference in Glasgow, Scotland under the title "Is Race to
Color as Sex is to Gender?" and others at the 1999 Eastern division APA. I am grateful to
participants in these events, especially Pat Cain, Martha Ertrnan, Katherine Franke, Clark Freshman,
John Harrison, Frances Kamm, Julie Nice, Ana Ortiz, Seana Shiffrin, Kendall Thomas, and Frank
Valdes; as well as to Stevie Beck, Adrienne Davis, David Greenberg, Alex Johnson, Martha
Nussbaum, Randy Picker, Richard Rorty, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Jim Whitman, and research
assistants Julia McDonough and Allyson Newton.
1. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Francisco Valdes,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex, ""Gender," and
"Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995). A third major
article on a similar subject appeared at about the same time. See Katherine Franke, The Central
Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1995). In a sense, Valdes, Franke, and I each centered on a different apex of the triangle formed by
sex, gender, and orientation. Valdes, who seeks to break down the conflation between the three as a
step toward queer legal theory, takes sexual orientation as his apex. Franke seeks to break down the
category of sex and I concentrate on gender. Although each of us concerns him or herself with
numerous aspects of what Valdes calls the conflation of sex, gender, and orientation, my focus is the
genderbender, Valdes's the homosexual, and Franke's the transsexual.
2. This term is not my own; I take it from the title of the Symposium.
3. Valdes, supra note 1, at 210.
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world into two roughly equal and separate spheres by gender and the
second is the ability of an individual to choose between these spheres,
not on the basis of biological sex alone, but on the basis of gendered in-
clination. In my view such a system would contract, not expand, our
present horizons. It would do little more than substitute a package deal
centered around gender for the one our culture has conventionally built
around sex.
I believe Valdes and I are in substantial agreement as to what would
be an attractive sex/gender system: We would each like to see a world in
which legal and cultural constraints on an individual's freedom to ex-
press gendered traits are minimized. The existing constraints include, not
only pressure to conform gender to biological sex, but also a systematic
devaluing of traits gendered feminine such that even women are often
discouraged from displaying them. Our society has come a long way in
allowing individuals within it to mix and match gendered traits as their
personal inclination and the tasks at hand may dictate. Although it has
not yet come nearly as far in equalizing the values placed on traits
viewed as masculine and feminine, further reifying those traits into gen-
dered bundles., into package deals, is not the answer. In my view, a move
in the direction of separate spheres, even separate but equal spheres, even
when individuals are given a meaningful choice between those spheres
unconstrained by biological sex, would be a step back.' Moreover, it
would be inconsistent with the best principles of American constitutional
law.
The Native American system described by Valdes rests on a thor-
oughgoing division of life and its activities into two separate but equal
and opposite gendered spheres. Everything from articles of clothing to
occupations and household tasks is assigned to one sphere or the other,
although the particularities of assignment may differ from one tribe to
another:
Among the Zuni, for instance, men constructed dwellings, women
performed the plastering. Men cultivated the corn, women supervised
4. These two aspects of the system not only are central to Valdes's analysis, but also have
been described by scholars as the "minimal conditions" for the presence of multiple genders in the
Native American tradition. See Will Roscoe, How to Become a Berdache, in THIRD SEX, THIRD
GENDER: BEYOND SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN CULTURE AND HISTORY 371 (Gelbert Herdt ed., 1994).
5. The objections I have to the Native American model are not quibbles about its
implementation, but fundamental difficulties with its premises even when well and fully realized. I
do not, therefore, propose to contest as an empirical matter whether in any particular Native
American culture the spheres assigned to the sexes really were equal or whether crossing into the
sphere associated with the other sex was easier for men than for women. A vast anthropological
literature already debates the question whether there have ever been societies in which the sexes
enjoy equal status. For a review of this literature, see SHERRY B. ORTNER, MAKING GENDER: THE
PoLITIcs AND EROTICS OF CULTURE 139-80 (1996). For purposes of my analysis, I will assume a
society along these lines is possible and ask whether it would be desirable.
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the staple's storage and distribution; indeed, men were not allowed
access to granaries at all....
... [Tihese roles or categories were not constructed to delineate
and to enforce dominant/subordinate or active/passive power relations
based on sex (or gender): even though "Zuni women and men spe-
cialized in separate areas of economic, social, and spiritual life they
enjoyed equal prestige and status." Equalized role allocations pro-
vided opportunity and status to members of both sexes by dispersing
authority over important aspects of society along lines that roughly
constituted a sex/gender checks-and-balances system.
Assignment to one sphere or the other was not made strictly on the
basis of biological sex, however. Rather, "sex merely created a presump-
tion of gender, rebuttable as each individual discovered her or his actual
gender through personal development and through manifestation of indi-
viduated social propensities."' A crucial part of this sex/gender model is
a figure commonly referred to as the berdache, who is a person of one
biological sex who gravitates naturally toward the role of the other sex.
Typically, a berdache is someone with male genitalia and XY chromo-
somes who, as an adolescent, gravitates to women's work and behavior
patterns and then takes on the female role, including its social status, its
habitual activities, its garments and also, as a general matter, its sexual
orientation, in that a male berdache usually takes as a sexual partner a
traditionally masculine male, with whom he assumes a wifely role.'
Traces of something akin to berdache may be found in a variety of
American communities Let me take the risk of suggesting two examples
of what I have in mind. First, although I can neither speak as an expert,
nor yet back up my claim with the sort of documentation I would like, it
6. Valdes, supra note 1, at 212-13 (footnote omitted) (quoting WILL ROSCOE, THE ZUNI
MAN-WoMAN 18 (1991)).
7. Id. at 212. A good illustration of the way this presumption worked itself out may be the
Greek myth of Achilles's failed attempt at draft-dodging. In order to escape his being sent to a war
in which it was predicted he would die, Achilles's mother disguised him in women's clothes and hid
him among the women. To catch him out, the Greeks brought gifts to the group of girls among
whom Achilles was hiding. While all the others selected beads and trinkets, Achilles alone chose a
sword, thereby revealing his masculine gender. In Native American terms, Achilles, by choosing the
bow and not the burden strap, has indicated his masculine gender. See Harriet Whitehead, The Bow
and the Burden Strap: A New Look at Institutional Homosexuality in Native North America, in
SEXUAL MEANINGS: THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER AND SEXUALrrY 80, 87 (Sherry B.
Ortner & Harriet Whitehead eds., 1982).
8. See Valdes, supra note 1, at 224-25. There is much dispute among historians and other
scholars of the Native American sex/gender system about the exact parameters of berdache. Areas of
disagreement (and perhaps of tribal variation) include the extent to which a berdache was seen as a
"third gender" rather than as someone who had crossed all the way from one gender to the other,
whether women had opportunities comparable to men to become berdache, and whether bisexuality
and other liminal behavior was an option for berdache. See id at 226, 232-33. For purposes of this
article, these disputes, though interesting and relevant, do not need to be resolved.
9. Again, I mean my discussion of berdache-like elements in these communities to be
compared primarily with Valdes's ideal of berdache, rather than with the actual practices of
berdache in any particular Native American community.
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seems that there is something akin to the berdache tradition in the lives
of some African American gay men.'" I have earlier had occasion to note
that the majority of legal challenges brought by effeminate men were
brought by black men." These include Bennie Smith, who unsuccessfully
challenged another black man's refusal to hire him simply on the
grounds that Smith was "effeminate;"'' Anthony Slater, who successfully
petitioned to appear at his public high school graduation in women's
clothing;'3 Darrell Williamson, who unsuccessfully claimed race dis-
crimination when fired for wearing makeup on the job;" and Ernest Dil-
lon who unsuccessfully claimed that the anti-gay harassment he suffered
as a postal employee resulted from impermissible sex-stereotyping. 5 In
addition, one of the few ultimately successful challenges to the U.S.
military policy of excluding homosexuals was brought by Sgt. Perry
Watkins, a flamboyantly effeminate black "queen" who was reported to
have ingratiated himself with his fellow soldiers, inter alia, by perform-
ing as a female impersonator. 6 Might it be that these effeminate black
men are occupying a space akin to the berdache, such that exaggerated
effeminacy becomes the safest alternative in a culture prone both to im-
pose hypermasculinity as a model for black men and to see such hyper-
masculinity as a threat? Might it also be that the strong role women have
played in African American culture makes the choice between the mas-
culine and feminine spheres a more balanced one for black than for white
Americans?'7
10. I wish there were a similarly extensive body of sociological and historical scholarship here
as there is on the Native American berdache tradition. Unfortunately, in its absence, I have had to
rely more than I would have wished to on anecdote and speculation.
11. See Case, supra note 1, at 50 n. 166.
12. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1978).
13. Richard Leiby, Clothed in Controversy; He's a 16-Year Old Gay Transvestite. Somehow,
Anthony Slater Has Made Life Work, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1994, at CI.
14. Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989).
15. Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *5, *10 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
16. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 701-02, 711 (9th Cir. 1989).
17. See, e.g., LEON E. PETrlWAY, HONEY, HONEY, Miss THANG: BEING BLACK, GAY, AND
ON THE STREETS at xxxiv-xxxv (1996). Reporting of the black drag queens who are the subject of
his book, Pettiway writes:
They portray their mothers as matriarchs like those who have so often been depicted
ruling their nests in sitcoms as well as the academic press .... [M]others are resourceful
providers who are strong and determined, and who are the first lines of defense from both
internal and external threats to their children's emotional and physical well-being.
Therefore, in comparison to men, women are good.
Id. Consider also the subculture of (male or transgender) participants in competitive drag/voguing
depicted in the documentary Paris Is Burning, who organize themselves into groups called "houses"
whose leaders are called "mothers." PARIS IS BURNING (Miramax 1991). Filmmaker Jenny
Livingston interviewed the mothers of two of the most successful houses. Although both were
viewed as successful leaders (whether measured by number of followers attracted, satisfaction of the
followers, competitive success of the members of the house, or general prestige), both also differed
markedly in approach in ways that social scientists (although apparently not the two mothers
themselves) would view as sharply gendered. One described the role of a "mother" as leading the
house into battle, being tough, strong, and competitive; the other spoke of a "mother's" role as
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Some further evidence that a berdache-like role may provide a safe
space for young African American men who might otherwise be casti-
gated as sissies comes from reports of community acceptance, indeed
encouragement, of cross-dressing on the part of effeminate or homosex-
ually inclined African American adolescents. Thus, the Lady Chablis, the
African American drag queen who played a central role in Midnight in
the Garden of Good and Evil,'8 sets forth in an autobiography the experi-
ence of some parental resistance,'9 but substantial community support, for
an adolescent transition from "sissy" to "the woman [s/he had]
become."2 As Chablis puts it:
I was the first openly and flamboyantly "gay" person I knew of in my
hometown. That being the way, I guess I was protected by my family,
much the way a retarded child is looked after. I mean, Gran'mama
knew I was a sissy, and while I don't think she liked it, her boundless
love for me would never have allowed her to harp on the fact that I
needed to make drastic changes. Besides, she didn't believe in tam-
pering with what was purely the Lord's business. And she made sure
I knew that a higher power ultimately called the shots.2'
While there are clearly dissimilarities and a lack of full acceptance,
the process Chablis describes does have a certain resemblance to the
Native American notion of the "cooking" of gender. Cooking, as Valdes
describes it, "revealed gender: as the individual grew and incrementally
performed and embraced one gender or another, or a mixture, he or she
became that gender regardless of the genital anatomy under his or her
garments. '
comforter and nurturer of the members of the house. Id. (Again, remember that both mothers are
genetic males flourishing in a subculture that glories in their effeminacy). Not only is strong
leadership potential here identified with a female role, the voguing subculture also demonstrates that
both stereotypically masculine qualities and stereotypically feminine qualities can be seen by a
successful leader as the key to success. As the work of a white lesbian depicting the lives of gay men
of color, Livingston's film has generated much critical commentary. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER,
BODIES THAT MATrER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 121-40 (1993); BELL HOOKS, REEL
TO REAL: RACE, CLASS, AND SEX AT THE MOVIES 214-26 (1996); JACQUELINE ZITA, BODY TALK:
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON SEX AND GENDER 182-201 (1998); Jackie Goldsby, Queens of
Language: Paris Is Burning, in QUEER LOOKS: PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN AND GAY FILM AND
VIDEO 108-15 (Martha Gever et al. eds., 1993). Of course, in writing this article, I run some of the
same risks as Livingston, but I can see no way to avoid these risks short of avoiding the subject
entirely.
18. JOHN BERENDT, MIDNIGHT IN THE GARDEN OF GOOD AND EVIL: A SAVANNAH STORY
(1994), adapted and released as a motion picture, MIDNIGHT IN THE GARDEN OF GOOD AND EVIL
(Warner Bros. 1997).
19. As the resistance included severe beatings by a mother and stepfather virulently opposed
to Chablis's effeminacy and homosexuality, I do not mean to suggest that acceptance was complete
and easy.
20. THE LADY CHABLIS WITH THEODORE BOULOUKOS, RIDING MY CANDY: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE GRAND EMPRESS OF SAVANNAH 45 (1996) [hereinafter THE LADY
CHABLIS, HIDING MY CANDY].
21. Id. at 39.
22. Valdes, supra note 1, at 217.
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Chablis describes taking an early interest in feminine activities such
as food preparation and hair care, which his grandmother indulged to a
point and then resisted.' Initially upset by a failure to interest his twelve-
year-old son in baseball, Chablis's father then enrolled him in a sewing
course at the Harlem Institute of Fashion, where s/he was thrilled to meet
another "[v]ery fem'nine" gay man wearing "pink ruffled shirts ... [and]
lotsa rings and bracelets."'
Much like a traditional berdache' s, Chablis's "decision became final
at puberty when the youth adopted female dress." Also like a berdache,
Chablis found particular support for this decision among the women of
the community.26 Thus, Chablis's early experiments in cross-dressing at
age fourteen were facilitated by hand-me-downs from two neighbor girls
and encouraged by female teachers who described Chablis's look as "so
good, so natura" 7 and helped improve it with page boy hair-styling and
lessons in mascara use.' S/he moved in with a sympathetic neighbor,
Rhonda Conyers, and expanded her feminine wardrobe, which s/he wore
everywhere but to church.29 Soon the whole community was "donating
something to my cause for womanhood" as well as calling the youth
"Miss Benji" or "Miss Pee-Wee."3
I never worried none about "passing." The kindly folks in Quincy al-
ready knew who and what I was, and they accepted me as Miss Benji
or Miss Pee-Wee without any real degree of fanfare. While I wasn't
exactly stuffing my bra, I did work my God-given illusions to the
max. And enhanced now by the magic of Miss Rhonda Conyers, my
cosmetic transition was all but complete. Whether it was a midriff
and cutoffs or strippy-strappy sandals and rayon evening pajamas,
there was no question that The Doll was coming of age just in time
for her sixteenth birthday.
I was perceived as a girl 'cause I carried myself like one.
And if I was ever regarded as an oddity, I was also a damn sure lik-
able one!31
The Lady Chablis's experience is not unique. Critical race theorist
Kendall Thomas has, for example, recounted to me in conversation the
23. See THE LADY CHABLIS, HIDING MY CANDY, supra note 20, at 39.
24. Id. at 44.
25. WILL RosCOE, THE ZUNI MAN-WoMAN 22 (1991).
26. Id. at 22-23.
27. THE LADY CHABLIS, HIDING MY CANDY, supra note 20, at 61.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 65.
31. Id. at 67, 70.
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similar story of one of his neighbors growing up. 2 Professor Thomas's
account contains within it a sense of the community's fear of liminality,
the sense that being squarely on one side of the line or the other is safer.3
For Thomas, the neighbor boy's experience was an object lesson in the
risk of letting his own feminine tendencies show-if they were spotted
he might find himself pushed willy-nilly into a dress and a female role.
This insistence on gender role as a package deal is, for me, the grim side
of berdache, as the bright side, stressed by Valdes, is its willingness to let
inclination and not simply anatomy dictate behavior.
Lest I be seen as confining my analysis of berdache to communities
of color, treating them as exotica, let me use as my final illustration of
the grim side of berdache an example from the mainstream upper-class
white community of a New England prep school. The example, admit-
tedly fictional, comes from the 1956 movie, Tea and Sympathy, ' adapted
from Robert Anderson's 1953 Broadway hit of the same name. The
movie's central character, Tom Lee, is an effeminate adolescent whose
father has sent him to prep school in hopes of "making a man" of him.
Once they observe his feminine inclinations, however, his classmates
seem determined instead to make a woman out of him, first letting him
into the drama club only if he takes a female part and wears a dress; then
calling him "sister boy," using female pronouns to refer to him, and mer-
cilessly teasing him to the brink of suicide."
Most of those around Tom Lee see only two options-two separate
and opposite spheres, masculine and feminine-and they are determined
to push him into one or the other. 6 Like the Native Americans Valdes
32. Kendall Thomas, a Professor of Law at Columbia University School of Law, participated
in the InterSEXionality Symposium sponsored by the University of Denver College of Law and
Denver University Law Review on February 6-7, 1998.
33. Fear of the liminal may also have played a part in the sexual harassment of an earring-
wearing teenage boy in Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997). Co-workers
repeatedly asked Doe, "Are you a boy or a girl?" Doe, 119 F.3d at 566. They called him "bitch" and
eventually grabbed him by the testicles in an attempt "to finally find out if you are a girl or a guy."
Id. at 567. "The sense of distinction," writes Pierre Bourdieu,
which demands that certain things be brought together and others be kept apart, which
excludes . . . all unions contrary to the common classification[,] . . . responds with
visceral, murderous horror, absolute disgust, metaphysical fury, to everything which lies
in Plato's "hybrid zone," everything . . . which by challenging the principles of the
incarnate social order, especially the socially constituted principles of the sexual division
of labor and the division of sexual labor, violates the mental order, scandalously flouting
common sense.
PIERRE BOuRDmtEu, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, ch. 4 (Richard
Nice trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1984) (1979).
34. TEA AND SYMPATHY (MGM 1956), adapted from ROBERT WOODRUFF ANDERSON, TEA
AND SYMPATHY (Random House Play 1953).
35. Id.
36. While Tom's classmates sought to categorize him as an effeminate homosexual, similar
childhood experiences shaped Christine (born George) Jorgensen's decision to seek a sex change.
Jorgensen reported being accused of carrying school books like a girl or being a girl dressed in boys'
clothing. See CHRISTINE JORGENSEN, A PERSONAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY 16 (1967). An elementary-
school teacher who found a piece of needlepoint in Jorgensen's desk called Jorgensen's mother to
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described, their view is that, "You can't escape from what you are, your
character."37 The manliness of Tom's character is put in doubt by his
taste for chintz curtains and flowers, folk songs and poetry, and by his
unwillingness to get a crew cut or plaster his walls with pinups from
girlie magazines. Like the male berdache, Tom prefers spending time
with women doing women's tasks-his troubles come to a head when his
classmates observe him opting to join the faculty wives' sewing circle
rather than accompany the boys on an athletic romp. 8 Tom sews quite
well. He is also the school's tennis champion; unfortunately, he wins by
"playing like a girl," causing his classmates to deride his championship
game as "the mixed singles final."39 But to isolate Tom in a feminine
sphere where "the nasty rough boys can't hurt" him is no more fair to his
inclinations than to force him into conventional manliness.' As his
headmaster's wife, Tom's only defender, puts it: "Manliness is not all
swagger and swearing and mountain climbing. Manliness is also tender-
ness, gentleness, consideration."'
I propose to read Tea and Sympathy straight. 2 That is to say I shall
take at face value that it is not about a repressed gay youth, who today
might come out of the closet. Instead, it is about an unusually sensitive
and feminine heterosexual boy, who ends his prep school career in the
arms of his headmaster's wife (his love object throughout the movie), a
boy who, in the movie's epilogue, is revealed to have grown into a hap-
pily married man and an accomplished author.
In addition to the tendency to polarize gender, another disturbing
tendency in the berdache tradition is the tendency to push effeminate
men, as well as masculine women, toward homosexuality. 3 It also tends
to push everyone, whether gender conforming or cross-gendered, erotic-
ally toward his or her opposite. What is interesting about Tea and Sym-
school to ask, "[D]o you think this is anything for a red-blooded boy to have in his desk as a
keepsake? The next thing we know George will be bringing his knitting to school." Id. at 15. On one
account, then, the berdache tradition may free people like Lee and Jorgensen from needing to keep
or acquire one part of what has been the socially accepted package deal of sex, gender, and
orientation-it allows them to take up their sewing without first having to acquire a vagina.
Although it may package gender and add to it orientation, berdache does not prescribe genital
conformity to this package.
37. TEA AND SYMPATHY, supra note 34.
38. This marks an important difference between the play and the movie adaptation. While the
movie's central theme is gender, the play's is sexual orientation. Thus, in the play, Tom Lee's
troubles trace to his being observed, not sewing with the faculty wives, but going for a swim in the
nude with an unmarried male instructor.




43. Perhaps the only instances in contemporary American culture in which homosexual
identity may be externally imposed may be certain genderbenders--effeminate boys and tomboys-
pushed into gay identity by an outside world only too ready to typecast.
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pathy is that Tom Lee is drawn erotically toward his like, but his like in
terms of gender, not of sex: He wants a soft, romantic, loving view of sex
and resists the rough, loveless, promiscuous masculine view of sex that
he is pushed to seek with the lower class waitress to whom all the other
boys go when they want to get laid. Instead, he finds his sexual and ro-
mantic ideal with someone who is (a) of the opposite sex, but also (b) of
the same gender. As I understand the berdache tradition, it cannot ac-
commodate the world's Tom Lees much more comfortably than can the
Euro-American conflation Valdes rightly criticizes."
The problem with the berdache model is that it is a package deal.
And I resist package deals. Perhaps this is because I studied antitrust law
at an impressionable age. United States antitrust law prohibits what is
known as a tying arrangement-an arrangement by which customers can
acquire a product they really want only on condition that they also pur-
chase another in which they have no interest. 5 Berdache and the world of
separate spheres in which it is imbedded force people into accepting such
tying arrangements-it forces them to acquire the whole of a gendered
package to get the part of it that suits them.
Berdache is not a solution to the problem of separate spheres, al-
though it is concededly an improvement over a world in which assign-
ment to those spheres is by biological sex alone. In the traditional nine-
teenth-century American world of spheres separated by sex, for example,
Myra Bradwell was told by a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court that, as a
woman, she could not be licensed to practice law because it was "the
domestic sphere.., which properly belongs to the domain and functions
of womanhood."' It would not be enough of an improvement if Brad-
well's twentieth-century female counterpart were to be told instead that
she can practice law only if she is a butch lesbian. This would be unfor-
tunate both for individual human freedom and for the practice of law,
which, as Bradwell's lawyer Matthew Hale Carpenter argued to the Su-
preme Court, can benefit from both masculine "sternness" and a "silver
[feminine] voice." 7
Now that the Bradwell case has been repudiated, how clear is it that
American constitutional law also repudiates package deals for the sexes?
44. Even among those accepting of homosexuality and transgenderism, persons who desire
others of the same gender can lack for acceptance. Although she apologizes by the end of the novel,
Jess, the transgendered heroine of Stone Butch Blues, is initially distressed by the relationship
between two of her hutch friends: "The more I thought about the two of them being lovers, the more
it upset me.... [T]wo butches? How could they be attracted to each other? Who was the femme in
bed?" LESLIE FEINBERG, STONE BUTCH BLUES 202 (1993).
45. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). These days, some
antitrust scholars do not think much of the prohibition on tying, but their criticisms reached me too
late to have much influence on my personal intellectual history. For a scathing critique of
prohibitions on tying, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 365-81 (1978).
46. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
47. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 137.
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Concurring in United States v. Virginia,8 Chief Justice Rehnquist in-
sisted:
[I]t is not the "exclusion of women" [from the state-sponsored Vir-
ginia Military Institute] that violates the Equal Protection Clause, but
the maintenance of an all-men school without providing any-much
less a comparable-institution for women .... An adequate remedy
in my opinion might be a demonstration by Virginia that its interest in
educating men in a single-sex environment is matched by its interest
in educating women in a single-sex institution. To demonstrate such,
the Commonwealth does not need to create two institutions with the
same number of faculty Ph.D.'s, similar SAT scores, or comparable
athletic fields. Nor would it necessarily require that the women's in-
stitution offer the same curriculum as the men's; one could be strong
in computer science, the other could be strong in liberal arts. It would
be a sufficient remedy, I think, if the two institutions offered the same
quality of education and were of the same overall caliber.49
This sounds suspiciously like a vision of separate (but equal)
spheres, a vision of equality in sexual difference often announced, but
never, to my mind, realized.' As with the separate but equal racial
spheres categorically rejected in Brown v. Board of Education5 and its
progeny, much of the problem with constitutionally endorsed, state en-
forced separate spheres for the sexes may be a practical one-as Justice
Souter noted at oral argument in United States v. Virginia, because we do
not stand "on the world's first morning"52 with respect to sex distinctions,
but rather at the close of millennia of subordination, continued separation
of the sexes along the remedial lines suggested by Rehnquist cannot be
free of subordinating taint.53
I would argue, however, that the objections go beyond impractica-
bility. There are two main ways of formulating the principle behind the
constitutional norm against the denial of equal protection on grounds of
48. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
49. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 565 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
50. Lest one think that, pace Rehnquist, there is no realistic likelihood of a court's
endorsement of separate spheres under current American law, consider, for example, Klinger v.
Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994), involving the sex-segregated sphere of the
prison. In that case, the circuit court held it to violate the rights of neither male nor female prisoners
for a prison system to choose to allocate resources so that female prisoners, but not males, were
allowed overnight visits with their children, while male prisoners, but not females, were given
extensive vocational training. Klinger, 31 F.3d at 732-33.
51. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 18, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), available in 1996 WL 16020, at *18.
53. To the extent that the anti-subordination and anti-differentiation goals of the constitutional
law of sex discrimination are in tension, Rehnquist emphasizes anti-subordination, for example by
repeatedly objecting to heightened scrutiny for laws favoring men. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559-60,
565. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns:
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies (unpublished manuscript on
file with the author).
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sex. The first is that women should not be subordinated, by the law or,
more broadly, by men. The second is that sex should be irrelevant to an
individual's treatment by the law, and, more broadly, to his or her life
chances. On the latter view, "fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females"' ' are problematic when embodied in law,
even in law that does not in any articulable way subordinate women to
men. Our current constitutional law of sex discrimination clearly and, I
would argue, appropriately, encompasses this latter view, and does not
limit itself to questions of subordination.
The constitutional principle that "[t]here is no caste here"" is not
cashed out by "[t]here is no subordination" here. "Our Constitution...
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens," not even separate
but equal classes. 6 Imagine, for example, a society with two castes, not
upper and lower, not Brahmin and untouchable, but priest and warrior.
This is not all that far-fetched a hypothetical, at least in its assumption
that there can be equality in difference. Consider, for example, the estates
of the clergy and nobility in medieval and early modern France. The re-
lationship between these, the First and Second Estates, presents a some-
what different problem than the conventional one of subordination
framed by the position of the Third Estate. Both clergy and nobility ran
the gamut of wealth and power, from the impoverished country squire
and village priest to the prelates and princes of the royal line. And the
two estates were distributed throughout the land. Although nominally the
clergy was the premier estate, the nobility was hardly subordinate. Role
differentiation, rather than inequality, marked the difference between the
two. The two castes are roughly equal in status, but radically different in
role. Those assigned to the priest caste are limited to the role of priest
even if they would rather fight than pray, and vice versa. Is such a divi-
sion consistent with the American Constitution? I don't think so."
Ironically, strong support for the proposition I am here advancing
comes from none other than Justice Bradley, who, in his Slaughterhouse
dissent, asked:
[I]f a State legislature should pass a law of caste, making all trades or
professions, or certain enumerated trades and professions, hereditary,
so that no one could follow any such trades or professions except that
54. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
55. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
57. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(rejecting as un-American the Indian system of allocating parliamentary seats by religion and ethnic
group). I realize I am building my argument here largely from dissenting Supreme Court opinions,
but this, too, has become part of the American constitutional tradition, which has come to accord
special status to eloquent and prescient dissents, from Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson to those of
Holmes and Brandeis in the free speech cases. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 158 (1988).
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which was pursued by his father, would such a law violate the privi-
leges and immunities of the people of that State....
He then answered:
In my view, a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from
adopting a lawful employment ... does deprive them of liberty as
well as property, without due process of law. Their right of choice is a
portion of their liberty; their occupation is their property. Such a law
also deprives those citizens of the equal protection of the laws .... 59
As Harlan's Plessy dissent makes clear, the problems with equality
of separate Spheres exceed the practical-the Constitution guarantees
liberty as well as equality; indeed, the constitutional equality norm itself
has regularly been interpreted to guarantee equal liberty. I would say of
Rehnquist's remedy for United States v. Virginia what Harlan said of the
legislation at issue in Plessy: "Indeed, such legislation as that here in
question is inconsistent not only with that equality of rights which per-
tains to citizenship, national and state, but with the personal liberty en-
joyed by every one within the United States."' My contention is that,
under the Constitution, no less than under Title VII,6' "[a]s for the legal
relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when [individuals
of either sex can be] evaluate[d] by assuming or insisting that they
match[] the stereotype associated with their group."'2 This is so whether
or not that stereotype is itself subordinating or demeaning.
Substituting a berdache-like system of preferences for de jure exclu-
sion of one sex from the other's activities or professions would not solve
the problem, as the Supreme Court suggested in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.63 In that case, the passage
of laws prohibiting sex discrimination in employment led a newspaper
58. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 113 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 122. Bradley viewed it as a settled question that the law he hypothesized would be a
violation of privileges and immunities; the only question he considered was whether the violation
was of the privileges of federal as well as state citizenship. See id. But see Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 562 (1947) (upholding a licensing scheme for New Orleans river
pilots that in effect allowed "the male members of a family [to] follow the same work from
generation to generation" and closed that line of work to all without family connections). Once again
in Kotch, the position I am advocating here is put forth by the dissent, which insisted that, even if it
were to prove the most efficient means of selecting pilots, a selection system based on blood
relationship, like one based on "race, color, creed and the like," is forbidden by the U.S.
Constitution. See Kotch, 330 U.S. at 566 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). This is very much in line with the
rejection of even very good proxies in modern constitutional sex discrimination cases.
60. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 1145.
61. Civil Rights Acts of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
62. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). Note that the rejection of
comparable worth as even a statutory, let alone a constitutional, principle in American law, can be
seen as a rejection of the equalization of separate spheres as a solution to women's subordination.
63. 413 U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973) (holding that a local anti-discrimination ordinance




merely to change the headings on its help wanted ads to classify jobs no
longer as "help wanted male" or "female," but instead as "male interest"
or "female interest."' Like the proxies used to generate the sex respect-
ing rules struck down by the Court in constitutional cases, this classifica-
tion by interest probably was accurate more often than not. But the self-
reinforcing stereotypical assumption that male and female interests fall in
separate spheres was held unacceptable in the statutory as it has also
been in the constitutional context.'
Although I do not urge an abolition of conventional gender catego-
ries, I am troubled by the alternative of berdache because I am also not
committed as either a descriptive or a normative matter to the preserva-
tion of these categories. I would neither be particularly surprised nor
particularly disappointed if masculinity and femininity as we today de-
fine them were to be amalgamated, to be diversified, or to wither away in
future generations. I, therefore, worry about two sorts of potential gender
essentialism-not merely the essentializing of women as feminine, but
the essentializing of the feminine itself. Separate gendered spheres, how-
ever open to persons of both sexes, increase the risk of reifying current
definitions of masculine and feminine, which I would prefer had more
room to develop, even to disappear.
If not berdache, what would serve as a useful model for the disag-
gregation of sex from gender? As I have already observed, it may seem
doubly paradoxical to suggest both that gender can be disaggregated
from sex and that it may then wither away. After all, gender now is de-
fined as that which is deemed culturally appropriate for members of a
particular sex. If gender to begin with is defined entirely in terms of sex,
a disaggregation, if conceivable at all, seems likely to involve reifying
those bundles of characteristics associated with masculinity or femininity
at the time they are split off from maleness or femaleness. There are,
however, historical precedents for the sort of conceptual shift I am here
imagining, and a brief discussion of two of them may help illuminate the
point. '
The first analogous precedent is that of the categories "noble" and
"base;" the second is that of the humors or temperaments. Both examples
involve classification schemes once quite prevalent, but which have lost
virtually all significance in our contemporary American society.67 In each
case, the categories were, like that of gender, originally seen to have a
physiological base from which they were then conceptually disaggre-
gated. Thus, those with noble blood were seen to possess a variety of
desirable characteristics the base-born lacked, from good bone structure
64. Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 379-80.
65. Again, for further discussion, see Case, supra note 53.
66. See Case, supra note 1, at 105 n.261 (exploring the historical precedents).
67. Although surely not in all societies, as British members of the audience rightly insisted
when I delivered a version of this argument at the 1996 Law and Society conference in Glasgow.
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to good character, to grace and virtuosity. But as early as the time of
Chaucer, the qualities associated with nobility could be disaggregated
from the bloodlines that were thought to give rise to them and those pos-
sessing such qualities could be characterized as noble regardless of their
actual class origin. "[H]e is gentil [i.e., noble] that dooth gentil deedes,"
says Chaucer's Wife of Bath,' although for centuries thereafter in litera-
ture, apparently base-born people who behaved nobly usually turned out
to have been switched at birth. Similarly, today, some transsexuals assert
that because they manifest feminine gender characteristics in a male
body, they must have been assigned to the wrong sex.
Over time, the qualities associated with nobility not only took on a
life of their own, far removed from their origins, but noble/base also
ceased to be an important fault line in the categorization of human beings
in this society. This is not at all to argue that class distinctions have lost
their meaning. But, in contemporary America at least, class has not only
become more fluid than it was in medieval Europe, it has also become far
less of a package deal. The qualities seen as united of necessity in an
individual medieval or Renaissance nobleman are in the United States
today acknowledged to be dispersed over a wide variety of elites, such as
those defined by ancestry (e.g., Mayflower descendants), education (e.g.,
Ivy League grads), wealth (e.g., members of the Forbes 400), looks (e.g.,
supermodels), talent (from Nobel prize winners to Hall of Fame athletes)
and power. Of course, some individuals do possess most or all the marks
of high status. But it is no longer assumed that to possess one, one must
possess the others.
The first step in this process of disaggregation came when nobility
was viewed as something one could manifest by one's behavior rather
than simply through one's blood lines. Today, all men are or can be gen-
tlemen and all women ladies.' And, for example, although the word
"villain" still has contemporary significance, it has lost all resonance of
its etymological origin in "villein" or "base-born." As Richard Rorty
suggests, perhaps the distinctions and androcentric value judgements
today associated with sex and gender may some day be forgotten, "just
as we have forgotten all about the discussion between base and noble
ancestry."7
68. Geoffrey Chaucer, The Wife of Bath's Tale, in CHAUCER'S POETRY 228 (E.T. Donaldson
ed., 2d ed., Ronald Press Co. 1975).
69. And all women gentlemen as well? See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN:
WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTrrUTIONAL CHANGE 85 (1997) (describing a Yale Law School
professor's justification of addressing all in his class, regardless of sex, as "gentlemen," since
women law students, too, should cultivate the civilized detachment associated with the gentlemanly
ideal); cf. LUISE F. PUSCH, ALLE MENSCHEN WERDEN SCHWESTERN (1990) (exploring the difference
in emphasis created by change in gender of words, e.g., when "alle Menschen" ("all human beings")
are described as "sisters" ("Schwestem") instead of "brothers").
70. Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, 30 MICH. Q. REV. 231, 248 (1991).
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A world in which people can, if they wish, forget about sex and
gender distinctions, a world in which the possibilities of liberal individu-
alism and universalism can be better realized, strikes me as more attrac-
tive than one in which sex and gender necessarily retain their salience but
change some of their valence. Thus, for many of the same reasons I resist
Valdes's enthusiasm for berdache, I am not satisfied by Rorty's alterna-
tive vision, in which women have the chance, previously denied them, to
find their moral identity in being women. According to Rorty:
To find one's moral identity in being an X means being able to do the
following sort of thing: make your Xness salient in your justification
of important uncoerced choices, make your Xness an important part
of the story you tell yourself when you need to recover your self-
confidence, make your relations with other X's central to your claim
to be a responsible person. These are all things men have usually been
able to do by reminding themselves that they are, come what may
men. They are things which men have made it hard for women to do
by reminding themselves that they are women.
•.. [W]omen are only now in the process of achieving a moral
identity as women."
While I have no objection if those women who wish to do so find
their moral identity in being women, I no more see this as the utopian
ideal than I do an equalization of separate spheres. For me, it is only
when women can, but need not, find a moral identity in being women,
that women's liberation will have come. To put this in Rorty's terms, this
day will come when the poet Adrienne Rich can join the club of poets if
she wishes, and be welcomed to membership by poets of both sexes. For
me it is not enough if Rich is restricted to the option Rorty imagines for
her, that of starting a "feminist separatis[t]" club of female poets once
she realizes she can never be one of the "band of brothers," the "invisible
club" of "young male" poets from Byron and Goethe to their present day
male counterparts.72
Pressing too closely the analogies between noble and base and mas-
culine and feminine would not be in the interests of someone like myself
who wants feminine qualities to be more highly valued than they have
been, however. This is because even today we still think villains are bad,
and we still associate goodness with most things previously deemed no-
ble. Indeed, just about the only item I can think of whose valence has
clearly shifted is bread-whole grain bread was once consumed by peas-
ants and despised by nobles, who preferred white bread made of refined
flour. Today, white bread is more closely associated with the lower
classes, while those of higher status tend to prefer whole wheat or even
seven grain bread.
71. Id. at 243-44.
72. Id. at 246.
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The more the masculine is seen to resemble the noble, the less space
remains for the feminine, even (indeed especially) in a world in which
masculinity, like nobility, is seen as open to all who choose it. For this
reason an analogy to the concept of the humors, which did not embody
the stark normative contrast of good and bad, may be helpful in addition.
Temperaments such as the melancholic or choleric were originally seen
as dictated by and associated with a specific physiology "and the words
carried much weight that they have since lost: e.g., the choleric man was
not only quick to anger but also yellow-faced, lean, hairy, proud, ambi-
tious, revengeful and shrewd."73 Today, however, although to describe
someone as choleric is not meaningless, we have not only ceased to view
persons of choleric temperament as by nature hot and dry and filled with
an excess of yellow bile, we are also quite unlikely to use the humors as
a basis for categorizing or evaluating people in the first place.
My final analogy is much more up to date. If, as some have sug-
gested, choosing sexual orientation can be analogized to choosing cloth-
ing, then the separate spheres of the berdache tradition may be akin to
"getting your colors done." Those who followed this theory of fashion,
popular in the 1980s and enjoying a recent revival, were categorized on
the basis of skin tone, eye, and hair color. "Everybody was forced into
four categories-winter, spring, summer, autumn. And sometimes that
one category wasn't the best choice, but it was the only choice.""4 Some-
one categorized as an "autumn" was directed to wear only autumn colors
and to purge her wardrobe of all other pieces of clothing, no matter how
attached to them she had become. I think we ought to be able to include
in our wardrobe any variety of things we wish, whether that be all
autumn colors and nothing but autumn colors or all the colors of the
rainbow. And we ought to be able to include in our lives whatever com-
bination of gendered traits we wish, regardless of whether they have pre-
viously been put together into a package deal.
73. Britannica Online, Humour (visited Dec. 6, 1998) <http:www.eb.com:180/cgi-
bin/g?DocF=micro/281/67.html>.
74. Janet McCue, Color Me Blue, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 30, 1995, at 1E. The fact that
new versions of "Color Me Beautiful" have expanded the number of options to twelve may be an
improvement, but, from my perspective, not a solution to the problem. See MARY SPILLANE &
CHRISTINE SHERLOCK, COLOR ME BEAUTIFUL'S LOOKING YOUR BEST: COLOR, MAKEUP, AND
STYLE 22-23 (1995), the follow-up to CAROLE JACKSON, COLOR ME BEAUTIFUL : DISCOVER YOUR
NATURAL BEAUTY THROUGH THE COLORS THAT MAKE You LOOK GREAT AND FEEL FABULOUS!
(1980).
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It was only a dream, but it seemed real at the time.
I stood in the middle of a forest and looked into a stream of water,
much as Narcissus must have done. The water reflected as clearly as
a mirror. When I saw my reflection, I said: "I am a flower."
The trees of the forest came alive and spoke. "You are a daffodil,"
they said. But I knew otherwise.
"No, a hyacinth," I said.
We could not agree. I was one or the other and we could not agree.
Then the god of light and wisdom appeared. The god said that I was
both a daffodil and a hyacinth and I was happy.
But then the rule was written. The rule said: "A flower is special and
cannot be harmed." The interpreters said that a daffodil was a flower
and a hyacinth was a flower. At first, I felt protected and warm.
Then one day I was threatened by a great wind. I said to the wind: "I
am a flower and you cannot harm me." The wind began to hum. Then
the wind began to laugh. "You are not a flower," said the wind. "You
are not a daffodil and you are not a hyacinth."
"Yes, I am. I am both daffodil and hyacinth."
And as the wind blew over me and trampled me to the ground, I
heard it say: "Not a flower, not a flower, not a flower."
And the interpreters agreed with the great wind. "A daffodil/hyacinth
is not A flower," said the interpreters. "If you are both, you are nei-
ther. You are not A flower and you are not protected. Only A flower
is special."
I protested, but to no avail. If a daffodil is special and a hyacinth is
special, then shouldn't a daffodil/hyacinth be even more special? Is it
not worse to destroy both?
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa; A.B., Vassar College, 1968; J.D., University of
Georgia, 1973. Special thanks to Jean C. Love for editorial comments and to all the participants at
the University of Denver College of Law Symposium on InterSEXionality for their questions,
criticisms, and encouragement. I owe an additional debt of gratitude to the University of Wisconsin
Law School for inviting me to present a version of this paper at a faculty workshop in the spring of
1998. My research assistant, Jill Krueger, J.D. Iowa, 1998, provided not only research support, but a
creative ear as she listened to the many ideas (some good, some bad) that were suggested by this
project.
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The dream is easy to explain. It is spring and, despite the recent
snows in the Midwest, my daffodils are starting to bloom. The hyacinth
was my favorite flower in childhood, but only the blue ones. I used to
crush their blooms into pixie dust so that I could fly. Sometimes I was
Peter Pan. Sometimes I was Superboy (but never Supergirl).
For months now I have immersed myself in the stories of female to
male transsexuals (FTMs), "boychicks" who are considering some form
of physical transition from femaleness to maleness, and butch lesbians
who embrace their female bodies while also embracing forms of mascu-
line gender expression. My reading has also included stories of male to
female transsexuals (MTFs). In addition, I have read every case of dis-
crimination against such people that has been reported in the federal or
state reporters. Most discrimination cases involve MTFs, but there are a
handful of cases in which FTMs are plaintiffs. The message from the
courts to the plaintiffs is the same in both cases: Men are protected from
discrimination and women are protected from discrimination, but you, as
a transsexual, are not protected. You are not a "sex." You are something
else.
The stories of butch lesbians, especially from the 1960s and 70s,
contain similar themes of rejection. This period was the heyday of civil
rights activism and the era of origin for anti-discrimination laws that
focus on sex and gender. For butch lesbians, it was not the legal system
that threatened their claims to masculine identity in a female body.
Rather it was the feminist community, and in particular lesbians within
that community, who began demanding that for lesbians to be true femi-
nists they must be "woman-identified."' Butch or masculine-identified
women were suddenly "politically incorrect."2
Similarly, progressive lesbian communities of the 1980s and 90s
have policed their borders by rejecting MTF transsexuals who claim les-
bian identity in a post-op female body. The Michigan Womyn's Music
Festival, for example, adopted a "womyn born womyn" rule in 1992 to
protect their female-only space.'
It seems, then, that in American law and society, sex is either male
or female. Gender is either masculine or feminine. Furthermore, mascu-
line gender is expected to correlate to male sex, feminine gender to fe-
1. "Because the proposition that lesbianism is an intensified form of female bonding has
become a belief, thinking, acting, or looking like a man contradicts lesbian feminism's first
principle: the lesbian is a 'woman-identified woman."' Esther Newton, The Mythic Mannish
Lesbian: Radclyffe Hall and the New Woman, 9 SIGNS 557, 557-58 (1984).
2. See Jeanne Cordova, Butches, Lies, and Feminism, in THE PERSISTENT DESIRE: A FEMME-
BUTCH READER 272, 272 (Joan Nestle ed., 1992).
3. See Nan Alamilla Boyd, Bodies in Motion: Lesbian and Transsexual Histories, in A
QUEER WORLD: THE CENTER FOR LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 134, 143-45 (Martin
Duberman ed., 1997) (discussing exclusion of transsexual women from Michigan Womyn's Music
Festival).
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male sex. Persons who do not fit these categories are unprotected by the
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex.' And persons who
blend masculine and feminine characteristics or one sex (e.g., female)
with the opposite gender (e.g., masculine) risk rejection, not only by our
legal institutions, but also by progressive communities.
Title VII' protects employees against discrimination on account of
6sex. Numerous state statutes protect persons from sex discrimination in
employment,7 housing,' credit,9 and education.'" At least ten states and the
District of Columbia have statutes that prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation." And Congress is considering once again the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would make employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation illegal in all states.' 2
With two exceptions, 3 none of these statutory protections offers any
protection to transsexual or transgendered individuals."
4. See, e.g., Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Iowa 1983)
(holding that a transsexual in transition cannot claim discrimination on the basis of sex because "the
common usage of the word sex denotes male or female, but not both").
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
6. Id. § 2000e-2.
7. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1996).
8. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:10 (Supp. 1997).
9. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81f (1997).
10. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 5 (West 1996).
11. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81d; D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. §
378-2 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553-10(G) (West Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 151B, § 4; MINN. STAT. § 363.03; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:10; N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §
961(6) (1995); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(d) (West 1997).
12. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997, S. 869, 105th Cong. The Senate rejected
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong., by a vote of 50 to 49. 142
CONG. REc. S10,129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996).
13. The exceptions are Minnesota (by statute) and New York (by case law). The Minnesota
human rights laws prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation. MINN.
STAT. § 363.03. "Sexual orientation" is defined as:
[Hiaving or being perceived as having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to
another person without regard to the sex of that person or having or being perceived as
having an orientation for such attachment, or having or being perceived as having a self-
image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or
femaleness.
Id. § 363.01 (emphasis added).
A New York court, in Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., provided protection to transsexuals
under New York City law by interpreting "sex" to include transsexuals. 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395-96
(App. Div. 1995) (rejecting, as "unduly restrictive," the federal courts' position that Title VII's
proscription against sex discrimination does not protect transsexuals). While the Maffei decision was
ambiguous as to the applicability of New York state law to transsexuals, a reasonable interpretation
of the decision, including its discussion of the more expansive nature of the state law as compared to
Title VII, indicates that the court recognized protections for transsexuals under New York state law
as well. See id. at 392-96; see also Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL
737215, at *9 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (interpreting the Maffei decision to protect transsexuals
under New York state, as well as city, law). In Rentos, a federal court applying New York state and
city law denied defendant's motion to dismiss, recognizing that the Maffei decision indicated that the
transsexual plaintiff potentially had a claim under these laws. See id. at *8-*9 ("Any ambiguity as to
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Why is it that our jurisprudence has developed a notion of sex, gen-
der, and sexual orientation that completely excludes transsexual or trans-
gendered persons? Are transsexual persons neither male nor female un-
der the law, and thus undeserving of protections that are available for
men and for women? Is our understanding of "discrimination on the ba-
sis of sex" so limited that it cannot accommodate the situation of a per-
son who was assigned one sex at birth, but has developed a different
gender identity throughout life? And how does our anti-discrimination
jurisprudence accommodate the biologically intersexed person or her-
maphrodite, whose sex and gender are blurred so as to defy classification
in our binary system?
Perhaps the problem is not with our jurisprudential vision, but with
our inability to visualize what it means to be transsexual or transgen-
dered. And if, as it appears, some of our most progressive political com-
munities experience difficulty with the blending of genders and sexes,
then perhaps we need to do some additional consciousness-raising on the
situation of transsexuals.
The purpose of this article is to enrich our understanding of trans-
sexuals and transgendered persons so that we can better determine
whether their experiences of discrimination ought to fall within existing
legal categories or whether we need to create new legal categories. To
this end, I will employ the method that feminist legal theorists of the
1970s and 80s used to develop new legal theories for the benefit of bat-
the plaintiff's protected status is... merely reflective of the present state of the law, and the
complaint clearly alleges membership in what [the Maffei] court has found to be a protected class
under city and state law.").
14. Although courts consistently interpret Title VII to exclude transsexuals from
antidiscrimination protection, see Rentos, 1996 WL 737215, at *7 ("Every federal court that has
considered the question has rejected the application of [Title VII] to a transsexual claiming
employent discrimination."), Title IX has recently been applied in a sexual harassment case in which
the plaintiff was a transsexual, harassed because she appeared female to the harasser. See Miles v.
New York Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("There is no conceivable reason why such
conduct should be rewarded with legal pardon just because, unbeknownst to [the harasser] and
everyone else at the university, plaintiff was not a biological female."). Title IX's sex discrimination
language is equivalent to the language in Title VII. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) (Title IX
language: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex . . . be subjected to
discrimination under any education program .... ), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (Title VII
language: "It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
individual.., because of such individual's ... sex."). Thus, the two statutes should be interpreted to
apply to similar discriminatory behavior. See Miles, 979 F. Supp. at 249-50 & n.4 (recognizing that
"it is now established" that the sex discrimination language in Title VII and Title IX are interpreted
in the same manner). In addition, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989), a case in which a woman was discriminated against for not being feminine
enough, signals the possibility for future application of Title VII to cases involving transsexuals. See
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (finding "because of such individual's.., sex" language in Title
VII "mean[s] that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions"). The Court's discussion in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998), also contains language which
might support future claims by transsexual plaintiffs. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (stating that
"statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils").
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tered women and women in the workplace who were harassed. That
method entails listening to and believing stories of the oppressed-"sto-
ries from the bottom," as Mari Matsuda would call them."
Part II of this article will outline briefly what I mean by feminist
method. In Part Ill, I will describe what I mean by "differently gendered
persons." Part IV focuses on the stories of differently gendered persons.
After making some preliminary observations about those stories in Part
V, I conclude in Part VI with some suggestions for legal reform in the
area of anti-discrimination law.
II. FEMINIST METHOD
A. Consciousness-Raising as Feminist Method
As Chris Littleton explained years ago: "Feminist method starts
with the very radical act of taking women seriously, believing that what
we say about ourselves and our experience is important and valid, even
when (or perhaps especially when) it has little or no relationship to what
has been or is being said about us."'6 For me this is still the starting place
for constructing feminist legal theories, listening to and believing
women's stories. It means holding back the critiques and the judgments
until the story has been heard in full-with empathy and understanding.
Some feminist theorists have described this process as akin to con-
sciousness-raising." Imagine a group of women sharing with each other
their stories and perspectives-stories and perspectives they have never
shared before; for some out of fear, for some as a result of the indiffer-
ence of available listeners. The process builds a new understanding of
previously silenced experiences and the women sharing in the process
gain insights about their own stories.
Consciousness-raising has been described as the "personal reporting
of experience in communal settings to explore what has not been said."'8
It enables "feminists to draw insights and perceptions from their own
experiences and those of other women and to use these insights to chal-
lenge dominant versions of social reality.""
This process of telling and hearing stories is credited with the for-
mulation of legal theories dealing with sexual harassment, pornography,
15. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); see also infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (providing
further discussion of Matsuda's term).
16. Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 751, 764 (1989) (reviewing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINSM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
17. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 863-67
(1990) (discussing consciousness-raising through the articulation of experiences as a "feminist
method for expanding perceptions").
18. Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10,64(1987).
19. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 866.
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battered women, and rape." It has also helped us to understand connec-
tions between sexism and racism.
There is a risk to this form of feminist method. For example, Andrea
Stuart argues that "[e]ncounter groups and consciousness raising seem[ ]
most pertinent to a privileged few, largely white and middle-class, who
[are] lucky enough to be able to put to one side issues of race and
class .... ,,21 Critics charge that consciousness-raising may produce a
feminist "movement side-tracked by a peculiarly narcissistic dimension
of 'the personal is the political.' 2  Others charge that the consciousness-
raising "model 'works' mainly in a culture that prioritizes individual,
rather than collectivist, strategies and solutions.
23
"Difference feminism" has emerged from this method, offering a
critique of reality from the perspective of women, a perspective that is
claimed to be different from that of men.' To the extent difference femi-
nism has relied on or even suggested the existence of a monolithic and
coherent woman's standpoint, it has been criticized for its failure to in-
clude the voices and viewpoints of diverse women. Racial critiques25 and
lesbian critiques26 have claimed that feminist standpoint theories too of-
ten ignore the realities and experiences of women of color and lesbians.
Thus, according to these critiques, the truths such standpoint theories
offer are only partial.
I have argued elsewhere that lesbian experience must be understood
and included in feminist critiques. Legal solutions that ignore lesbian
experience may contribute to the continued subordination of lesbians.
Such solutions are not really feminist, for feminism means working
against the subordination of all women. Relational or cultural feminis 8
arguments that value the biological connection between mother and
20. See, e.g., id. at 864-65; cf Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 642-48 (1986) (addressing the
effects of feminist thought and discourse on sexual harassment and battered women).
21. Andrea Stuart, Feminism: Dead or Alive?, in IDENTITY: COMMUNITY, CULTURE,
DIFFERENCE 28, 37 (Jonathan Rutherford ed., 1990).
22. Id.
23. Kobena Mercer & Isaac Julien, Race, Sexual Politics and Black Masculinity: A Dossier, in
MALE ORDER: UNWRAPPING MASCULINITY 97, 122 (Rowena Chapman & Jonathan Rutherford eds.,
1988).
24. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (discussing the existence and implications of distinctions between
male and female modes of observation and communication).
25. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990).
26. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989).
27. Id.
28. Difference feminism is sometimes called cultural feminism and cultural feminists often
stress relationships between women and children. See,- e.g., Susan H. Williams & David C. Williams,
A Feminist Theory of Malebashing, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 35, 110-15 (1996).
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child,29 for example, may serve to devalue the mother and child connec-
tion for the lesbian mother who is a "second parent."3
Linda McClain has described the problems that may result from a
misuse of feminist method. In a recent article, she says:
There has been a deep impulse in feminism, throughout its his-
tory, to engage in judgment or critical evaluation with a view to
helping women. Arguably, the role of consciousness-raising as a
feminist method yielding knowledge about women's lives reflects
this impulse. But, as applied to other women, a stance of judgment
may suggest an us/them or self/other relationship in which feminists
attempt to interpret the experience and voices of other women. Par-
ticularly when differences such as race, ethnicity, and class exist,
there are risks of incomprehension and misinterpretation, as well as
solipsistic use of one's own experience as a measure or norm. The
consequences are exacerbated when the interpreter is in a position of
power (e.g., to prescribe policy agendas or to regulate the lives of the
women under interpretation)."
The task of feminist method is to listen openly to those women who
are different from us, especially the most subordinated-to hear their
stories as best we can and to check our theories against the interests of
those we have listened to. In addition, we must be slow to generalize,
slow to build grand theory-or at least willing to revise our theories con-
tinuously in light of new knowledge.
B. Narrative and Stories from the Bottom
Consciousness-raising implies dialog, the sharing of stories. My
method in this article is not true consciousness-raising because I have not
engaged in rap sessions or dialog groups with FTMs or other differently
gendered persons. But like consciousness-raising, my method begins
with the real life experiences of FTMs and other differently gendered
persons. I have lurked on internet discussion lists dealing with FTM
identity and immersed myself in autobiographies, personal statements,
and interviews with FTMs and cross-dressers. In this article, I will offer
legal theories based on the listening I have done. In addition, I will share
29. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 12 (1988)
(criticizing dominant legal doctrine for valuing separation rather than connectedness). Feminists who
value maternal connections argue in favor of the maternal presumption in child custody. See Rena K.
Uriller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 107, 127 (1978).
30. The nonbiological second mother is rarely recognized as a parent for purposes of seeking
visitation with a child she has raised jointly with the biological mother. See, e.g., Curiale v. Reagan,
272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990) (partner of biological motHer has no standing to claim visitation
rights); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (partner of adoptive mother has no standing to
claim visitation rights).
31. Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 339, 446 (1996)
(footnotes omitted).
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with readers some of the stories I have heard. Thus, this article embraces
both the narrative and analytic traditions in legal scholarship."
Narrative has been used by critical race scholars" as well as by
feminist scholars" to communicate the experiences of the subordinated to
others. Different scholars make different claims regarding the value of
narrative scholarship. Some claim that the narrative standing alone is
sufficient if it causes others to engage in paradigm shifts regarding legal
positions or theories. Some claim that some narratives have more value
than others. And some claim that the truth of the narratives is irrelevant
to their value. Stories have power as stories whether true or not.
I wish to avoid as much of this debate as possible. I make a simple
claim: By listening to the stories of differently gendered persons, I learn
something about their lives. I don't claim truth or higher value for these
stories. I retell the ones that resonate with me, the ones that have raised
my consciousness. I retell these stories for a concrete purpose: to ques-
tion the current judicial understanding of sex discrimination law, an un-
derstanding that has denied meaningful existence to persons who are not
at all times clearly categorized as either male or female.
The stories I have chosen for this project are the stories of women
who identify as men or as masculine, including butch lesbians and
FTMs. I have chosen to focus primarily on FTM experience because, in
the transsexual/transgender world, their stories are the "stories from the
bottom."
"Stories from the bottom" is a concept introduced by Mar Matsuda
when she argued in a 1987 article:
[T]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a special
voice to which we should listen. Looking to the bottom-adopting
the perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the lib-
32. See Jean C. Love, The Value of Narrative in Legal Scholarship and Teaching, 2 J.
GENDER, RACE, & JUSTICE (forthcoming 1998).
33. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Charles R.
Lawrence, III, A Dream: On Discovering the Significance of Fear, 10 NOVA L.J. 627 (1986).
34. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); see also Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77
IOWA L. REV. 19, 38 (1991) (calling for feminist scholars to translate experience to those who are
strangers to the experience); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law,
Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1688 (1990) (stating that stories are used
in the hope that they "can create a bridge across gaps in experience and thereby elicit empathetic
understanding").
35. For the substance of the debate, see Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 971 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994);
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on
Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Randall L.
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989).
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eral promise--can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the
phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice.s6
Professor Matsuda's claim was that "the victims of racial oppression
have distinct normative insights."" I make a more modest claim. Victims
of discrimination whose stories have not been heard will always teach us
something about discrimination. Their perspective need not be more
valuable or more "true" in order to teach us something. The purpose of
feminist method is not to uncover truth, the view from nowhere. It is to
uncover new perspectives, new views from lives and stories that have not
been heard before. FTM stories can teach us something about gender
discrimination-and they are stories that have been ignored, have gone
unheard.
James Green, president of FTM International says:
The FTM population suffers greatly from marginalization, even
within the cultural dialog on transgender and transsexualism. We
have a hard time getting published-perhaps because no one takes us
seriously, perhaps because we were once women, perhaps because we
are simply invisible, not as threatening as people who cut off their
penises."
In his book, Female-to-Male Transsexualism, Dr. Leslie Lothstein
says:
When transsexualism was finally included as a disorder [by the
American Psychiatric Association in 1980] there was no attempt to
separate male from female transsexualism. Consequently, there were
no guidelines for evaluating, diagnosing, and treating female trans-
sexualism as a distinct clinical entity. If the disorder of transsexual-
ism was ever mentioned in the major psychology and psychiatry
texts, it was either given short shrift or the focus, however brief, was
on male transsexualism.3 9
Gordene Olga MacKenzie, in her book, Transgender Nation, reports
that anthropologists have reported less on FIMs (sometimes called
"amazons") as compared with MTFs. She cites Paula Gunn Allen's ex-
planation that "fewer accounts of cross-gender women exist because
women have always been considered less important than men."
36. Matsuda, supra note 15, at 324; see also Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
37. Matsuda, supra note 15, at 326.
38. Email from Jamison Green to Pat Cain (Feb. 3, 1998) (on file with the author); see also C.
Jacob Hale, Consuming the Living, Dis(re)membering the Dead in the Butch/FTM Borderlands, 4
GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STuD. 311, 329-30 (1998) (noting that MTFs have more power in
community organizations than FTMs, as well as greater access to the media, and explaining how
current discourses on transsexuality ignore the specifics of FTM experience).
39. LESLIE MARTIN LOTHsTEiN, FEMALE-TO-MALE TRANSSEXUALISM: HISTORICAL,
CLINIcAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 4 (1983).
40. GORDENE OLGA MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION 32 (1994).
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In addition, feminist legal and non-legal scholarship has tended to
focus more on the MTF than on the FTM. Janice Raymond, a feminist
scholar, wrote an early scathing critique of what she calls "The Trans-
sexual Empire," arguing that with sex reassignment surgery, the medical
profession has attempted to control the very definition of what it means
to be a woman." By relying on overly essentialized notions of femininity,
doctors require men who want to become women to conform to their idea
of the ideal woman." Women who want to become men (FTMs) are at
the margin of her analysis. They are viewed as tokens necessary to make
the enterprise appear even-handed.43
Much feminist scholarship has focused on the meaning of "woman."
Scholars have debated whether MTFs should count as women. The issue
arises most frequently in the context of debates over separate space for
women, raising the question of who counts as a woman for those pur-
poses." Rarely, however, do these discussions include questions about
women who have become men.
Feminist method is about uncovering silences. It is about learning
from subordinate perspectives that have been ignored by the dominant
discourse. Listening to the narratives of the differently gendered, and
FTMs in particular, is feminist method. Retelling those stories in an at-
tempt to raise consciousness and create paradigm shifts in gender dis-
crimination law is feminist method applied.
C. Personal Perspective
It has become common for feminist legal scholars to identify their
personal connections to the subject matter they have chosen to address in
law review articles. Feminists who write about rape often identify as rape
victims" and feminists who write about domestic abuse often identify as
abuse survivors." Others tell personal stories of childbirth, 8 discrimina-
tion, '9 or family disputes,0 when writing about related topics. Although I
41. See JANICE G. RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE
91-98 (1979).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26-28.
44. See Boyd, supra note 3, at 143-48; see also Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Gendered
Politics of Identity: Who Owns the Label "Lesbian"?, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1997).
45. But see Arriola, supra note 44, at 27 (raising question of whether lesbian partner of
woman who becomes a man can still claim the label "lesbian").
46. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); see also Lynne N. Henderson,
The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938 n.3 (1985) (identifying the author as a
victim of a violent crime).
47. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 34, at 8.
48. See Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction"
and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989).
49. See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-
role Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 514
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recognize that there are objections to these "personal footnotes,"5' I agree
and support this feminist move in legal scholarship. My position is not
based on a belief that the survivor of domestic abuse or rape or other
sexual violence has a special claim to truth about the subject. Rather, my
position is based on an ethical concern that when one is writing about
topics that are closely connected to one's personal experience, as a
scholar, one is under a special responsibility to disclose the experiences
or connections that might affect the author's "voice."
With respect to the topic of this article, I claim no special knowl-
edge, no special subjective access to truth, and no special ability at ob-
jective analysis. But I do have a connection or perspective with respect to
the topic of butch lesbians and FTMs, and I believe it is worth reporting.
The reader can then read my analysis through whatever lens is suggested
by my connection and perspective.
I identify today as a lesbian and have often identified as a butch les-
bian. When I was growing up in the 1940s and 1950s, I would have
given anything to be transformed from female to male. I was very relig-
ious as a child and often prayed to God that He would miraculously
transform me from female to male. My prayers were very specific in that
I wished to wake up with a male body. My wishes seem to me now to
have had nothing to do with sexual feelings, because the longings for a
male body predated any memory of sexual arousal or awareness. I was
athletic and hated the limitations placed on females in the 1950s regard-
ing athletic options. I always identified with male heroes, whether in
ancient myths or in modern cowboy stories. I thought many females were
silly. At the same time, I had many female friends who were tomboys
and who shared my love of athletics. Not surprisingly, I experienced a
profound internal crisis when my body began to take a more female
shape at age ten or eleven. Because people didn't talk about such things
as gender identity in those days, I never discussed any of these longings
or feelings with anyone when I was growing up. Rather, I survived the
experience in silence.
I embraced the concept of "women loving women" and the label
"lesbian" as soon as I became aware of the existence of lesbians, which
was sometime in my twenties. Despite my deep religious beliefs and
experiences, I never viewed myself as a sinner because I loved women
and I never felt that my religion required me to distance myself from
(1992); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 128-29 (1987).
50. See, e.g., Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral,
Child-Centered Approach to Child Name Change Proceedings, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 3-6 (1996)
(beginning with a personal story about the naming of her own children).
51. See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon ": The Human Voice in Legal Rules,
66 TEx. L. REv. 589, 598-600 (1988) (arguing such personal accounts are often irrelevant to the
author's legal scholarship).
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lesbian love. To me, love has always been good, and honest love is above
reproach. Such beliefs and attitudes seemed perfectly consistent with
what I had learned about love in my church.1
2
I had never considered the possibility of using medical science to ac-
complish the goal of my unanswered prayers until I began this project.
This project has made me confront that possibility. But it took very little
time for me to realize that, somewhere between the ages of four and
forty, I made peace with my female body and my masculine gender
identity.
Given my personal perspective, my reaction upon hearing the indi-
vidual stories that I uncovered in this project was to feel a deep sense of
connection with the storytellers. I felt no need to distance myself in order
to maintain my own identity. At the same time, I know that I have no
special connection that makes FTM stories more transparent to me than
to others. I may connect more easily with certain FTMs, and we may
share some common life experiences, but I have learned that the differ-
ences of time, class, race, and geography are just as real here as in other
narratives. Moreover, there is no meta-FTM narrative, despite the medi-
cal profession's attempt to create one for diagnostic purposes.
During my work on this project, I have been accused by some of
being a voyeur, of stepping into areas that I know nothing about. Such
complaints come primarily from those who believe I have no special
connection with FTM experience, some of whom even suggest that I am
not sufficiently "butch" to claim that label. These charges, although dis-
turbing at a number of levels, have helped to raise my own consciousness
about the dangers of identity politics and of legal analysis based on iden-
tity categories. Although I firmly believe in a subject's right to self iden-
tification, I am also committed to projects that deconstruct fixed or rigid
categories, even those embraced by the very subjects whose life experi-
ences I honor and respect. As a listener in this project, therefore, I have
endeavored to be open-minded and understanding, while at the same
time questioning the basic premise of bipolar sex identity upon which
FTM identity and narrative is based.
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN To BE DIFFERENTLY GENDERED?
In law, as well as in other disciplines, the term "sex" has come to
mean biological sex and "gender" has come to mean that which is so-
cially constructed. Thus, one's sex is either male or female, and one's
52. I grew up in the Southern Baptist Church. I can't explain why I, unlike other Southern
Baptists, developed a sense of love that included same-sex love. I always believed in the power of
faith to move mountains and I always believed that honesty was the greatest virtue of all. Being true
to myself, including being honest about the love I felt for women, was absolutely consistent with my
own religious principles as I developed them while an active member of the First Baptist Chruch in
my home town.
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gender may be either masculine or feminine. This binary classification
system is much too constrained to embrace all of reality. Some people
are intersexed in that they combine both male and female biological
traits. Sometimes the balance between male and female is sufficiently
even that we cannot tell for certain whether a person is one or the other.
Nonetheless, such intersexed people are assigned a single sex at birth. 3
Thus, they begin their lives in the assigned sex role with expectations
that gender will conform to the assigned sex. Later in life, it may turn out
that some such persons develop secondary sex characteristics of the sex
opposite to the one assigned. At that time, reassignment will be difficult,
although surgical intervention can sometimes help.
Some people begin their lives in one biological sex (e.g., female),
but with a strong gender identity of the opposite sex (e.g., male or mas-
culine). Many butch lesbians fit within this category, ' as do some man-
nish heterosexual women. With the help of modern medicine, some of
these differently gendered people elect to go through treatments that will
more nearly align their bodies (i.e., their biological sex) with their gender
identity.
Some butch lesbians spend a lot of time working on their bodies to
become more masculine in appearance. They work out at gyms and
health clubs. Some even elect breast reduction surgery, often for good
medical reasons, but buttressed by a desire to appear more butch or mas-
culine.55 FTMs also work on their bodies and have surgeries. Some start
with breast reduction and end up with double mastectomies. Most FTMs
have hormone therapy treatments. That is, they take testosterone on a
regular basis. Some individuals who identify as FTM avoid taking hor-
53. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.3, IV.B.2.b (presenting the stories of Thomas Hall and
Lynn Edward Harris).
54. The term "butch" is more fluid than my use of it in the text might suggest. Within the
lesbian community, butch and femme are terms that describe behaviors of individuals as well as
relationships between two women. Although some might perceive the labels as fixed (i.e., a butch is
always a butch), others perceive the labels as relative (e.g., in every couple one person is more hutch
than the other and a woman who is butch in one relationship might be perceived as femme in another
relationship). For purposes of this article, my use of the term "butch" is closest in meaning to that
offered by Gayle Rubin:
Butch is the lesbian vernacular term for women who are more comfortable with
masculine gender codes, styles, or identities than with feminine ones. The term
encompasses individuals with a broad range of investments in "masculinity." It includes,
for example, women who are not at all interested in male gender identities, but who use
traits associated with masculinity to signal their lesbianism or to communicate their
desire to engage in the kinds of active or initiatory sexual behaviors that in this society
are allowed or expected from men.
Gayle Rubin, Of Catamites and Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender, and Boundaries, in THE
PERSISTENT DESIRE: A FEMME-BUTCH READER, supra note 2, at 466,467.
55. For example, short of sex reassignment surgery, some butch lesbians will elect breast
reduction surgery so that their bodies become more aligned with their gender identities. See Maj
Plumb, Butch Identity, Breast Reduction, and the Chicago Cubs, GIRLFRIENDS 25, 27 (March 1998),
excerpted from THE LESBIAN HEALTH BOOK: CARING FOR OURSELVES (Jocelyn White & Marissa C.
Martinez, eds. 1997).
19981 1333
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
mones because they fear the consequences of taking a powerful drug like
testosterone, which changes more than appearance.
Butch lesbians differ from FTMs in that they identify as women,
both privately and publicly, despite the fact that they embrace some at-
tributes of masculinity. This category would include persons identified as
female at birth or later.
5 6
Many scholars identify transsexual persons as those who desire sur-
gery in order to change their physical bodies so that the body will more
closely align with gender identity.57 Thus, the desire for sex reassignment
surgery has come to be understood as the key factor that divides true
transsexuals from other transgendered persons. The focus on surgery or
the desire for surgery is troubling, especially as a defining line for FTMs.
Breast reductions or mastectomies are surgical interventions, but are not
solely thought of as sex reassignment surgeries because they are avail-
able to women for other purposes. 8 Many, perhaps most, FTMs decline
to purchase genital reconstructive surgeries. 9 Thus, for many, hormone
treatment is the primary medical intervention.
In this article, my focus is on women who were identified as female
at birth, but who claim some degree of masculine identification, regard-
56. I include in the category of masculine or butch women, persons who may have
transitioned to a female body through sex reassignment surgery. I certainly do not intend to exclude
MTF transsexuals from the category "woman" or the category "lesbian" as certain feminist
organizations have tried to do. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 3, at 143-45 (discussing exclusion of
transsexual women from Michigan Womyn's Music Festival).
57. See, e.g., BERNICE L. HAUSMAN, CHANGING SEX: TRANSEXUALISM, TECHNOLOGY, AND
THE IDEA OF GENDER 72-109 (1995) (examining case studies); Ken Morris & Candace Hellen
Brown, The Alan Lucill Hart Story, 6 TNT: TRANSSEXUAL NEWS TELEGRAPH 3, 14 (1996) (stating
that "[i]t is not surgery which defines a transsexual, but the internal visualization and experience of
the body as being of the opposite sex" and the resulting "desire to bring the body into conformity
with the internal image").
58. Breast surgery is included as genital surgery in the Standards of Care first published by the
Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association. See HARRY BENJAMIN
INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION, INC., STANDARDS OF CARE: THE HORMONAL
AND SURGICAL SEx REASSIGNMENT OF GENDER DYSPHORIC PERSONS (1990) [hereinafter
BENJAMIN STANDARDS], reprinted in GENDER BLENDING 505 (Bonnie Bullough et al. eds., 1997).
The standards require a second opinion before surgery is authorized. Id. § 4.7.5 Standard 7, reprinted
in GENDER BLENDING, at 515. No second opinion is required for hormone therapy. Before genital
sex reassignment is authorized, the patient must live full-time in the social role of the genetically
opposite sex for a year. Id. § 4.9.1 Standard 9, reprinted in GENDER BLENDING, at 515. No such 12
month requirement precedes breast surgery.
59. See HOLLY DEVOR, FrM: FEMALE-TO-MALE TRANSSEXUALS IN SOCIETY 447 (1997).
There are several reasons why FTMs are more likely than MTFs to decline genital reconstructive
surgery. First, FTMs are generally successful in changing their gender attribution from female to
male without surgery. Apparently individuals feel less compelled to have surgery once they are
recognized as members of the new gender. In addition, the quality of phalloplasty surgery in terms of
both aesthetics and function is not high. Vaginoplasties are much more effective. Finally, the cost of
phalloplasties is much greater, sometimes estimated as high as $150,000. See generally CLAUDINE
GRIOGS, S/HE: CHANGING SEX AND CHANGING CLOTHES 81-86 (1998) (discussing the relative
values of surgery).
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less of whether they take extraordinary steps to align their bodies with
masculinity. Since I rely on self-identification, neither surgery nor hor-
mone therapy are prerequisites to claiming the FTM label. I will not gen-
erally distinguish between pre- and post-op transsexuals, although where
the fact of surgery is relevant, I will mention it. I sometimes identify
FTMs as in transition or fully transitioned. Full transition does not de-
pend on the amount of surgery the FTM has completed. Again, I rely on
self-descriptions, so that a subject who claims to be fully transitioned
may or may not have had any surgery. Furthermore, my use of the cate-
gory FTM probably includes persons that others would label as transgen-
dered rather than transsexual.
Passing women present an analytical challenge as they are not easily
assigned to either the category FTM or butch lesbian. Passing women
were women who lived as men before there was any possibility for sur-
gical intervention. Some of these women might well identify as FTM
today, but there is no way to know for sure. Both FTMs and butch lesbi-
ans have claimed many of these women as part of their historical heri-
tage.' I include some of their stories in this article because, in whatever
category they fall, they certainly qualify as "differently gendered" and
their stories are "stories from the bottom."
I also include in my "gender garden" persons of either biological
sex who embrace both masculine and feminine gender identities. My
term for describing such people is that they are "radically androgynous."
On a gender continuum from masculine to feminine, they are not neces-
sarily at the center, the usual location under traditional notions of an-
drogyny. Such traditional notions of androgyny conjure up images of
unisex individuals, of persons who are neither male nor female. Such a
notion is what gave androgyny a bad name in the early stages of the sec-
ond wave of feminism.6' My concept of androgyny as a radical concept is
intended to embrace both ends of my imaginary continuum of gender. A
person's gender identity may be any place on the scale at any given time.
Some people may, throughout their lives, hover around one end of the
scale. Others may jump all over the place, sometimes expressing their
masculine identities and sometimes expressing their feminine ones.62
60. The slide show "She Even Chewed Tobacco" focuses on a number of such passing women
who have been claimed by the lesbian community and by the FrM community. For a textual
description of the show, see The San Francisco Lesbian and Gay History Project, "She Even Chewed
Tobacco": A Pictorial Narrative of Passing Women in America, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY:
RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 183 (Martin Duberman et al. eds., 1989).
61. But see generally CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF ANDROGYNY
(1973) (presenting a feminist argument in favor of using the notion of androgyny to free individual
human development from the limits imposed by polarized concepts of sex and gender).
62. The radically androgynous would include the "men in skirts" that Mary Anne Case is
concerned about. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995). A good
contemporary example of a male who sometimes expresses female identity is gender-bender Dennis
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IV. STORIES FROM THE GENDER GARDEN
A. Stories from History
Throughout history there have been stories, real and fictional, of
women who have chosen to live as men, to wear men's clothing, to
"pass." Sometimes these women passed for short periods of time and
sometimes their biological sex was only discovered after death.63 Such
stories include the lives of so-called transvestite Saints,' the lives of
women who donned male clothing and fought for their countries as sol-
diers or sailors,' and the lives of women who chose male identities to
escape marriage or other female destinies.' Although the category trans-
sexual did not exist during these periods, some of these women undoubt-
edly would have classified themselves as FTMs if they had lived today.
1. Balkan "Sworn Virgins"
In the mountains of North Albania, close to the Yugoslavian border
of Montenegro, tribal societies continue to exist in which there are strict
hierarchies between men and women. 7 Women have few rights inde-
pendent of their fathers and husbands. A widow who has no surviving
son, for example, would not be allowed to maintain her own home. To
Rodman of the Chicago Bulls. An example of a female who sometimes expresses male identity is
k.d. lang.
63. See, e.g., JONATHAN NED KATz, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN
THE U.S.A. 232 (rev. ed. 1992) (telling the story of Murray Hall, a woman who posed as a man,
married twice, was active in New York City politics, and whose true sex was not discovered until
she died of breast cancer); Louis SULLIVAN, FROM FEMALE TO MALE: THE LIFE OF JACK BEE
GARLAND 8 (1990) (describing the headlines of the San Francisco Chronicle as proclaiming "'Jack
Bee' Was Woman" in 1936 when Garland died in a San Francisco hospital).
64. Joan of Arc is the most familiar of these Saints. But there are numerous others, including
Saint Thecla, who was a follower of Paul; Saint Margaret, who dressed as a man to escape her
arranged marriage; and Saint Uncumber who, when she prayed to be saved from marriage, became
physically able to grow a beard. See RUDOLF M. DEKKER & LOWrE C. VAN DE POL, THE TRADITION
OF FEMALE TRANSVESTISM IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 45-46 (1989). For a brief description of 34
female Saints who dressed or passed as men from the second to fifteenth centuries, see VALERIE R.
HOTCHKISS, CLOTHES MAKE THE MAN: FEMALE CROSS DRESSING IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 131-41
(1996).
65. See DEKKER & VAN DE POL, supra note 64. Their research uncovered 119 cases of females
who attempted to pass as men during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the Netherlands.
Many of these cases were discovered because the women had attempted to pass as soldiers or sailors
and their true sex was identified. Id.; see also KATZ, supra note 63, at 212-14 (telling the story of
Deborah Sampson, who dressed as a man and fought in the Revolutionary War).
66. See, e.g., CATALINA DE ERAUSO, LIEUTENANT NUN: MEMOIR OF A BASQUE
TRANSVESTITE IN THE NEW WORLD (Michele Stepto & Gabriel Stepto trans., Beacon Press 1996)
(telling the story of Lieutentant Nun, born in the Basque town of San Sebastian in 1585, who
escaped the convent at age 14 by donning male attire and sailing to the New World).
67. DEKKER & VAN DE POL, supra note 64, at 42; Mildred Dickemann, The Balkan Sworn
Virgin: A Traditional European Transperson, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 58, at 248; Rene
Gremaux, Woman Becomes Man in the Balkans, in THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER: BEYOND SEXUAL
DIMORPHISM IN CULTURE AND HISTORY 241-46 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1994).
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escape this fate, a daughter in a family with no sons might choose to be-
come the "man" of the family. Alternatively, if a family had no male
heirs, the parents or grandparent might declare that a daughter too young
to make her own declaration would henceforth be raised as a boy. From
that point forward, the girlchild would dress as a man, carry weapons,
and perform the ritual acts reserved for men. In exchange for this recog-
nition of male privilege, the girl child would vow to remain unmarried
and chaste for the rest of her life.
Mikas Milicev Karadzic, by all accounts, was born female in the
late nineteenth century in the Balkans.' When she was quite young,
Milica (her female name) lost her father. He was killed in battle and her
mother, left with no male in the house, dressed Milica in male clothes
and renamed her Mikas. Mikas adopted his new gender identity readily
and grew into a man, acted as head of the household, and performed the
ritual and ceremonial acts assigned to men. He even voted as a man and
was accepted in his male role by the chieftains of the surrounding clans.
Although it appears that the male role was thrust upon him, probably
more by the grieving grandmother than the mother, Mikas apparently
grew into the role and refused to be known as female ever again. He be-
came a soldier, was referred to either as husband's brother or elderly
man, and was buried as a man in male attire. Regarding physical attrib-
utes, Mikas claimed to have menstruated for a short period at age 13, but
never again. Women who cared for Mikas in his old age said he had "ill-
developed breasts." He had no intimate relationships, although it is said
that he used to talk to other men about his lust for women.
Rene Gremaux has uncovered the case histories of 120 such women
who lived as men in the Balkans.' They were not true "passing women"
because they remained in their homes where the clanspeople knew that
they were born female. Yet, either by choice or by force of circumstance,
they took on the male role with the approval of male elders, usually at
puberty, and they remained in that role throughout their lives, even after
the necessity for being male had ended (e.g., after the widowed mother
had died).
2. Maria van Antwerpen
Maria van Antwerpen was born in Breda in 1719 and orphaned at
the age of 12.70 She worked as a maidservant for a while, and then in
1746 enlisted as a soldier under the name of Jan van Ant. One year later,
she officially married a woman who was not aware of Maria's true sex.
While stationed with her army unit in Breda in 1751, Maria was recog-
68. Mikas Milicev Karadzic's story is taken exclusively from Gremaux, supra note 67, at
246-53.
69. Id. at 242 (providing case histories for four of these individuals).
70. Maria van Antwerpen's story is taken exclusively from DEKKER & VAN DE POL, supra
note 64, at 3-4 and other scattered portions of their work.
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nized by a previous acquaintance and, thus, her disguise was discovered.
She was subsequently arrested and sentenced to a period of exile. Ten
years later, she again disguised herself as a man and married another
woman. She was arrested again in 1769. From the records of her arrests
and trials, we learn of her reasons for her decision to live as a man.
Maria argued that "God, Nature, and Fate had predestined her cross-
dressing."7 She claimed that she should have been and was expected to
be the seventh son of her parents. In her own words: "I take this as rule,
that no one can escape his predetermined fate. It is impossible to control
one's first passions."7 She said she was not like any other woman and
therefore it was best to dress in men's clothing. She also said she "was in
appearance a woman, but in nature a man."73
Many of these statements sound much like the statements of modem
FTM transsexuals. It is almost as though she was crying out, "I am a man
trapped in the body of a woman." In her autobiography, she explained
her feelings as follows: "It often made me wrathful that Mother Nature
treated me with so little compassion against my inclinations and the pas-
sions of my heart."74 It is reported that even when she dressed as a
woman, she wore male undergarments. She also reported that as a teen-
ager a "shaft shot out of her body""5 when she menstruated, thereby
claiming a biological cause for her actions. She was medically examined
and found to be female.
3. Thomas or Thomasina Hall
The story of Thomas or Thomasina Hall is derived from court rec-
ords in 1629 Virginia. 6 Hall was brought before the court because he/she
sometimes dressed as a woman and sometimes as a man. Although never
charged with a crime, Hall had been reported to the authorities because
villagers were confused as to whether Hall was a he or a she. Hall was
born female according to the English records of her birth. She moved to
the New World as an indentured servant in male attire, claiming male
identity. But after settling in Virginia, he sometimes reverted to female
clothes and female identity. The women appointed by the court to deter-
mine whether Hall was female searched him and found him to be male.
Others were not convinced, so Hall was inspected again-this time by
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 68.
75. Id. at 67.
76. Thomas or Thomasina Hall's story is taken from MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING
MOTHERS & FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 183-88
(1996), and Hasan Shafiqullah, Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An Argument for the
Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 195, 198 (1997).
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men and women. The women agreed again that Hall was male, but the
men were divided.
The court ultimately appears to have accepted Hall's self-
description as male and agreed to refer to him as "he." Yet, at the same
time, the court pronounced him both male and female and ordered him to
wear female headgear and an apron over his male attire as, one might
surmise, an outward expression of his dual status. It is unfortunate that
we do not have any verified first person accounts by Hall himself. It is
also unfortunate that court records were burned during the Civil War,
making it impossible to further trace Hall's history. It seems that his sex
may have been physically ambiguous and that his gender was mixed.
The time and effort the community committed to determining the
correct category for Hall-male or female-is consistent with society's
reluctance to accept the possibility of both categories in the same person.
Their actions reflect their understanding that male and female are polar
extremes-for both sex and gender. Hall could be one or the other but
not both. The amazing ending to the story is that the court's action is
consistent with a recognition that Hall was both. It is not clear that the
community embraced the court's determination, but it does seem that a
determination by the court was needed to end the conflict. Thus, there
was a legal solution to the dilemma and Hall was legally assigned to a
special category that had not existed before.
4. Passing Women
Jack Bee Garland died in 1936 after living as a man for 40 years.77
Garland had been born in San Francisco in 1869 as Elvira Virginia Mug-
arrieta, the daughter of San Francisco's first Mexican consul. Her sister
reported that Garland had dressed as a man for numerous reasons in-
cluding: creating the opportunity to visit the Spanish-American war front
in the Philippines in 1899, because it fit her/his style, and because it en-
abled Garland to help the down-and-outers on the streets of San Fran-
cisco. Before moving to San Francisco and passing as a man, Garland
lived in Stockton and used the name Babe Bean. In Stockton, her sex was
publicly questioned and she seems to have intentionally maintained an
ambiguous gender identity, straddling male and female. She was often
referred to in the local press as a woman in male attire, but the newspa-
per also maintained the mystery by continuing to question whether she
was male or female.78
There is no evidence that Garland passed as a man to enable him to
maintain sexual or romantic relationships with women. His biographer,
Louis Sullivan, claims Garland was a true FTM, who embraced a mas-
77. Jack Bee Garland's story is taken exclusively from SULLIVAN, supra note 63.
78. Id. at 31 (quoting from the local newspaper that "[tihe mystery is still unsolved as to
whether 'Babe' Bean is a boy or girl, a man or a woman").
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culine identity "in order to be a man among men."' 9 Sullivan quotes from
Garland's memoirs:
Many have thought it strange that I do not care to mingle with
women of my own age, and seem partial to men's company. Well, is
it not natural that I should prefer the companionship of men? I am
never happy nor contented unless with a few of "the boys." They talk
and act naturally-without the conceit or affectations so often prac-
ticed in the drawing-rooms. Could women see men as I have, they
would love them all.8°
Dorothy Lucille Tipton was born female in 1914.81 In the early
1930s, she began the transformation process which established her new
identity as Billy Tipton, jazz musician. Billy died in 1989 at the age of
74. His three adopted sons and several of his five wives expressed as-
tonishment at the revelation of Tipton' s biological sex after death. Tipton
never had surgery or hormone treatment, but nonetheless passed as a
male for over forty years, a feat all the more remarkable given his life-
time of travelling in close quarters with other musicians. He bound his
chest, used a prosthesis, and claimed his privacy as protection against
discovery. His mother stayed in touch with him until her death in 1971,
but never revealed Tipton's gender to his wives or children. Because
Tipton left us no personal insight into his choices, we are left to guess the
reasons. Some surmise that the explanation lies in the fact that maleness
was a prerequisite for the vocation that Billy chose, jazz musician. At the
same time, Billy rejected jobs that would have led to greater renown in
the music world, apparently concerned that too much fame would subject
him to the risk of being discovered female. Late in life, when he needed
medical care, which he also rejected for fear of discovery, he explained
to visiting cousins that he could not be truthful about his sex because
transsexualism and cross-dressing were against the law and he feared
arrest. Billy Tipton lived in constant fear of being "found out." He con-
fided to his cousin Madeline, " Some people might think I'm a freak or a
hermaphrodite. I'm not. I'm a normal person. This has been my
choice.""2
Unlike Jack Bee Garland, Billy Tipton had sexual relationships with
women, several of whom he "married." Although Billy's first involve-
ment was with a woman whom many labeled lesbian, Billy's lifetime
choice to live as a man did not seem to be motivated primarily by a de-
sire to be sexually involved with women. In fact, according to his last
wife, Kitty, she and Billy had no intimate sexual relationship. Nonethe-
79. Id. at 4.
80. Id.
81. A recently published full-length biography of Billy Tipton tells the full story of this
remarkable life. See DIANE WOOD MIDDLEBROOK, SUITS ME: THE DOUBLE LIFE OF BILLY TIPrON
(1998).
82. Id. at 278.
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less they were married for 18 years. They finally divorced over problems
they had in raising their three adopted sons. After a major argument,
Billy took the side of the children against his wife, and moved out of the
family home with his sons.83 Playing husband and father were central
aspects of Billy's overall identity as male. The roles do not appear to be a
cover for a lesbian relationship.
By contrast, many passing women live as men in large part to en-
able pursuit of romantic or sexual relationships with other women. Al-
berta Lucille Hart appears to have been such a woman. Her story is re-
ported in some detail by a Portland, Oregon psychiatrist whom she con-
sulted in 1918." The story includes a number of incidents of deep emo-
tional attachments to other females as she was growing up, coupled with
fairly explicit "daydreams" about being with these women as a husband
or boyfriend. She was an intelligent and industrious student, who went to
Stanford medical school and became a doctor. The psychiatrist diagnosed
her as homosexual, and for a while engaged in treatments (e.g., hypnosis)
aimed at correcting that "problem." The patient, however, became con-
cerned that any such treatment might diminish her masculine identity.
"She had an utter loathing of the female type of mind."85
The patient's solution was to ask for her doctor's assistance in ena-
bling her to live as a man, which was in conformity with her true nature.
The doctor appears to have required more than psychological evidence of
masculinity before agreeing to this proposal. He physically examined her
and found "deviations sufficiently marked to attract attention."' He noted
an enlarged clitoris, but gave no details. He also found that her breasts
and hips were clearly female, but smaller than normal. Hart requested
surgical removal of her uterus, in part to help her pass as male since
menstruation was occurring. A hysterectomy was performed, she cut her
hair, and assumed a male identity. She married a woman and practiced
her profession, medicine, in a neighboring state. The psychiatrist con-
cluded in his notes of the case:
If society will but let her alone, she will fill her niche in the
world and leave it better for her bravery in meeting the issue on the
merits of the case as best she knew. Instead of criticism and hound-
ing, she needs and deserves the respect and sympathy of society,
which is responsible for her existence as she is.1
7
If being transsexual means desiring surgery to help one's gender
identity more readily conform to one's body, then Hart should qualify.
83. Id. at 252-59.
84. Alberta Lucille Hart's story is taken exclusively from Allen J. Gilbert, Homosexuality and
its Treatment, 52 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DIsEASE 297 (1920), reprinted in KArZ, supra note 63, at
258.
85. Id. at 275.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 277.
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The requested surgery, a hysterectomy, was requested for purposes of
enabling her body to conform to her own idea of herself as male. But
Hart also requested the surgery to assure that she would not have chil-
dren. Somewhere along the line, someone had convinced her that her
relations with women were deviant and she seems to have thought this
judgment meant she should not have children. Whether Hart would have
been a transsexual man or a butch lesbian in today's culture is unclear,
but she was clearly differently gendered in her own time. Her psychiatrist
seems to have been won over by her strength of character and will. Liv-
ing as a man was her choice and it seemed the best solution, given her
determination to practice medicine and to be intimate with women.
B. Modem Stories
The stories that follow are stories told by FTMs in their own words,
either in autobiographies, or in articles, or as reported by social scientists
who have interviewed subjects. I have grouped the stories according to
some common themes that emerge.
1. "I am biologically male."
In the 1950s transsexualism gained its first modem hero in the form
of Christine Jorgensen, a man who became a woman.88 Others followed
and their autobiographies engaged audiences around the world. Jan Mor-
ris, who was professional writer, wrote her own autobiography when she
became a woman. 9 The story of Ren6e Richards,' a male to female who
gained fame from her legal battle to play women's tennis, is probably
familiar to many Americans, especially since the story was made into a
made-for-TV movie, Second Serve." Autobiographies by FTMs are less
well known and less common.
a. The Story of Mario Martino
The earliest first person full-length autobiography appears to be that
of Mario Martino, published in 1977 under the title Emergence." The
autobiography contains no specific dates, but from the story I conclude
that Mario, who grew up as Marie, was probably reaching puberty at
about the time the Jorgensen story broke in 1953. That would make
Mario about 55 years old if he is alive today.
88. See CHRISTINE JORGENSEN, CHRISTINE JORGENSEN REVEALS (J Records 1953) (sound
recording); see also CHRISTINE JORGENSEN, CHRISTINE JORGENSEN: A PERSONAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1968).
89. JAN MORRIS, CONUNDRUM (1974).
90. REN E RICHARDS, SECOND SERVE: THE RENIE RICHARDS STORY (1983).
91. SECOND SERVE (Lorimar-Telepictures 1986).
92. MARIO MARTINO WITH HARRIETr, EMERGENCE: A TRANSSEXUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1977). Mario's story is taken exclusively from this source.
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Marie was raised Catholic in an Italian-American family. She went
to a convent school where she fell in love with and had some minor
physical relationships with other girls-which of course were discovered
by the nuns and for which she was often expelled. She trained to be a
nurse at a Catholic hospital and, as a novitiate, was known as Sister Mary
Dominick. She left the convent at age 25, but continued her nursing ca-
reer and her relationships with women. She had never been with a man.
Marie claimed that she didn't know until age nine that she wasn't a
boy. Shortly after she left the convent she and some friends at the hospi-
tal were running urine tests on themselves to check hormone levels.
Marie's test was consistent with the hormones of a seventeen-year-old
boy. She was elated. Her sense of herself as male had been confirmed by
physical evidence.
She writes in the preface to her book:
My life was a series of distorted mirrors. I saw myself in their crazy
reflections false to the image I had of myself. I was a boy! I felt like one,
I dressed like one, I fought like one. Later, I was to love like one.
Unless you have actually experienced transsexualism, you cannot
conceive of the trauma of being cast in the wrong body. It is the impris-
onment of body and of soul...."
The most important event in her life as Marie (other than the dis-
covery that her urine test could have been mistaken for a male's) was her
relationship with Becky. While Becky maintained initial reservations
against Marie's decision to become Mario, they overcame these difficul-
ties. Becky, also a nurse, attended Mario during his recuperation. The
most important event in Mario's life was his marriage to Becky.
The marriage was not an easy event to plan. They wanted to be mar-
ried in the Church by a priest and they found one who was supportive.
Mario's birth certificate had been changed to male and his nursing li-
cense had been changed as well. But now he had to deal with his home-
town priest in order to acquire his baptismal certificate. Here the trouble
began. The hometown priest refused to cooperate, the supportive priest
could not be available at a later date, and the new priest who initially
agreed to do the marriage did not know Mario's story. When a co-worker
called the new priest and explained Mario's situation, the new priest
telephoned Mario, called him a "despicable thing" who submitted to sur-
gery for "immoral purposes," and cancelled the wedding ceremony.'
With the help of friends, a Methodist minister agreed to substitute. Mario
says of himself now: "Legally male, a happily married husband, I ask
only to be accepted now as an average man.""
93. Id. at xi-xii.
94. Id. at 227.
95. Id. at xi.
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Marie's life was filled with disasters and, once she was in transition,
her status as an outcast brought even more disasters. Even though he was
a good nurse, Mario was ostracized by the other nurses as he was going
through the process of becoming Mario. Mario's co-workers had a harder
time dealing with the transition period than with the final outcome. They
could not deal with that "in between" stage of his being part male and
part female. And yet, for Mario, that had been the problem all along:
being part male and part female. The transition made Mario whole,
bringing his maleness to the fore.
b. The Story of Lynn Edward Harris
Lynn Edward Harris was born in California with combined male
and female sex characteristics.' At birth, the genitalia appeared ambigu-
ous, causing her parents and doctor to arbitrarily designate her as female.
Outward manifestations of male characteristics, including the develop-
ment of a budding penis at age five, a lowering of the voice between ages
eleven and thirteen, and the need to shave daily by age fifteen, as well as
internal questions of gender identity prompted Lynn to seek answers
from the medical profession-but a doctor failed to even acknowledge
her questions. Her mother refused to recognize the problem and insisted
it was all mental. At age twenty-three, Lynn checked herself into a hos-
pital for analysis and the congenital anomaly was discovered. Because
she had been raised as a woman, Lynn continued to adopt female attire-
but it never felt right to her. At the same time, she had no interest in go-
ing through surgery to change her body.
Finally, a friend suggested that she simply embrace a male identity.
To do so, she began dressing as a man and stopped shaving. Then she
requested a legal name change, changing her middle name to the male
name "Edward." She also requested a new birth certificate that would
show her sex as male. Harris made these requests in a court petition,
fully aware of the California statute that required her to undergo surgical
treatment before a new birth certificate would be issued indicating a new
sex.9" The California statute did not contemplate, as some other states do,
that the sex may have been designated incorrectly at birth.98
96. Lynn Edward Harris's story is taken exclusively from Lynn Edward Harris, A Legal Path
of Androgyny, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 58, at 495.
97. California's Health and Safety Code states:
Whenever a person born in this state has undergone surgical treatment for the purpose of
altering his or her sexual characteristics to those of the opposite sex, a new birth
certificate may be prepared for the person reflecting the change of gender and any change
of name accomplished by an order of a court of this state ....
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 1996).
98. For example, Hawaii expressly addresses the problem of incorrect designation by allowing
a change in sex designation on a birth certificate if:
(4) Upon receipt of an affidavit of a physician that the physician has examined the birth
registrant and has determined the following:
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Harris argued before the court that her sex was male and that the
birth certificate was a fraud. She/he requested a legal remedy for the
"ambiguity, lack of continuity and presumed fraudulence associated with
my present gender status. '"" The petition was granted although it is un-
clear from Harris's account whether the judge ruled only on the name
change or both the name change and sex change.
At any rate, presuming that he now had the power of the court deci-
sion on his side, Harris wrote to the Department of Vital Statistics, re-
questing a new birth certificate. The Department of Vital Statistics sent
back a "new" certificate with the "new" name, but the sex indicated on
the certificate remained female. When Harris complained, the Depart-
ment sent a copy of the California statute. Harris countered with the ar-
gument that the statute only applied in cases where a person changed
from one sex to the opposite sex and since he was both male and female
he could not identify what "opposite sex" could mean in his case. Thus,
the statute simply did not apply to him. Furthermore, there was no gen-
eral requirement that one go through surgery in order to correct the sex
on a birth certificate. Finally the Department relented and issued a new
certificate indicating that his sex was male.
Harris describes his legal victory as follows:
Justice was done. To win as I did, having both the facts and the
law on my side, was an ultimate victory .... The court in its wisdom
had profoundly empowered and enabled me to actualize my potential
and destiny with authenticity as I, a true hermaphrodite, am living life
and perceiving it.'&°
It is easy to understand the sense of victory in having one's claimed
identity recognized by a court without having to jump through the sur-
gery hoop required by the statute. But one can only ask: How much of a
victory is it and how authentic is it to live within the category "male" if
one is really both male and female?
c. Other Stories
Holly Devor's recent study of FTMs uncovered some cases of indi-
viduals who had been designated female, but who, when surgery was
finally performed, turned out to have some male characteristics in their
reproductive systems."' Devor questions whether it is appropriate to call
(A) The birth registrant's sex designation was entered incorrectly on the birth
registrant's birth certificate; or
(B) The birth registrant has had a sex change operation and the sex designation on
the birth registrant's birth certificate is no longer correct; provided that the director of
health may further investigate and require additional information that the director deems
necessary....
HAW. REv. STAT. § 338-17.7(a)(4)(A), (B) (1993).
99. Harris, supra note 96, at 499.
100. Id. at 502.
101. See DEVOR, supra note 59, at 405.
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these persons FTMs or whether they belong in a different sex/gender
category altogether.
0 2
Aaron, one of her subjects, calls his sex ambiguous, and says of
FTMs: "How can they stop being female if they never been? They can
stop looking female. They can stop acting female .... But they can't
stop being something they've never been."'' 3 Peter, another of her sub-
jects, also denies ever having been female:
I don't think that I ever thought that I truly was [female] but, at some
point in time, I said you're not even going to get to call me this....
I'm getting to the point where I hate the word "transsexual." It's a la-
bel, and I don't like it. I also don't like "F-to-M." It implies that there
really was something else that I don't really feel .... 04
2. "I am a man, not a lesbian."
Many FTMs have lived some part of their lives as lesbians, even
embracing the label lesbian. Since FTMs are usually attracted to women,
they have much in common with lesbians and find lesbian communities
offer some solace and opportunity to be who they are. Nonetheless,
FTMs maintain their differences from lesbians, sometimes to the verge
of appearing homophobic.
At a meeting of FTM International, 0 5 a member explains how he
chose to tell his father about his transition: "I told him, 'The good news
is, I'm not a lesbian. ' t 6
Other accounts echo this sense of difference.
When I got involved with gay women and found out how frigging
different I was it was obvious. Up until that point I thought that other
gay females were the same as me, they wanted to be male. And when
I found out that was not true that no matter how masculine they acted,
they had female identities, I realized I didn't quite fit in here, but I fit
in closer here than I ever had.'07
I knew about lesbians but it just didn't occur to me that's what it
was.... What I knew about lesbians was that two women can be to-
gether and it's okay if they are lesbian. . .. It was something they did
on the coast in the big cities, more liberal people did. I just didn't
consider myself that liberal, that open minded .... To get into being
102. Id.
103. Id. at 449 (statement of Aaron).
104. Id. at 448 (first and second alterations in original) (statement of Peter).
105. FIM International is a San-Francisco based education and support group. The group
includes around a thousand members who range from FrMs who are only taking hormones to those
who have completely transitioned with the help of surgery. See FrM International Homepage
(visited Nov. 21, 1998) <http://www.ftm-intl.org>.
106. David Tuller, A Self-Made Man, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21, 1997, at Z1.
107. GENDER BLENDING, supra note 58, at 96 (statement of Aaron).
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a lesbian, like, you have to march for things and you gotta go to cau-
cuses, you gotta hate men, you gotta dress butch, and you gotta get in
to all that stuff, and I didn't want to do that. I didn't want to get into
all that stuff."8
James Green, a fully transitioned FTM and president of F1TM Inter-
national, describes his relationship with the lesbian community during
the time he was still a woman: "I was excluded from lesbian events even
before I started the transition. I was just too male-not butch but male. I
crossed some line somehow, and everyone, the other women, felt that
there were things about me, despite my female body, that were just not
female. , ,lca
Another transitioned FTM says:
I thought, Well, maybe I'm a lesbian. Could be-I know I'm attracted
to women. I went to consciousness-raising meetings, and I'd listen
and feel like a fraud. One girl said, "What makes each of us feel like a
real woman?" And while they went around the room answering, I
thought, Nothing-absolutely nothing on earth makes me feel like a
woman.
I'm just a plain old heterosexual man.... I'm not a professional
transsexual. I don't think of myself as a transsexual anymore. I was
one, I made that transition, now I'm just a man.''°
Tony Barreto-Neto stated: "People may have seen me as a lesbian,
but, in my mind, I was a straight, heterosexual man.""'
In a letter to Dr. Lothstein, Barbara L. writes:
I was asked to leave college because they thought I was gay. I
never even became involved with anyone, but because I was attracted
to women, they believed I was. I know I am not a latent homosexual
or a transvestite, but a transsexual. I feel male and I am."
2
In his autobiography, Emergence, Mario Martino tells of his rela-
tionship with Becky, pre-transition, when Mario was Marie. Love be-
tween two women was initially difficult for Becky, probably in large part
due to her Catholic upbringing. Although Marie insists that she always
thought of herself as male, this claim became stronger in response to
Becky's misgivings about lesbianism. Marie says to Becky: "[Y]ou and I
are not lesbians. We relate as man to woman, woman to man.""3 Then
108. Id. at 95 (alterations in original) (statement of Stan).
109. Amy Bloom, The Body Lies, NEW YORKER, July 18, 1994, at 41.
110. Id. at 49 (quoting "Michael," a transitioned FTM).
111. Paulo Lima, Cop Beats Sex-Change Backlash, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 20, 1996, at I (reporting
on Tony Barreto-Neto, a fully transitioned FIM who is a sheriffs deputy in Hillsborough County,
Florida).
112. LOTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 1.
113. Id. at 132.
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Marie further rationalizes: "Any resemblance to lesbianism on our part
was due to my lack of the proper organs. Never did I use my vagina
during lovemaking-always I attached and wore my false penis.""'
The rejection of the lesbian label can be explained in several differ-
ent ways. It would not, for example, be in the least surprising to discover
that society's homophobic attitudes have permeated even the lives of the
differently gendered. In addition, for any female who is male identified
and desirous of either hormone treatment or surgery, rejection of homo-
sexual identity is necessary. The clinics and professionals that act as
gatekeepers to the availability of medical treatment have clearly con-
structed case profiles which applicants are expected to fit."' Several
scholars, most recently Bernice Hausmann in her controversial book,
Changing Sex, have argued that transsexuals know more about the medi-
cal condition known as Gender Identity Disorder than most doctors."'
Transsexuals"' must convince their doctors that they are entitled to such
surgery."' Doctors determine suitability based on psychological testing
and interviews. Transsexuals who wish to qualify for surgery learn how
to tell their stories so that they will fit the requisite profiles."9
From my reading of the literature, the insistent rejection of homo-
sexual desires and the distancing of one's self from gay identity appears
more prevalent in the MTF population than in the FTM population.
There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. Many
FTMs identify as male or transgendered without ever having surgery.
Hormone therapy may be sufficient. If this is true, then the FTM popula-
tion is less dependent on the medical profession and less likely to medi-
ate their stories with an eye toward claiming the right to surgery.
Nonetheless, stories abound from FTMs who distance themselves
after transition from their previous lesbian identities. Yet, this is not al-
114. Id. at 134.
115. See BENJAMIN STANDARDS §§ 4.1.1-4.11.1, 5.1-5.2.4, reprinted in GENDER BLENDING,
supra note 58, at 505-20; see also Rubin, supra note 54, at 476 (arguing that, especially in the past,
transsexuals "had to be able to persuade a number of professions that they were determined to be
completely 'normal' members of the target sex").
116. See, e.g., HAtSMAN, supra note 57, at 110-40 (discussing the role of transsexuals in the
diagnosis of gender identity disorders and arguing that the role of the doctor is essentially
mechanical in nature).
117. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines transsexualism as:
The essential features of this disorder are a persistent discomfort and sense of
inappropriateness about one's assigned sex in a person who has reached puberty. In
addition, there is persistent preoccupation, for at least two years, with getting rid of one's
primary and secondary sex characteristics and acquiring the sex characteristics of the
other sex .... Invariably there is the will to live as a member of the other sex.
Id. at 2 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 74 (3d ed. 1987)).
118. Id. at 143.
119. Id.
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ways the case. Bruce, one of the subjects in Holly Devor's study, retains
a strong attachment to his previous lesbian identity:
I'm a lesbian man.... I'm very committed to the lesbian movement.
I'm very committed to women. And to their struggle in this life. I just
happened to be born with tits .... But I can't have tits .... I never
used to look in the mirror. Now I shave every day.... I would like to
be able to not have to be a man. I would like to be able to be a lesbian
without tits. But I can't. °20
3. "People think I am male and it is dangerous for me if they find
out I am female."
a. Brandon Teena
Brandon Teena, born female but passing as a male, made quite a hit
with a number of females.'2 ' Once discovered to be a she by her lovers,
Brandon represented to her lovers that she was a pre-op transsexual and
that she would have surgery as soon as she could afford it. Some of these
lovers still refuse to admit that Brandon was female. After moving from
Lincoln, Nebraska to a smaller, less tolerant town in Nebraska, Brandon
started a relationship with another young female. The people in the town
thought Brandon was male. When her anatomical sex was discovered by
two males she had hung out with, their response was to rape and beat her.
Within a week Brandon was dead and the two males arrested for murder.
Brandon's story has struck a strong chord with the transgendered
community, especially with young FTMs who identify with Brandon's
attempt to pass as male. Brandon had fought for inclusion in the local
community as male. The fact that he was murdered by two males, mem-
bers of the gender group he wished to join, strikes some as a particularly
unsettling betrayal. Also, it is unclear whether Brandon's female anat-
omy would have been discovered had he not been arrested by the local
police, who, once they had discovered his anatomical gender, "outed"
him to members of the local community.' Thus, there is also a betrayal
by public servants who are entrusted with protecting the vulnerable from
harm. Transgender activists have rallied for an investigation into the re-
sponsibility of the local police in contributing to Brandon's murder and
for possible infringements of his civil rights.'
120. DEVOR, supra note 59, at 448 (statement of Bruce).
121. For a thorough account of the story of Brandon Teena, see Roger Worthington, Deadly
Deception: Teena Brandon's Double LUfe May Have Led to a Triple Murder, CH. TRIB., Jan. 17,
1994, Tempo, at 1.
122. Davina Anne Gabriel, Background of the Murder of Brandon Teena (visited Oct. 12,
1998) <http://www.ftm-intl.org/ftmNews/Bran/bran.bkgr.html>. A documentary film based on
Brandon's story won the Teddy for best documentary at the 1998 Berlin Film Festival. THE
BRANDON TEENA STORY (Bless-Bless Prods. 1998) (Susan Muska & Greta Olafsdottir, filmmakers).
123. Gabriel, supra note 122.
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b. Leslie Feinberg"
When I say I am a gender outlaw in modem society, it's not rheto-
ric. I have been dragged out of bars by police who claimed I broke the
law when I dressed myself that evening. I've heard the rap of a cop's
club on the stall door when I've used a public women's toilet. And
then there's the question of my identity papers.
My driver's license reads Male. The application form only offered
me two choices: M or F. In this society, where women are assumed to
be feminine and men are assumed to be masculine, my sex and gen-
der expression appear to be at odds. But the very fact that I could be
issued a license as a male demonstrates that many strangers "read
me" as a man, rather than a masculine woman.
In almost thirty years of driving I've heard the whine of police si-
rens behind my car on only three occasions. But each time, a trooper
sauntered up to my car window and demanded, "Your license and
registration-sir." Imagine the nightmare I'd face if I handed the
trooper a license that says I am female. The alleged traffic infraction
should be the issue, not my genitals. I shouldn't have to prove my sex
to any police officer who has stopped me for a moving violation, and
my body should not be the focus of investigation. But in order to
avoid these dangers, I broke the law when I filled out my driver's li-
cense application. As a result, I could face a fine, a suspension of my
license, and up to six months in jail merely for having put an M in the
box marked sex.
And then there's the problem of my passport. I don't feel safe
traveling with a passport that reads Female. However, if I apply for a
passport as Male, I am subject to... felony charges."l
4. "I am a third sex."
Many transsexuals want more than anything to pass in the role of
the opposite sex. If they identify as transsexual at all, they do so pre-op
or during transition. However, with the growth of the transgender move-
ment, more individuals are embracing their transsexual or transgender
identities.'26
FTM and MTF transsexuals often embrace both their maleness and
femaleness and express a longing to be identified as both, rather than
124. LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC TO
RUPAUL 61 (1996). The following section excerpts a portion of Feinberg's book.
125. Anyone who knowingly makes a false statement in an application for a passport violates
federal law and is subject to a fine, imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996).
126. In a recent survey, admittedly skewed towards people who are more likely to be open
about their transsexuality, over half of the respondents self-identified as transsexual and over ten
percent identified as transgenders. See Dallas Denny & Jan Roberts, Results of a Questionnaire on
the Stanards of Care of the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, in
GENDER BLENDING, supra note 58, at 326, 327 tbl. 1.
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either/or.'27 Kate Bornstein, by contrast, an MTF, expresses a desire to be
neither as opposed to one or the other: "I know I'm not a man-about
that much I'm very clear, and I've come to the conclusion that I'm
probably not a woman either ... ""
Many of the FTMs in Holly Devor's study express dual identities
that embrace both femaleness and maleness.'29 Bruce, for example, says:
"So I feel like I'm a third gender.""'3 He hopes for the day when it will be
okay to have both male and female identities in the same person. But for
now, "I have to be a transsexual man because there is no place for me as
a third gender."'3 '
Thirty-three percent of the FTMs in Devor's study said that they
believed transsexual people went through a stage of being both male and
female.' Many of them said that they retained some of the feminine part
of themselves even after they had transitioned.'33 But the transition proc-
ess is a slow one, not something that occurs overnight. And it is in this
slow transition that transsexuals learn how to be both male and female.
Bill, for example, says: "One can be both a man and a woman. I think
most transsexuals experience this state in some part of transition .... I
think it is accomplished through an acceptance of ambiguity, or role
flexibility.... I have been and still am both."'"M
And Bruce, another Devor FTM, says:
I've been growing into becoming a man. I didn't just all of a sudden
decide to be one .... There's a whole personality change that takes
place. There's a bonding that takes place with men .....
... An F to M stops being a woman when they deny who they
are. See, I think the reality is, you are bom physically a woman. You
come into the world as a woman .. .and I think that you need to
come to terms with that part of you, and then move on .... I don't
think I'll ever stop being a woman."'
127. For a discussion of this point, see PAT CALIFtA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLITICS OF
TRANSGENDERISM, at ch. 8 (1997).
128. KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF Us 8 (1994);
see also CALIFIA, supra note 127, at 245-77.
129. See DEVOR, supra note 59, at 447-58.
130. Id. at 448 (statement of Bruce).
131. Id.
132. Id. at456.
133. Id. at 457 ("I have been and still am both.... [But] I am only comfortable with myself as
having female components since I have fully lived and expressed myself as a male .... (alterations
in original) (statement of Bill)).
134. Id. at 457 (statement of Bill).
135. Id. at 457 (first, second, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (statement of Bruce).
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V. SOME OBSERVATIONS
There is no single identifiable meta-narrative for persons who iden-
tify as FTMs. Nor do all aspects of the alleged meta-FTM narrative con-
structed by medical professionals apply only to FTMs. Butch lesbians
share childhood experiences that are similar to FTMs. Butch lesbians
identify with male heroes, embrace athletics, and are active tomboys.
Butch lesbians may pass as men, not on a permanent basis, but for eco-
nomic or safety reasons.'36 Butch lesbians are female, even though they
may temporarily embrace masculine identities or attributes.
Some FTMs, even after hormones and therapy, embrace the female
part of themselves. Those that do not, remain cognizant of the female-
ness of their bodies. A female who has become a male may still retain
female sexual organs.'37 Furthermore, although many FTMs elect "top"
surgery, very few elect "bottom" or genital reconstructive surgery.
Probably more frequently than MTFs, FTMs live with bodies that exhibit
some maleness and some femaleness.
The laws of each state vary regarding legal change of sex on birth
certificates.' In many states, however, the sex on one's driver's license
is determined by the applicant's self-identification. Thus it is possible for
the same person to be identified as female on one document and male on
another.
In order to obtain sex reassignment surgery, the Benjamin Standards
require that the applicant live successfully in the role of the desired sex
for at least one year.'39 Thus, the medical profession requires anatomical
females to pass as males before their bodies can be surgically altered to
fit their male identities. During this period of transition, transsexuals live
in an "in-between state" that is part male and part female.
After transition, some FTMs continue to embrace their prior female
identities. Some FTMs identify as transsexual, which means that they
acknowledge their prior lives as females. Even though able to pass suc-
cessfully as men, these people are unwilling to forsake the reality of their
lives as women. The integrity of such self-identification and the respon-
136. See KATH WESTON, RENDER ME, GENDER ME: LESBIANS TALK SEX, CLASS, COLOR,
NATION, STUDMUFFINS... 80-81 (1996) (essay based upon an interview with Jeanne Riley).
137. See, e.g., DEVOR, supra note 59, at 472 (statement of Ken).
138. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 1996) (requiring petition to
superior court for issuance of a new birth certificate after surgical sex change), with N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 130A- 118 (1997) (requiring written request to State Registrar accompanied by notarized
statement of physician that individual underwent sex reassignment surgery), with N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 4138 (McKinney 1985) (not addressing sex change as a basis for birth certificate alteration),
with TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203 (1996) (expressly denying amendments to birth certificates
because of sex change surgery).
139. BENJAMIN STANDARDS § 4.9.1 Standard 9, reprinted in GENDER BLENDING, supra note
58, at 515 ("Genital sex reassignment shall be preceded by a period of at least twelve months during
which time the patient lives full-time in the social role of the genetically other sex.").
[Vol. 75:41352
TRANSSEXUALS & ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
sibility for a continuous sense of self in the world are values worth pro-
tecting, both for the individual and for the society with which the indi-
vidual interacts. The only way to become one sex is to deny the reality of
the prior life.
These observations are intended to emphasize that it is difficult and,
perhaps, undesirable for transsexuals to become one sex by eliminating
all traces of the other sex. Also, they are intended to call into question the
bipolarization of sex and gender identity, which requires that we view a
single individual as belonging for all time at one bipolar extreme to the
exclusion of the other.
VI. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS: DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX
A. Current Status: Legal Protections in the Workplace for Transsexuals
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of
sex." State laws modeled on Title VII contain similar prohibitions."'
None of these laws specifically include or exclude transsexuals.' 2 Mu-
nicipal laws add additional protections against workplace discrimination.
Some of these laws include discrimination against transsexuals, either
under court interpretations of the word "sex"'' 3 or because they have been
amended to include transsexuals as a protected class.'"
140. In addressing employer practices, Title VII states:
-It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
141. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.22. (Michie 1996); ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463
(West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303
(1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.030 (1989).
142. But note that Minnesota's Human Rights law, adding sexual orientation as a protected
category, specifically included protection for transsexuals as well. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01 (1996)
(defining "sexual orientation" to include "having or being perceived as having a self-image or
identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness"). It is unique in
that regard. See also Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 Wt 737215, at *8-*9
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (holding that New York State human rights law prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sex includes discrimination against transsexuals).
143. See, e.g., Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding
that a FIM transsexual fell within the protections of New York City's regulatory prohibitions
against discrimination based on sex).
144. See, e.g., IOWA CrTY, IOWA, REV. ORDINANCES 95-3697 (outlawing discrimination on the
basis of "gender identity" which is defined as "a person's various individual attributes as they are
understood to be masculine and/or feminine").
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Early litigation by transsexuals claiming protection under Title VII
resulted in a series of court holdings in which the term "sex" was inter-
preted to exclude transsexuals. Some courts reasoned that the word "sex"
includes male and female, but not transsexuals who were both.' 5 Others
reasoned that employers who discriminated against transsexuals were
discriminating not because of the plaintiffs sex, but because of the
plaintiffs decision to change sex.'" Still another held more simply that
discrimination against someone who was a transsexual simply did not
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex, but rather on the basis of
transsexualism.
14 7
Every court that has considered whether Title VII should cover dis-
crimination against a transsexual qua transsexual has decided the issue
against such an interpretation of the statute.' 8 One recent case, however,
indicates that transsexuals are not completely omitted from Title VII. In
Miles v. New York University,' 9 the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment
by a male professor, claiming that he harassed her because she was a
woman.' The court held that the plaintiff's claim could not be dismissed
on the basis that she was a transsexual, rather than a biological, female.'5'
One wonders, however, whether an alternative defense, "I sexually har-
assed her because transsexuals turn me on," would survive a motion to
dismiss quite as readily. Since all courts have agreed that discrimination
against transsexuals qua transsexuals is not covered, it is only a short
step away to find that harassment against transsexuals qua transsexuals is
similarly not covered.
In sum, there is virtually no protection under Title VII for transsexu-
als who transition on the job, or for transsexuals who fail to pass after
transition, or for transsexuals who identify as transgendered rather than
as male or female.
145. See, e.g., Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 473-74 (Iowa 1983).
146. See, e.g., Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 975 WL 302, at *4
(D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975).
147. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
148. See Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 W 737215, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 24, 1996) ("Every federal court that has considered the question has rejected the application of
[Title VII] to a transsexual claiming employment discrimination."). But note that the federal district
court in Ulane did rule in favor of the transsexual plaintiff. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581
F. Supp. 821, 839-40 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
149. 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
150. Miles, 979 F. Supp. at 249. The case was brought under Title IX, which prevents
discrimination "on the basis of sex" in the context of educational programs or activities that receive
federal financial assistance. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). However, the court noted that the Title
IX "on the basis of sex" term should be interpreted in the same way as similar language in Title VII.
See Miles, 979 F. Supp. at 250 n.4.
151. Id. at 249-50. As stated by the court: "There is no conceivable reason why such conduct
should be rewarded with legal pardon just because, unbeknownst to [the professor] ... plaintiff was
not a biological female." Id. at 249.
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B. Critique of Current Title VII Doctrine
The refusal of federal courts to extend Title VII's protection to trans-
sexuals is unduly restrictive. One early decision by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit continues to be cited as controlling or persuasive by
other courts. In Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,"2 the court refused
to allow a MTF transsexual who transitioned on the job and was then
fired to bring a Title VII claim for sex discrimination.' 3 The court rea-
soned that a "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction required
that the term "sex" be given its traditional meaning.' As further evi-
dence that Congress intended only the traditional meaning of "sex," the
court noted that attempts to amend Title VII to include "sexual orienta-
tion" discrimination had failed.' Applying a "plain meaning" analysis,
the court reasoned that Title VII's "prohibition against sex discrimination
in employment is to ensure that men and women are treated equally, ab-
sent a bona fide relationship between the qualifications for the job and
the person's sex."'56 In this one sentence, the court declared, without seri-
ous question, that there can only be two sexes-male and female.
1. There Are More Than Two Sexes
If Title VII must be read to protect only on the basis of biological
sex, then courts must recognize that there are more than two sexes. As
Professor Anne Fausto-Sterling has argued, according to current scien-
tific knowledge, there are at least five, and perhaps more, sexes.' 7 These
include male, female, and three types of intersexed persons-so-called
152. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
153. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
154. Id. at 662.
155. Id. at 662 n.6 (citing nine bills from 1975-77 which sought to add Title VII protection
based upon sexual orientation, all of which were defeated). Holloway was decided in 1977. At that
time, perhaps, judges were not familiar with the delineation between transsexualism and sexual
orientation. The need to add "sexual orientation" to Title VII's list of protected classes to effectuate
protection of homosexuals was necessary because courts had held that "sex discrimination" did not
include discrimination against homosexuals. See Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp.
1068, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Although scholars have argued that homophobia and sexism are closely
linked, courts have remained unwilling to expand the meaning of "sex" to include "sexual
orientation." See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Title
Vi's prohibition of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and
should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality." (quoting
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979))). The argument that "sex
discrimination" includes discrimination against transsexuals is a totally separate argument from the
argument regarding sexual orientation. Nonetheless, the Holloway court dismissed the argument in
less than a paragraph. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
156. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
157. See generally Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not
Enough, SCIENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20-24. But see JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY
AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO COUNSELING CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS, AND THEIR
FAMILIES 6 (1994) (arguing that it does not "make sense to talk of a third sex, or of a fourth or fifth,
when the phylogenetic scheme of things is two sexes. Those who are genitally neither male nor
female but incomplete are not a third sex. They are a mixed sex or an in-between sex.").
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true hermaphrodites (herms), male pseudohermaphrodites (merms), and
female pseudohermaphrodites (ferms).155 According to John Money, as
many as four percent of all births may produce some variety of these
intersexed persons.'" Although most such newborns are assigned a sex
that is either male or female and are medically treated to help their bod-
ies conform to the assigned sex, their natural biological sex is mixed.
Sex reassignment surgery has also worked to create more than two
sexes. The biological male who undergoes surgery to become a woman
usually has a vaginoplasty. If physical appearance of genitalia were to
define femaleness, then post-op MTF transsexuals would typically qual-
ify as female. Since FTMs often forego phalloplasties, it is more difficult
to classify them as male on the basis of physical appearance of genitalia.
But to classify them as female would deny their reality. As opposed to
the situation in the past, when most transsexuals were committed to rela-
tively complete sex changes, an increased number of individuals, both
MTF and FTM, elect medical intervention involving less than a complete
change." Such persons go through life with bodies that we might de-
scribe as "intermediate," somewhere between male and female. '6
Every person has a sex. Title VII protects on the basis of sex and is
intended to protect every person, regardless of what the person's sex is.
Such an interpretation of Title VII is consistent with our liberal interpre-
tation of anti-discrimination law. 2 Title VII ought to protect discrimina-
tion against transsexuals not only in cases where they can prove that dis-
crimination occurred because they were perceived to be either male or
female, but also in cases in which the employer claims that discrimina-
tion occurred because the employee failed to fit within the neat binary
classification of male or female.
2. "Sex" Should Be Interpreted to Include Gender Expression
Although there is virtually no legislative history regarding the
meaning of "sex" when it was added to Title VII, it must have meant
more than biological sex. The image that senators had in mind when they
discussed the addition of sex was that it would require employers to hire
women with feminine roles and identities (e.g., wives and mothers tradi-
158. Fausto-Sterling, supra note 157, at 21.
159. Id.
160. See Rubin, supra note 54, at 476. This phenomenon, in part, is due to changing attitudes
and practices within the medical community. See id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983) ("To effectuate its
purpose of eradicating the evils of employment discrimination, Title VII should be given a liberal
construction. The impact of this construction is the broad interpretation given to the employer and
employee provisions." (citations omitted)); cf., e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976) ("[Title VII's] terms are not limited to discrimination against members of
any particular race."). These and other cases recognizing the breadth of Title VII protections act to
reject a strict bipolar (black/white) approach to racial discrimination.
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tionally assigned to private sphere roles).'63 Some of them expounded on
the difficulties that would ensue as women moved from the private
sphere to the public sphere of work.'" And yet the bill passed. To give
effect to the bill, employers cannot require women to behave as men in
the workplace. Feminine values must be protected. To that end, Title
VII's coverage has been expanded by legislative amendment to cover
pregnancy'65 and it has been interpreted to cover sexual harassment.'"
"Sexual harassment" has recently been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to include same-sex harassment.'67 Accepting the fact that Congress
did not enact Title VII for the primary purpose of regulating same-sex
sexual harassment, the Oncale Court nonetheless applied Title VII to a
male on male sexual harassment claim, stating: "[S]tatutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."'6 8
If Title VII was intended to make it possible for females with femi-
nine sensibilities to work comfortably in the public sphere, then the
statutory protections must be interpreted to cover expressions of femi-
nine gender by transsexuals, whether or not the expression of such femi-
ninity by transsexuals was the principal concern of Congress. FTMs,
whom the law may identify as male post-transition, but who retain and
express their sense of the feminine, must be protected in order to carry
out the purpose of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. Similarly,
MTFs, who express their femininity during transition even though their
bodies may be more biologically male, must be protected.
3. MTF Transsexuals Must Be Protected in Order to Ensure Pro-
tection of Women, and FTM Transsexuals Must Be Protected in
Order to Ensure Protection of Both Men and Women
When a transsexual transitions on the job, a decision to fire the indi-
vidual often includes assumptions about the inappropriateness of the
163. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 2577-78 (1964) (statements of Rep. Celler).
164. See id.
165. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)), amended the definitions section of Title VII by adding subsection (k) which
states, in part: "The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include... because of or on the
basis of pregnancy ......
166. The sexual harassment cases in particular have shown that Title VII was intended to
change the workplace from the male bastion that it was prior to Title VII to something different, a
place in which females with feminine sensibilities could work comfortably. See, e.g., Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1994) ("When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, Tite VII is violated." (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)).
167. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding that male-on-
male harassment of a sexual nature is covered by Title VII).
168. Id. at 1002.
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newly gendered person holding the same job as was held by the previ-
ously gendered person. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines69 is a prime example of
this situation. Ulane was attempting to keep her job as an airline pilot, a
job which at the time of the case was held almost exclusively by men.'7"
The decision to fire Ulane was likely prompted as much by a fear of fe-
male pilots as by a fear of transsexual pilots.
The situation presented in Ulane is not a unique one. Barbara Renee
James lost her job in the electrical sales division of a hardware store
when she transitioned from male to female.'7 ' And Jane Doe lost her job
as a Boeing engineer when she transitioned on the job.'72 It is probably
not coincidental that a number of litigated cases involve MTFs in jobs
that have been historically held by men.
Legal protection of MTFs who transition on the job, and who want
to continue holding jobs that have been identified as male jobs, is neces-
sary to assure legal protection for persons born female who wish to hold
those jobs. A primary purpose of Title VII is carried out if "sex" is read
to include "MTF transsexuals."'73
There is no evidence in the form of reported cases of a similar trend
involving FTMs. In fact, in the only two FTM anti-discrimination cases
that I found, the trial court judges both ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on
the motion to dismiss the complaint.'" However, it would not be surpris-
ing to find that women in "female" jobs who transitioned to being male
had a harder time with their employers than other FTMs in more "an-
drogynous" jobs. The story of Mario Martino suggests, for example, that
despite "her" excellent credentials and experience as a nurse, co-workers
avoided "him" and joked about "him" while he was in transition.'
Eventually, he changed jobs. Legal protection of FTMs who wish to re-
main in or retain jobs that are traditionally thought of as "feminine"
serves to protect persons born male who also wish to hold such jobs.
The stories from the Balkans show us that male roles that are tradi-
tionally honored and respected can be carried out by women passing as
men with the blessing of the community, so long as there are no males
169. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
170. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082-83.
171. James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478,480-81 (D. Kan. 1995).
172. Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 533-34 (Wash. 1993).
173. See text supra accompanying note 168.
174. In Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., the court held transsexuals were protected under New
York City human rights laws. 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395-96 (Sup. Ct. 1995). The second case
addressing FTMs, Conway v. City of Hartford, found transsexuals were protected under laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of mental disability, even if not protected under laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. No. CV 950553003, 1997 WL 78585, at *3-*7 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997).
175. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.a.
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available.176 Our own post-World War II history tells us that the same is
true of our culture. Rosie the Riveter was held in high esteem until the
male troops came home. Legal protection of women who pass as men in
order to hold masculine jobs," or of FTMs who transition in "masculine"
jobs, will help women who wish to hold such jobs. Thus, the purposes of
Title VII are better served by a statutory interpretation that includes
transsexual and transgendered persons within its protections.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current anti-discrimination law, in particular Title VII, prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex. Most courts have interpreted this lan-
guage to exclude discrimination against transsexuals. A recent district
court opinion in New York suggests that Title VII may apply to trans-
sexual plaintiffs, provided the discriminator does not know that the
plaintiff is transsexual.' Such interpretations of sex discrimination law
are too limited. Transsexuals, even those who pass successfully in their
new gender roles, cannot be viewed as solely male or female. Their sto-
ries teach us that individual gender identity is too fluid to force all per-
sons into the bipolar scheme that current Title VII jurisprudence seems to
presume. Title VII's sex discrimination jurisprudence must be recon-
ceptualized to account for the reality of individuals who are both male
and female, whether at the same moment in time or at different moments
over time.
176. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
177. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 124, at 12-13 (discussing her experience passing as a
male museum guard).




GAYS, LESBIANS, AND VISIBILITY POLITICS
NAN ALAMILLA BOYD*
INTRODUCTION
"How do you plan for your future together?" American Express Fi-
nancial Advisors ask two "lesbian-looking" women in a recent adver-
tisement in Out magazine, a gay and lesbian periodical.' In the same is-
sue, Budweiser poses a sweaty bottle of Bud Light against a can of the
same under the caption "SIGNIFICANT OTHER."2 Using images and
language specific to lesbian and gay culture, these advertisements di-
rectly address a lesbian and gay audience. In the American Express ad,
two white women lean gently against each other in warm sunlight as they
gaze contentedly into the distance. American Express asks them to con-
sider their future together-as a couple. In doing so, the advertisement
links financial security to same-sex domestic stability. Financial planning
secures the future for these presumed domestic partners; it links spending
(and saving) to the profound "investment" many lesbian and gay couples
have made in achieving the legal right to marry.
The Budweiser advertisement takes a slightly different approach in
that it addresses gay couples as consumers rather than investors. An-
heuser-Busch, the company that sells Bud Light, incorporates in-group
language ("significant other") and subcultural activity (sweaty "bodies"
in a bar atmosphere) to advertise its product to gay consumers. The ad-
vertisement's gay-positive directive, "Be yourself and make it a Bud
Light," legitimizes queer choices-particularly when the choice of ho-
mosexuality is accompanied by the choice of Bud Light.' Also, position-
ing a bottle and can of Bud Light as a kind of queer couple, this adver-
tisement, like the American Express ad, sells an affirming message to
queers about the viability of their relationships. Through marketplace
* Assistant Professor, Women's Studies Program, University of Colorado. I wish to thank
Lisa Pefialoza, Ara Wilson, and Polly Thistlethwaite for their generous and insightful comments on
different drafts of this article; Martha Ertman, Julie Nice, and Karla Robertson for their interest in
my research and their invitation to participate in the InterSEXionality Symposium at the University
of Denver College of Law; and last but not least, my students and colleagues at the University of
Colorado, Boulder for their ongoing support and encouragement of my work.
1. See OUT, Mar. 1998, at 19.
2. Seeid.at8l.
3. Although there are important historic and subjective differences, in this article I
interchange the terms "queer" and "lesbian and gay."
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visibility, both advertisements associate queer dollars (or consumer loy-
alty) with the legitimacy of lesbian and gay lives.
Mainstream marketing to gay and lesbian consumers is not new. In
1979 Absolut Vodka placed advertisements in the Advocate, a popular
gay magazine, and successfully generated name-brand loyalty among
gay men. Through the 1990s, however, advertisements directed toward
lesbian and gay consumers have become increasingly specific in their
representations of lesbian and gay culture. Advertisements by companies
such as Budweiser or Miller Beer often appeal to queer consumers by
representing same-sex couples or queer iconography rather than simply
placing generic or crossover ads in gay and lesbian magazines. To many,
these gay-specific advertisements document a breakthrough in queer
visibility. Here, large multinational corporations affirm that gay and les-
bian dollars matter. They visibly display the fact that gays and lesbians
comprise an important market segment-a "niche" market, perhaps. Be-
cause visibility has been crucial to progressive gay and lesbian social
movements, and because consumption in late capitalist development has
become a primary aspect of citizenship, the increased visibility of lesbi-
ans and gay men, combined with the economic power displayed in these
advertisements, seems to promise expanded civic recognition (citizen-
ship) for lesbians and gay men.' In fact, the equation that visibility equals
legitimization and enfranchisement is so embedded in lesbian and gay
culture that many activists see corporate recognition of gay/lesbian
spending power as a key to the contemporary struggle for civil rights.6
This article explores the politics of visibility implicit in the relation-
ship between the "gay market" and social movement activism. First, it
examines the political function of consumer visibility for queers, and it
challenges the liberal equation that visibility realized through mainstream
marketplace accommodation equals or reflects enhanced political
strength for queers. Second, this article evaluates the commodification of
lesbian and gay culture in recent mainstream advertisements. How do
multinational corporations such as American Express and Anheuser-
Busch manipulate representations of gay and lesbian life in order to
achieve gay and lesbian consumer loyalty? What is the impact of cultural
commodification? To explore these points further, I draw examples from
the early-1960s formation of the Tavern Guild of San Francisco. The
4. See Dan Baker, A History in Ads: The Growth of the Gay and Lesbian Market, in HoMo
ECONOMICS: CAPITALISM, COMMUNITY, AND LESBIAN AND GAY LIFE 11, 12 (Amy Gluckman &
Betsy Reed eds., 1997) [hereinafter BAKER, HOMO ECONOMICS].
5. See DAVID T. EVANS, SEXUAL CITIZENSHIP: THE MATERIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SEXuALrIEs 89-113 (1993).
6. See GRANT LUKENBILL, UNTOLD MILLIONS (1995). By civil rights, I mean state
sanctioned domestic partner benefits, employment non-discrimination legislation, or the inclusion of
homophobic violence in hate crime prohibitions.
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Tavern Guild used queer economic resources in the 1960s to achieve
limited political alliances and expanded civil rights without relying on a
politic of mainstream visibility. The example of the Tavern Guild ques-
tions whether mainstream visibility is necessary for economic power to
translate into political strength. Moreover, it questions whether the com-
modification explicit in mainstream advertising contributes to gay and
lesbian community strength. In fact, the contention that gays and lesbians
as a consumer group command significant spending power has instigated
a backlash against gay and lesbian civil rights.7 By observing the impact
of cultural commodification and posing alternative uses of queer eco-
nomic power, this article suggests new ways of thinking about the rela-
tionship between queer consumption, political subjectivity, and civil
rights protections.
I. THE GAY MARKET AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVISM
In the United States, gays and lesbians occupy a "culture of con-
sumption." Not only is gay and lesbian culture expressed in marketplace
activities such as bars, restaurants, and theaters, but gays and lesbians
also participate in a larger social and political system based on the acqui-
sition and consumption of goods. In a society saturated by mass media
and mass markets, twentieth-century consumers are not simply buyers of
goods, as Richard Wightman Fox and T.J. Jackson Lears explain, they
are "recipients of professional advice, marketing strategies, government
programs, electoral choices, and advertisers' images of happiness."' Con-
sumption has become a primary characteristic of post-industrial civic
life. Following this, as sociologist David T. Evans argues, sexual minori-
ties have become "citizens" of developed capitalism through their role as
legitimate and recognizable consumers In other words, because con-
sumption has become an important part of contemporary political par-
ticipation, for lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgenders, mainstream
recognition of their status as consumers legitimizes their political sub-
jectivity in the eyes of the state. For this reason, Lisa Pefialoza, a mar-
keting professor, argues that gays and lesbians constitute a viable market
segment. Their marketplace activity should be of interest to mainstream
advertisers in that gays and lesbians are not only "identifiable, accessible,
and of sufficient size,"'" the traditional criteria of a market segment, but
7. M.V. Lee Badgett notes that biased samples yielding disproportionately high reports of
lesbian and gay annual incomes have become a part of an anti-gay discourse. See M.V. Lee Badgett,
Beyond Biased Samples: Challenging the Myths on the Economic Status of Lesbians and Gay Men,
in BAKER, HoMo ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 65, 66; see also Baker, supra note 4, at 18 (noting
that the fear of backlash is often overestimated).
8. RICHARD WIGHTMAN Fox & T.J. JACKSON LEARS, THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION at xii
(1983).
9. See EVANS, supra note 5, at 113.
10. Lisa Pefialoza, We're Here, We're Queer, and We're Going Shopping! A Critical
Perspective on the Accommodation of Gays and Lesbians in the U.S. Marketplace, in GAYS,
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gays and lesbians as a social group also comprise a distinct consumer
culture which encompasses both marketplace expressions (buying pat-
terns) and identifiable marketing strategies that allegedly influence gay
and lesbian consumption." In this way, lesbian and gay consumer culture
is dynamic, but nevertheless determined by and dependent on its ability
to successfully identify itself as a socially coherent group, a social class.
Social movement activism is a primary marker of lesbian and gay
community strength and cohesion. In other words, the community's defi-
nition of itself as a social class springs from its collective consciousness
of and resistance to oppression. While there have been many modes of
resistance, some are more recognized and remembered than others. A
dominant mode of resistance in lesbian and gay history has been that of
acceptance, integration, and assimilation-the key to which has been the
increased visibility of lesbians and gay men in mainstream society. As a
result, a politic of mainstream visibility frames the history of lesbian and
gay social activism. Two early lesbian and gay civil rights organizations,
the Mattachine Society (founded 1950) and the Daughters of Bilitis
(founded 1955), sought to increase the visibility of the homosexual in
heterosexual society by promoting positive images ("advocating a mode
of behavior and dress acceptable to society")'2 and educating profession-
als and civic leaders such as doctors, lawyers and the clergy about the
plight of "this minority group."" In fact, the post-1953 Mattachine Soci-
ety identified "education of the general public" to "correct general mis-
conceptions" about the homosexual as their primary goal." Later, the
Gay Activist Alliance, a gay liberation organization, worked against the
invisibility or negative stereotyping of homosexuals in the mainstream
press.'" In January 1970, they raided the offices of the New York Post and
demanded "positive news coverage of Gays in establishment newspa-
pers., 6
More recently, queer organizations such as GLAAD, the Gay and
Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, work to promote images of lesbi-
ans, gays, bisexuals and the transgendered in the mainstream media, spe-
LESBIANS, AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH ISSUES IN MARKETING
9, 10 (Daniel L. Wardlow ed., 1996).
11. Id.
12. See Purpose of the Daughters of Bilitis, LADDER, Sept. 1959, at 1, 1.
13. Id.
14. The Mattachine Society split in 1953 due to red-baiting, and its leadership shifted from
one that stressed minority-group politics and the development of gay culture to one that stressed a
politics of visibility focused on mainstream acceptance of the homosexual. See JOHN D'EMILIo,
SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 57-84 (1983); see also Aims and Principles,
MATrACHINE REV., Jan. 1956, at 1, 1.
15. Terance Kissack, Freaking Fag Revolutionaries: New York's Gay Liberation Front, 1969-
1971, 62 RADICAL HIST. REV. 104, 117 (1995).
16. DONN TEAL, THE GAY MILrrANTS 134 (1971) (quoting Arthur Irving, Gay Activists
Alliance News and Other Events, GAY POWER, No. 11, 1970).
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cifically television. They organize letter writing campaigns by viewers,
and give annual awards to programs that maintain positive depictions of
gay, lesbian or bisexual characters. Mainstream visibility has long been
an important aspect of lesbian and gay social movement activism, and
advertisements by multinational corporations that depict same-sex cou-
ples or queer culture seem an important contribution to this cause.
Because advertisements directed at gay and lesbian consumers en-
hance mainstream visibility, many gay activists and entrepreneurs cele-
brate the gay market's ability to attract corporate attention. Sean Strub,
for example, noticed in 1985 that there were no gay lists registered in
The Standard Rate and Data Service Directory of Mailing Lists,'7 so he
founded a telemarketing company, Strubco, to assemble lists of potential
queer buyers in a variety of gay and lesbian lifestyle categories.'8 These
lists were useful initially in directing queer products to queer consumers,
but the lists grew to become an important commodity themselves. Once
predictable buying patterns are demonstrated, gay lists sell for top dollar
to multinational corporations seeking queer consumers. In 1994, for ex-
ample, AT&T and MCI both used gay lists in direct-mail campaigns to
successfully target gay and lesbian consumers.'9 Moreover, research
groups such as Overlooked Opinions and Simmons Market Research
have encouraged corporate sponsorship by documenting the unique
qualities of the gay market. In several early-1990s studies, they asserted
the dubious claim that gay households have more overall income than
heterosexual households, and they observed that gay couples, as
"DINKS" (double income, no kids), are more conscious of marketing
trends and, thus, more likely to be loyal name-brand consumers.' While
others have argued against the plausibility of these claims, the enthusi-
asm gay entrepreneurs express toward the gay market evidences a deep
investment in economic citizenship-the faith that gay buying power
will somehow benefit gays (or at least gay entrepreneurs). Because ad-
vertising promotes the visibility and (allegedly) the legitimacy of lesbian
and gay lives, it cements the relationship between economics and enfran-
chisement.
II. TAVERN GUILD OF SAN FRANCISCO
There are other modes of queer resistance, however, and other ways
that queer marketplace activity reflects social activism outside the equa-
17. See Sean Strub, The Growth of the Gay and Lesbian Market, in A QUEER WORLD: THE
CENTER FOR LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 514, 514 (Martin Duberman ed., 1997)
[hereinafter A QUEER WORLD].
18. Seeid. at 514-15.
19. See Baker, supra note 4, at 15-18.
20. The biased quality of these findings have been well documented. See Badgett, supra note
7, at 65-68; Baker, supra note 4, at 11-20; Amy Gluckman & Betsy Reed, The Gay Marketing
Moment, in BAKER, HOMO ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 3, 3-10.
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tion that visibility equals civil rights. In San Francisco, in the early
1960s, homophile organizations were obvious places for lesbians and gay
men to assert their political strengths. Both the Mattachine Society and
the Daughters of Bilitis were headquartered in San Francisco, and they
organized mainly around the problems of homosexual invisibility and
medical misrepresentation. As mentioned above, they functioned as re-
form movements which projected positive images of the homosexual and
sought to "educate of the public" about the unthreatening gender and sex
normativity of the "sex deviant."2' Through the 1950s and 1960s, how-
ever, they drew only small numbers (10-20) to their monthly meetings,
and although their monthly newsletters reached a larger audience, homo-
phile organizations seemed unable to tap into the much larger queer
community. They were especially unable to address the needs of the
community's bar-going constituents.' In early 1962, however, an infor-
mal Tuesday afternoon drinking society comprised of gay and lesbian bar
owners and bartenders decided to band together more formally to protect
themselves from continued police harassment. They met at the Suzy-Q, a
gay bar on Polk Street, and called themselves the Tavern Guild of San
Francisco. In a "thumbnail history" of the organization, the original
members reasoned that "the unjust and intolerable laws, the method of
enforcing them, and the seriousness of their consequence gave this
weekly drinking group purpose and determination to build an organiza-
tion which collectively could fight the discriminatory acts against our
community. '2 They elected Phil Doganiero, a popular Suzy-Q bartender,
as the first president of the Tavern Guild and continued to meet weekly
on Tuesday afternoons at alternating host bars to discuss the needs of San
Francisco's gay bar owners and bar-going populations.'
The function of the Tavern Guild of San Francisco (TGSF) was
similar to many fraternal and ethnic organizations that surfaced in the
21. See Purpose of the Daughters of Bilitis, supra note 12, at 1.
22. In 1954 Mattachine Society chapters in the Bay Area totaled 40 members. By 1960
Mattachine's national membership had risen to 230, but this total included members from San
Francisco, Los Angeles/Long Beach, New York, Boston, Denver, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago,
and Washington D.C. See D'EMILIO, supra note 14, at 115; S.F. MATrACHINE NEWSL. (San
Francisco Mattachine Society, San Francisco, Cal.), May 15, 1954.
23. LEST WE FORGET: A THUMBNAIL HISTORY OF THE TGSF 1 (Gay and Lesbian Historical
Society of Northern California Archives (GLHS), Tavern Guild of San Francisco (TGSF) Collection,
San Francisco, Cal.) [hereinafter LEST WE FORGET].
24. During the first year of operation, bar owners and bartenders who participated in Tavern
Guild activities worked at the Handle Bar (1959-60), 1438 California St.; Lupe's Echo (1952-54),
545 Post St.; Keno's (1950-56), 47 Golden Gate Ave.; Chili's (1954), 141 Embarcadero; Coffee
Don's (1950s-1960s), Pine Street at Leavenworth; The Sea Cow (1954-56) and The Cross Roads
(1956-63), both at 109 Steuart St.; Cal's (1957-62), 782 O'Farrell St.; Dolans Supper Club (1940s-
1956), 406 Stockton; The Paper Doll (1940s-1961), 524 Union Street; The Beige Room (1951-58),
831 Broadway; and Suzy Q's (1960-62), 1741 Polk Street. See id. at 2; ERIC GARBER, HISTORICAL
DIRECTORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY ESTABLISHMENTS (GLHS Archives, TGSF collection). Many of
these establishments had been closed by the California State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board or
the San Francisco Police Department's Vice Squad. See LEST WE FORGET, supra note 23, at 1.
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United States in the early-twentieth century.' By pulling together collec-
tive resources, TGSF was able to cushion the economic hardship of its
members, mostly small business owners and employees, while simulta-
neously protecting members from police harassment and/or the manipu-
lations of organized crime."6 Within its first year, the TGSF instituted a
number of policies that helped protect gay bar owners and their clientele
from regular harassment by the police and the California State Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board (ABC) which issued and revoked tavern li-
censes. They established a telephone networking system-a phone tree-to
track police and ABC movement, so if a bar was being raided or harassed
TGSF members would quickly find out. They also set up a bad check list
"to protect itself from its over-indulgent customers."27 Also, primarily
due to the level of police harassment at this time, gay bars in San Fran-
cisco averaged only six months to a year in operation. Unemployment
was a constant threat to bar employees, so the Tavern Guild set up a loan
fund for its unemployed members, a group medical insurance plan, and
an employment development program&. TGSF also developed a number
of business practices that undercut the traumas of a competitive market.
They fixed prices at reasonable rates and worked against unfriendly "ru-
mormongering. ' " A "leaked" story, for instance, that a particular bar was
being watched by the police would quickly ruin a good business."
By July 1962, TGSF composed its first formal constitution, identi-
fying itself as "a non-profit organization established to exchange infor-
mation and ideas for the operation of our particular caliber of establish-
ments."3 Clearly, Tavern Guild members recognized their interests as
business owners, but the function of the Tavern Guild exceeded a simple
economic explanation. The gay bar, as a marketplace activity, had be-
come an important cultural institution in queer urban life, so bar owners,
employees, and patrons shared an (albeit unequal) interest in the eco-
nomic success of the bar.
25. See generally JOHN E. BODNAR ET AL., LIVES OF THEIR OWN (1982) (discussing the
economic progress of African Americans, Italians, and Poles in Pittsburgh from 1900-1960 and the
measures taken to attain it); OLIVER ZuNz, THE CHANGING FACE OF INEQUALITY (1982) (examining
the evolution of Detroit's ethnic organizations from 1880-1920).
26. See Bill Plath, The Tavern Guild: A Record of Accomplishment, Address to the Tavern
Guild of San Francisco (Apr. 5, 1966) (transcript available in the GLHS Archives, TGSF
Collection). For more information about mafia control of gay bars in New York City, see GEORGE
CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE
WORLD, 1890-1940 (1994).
27. LEST WE FORGET, supra note 23, at 3.
28. See Plath, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Charlotte Coleman, an early member of TGSF, claimed that price-fixing was one of the
most important original purposes of the Tavern Guild. Coleman opened The Front at 600 Front St. in
1959 with the $1000 settlement money she received from the IRS after they fired her "for
associating with persons of ill repute." Interview with Charlotte Coleman, TGSF Member and
Owner of The Front tavern, in San Francisco, Cal. (July 13, 1992).
31. CONSTITUTION OF THE TAVERN GUILD OF SAN FRANCISCO (1962) (GLHS Archives,
TGSF Collection).
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The sheer popularity of bar-related socializing within lesbian and
.gay communities gave TGSF members economic strength. Because the
bar functioned as a kind of community center, it engendered a great deal
of patron loyalty-and a growing sense of itself as an economic commu-
nity, a consumer group. With time, Tavern Guild members developed
friendly relations with beer distributors, touring breweries and promoting
their products at Tavern Guild events. In return, beer distributors began
to support gay bar owners during disputes with the law. Charlotte Cole-
man, a TGSF member and owner of a lesbian bar called "The Front"
remembers, "[Beer distributors] were behind us to fight anything that
went wrong because they were making a lot of money through us."32 She
adds that the San Francisco's Tavern Guild "was a great thing in the end
because it got the government-the ABC and the police department-to
leave us alone a little bit because we showed some strength."33 Because
Tavern Guild members were able to control the spending power of this
lesbian and gay marketplace, bar owners and bartenders found that they
could influence the state institutions that policed them.
Fund-raising, as a result, became the key to Tavern Guild successes.
In 1964, TGSF hosted a drag ball (a gay masquerade party), the Beaux
Arts Ball, where participants dressed up, danced, and elected an "em-
press." Jos6 Sarria, San Francisco'sfirst Empress and a long-time drag
performer at the Black Cat Bar, an early gay tavern on San Francisco's
waterfront, remembers:
This was 1964, and the Black Cat had just closed... they wanted to
thank me for all I had done fifteen, twenty years before that. Plus, the
then leaders of the Tavern Guild saw a way to make money, so they
gave what they called the Beaux Arts Ball. They wanted to name me,
which they did, the queen of the Ball. And from then I became, I
made myself Empress.
The Tavern Guild's acknowledgment of Sarria's community service de-
veloped into a "court system," an internal government, whereby an elec-
tion process, and a New Year's Day coronation established an annual
slate of bar community representatives. Today, according to Sarria, drag
"courts" have been established in most large cities in the United States.
Election festivities, as fund-raising events, net huge profits, and the
elected "court" functions as a grant-giving organization, returning profits
to community organizations.35 Money garnered from TGSF events such
32. Interview with Charlotte Coleman, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Interview with Jos6 Sarria, San Francisco's First Beaux Arts Ball Empress, in San
Francisco, Cal. (May 20, 1992).
35. See Nan Alamilla Boyd, San Francisco Was a Wide Open Town: Charting the Emergence
of Gay and Lesbian Communities through the Mid-Twentieth Century 193-213 (1995) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Brown University) (on file with the Brown University Library); see also NAN
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as the Beaux Arts Ball allowed its members to promote leadership within
the bar community, protect their own legal and financial interests, con-
tribute to a number of charitable causes (including homophile organiza-
tions), and most importantly, intervene in evolving gay politics in San
Francisco. Rikki Streicher, owner of Maud's, a Haight-Ashbury lesbian
bar, notes:
The Tavern Guild was probably singly the reason why bars achieved
a success politically. 6Because a buck is the bottom line at all times.
And the bars had commanded an enormous amount of money in
terms of the city. So when they began to invite politicians to their
meetings, the politicians realized that here's an organized group
and... number one, they have money and, number two, they have
votes.
Although Streicher jumps ahead of the story, the Tavern Guild's history
provides an interesting case because in it the relationship between social
movements and the gay market is reversed. Rather than social move-
ments providing visibility which attracts marketing, advertisement, and
consumer identification, the Tavern Guild represents a marketplace ac-
tivity that, in order to protect itself, evolves into a social movement.
While the Tavern Guild, as a business association, gained a certain
amount of political momentum, even authority, as a social movement, it
remained ideologically distinct from homophile movements. Homophile
organizations pursued visibility and assimilation into the larger society;
the Tavern Guild did not. Both groups sought civil rights, but the Tavern
Guild, as a representation of queer bar culture, denied assimilation as a
political goal. It remained preoccupied with protecting its right to assem-
bly-its right to maintain distinct subcultural institutions that were rela-
tively free from police harassment and marketplace instability. In this
way, the Tavern Guild was able to control queer dollars and shop for
rights without relying on visibility politics.
The tension between "separatist" subcultural politics and main-
stream visibility politics frames a difference in lesbian and gay political
strategy that continues to this day. Like homophile movements, GLAAD
and the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), two of the most important na-
tional gay and lesbian organizations, rely on a politic of visibility and
ALAMILLA BOYD, WIDE OPEN TOwN: SAN FRANcIsco's LESBIAN AND GAY HISTORY (forthcoming
1999).
36. One facet of this success was realized in December 1959, when the California Supreme
Court held a law providing for revocation of liquor licenses of bars which serve as a "resort" for
homosexuals facially invalid. See Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 347 P.2d
909, 912 (Cal. 1959); see also Boyd, supra note 35, at 174-77.
37. Interview with Rikki Streicher, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 22, 1992) (footnote added).
Rikki Streicher was owner of Maud's, San Francisco's famous lesbian bar made more famous by the
documentary by Paris Poirer, Last Call at Maud's. See LAST CALL AT MAUD'S (Water Bearer Films
1993). Streicher participated in the Tavern Guild through the late 1960s and 1970s.
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mainstream accommodation to achieve civil rights protections. Mean-
while, the "court system," a network of drag balls and coronations that
elect local, state, and national representatives, remains outside of the
spotlight of mainstream activism despite their impressive fund-raising
abilities. With queer dollars raised at queer events, the court system feeds
a queer infrastructure, funding community institutions such as hospice
care, LGBT community centers, and queer performing arts."
CONCLUSIONS
Mainstream advertisements directed toward lesbian and gay con-
sumers publicly affirm the economic strength of the lesbian and gay
community. Advertisements depicting same-sex couples or queer iconog-
raphy increase the visibility of lesbian and gay lives. This combination of
strength and visibility promises to some citizenship and increased access
to civil rights. However, there are problems with this equation. While
research data depicting lesbian and gay wealth has successfully attracted
the corporate sponsorship of lesbian and gay media and community
events, it also has become part of an anti-gay discourse that lobbies
against lesbian and gay civil rights. Anti-gay activists have used the al-
leged wealth of gay couples to manipulate a public fear of homosexual
power and assert the existence of a well-funded gay agenda. For exam-
ple, Colorado for Family Values used Simmons Market Research data in
literature that supported Amendment Two, Colorado's 1992 state refer-
endum to prohibit gay and lesbian civil rights protections. They argued
that gay and lesbian communities did not need civil rights protections
because they were already disproportionately wealthy. "Are homosexuals
a 'disadvantaged' minority? You decide! Records show that even now,
not only are gays not economically disadvantaged, they're actually one
of the most affluent groups in America!"3 Anti-gay activists have also
used Simmons Market Research data to lobby against federal legislation
such as ENDA, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would
protect gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and the transgendered from employ-
ment discrimination. While anti-gay uses of market research information
relies on common confusion between "special rights" and civil rights,
gay and lesbian civil rights activists have had to contest the statistics
generated by gay consumer enthusiasts in order to correct the misleading
impression that all gays and lesbians live comfortably in a $50,000 in-
38. Josd Sarria notes that "we are now the largest fund-raising organization in the gay
community in San Francisco." Interview with Jos6 Sarria, in San Francisco, Cal. (Apr. 15, 1992).
39. Badgett, supra note 7, at 65 (quoting literature published in 1992 by Colorado for Family
Values, a right-wing anti-gay religious organization based in Colorado Springs, CO).
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come bracket. ' Clearly, the transformation of queer culture into a con-
sumer lifestyle problematically misrepresents the diversity of lesbian and
gay lives; specifically, it misrepresents the need for basic anti-violence
protections.
As the commodification of queer culture in mainstream advertise-
ments functions to make certain kinds of lesbians and gay men more
visible and, therefore, more politically powerful, it alienates others,
deepening the gulf between privileged and non-privileged queers. Ad-
vertisements not only render invisible whole segments of the lesbian and
gay community, they solidify social inequalities based on gender, race
and class. As Sarah Schulman argues, the majority of queers are not rep-
resented in mainstream media images, and the false image of the wealthy
white gay man breeds resentment.
This false gay man is so clearly not living next door, not your son, not
Asian, not your car mechanic, not your friend, not your lover, not
you. It is a mythical, eroticized, far-away Other who can never enter
your world or your soul. It allows straight people a way to accept the
existence of homosexuality without ever having to have their own
sexual identity implicated by it. More importantly, they can pretend
away the power they actually do have and falsely re-position them-
41selves as under the thumb of rich homosexuals.
Representations of gay consumers in mainstream advertisements often
reproduce racial and gender hierarchies by positioning people of color
and women (if represented at all) in subordinate positions. 2 In this way, a
politic of mainstream visibility reflects and reinforces social inequalities
within the lesbian and gay community. As Amy Gluckman and Betsy
Reed note, "[Tihe sword of the market is slicing off every segment of the
gay community that is not upper-middle-class, (mostly) white, and
(mostly) male." 3 Clearly, as corporate recognition secures a certain
amount of political agency for the social group, the group becomes in-
creasingly narrow. Also, because mainstream marketers are interested in
predictable and disciplined consumer groups, the commodification of
queer culture tamps down its creative, and often flamboyant, critique of
heterosexuality, racial inequality, and/or sexism. In other words, as civil
rights get attached to a particular image of lesbian and gay consumption,
how and when will civil rights protections expand to protect those who are
not immediately recognizable--or those who are unruly, reluctant, or sub-
40. See generally Karen Engle, What's So Special About Special Rights, 75 DENV. U. L. REv.
1265 (1998) (examining the uses of the term "special rights" by gay rights opponents and
proponents).
41. Sarah Schulman, The Making of a Market Niche, HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REv., Winter
1998, at 17, 20.
42. See Alexandra Chasin, Selling Out: The Gay/Lesbian Market and the Construction of
Gender, SOJOURNER, June 1997, at 14, 14-15.
43. Gluckman & Reed, supra note 20, at 7.
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versive shoppers? What is the relationship between queers and capitalism
beyond the easy equation that mainstream visibility equals civil rights?
What are other ways queers might use their marketplace activities to sub-
vert heteronormativity and secure broad-based civil rights protections?
M.V. Lee Badgett offers one solution in addressing queer workplace
activism.' On the job, queer workers can organize and press for non-
discrimination policies and/or same-sex domestic partner benefits. Queer
workplace activism also involves building coalitions with other activist
organizations, such as unions, which can lead to the strengthening of
worker solidarity and rights. Finally, queer workplace activism can affect
local or state politics. Here, she cites the impact of Microsoft's Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Employees of Microsoft (GLEAM) on Oregon's
Measure 9 and Colorado's Amendment 2, two state referenda aimed at
prohibiting municipal gay and lesbian civil rights protections. GLEAM
lobbied company officials to oppose Measure 9 and Amendment 2. They
also developed workplace coalitions with African American, Latino, and
other Microsoft employee groups, strengthening their overall impact on
company policies. Badgett rejects consumer agency in the face of queer
workplace coalition politics, and she positions worker rights as the key to
civil rights rather than mainstream visibility or spending power.
Another solution lies with the kind of marketplace activism ex-
pressed by the Tavern Guild of San Francisco. While national gay and
lesbian organizations such as the HRC work toward civil rights through
mainstream visibility, subcultural institutions support queer culture in the
interim. Marketplace activity that returns its capital to the queer commu-
nity rather than placing its faith in the power of mainstream visibility-
and its dollars in the pockets of multinational corporations-highlights
an important political strategy. Here, lesbians and gay men use their
buying power to support queer institutions and sustain fledgling and
often fragile community institutions. Lesbian and gay buying power
directed toward queer institutions debunks a liberal faith in "the system"
and seeks, instead, to secure and protect subculture resources. A politic
of mainstream visibility, on the other hand, works toward the
incorporation of lesbian and gay men into the body politic-it believes
that lesbians and gay men can achieve full citizenship by breaking
through the wall of mainstream invisibility.
Visibility politics have played an important role in the history of
U.S. lesbian and gay social movements. However, mainstream visibility
politics have always been a part of the project of assimilation, and as-
similation necessarily projects a disciplined as well as a race- and class-
specific image of the lesbian and gay community. The history of the San
44. MV. Lee Badgett, Thinking Homo/Economically, in A QUEER WORLID, supra note 17, at 467.
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Francisco Tavern Guild illustrates that queer marketplace activity as a
political tool does not depend on a politic of mainstream visibility or a
desire to assimilate into mainstream society. Instead, it encourages
queers to be subversive shoppers, willing to forego the attentions of cor-




PENETRATING SEX AND MARRIAGE: THE PROGRESSIVE




Two pure souls fused into one by an impassioned love-friends,
counselors-a mutual support and inspiration to each other amid
life's struggles, must know the highest human happiness;-this is
marriage; and this is the only cornerstone of an enduring home.'
Elizabeth Cady Stanton's century-old feminist vision of marriage as
grounded in companionship remains deeply imbedded in our social con-
sciousness. Society's vision of marriage focuses on love, companionship,
commitment, and romance. People also commonly view marriage as the
legal union of men and women, presumably heterosexuals. Although this
vision of marriage as heterosexual companionship is deeply rooted
within our social consciousness, law does not recognize the love and
companionship model of marriage.2 Neither case law nor statutes requires
marriage to be a union of companions, lovers, friends, partners or even
heterosexuals.3 This disconnect between legal and social understandings
of marriage reveals the heterosexual, companionship model of marriage
as idyllic social myth.
* J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1998; Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Harold
D. Vietor, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 1998-2000. I would like to
thank Martha Ertman for assisting me with the development of this Note, without whom it could not
have been written. I would also like to thank Janet Halley, Todd Ingram, and Julie Nice for their
helpful comments; Frank Valdes; and all of the participants of the InterSEXionality Symposium.
1. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 22 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1881).
2. This Note will demonstrate that in fact love and commitment fail to occupy a
determinative place in formal marriage law. Despite this fact, lawmakers also contribute to the
mythology that legal marriage is about heterosexual love. For example, in the recent debates about
the "marriage penalty," Republican lawmakers referred to the tax as "a tax on love." See Aaron
Zither, GOP Rides Herd on "Love Tax," ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 3, 1998, at 2A. Despite this
characterization by lawmakers, the institution of marriage does not contain such a requirement.
3. This Note focuses on ceremonial or formal marriage. See infra Part I. In many states,
couples may also form the marital union through common law marriage. See generally Cynthia
Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709
(1996) (discussing the evolution of common law marriage and its current status and desirability for
women).
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Instead of constructing marriage laws around companionship or
identity, family law doctrine constructs marriage around sex.' Specifi-
cally, the act of penis-vagina penetration (PVP) is the essential element
of a valid formal marriage This Note reviews case law and statutes to
reveal that the central criterion for the validation, creation, and recogni-
tion of legal marriage is not love, not companionship, nor heterosexual
identity, but instead the potential to engage in PVP. This Note exposes
this pattern by exploring how the law responds to bisexuality in mar-
riage. Examining bisexuality in marriage exposes the construction of
legal marriage6 as fundamentally sexual, and also reveals the progressive
potential of focussing on bisexuality to undercut legal regulations which
subordinate women and gay people.
Part I presents and analyzes three doctrinal areas that treat PVP as
the determinative factor in legitimizing legal marriage: (1) case law con-
cerning transgender marriage, (2) the Uniform Marriage and Dissolution
Act (UMDA) and corresponding case law, and (3) the Defense of Mar-
riage Act (DOMA). The transgender marriage cases most explicitly make
spouses' potential for PVP the essential criteria for legal marriage. The
UMDA and DOMA more subtly treat PVP as the cornerstone of mar-
riage. Viewing marriage through a bisexual lens exposes the centrality of
the PVP requirement in these contexts. To set the stage for this analysis,
Part I explores multiple permutations of bisexual identity, thus setting the
groundwork for an exploration of how bisexuality offers an under-
utilized tool for progressive analysis of marriage doctrine. Part II ad-
dresses an additional area of legal regulation-immigration-that com-
plicates the questions regarding marriage regulation. Part Ill argues that
notwithstanding marriage's conduct-based (PVP) nature, state courts and
Congress present marriage as status-based, specifically heterosexual
status. Part IV suggests that PVP is an illegitimate and unprincipled basis
for defining legal marriage because it has little to do with the benefits
that flow from marriage. Additionally, the PVP criterion perpetuates the
subordination of women. This Note concludes by arguing that in today's
debate over same-sex marriage, in which moral arguments are used to
convince citizens that only heterosexual companionship is deserving of
society's sanctions, exposing the fact that formal marriage is based on
4. Family law also encompasses divorce regulation; this Note, however, primarily focuses
on the creation of a formal marital union.
5. It has also been similarly argued that marriage is for sex. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Family
Law, Marriage, and Heterosexuality: Questioning the Assumptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L.
REV. 285 (1998) (stating that marriage is for "heterosexual genital intercourse" and arguing for
redefining the meaning of marriage in order to open marriage to same-sex couples).
6. This Note limits its analysis to American law. Other countries recognize same-sex
marriage and may define the hallmark of marriage by factors other than PVP. For an exploration of
marriage regulation outside the United States, see Barbara E. Graham-Siegenthaler, Principles of
Marriage Recognition Applied to Same-Sex Marriage Recognition in Switzerland and Europe, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 121, 129 (1998).
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PVP, a sexual act, should help pave the way for a re-examination of legal
marriage and lifting the ban on same-sex marriage.
I. LEGAL MARRIAGE DEPENDS ON PENIS-VAGINA PENETRATION
An analysis of pertinent doctrine reveals that legal marriage turns on
the ability to engage in one particular sex act: penis-vagina penetration.
Courts explicitly state this, requiring that men possess the "necessary
apparatus"7 in order to be married. Men need this particular apparatus-
the penis-in order to "function as a husband."' In order to be legally
married, couples must possess the capacity to "engage in normal sexual
relations,"9 normal being defined as PVP. Legally married couples find
trouble when the partners cannot continue to sexually fulfill the "mar-
riage contract."' This language, extraordinarily explicit, designates PVP
as the essential characteristic of marriage. Courts and legislators rely on
this requirement to determine which unions to recognize, overlooking
and even dismissing ideals of love, companionship, commitment, and
heterosexual orientation, which received wisdom tells us are central to
marriage.
A. Transgender Marriage
State courts' treatment of transgender" marriage illustrates that the
determinative criteria for granting legal recognition of marriage is the
spouses' potential to engage in PVP. The most striking example of this
fact is the New Jersey Superior Court decision in M.T v. J.T.2 In this
action for spousal support and maintenance, M.T., the plaintiff, was a
male to female transsexual.'3 M.T. was born with male sexual organs but
transitioned to a female identity, completing the transition by surgery
which removed her male genitalia and constructed a vagina." Prior to this
7. See Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
8. See id.
9. See id. at 713.
10. See generally Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500-01 (Sup. Ct. 1971). The
marriage contract includes the expectation of sexual relations. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
587 (1977). This expectation also illustrates that marriage depends on PVP.
11. There is much debate and some consensus regarding the terms transgender and
transsexual. A common definition of the term transsexual is a person who has undergone sex
reassignment surgery (SRS) to change his or her biological sex. See MARTINE ROTHBLATT, THE
APARTHEID OF SEX 17 (1995). The term transgender most commonly describes all those who are
differently gendered, including transsexuals, cross-dressers, and drag queens. See GORDENE OLGA
MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION 2 (1994). Some scholars and activists prefer not to use the
term transsexual, arguing that it places too much emphasis on genitalia as the defining characteristic
of gender identity. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 n.130 (1995). This Note discusses
cases including individuals who have undergone SRS, and uses transgender and transsexual
interchangeably.
12. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
13. M.T., 355 A.2d at 205.
14. Id.
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transition, M.T. met J.T., and informed him of her sexual and gender
identities as they became romantically involved. One year after the sur-
gery, M.T. and J.T. were married in a ceremonial marriage.'5 Following
this marriage, they lived together and had sexual intercourse.'6
As a defense to M.T.'s claim for support, J.T. asserted that his mar-
riage to M.T. was void because she was not female but male.'7 The Juve-
nile and Domestic Relations Court disagreed, finding that M.T. was le-
gally female and ordered J.T. to pay spousal support." J.T. appealed,
arguing once again that M.T. was male. 9
In resolving the maintenance dispute, the New Jersey Superior
Court framed the central issue as whether the marriage between J.T. (a
biological male) and M.T., a postoperative male to female transsexual,
qualified as a legal marriage between a man and woman.' The court
found M.T. to be legally female and therefore eligible to be married to
J.T. Most importantly, the court decided that in determining the sex of a
person, "the anatomical test, the genitalia of an individual, is unques-
tionably significant and probably in most instances indispensable.""' This
factor was most significant for the court because "it is the sexual capacity
of the individual which must be scrutinized."' An individual must be
able to "engage in sexual intercourse either as a male or female."23 In other






20. Id. at 208.
21. Id. But see Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306 (P.D.A. 1970). The court in Corbett
determined that a person's sex is decided and fixed at birth. Id. at 1323. The legal validity of a union
for marital purposes, then, depends on a person's chromosomes. Under this view of sex, the sex
change process becomes invisible, invalid, and/or ineffective for purposes of marriage benefits. This
essentialist understanding of sex directly contradicts the thesis of this Note in that it focuses on
chromosomes rather than PVP to define marriage. But Corbett can be distinguished; the British
courts decided the Corbett case. This Note deals with policy and case law from the United States.
Furthermore, the court's reasoning in Corbett mirrors my arguments about why the legal recognition
of marriage is based upon penis-vagina penetration. See infra Parts ml-IV. For example, the court
stated that sex must necessarily be decided based upon biology because a male to female transsexual,
for example, "cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capable of performing the essential role of
a woman in marriage." Id. at 1324-25 (emphasis added). Apparently, the court believed this role to
be child bearing as a consequence of being on the receiving end of PVP. The court treated "biology
as destiny" approach, reducing "the essential role of a woman in marriage" to becoming pregnant
through PVP. The Corbett court's reasoning would fail to explain why sterile women can get
married, or why a woman who had a hysterectomy can receive alimony. For another interpretation of
the Corbett case, see Mary Coombs, Transgenderism and Sexual Orientation: More than a Marriage
of Convenience, 3 NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 1 (1997).
22. M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
23. Id.
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case, M.T. acquired a vagina which allowed for such penetration, so the
court recognized the marriage and ordered J.T. to pay spousal support.'
The emphasis on male to female penetration as the consummate
requirement for marriage can also be seen in Anonymous v. Anonymous.'
The plaintiff, a man, married a person whom he thought was a woman. '
The plaintiff and defendant did not have sexual intercourse before the
marriage, and the day after the marriage ceremony, the plaintiff discov-
ered his spouse possessed male genitalia.27 Notwithstanding this discov-
ery, the parties remained married for some time. Eventually, however,
the plaintiff filed an action requesting the court to annul the marriage.28
The court found for the plaintiff, holding that "the so-called mar-
riage ceremony.., did not in fact or in law create a marriage contract."'29
The court reasoned that the defendant was not female at the time of mar-
riage, and a valid marriage requires the union of a male and a female?"
Furthermore, the court noted that the parties never had a sexual relation-
ship.3' Apparently the court used the term "union" as a euphemism for
PVP. Even though the defendant underwent a sex change operation after
the marriage, but before the annulment action, the initial union did not
constitute a valid marriage. The court granted the annulment not on the
basis of fraud or incapacity, but on the basis that the two were not quali-
fied to be married."
One of the Anonymous court's most revealing statements regarding
the PVP requirement is that "the mere removal of the male organs would
not, in and of itself, change a person into a true female."33 Apparently the
court saw genetic composition as determinative in deciding whether a
person is male or female. Later in the opinion, however, the court re-
counted another court's statement that "the law provides that physical
incapacity for sexual relationship shall be ground for annulling a mar-
riage."' This statement indicates that in determining a person's sex, and
therefore the ability to marry, PVP is the key factor.
24. Id. at 211. The court also stated that the decision to recognize a male to female transsexual
who could sexually function as female "no way disserv[ed] any societal interest, principle of public
order or precept of morality." Id. This statement underscores the operative principle argued in this
Note: When a man is able to penetrate a person with a vagina, legal and moral recognition follow.
25. 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
26. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 499-500.
29. Id. at 501.
30. Id. at 500.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 501.
33. Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
34. Id. (quoting Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605 (N.Y. 1926)). The Mirizio court continued
on to say that a marriage relationship should exist with the result and the capacity for the "purpose of
begetting offspring." Mirizio, 150 N.E. at 607. This emphasis on procreation was cited as a policy
reason for the requirements of marriage. For a discussion of this empty justification, see Part I.B.2.b.
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A third case which focused on the importance of penis-vagina
penetration is Frances B. v. Mark B.35 The plaintiff wife married the de-
fendant husband, believing the defendant to be a man. The wife sought
an annulment when she discovered the husband did not have a penis,
asserting that the defendant "was unable to have normal sexual inter-
course."3 The defendant was a female to male transsexual who had suc-
cessfully obtained a legal name change recognizing his transition. 7 De-
spite the husband's successful social transition, the court granted the
annulment, based upon the defendant's purportedly deficient genitalia.
While the court recognized that the defendant might pass as a man in
society, he could not "function as a husband."3 The court recognized the
transsexual identity, but stated that "[a]ssuming, as urged, that defendant
was a male entrapped in the body of a female, the record does not show
that the entrapped male successfully escaped to enable defendant to per-
form male functions in a marriage."39 The court explained that "hormone
treatments and surgery have not succeeded in supplying the necessary
apparatus to enable defendant to function as a man for purposes of pro-
creation."
The court in Frances B. emphasized two things: the importance of
possessing a penis and of using it for procreative purposes. The holding,
therefore, appears to suggest that the ability to procreate is the basis of a
valid marriage. However, the procreative use of the penis follows only
after the acquisition of the penis, something that the plaintiff alleged, and
the court found, the defendant did not possess. Additionally, the wife's
key argument was that the defendant could not have "normal" sexual
relations. The court recognized the validity of this claim by focusing on
the insufficiency of Mark's male "apparatus." The penis as a tool for
penetration, not procreation, occupied the central place in the court's
analysis. Although the defendant could be recognized as a man in soci-
ety, the marriage could not be legally recognized because the court found
Mark did not possess a penis, which was essential for performing his
marital function of penetrating Frances, with the possibility of procrea-
tion. The court found that Mark's deficient penis prevented him from
engaging in procreative sex. What the court did not say, however, is as
revealing as what it did say. Specifically, the court did not say that the
35. 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
36. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 713 (emphasis added). The wife also sought an annulment based
upon the fact that the defendant did not possess sexual organs. Id.
37. Id. at 714. The court granted a name change from Marsha to Mark after the defendant filed
a petition explaining his emotional and physical condition as not female, but male. See id. Changing
the sex on a birth certificate is also a pressing issue for many transgendered people, and courts
sometimes refer to birth certificates to verify sex when deciding whether to grant a marriage license.
See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
38. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
39. Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
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central requirement for marriage was the ability to procreate and since
Mark could not procreate, the marriage was invalid. Instead, the court
focussed on possessing the proper genitalia and then using this genitalia.
After meeting these two preconditions, procreation could follow.
This summary of transgender marriage cases illustrates courts' em-
phasis on PVP as the central element in determining the validity of mar-
riage." While some of these cases have discussed the ability to procreate
as a necessary component of the marital relationship, this component is
discussed within the context of penis-vagina sexual intercourse. In other
words, it is not procreation itself that concerns the courts, but rather that
procreation happens through penis-vagina sexual penetration. Thus, PVP
functions as a necessary precondition for the method of procreation dis-
cussed and advocated by the courts. 2 Nowhere do these cases discuss
whether the parties loved each other, were committed to one another, or
were companions at the time of marriage, or sufficiently possessed a
"heterosexual" orientation. In fact, discussions regarding sexual orienta-
tion are conspicuously absent from the cases, and instead the courts' de-
cisions regarding marriage validity rest on conduct.
41. One United States case, in addition to the British case previously discussed, see supra note
21, dismisses the relevance of penis-vagina penetration as a criteria of determining a valid marriage
and instead relies on the chromosomal make-up of the parties. See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828
(Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987). In Ladrach, a post-operative male to female (mtf) transsexual attempted to
marry a male. The court held that the two individuals could not marry each other because they were
of the same sex. Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832. In finding that the parties were of the same sex, the
court relied on the likely chromosomal make-up of the mtf transsexual. According to a doctor's
testimony, the mtf transsexual would most likely not possess the chromosomes of a female. Id. at
830. Also, the court noted that the mtf transsexual's birth certificate reflected a male sex. Id. at 831-
32. This fact, along with the likelihood of the chromosomal composition, provided the court with
support for its holding. Moreover, when describing the case, the court dismissed the fact that the mtf
transsexual possessed a vagina and, therefore, could engage in penis-vagina penetrative sex. Id. at
830-32. This case does not support this Note's PVP conclusion. However, of the handful of cases
that have been decided on this issue, Ladrach exists as an outlier and minority view.
42. The importance of PVP has also been discussed by the United States Supreme Court. See
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In Turner, the Court addressed whether the fundamental right
of marriage can be burdened to a greater degree for prisoners than for non-prisoners. The regulation
at issue in Turner allowed a prisoner to marry only with the approval of the prison superintendent.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 82. The Court held the regulation to be unconstitutional. Id. at 97. In so doing,
the Court discussed the "essential attributes" of marriage and the ability of these attributes to be
preserved in the prison context. The Court stated that "[m]any important attributes of marriage
remain, however, after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life." Id. at 95. These
elements included: (1) expressions of support and commitment, (2) an exercise of spirituality or
religion, and (3) the expectation that most marriages will be "fully consummated" upon the inmates'
release. Id. at 95-96. Emphasizing the expectation for consummation, the Court focused on the act
of PVP. While it is unclear how the Court prioritized these elements (especially in light of the
Court's statement of "most" instead of "all" in the consummation context), the Court assumed that
marriage, in general, is granted with the expectation that there will be penetration. If an inmate was
never able to consummate a marriage, because he or she was on death row for example, it is unlikely
the Court would affirm such a union.
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B. PVP Through the Lens of Bisexuality
Like the transgender marriage cases, the UMDA and cases inter-
preted directly under the act, and DOMA, also treat PVP as the determi-
native element of a legal marriage. Unlike the transgender cases, how-
ever, in the UMDA and DOMA marriage is not constructed as explicitly
dependent on PVP. But a careful analysis revealed through the lens of
bisexuality shows that PVP is the determining factor for judges and
lawmakers in these contexts as well, even if more subtly than in the
transgender marriage cases.
1. Understanding Bisexuality
At the most basic level, bisexuals 3 can be described as having the
potential to sexually desire both men and women. More specifically,
bisexuals refuse or fail to choose a specific gender or sex as the object of
their desire. Their sexual desire refuses the binary sexual construction of
desire.
Bisexual identity can exist in many permutations." This Note fo-
cuses on legally married bisexuals, but there are numerous other permu-
tations including single bisexual people and bisexual men and women in
same-sex relationships. The many permutations complicate an under-
standing of bisexuality. 5 Since few legal scholars have undertaken the
43. Attempting to define or unpack the label "bisexual" is tricky business. Many components
comprise identity, including legal status, desire, behavior, and perception. See generally John H.
Gagnon, Gender Preferences in Erotic Relations: The Kinsey Scale and Sexual Scripts, in
HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXUALrIY 177 (David P. McWhirter et al. eds., 1990) (discussing
aspects of identity and the Kinsey scale which measured identity based upon conduct and fantasies).
44. For a poststructural account of identity in general, see AFFER IDENTITY: A READER IN
LAW AND CULTURE (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995). Queer theory has persuasively
demonstrated the dangers of relying on identity and theorizing around its constructions. See, e.g.,
Lisa Duggan, Making It Perfectly Queer, in SEx WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE
155 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter eds., 1995) (arguing against a political or legal movement based
on an idea that sexual identity is "unitary" or "essential"). But see Suzanna Danuta Walters, From
Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace (Or, Why Can't a
Woman Be More Like a Fag?), in SIGNS, Summer 1996, at 830, 837 (arguing that the politics of
feminism and lesbian-feminism are at risk of being lost with the "deconstruction of the cohesion of
identity"). This Note does not directly enter into this debate, but does strategically depend upon the
existence (whether "real" or not) of a discreet and identifiable bisexual identity at some level to
make the larger point about legal marriage. By using bisexual identity in this way, this Note engages
in what has been called "strategic essentialism." See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies:
Deconstructing Historiography, in SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES 3, 13-15 (Ranajit Guha &
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak eds., 1988).
45. The term bisexual implies a desire based upon a person's sex. This term simplifies the
components of desire. For example, the number of bi-categories increases dramatically when a
transgendered person has a bi-identity or a non-transgendered person desires a same-gender,
transgendered person. In the case of transgender bi-desire, bisexual fails to capture such an
experience. Bi-gender or bi-gender identity may be more applicable. A discussion of transgender
identity and politics is beyond the scope of this paper. For an excellent article discussing transgender
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project of deconstructing the complex nature of bisexual identity, ' the
following section attempts to fill this gap by presenting some of the per-
mutations of bisexual identity to illustrate that marriage is based on PVP.
For purposes of this Note, the term "identity bisexual" refers to a
person who has refused to choose a gay or straight sexual orientation,
and thus the term refers to a person's orientation and potential desire for
both men and women,' not the many ways a bisexual may choose to live
his or her sexual life. The term "opposite-sexed bisexual" describes a
person who has a bisexual orientation but is currently partnered with an
opposite sex person. In the same vein, the term "same-sexed bisexual"
describes a person who has a bisexual orientation but is currently part-
nered with a person of the same sex."
identity issues, see Hasan Shafiqullah, Note, Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An
Argument for the Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 195 (1997).
46. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
47. When I refer to opposite-sex and same-sex identities and relationships throughout this
paper, I am relying on the traditional and conventional acceptance and understanding that there are
only two sexes. I realize, however, that this is not biologically correct. See Anne Fausto-Sterling,
The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, in THE MEANING OF DIFFERENCE 68
(Karen E. Rosenblum et al. eds., 1996) (presenting empirical evidence that at least five sexes
comprise the human race). This Note reveals that the entire body of family law marriage doctrine
depends on the two-sex supposition. For this reason, Fausto-Sterling's work is monumental in
showing that not only is the requirement of opposite sexed unions unprincipled because of the PVP
requirement, the requirement is based upon an incorrect and flawed supposition. Fausto-Sterling
states: "Western culture is deeply committed to the idea that there are only two sexes .... [T]oday it
means being. .. subject to a number of laws governing marriage, the family, and human intimacy."
Id. at 68. If this reality were to be acknowledged, the entire basis for legal regulation of human
relationships would change. "Imagine that the sexes have multiplied beyond currently imaginable
limits .... It would have to be a world of shared powers .... [M]ale and female, heterosexual and
homosexual-all those oppositions and others would have to be dissolved as sources of division." Id.
at 72. This Note uses such terms not to reify their mistaken meanings but instead to operate with
common understandings of sex and relationships.
This Note will also refer to heterosexual orientation and heterosexuality. Such terms assume a
lifetime of primary and/or exclusive opposite sex partnership or desire. In reality, even a person who
exclusively partnered with the opposite sex may desire both women and men. Yet for the purposes
of simplicity, this Note assumes this person has a heterosexual orientation. Additional terms could
apply in other situations as well. "Functional heterosexual" could refer to a person who may sexually
desire both sexes but has spent the majority of his or her recent life partnered with an opposite-sex
person. "Social heterosexual" could refer to a person who, regardless of sexual orientation, moves
through the world assumed to be heterosexual, because they often do not come out as gay, lesbian, or
bisexual. All of these terms illustrate the fluid and dynamic nature of sexual orientation identities.
Viewing sexual orientation, specifically bisexuality, as multidimensional and multifaceted can serve
a broader liberational goal. What these terms do not show, however, is the legal construction of
sexual orientation, specifically in the marriage context.
Finally, the term "legally unionized" could describe a person who has received state sanction
for his or her partnership. In other words, a "legally unionized" person is a legally married person.
This term does not establish any meaning particular to the sexual orientation of the spouses. Instead
the term refers to the legal status given to a person and a couple by the state. The term "legally
unionized" is more precise than marriage because marriage is constructed as and conflated with
heterosexual orientation, which I later show and deconstruct. See infra Part 1I1. Despite the efficacy
of the term "legally unionized," I will continue to refer to marriage as marriage in order to
deconstruct the term.
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Bisexuals are essential and unique players in analyzing and under-
standing legal marriage. Despite this unique role, the diametrical opposi-
tion between gay and straight has been, according to Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick, a crucial element of modem Western culture.4 ' According to
Sedgwick, twentieth-century thought cannot be understood without un-
derstanding the relationship between homosexual and heterosexual: 9
"[A] whole cluster of the most crucial sites for the contestation of mean-
ing in twentieth-century Western culture are consequentially and quite
indelibly marked with the historical specificity of homoso-
cial/homosexual definition.. . ."' This duality of homosexual and het-
erosexual lies at the heart of our "modem cultural organization."5 Iden-
tity bisexuals, however, do not fall on either end of this diametric oppo-
sition. This organizing principle, nevertheless, serves as one of the bases
for labeling bisexuals as either gay or straight, depending on the sex of
their partners or the purpose of the classification. Although identity bi-
sexuals have refused to choose, they have been forced into one of the
only two options, heterosexual or homosexual. This coercive classifica-
tion is not surprising since, based on Sedgwick's analysis, bisexuality
challenges the very nature of our cultural organization. Accepting a bi-
sexual orientation forces an expansion of dualistic thinking52 and exposes
the permeability of traditionally recognized identity boundaries. If
Sedgwick is right, bisexuality also undermines fundamental classifica-
tions that inform Western thought. Since the stakes of maintaining the
homo/hetero duality are so high, an analysis of how bisexual identity is
treated has much to offer queer theory.
Identity bisexuals have come out and challenged the omnipresent
nature of bipolar social construction.53 The bisexual challenges to binary
thinking about sexuality have met with considerable success, at least to
the extent that bisexuals are lumped into the "gay" side of the so-
cial/sexual ledger. Most gay pride parade banners and many gay com-
munity centers recognize bisexuality. Sexual orientation anti-
All of these terms are admittedly underinclusive. For example, it is possible that one person
could simultaneously be referred to as an: "identity bisexual," "opposite-sexed bisexual," "social
heterosexual," "functional heterosexual," and "legally unionized." It would be much easier to refer
to such a person as either a "bisexual" or "heterosexual" depending on their partner status. The fact
that a person could hypothetically fit into all of these categories at once, however, underscores the
complexity of identity and need for a deeper understanding and more detailed representation of
bisexuals.
48. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 45 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
49. Id. at 48.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Ruth Colker, A Bi Jurisprudence, in HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND
OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 15 (1996).
53. For comments on bisexual identity, see id.
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discrimination laws protect bisexuals.' Queer scholarship is also begin-
ning to include work about bisexuality." Yet, ironically, queer scholar-
ship provides one of the starkest examples of bisexuality invisibility. 6
Bisexuals continue to be misunderstood because of the traditional dual-
istic social construction of sexual orientation identity itself.
One social construction of bisexuals is that they are heterosexual.
Identity bisexuals are most often constructed in such a way when an
identity bisexual legally marries a person of the opposite sex (thereby
becoming an "opposite-sexed," "legally unionized" bisexual according to
this Note's classification terms) and receives the state-generated privi-
leges and benefits reserved for opposite-sex married couples. In this case,
however, a bisexual person does not change his or her orientation. Upon
marriage, this person could identify and be viewed as "legally unionized"
(the beneficiary of governmental benefits) rather than heterosexual. An
opposite-sexed, legally-unionized bisexual would be assumed to be het-
erosexual until and unless s/he publicly came out as bisexual. In other
words, a default rule presumes that being married means that the spouses
are heterosexual. This default rule both mischaracterizes bisexuality and
perpetuates the exclusivity of the marriage institution.
The diverse terms capable of describing various permutations of bi-
sexuality illustrate the fluidity of bisexuality but also of sexual orienta-
tion in general (including heterosexuality). When one considers that
identity bisexuals can and do freely enter and exit a legal union, the my-
thology that marriage is exclusively by and for heterosexuals gets desta-
bilized. Such destabilization "is an important goal that can be partly ac-
complished by an emphasis on acts."" Applying this idea here (i.e.,
54. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 363.02-03 (West 1997).
55. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, A Bisexual Jurisprudence, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 127 (1993);
Naomi Mezey, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Identity
Classification Based on Acts, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 98 (1995).
56. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997) (failing to include
bisexuals as meaningful participants in the creation of legal theory and to substantively distinguish
how they might be the same or different in perpetuating the racism criticized).
57. See supra note 47, see also infra Part I.B.2.b. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
assumes that those who marry are heterosexual. Labeling bisexuals as heterosexual, specifically
when married, does not accurately reflect the position of bisexuals in society generally because
bisexuals continue to be at risk of discrimination based on their orientation, not marital status. See
infra note 107. In fact, bisexuals are often singled out for biased treatment, notwithstanding marital
status. In the spring of 1994, the mayor of St. Paul, Minnesota, refused to sign a "gay rights"
proclamation because of the inclusion of bisexuals and transgendered persons. See Anthony
Lonetree, Coleman Won't Sign Gay Month Proclamation, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., May
4, 1994, at lB. The mayor stated that he would have signed the measure if it included only gays and
lesbians because their identity was a "sexual orientation" deserving of "protected class" status. Id.
Bisexuality, according to the mayor, was instead a "lifestyle issue" which does not deserve legal
protection. Id. The mayor further stated that including bisexuals under the rubric of "gay and
lesbian" represented the ultimate of "political correctness." ld.
58. Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1771 (1993).
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adopting a number of terms for bisexuals depending on the acts of part-
nering) can destabilize marriage by showing the institution depends upon
acts, rather than a particular sexual orientation. Revealing that identity
bisexuals legally marry opposite sex partners disrupts the myth that mar-
riage is a union based on heterosexual status.
2. Legal Marriage Under the UMDA and DOMA Depends Upon PVP
States traditionally regulate the confines of legal marriage.59 In two
instances, however, legal marriage has occupied national and federal
attention. First, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA),
which serves as the model for state marriage laws.' Second, Congress
passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)6' which supplanted tradi-
tional state jurisdiction over marriage and family regulation by defining
marriage as an opposite-sex union for federal purposes and supporting
states that ban same-sex marriage. Under both DOMA and judicial inter-
pretations of the UMDA, the dispositive criteria used to determine the
legitimacy of a legal marriage is the potential for or actual vaginal pene-
tration by a penis. Opposite-sexed bisexuals best reveal this point be-
cause they frequently receive the benefits and privileges of legal mar-
riage without fitting the social description of eligible individuals (i.e.,
heterosexuals). When they enter the marriage institution as bisexuals,"
they show that sexual orientation is immaterial to the defining character-
istics of marriage. Bisexuals illustrate that PVP, rather than sexual ori-
entation, is the key element of a legal marriage, necessitating a careful
59. See Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 515-19
(1994). See generally Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27
(1996) (discussing marriage as a fundamental right and the social benefits and constitutional
ramifications potentially arising from the abolition of marriage); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of
Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1469-75
(1997) (discussing the roles of the states and federal government in regulating marriage). A live
question exists whether the legal significance of marriage emanates from the United States
Constitution or from the bundle of state-conferred rights and entitlements to legally recognized
partnered individuals. The Supreme Court has recognized opposite sex marriage as a fundamental
right. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Regardless of the source of the legal significance of the marital bond, states traditionally regulate the
institution.
60. The UMDA was originally ratified by a national body entitled the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970 and then amended twice by the same national body.
At least eight states have adopted, at least in part, the UMDA including Arizona, Colorado, Illinois,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Acr, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 1 (1998) (providing table of jurisdictions adopting the act).
61. P.L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. H 1996) and
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998)).
62. This ability is not limited to bisexuals. Gays and lesbians also could freely enter the
institution if they wished to do so with an opposite sex partner. Bisexuals are best situated, however,
to play this subversive role because they are genuine participants in the mythology of marriage as
romantic, love and commitment based. The main point here is that marriage laws do not consider, or
even reject, sexual orientation on its face.
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review of marriage doctrine. This exploration reveals that love and com-
panionship fail to occupy a central, significant, or even minimal place in
legal marriage.
a. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
The UMDA63 outlines regulations for marriage and divorce. The
UMDA purports to "strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage
and safeguard family relationships"' and defines marriage as a "personal
relationship between a man and a woman."65 Evidence of a valid mar-
riage under the act can take the form of reputation, cohabitation, or the
acknowledgment of the parties.' The UMDA does not explicitly prohibit
same-sex marriage. 7 Many courts, however, reason that the generally
accepted definition of marriage as opposite-sex as defined by the UMDA
precludes legal recognition of same-sex relationships.68 Opposite-sexed
bisexuals, however, can and do legally marry under the UMDA.
Facially, the UMDA does not require that the parties to a marriage
love or even like eachother. Instead, the UMDA allows legal recognition
of a formal relationship between two opposite-sex people simply based
upon fact that the parties are opposite sexes.69 Two people could do
nothing more than acknowledge their commitment to one another by
registering as a couple after solemnization" and thereby become lawfully
married. The UMDA assumes that the parties are able to consummate the
union simply by the couples' opposite sex composition.7' Based upon the
language of the UMDA, a bisexual could, therefore, have no sexual de-
sire for, and never cohabitate or share finances with, her opposite sex
partner but legally marry anyway. The partners could, moreover, despise
one another. A bisexual person could announce at the wedding her sexual
63. Id. § 101 (amended 1973), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 171 (1998).
64. Id. § 102, at 171.
65. Id. § 201, at 175. To obtain a license in the registration process, the parties must present an
application with their sex noted. This statement will be used to verify that the parties are opposite
sex, or one man and one woman. If there is a question about the sex of a party, the birth certificate of
an individual is often consulted. See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 829 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987). This
is why it is crucial for many transgender individuals to change their sex on their birth certificate.
66. In re Bailey's Estate, 423 N.E.2d 488 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (interpreting the formality
provision of the Act).
67. UMDA § 207, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 1183 (1998) (providing a list of what types of marriages are
prohibited including: (1) marriages between uncles and nieces and between aunts and nephews
except as permitted by "established customs of aboriginal cultures," (3) marriages between brothers
and sisters, (4) marriages between ancestors and descendants, and (5) marriages entered into prior to
the dissolution of a previous marriage).
68. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
69. This requirement incorrectly presupposes that there are, in fact, only two sexes. See
Fausto-Sterling, supra note 47.
70. UMDA § 206, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 1182 (1998) (requiring parties to register and be
solemnized in order to obtain a marriage license).
71. Cf UMDA § 208(a)(2), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 186 (1998) (holding a marriage to be invalid if a
party lacks the physical capacity to consummate the marriage by sexual intercourse and the other
party was unaware of the incapacity at the time of solemnization).
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orientation and intent to remain identified and active as such but still
enjoy the legal recognition of her opposite sex relationship. Therefore,
this recognition is based solely on the sex (i.e., genitalia) of the partners,
and their potential to engage in PVP using that genitalia.
Thus, marriage under the UMDA is based upon the genitalia of the
parties. Facially, however, the UMDA does not provide any insight into
the purpose for the opposite sex/genitalia requirement. The criteria used
by courts deciding cases under the UMDA for declaring an attempted
marriage invalid more explicitly articulate that PVP is the precondition to
legal marriage. The UMDA outlines several reasons for invalidating a
marriage. A marriage can be declared invalid if a party was induced into
a marriage based on fraudulent grounds that relate to the essential ele-
ments of the marriage relationship,72 or if a party lacks the physical ca-
pacity to consummate the union."
The UMDA does not state what constitutes adequate grounds for
alleging fraud. Cases interpreting this provision of the UMDA provide
insight. In Woy v. Woy,74 a husband sought an annulment, alleging that
his wife failed to disclose her same-sex relationship history prior to their
marriage.75 At trial the wife denied she was a lesbian, but admitted she
had sexual relations with a woman before and during her marriage to her
husband. Her husband identified his wife as bisexual.7 The husband and
the wife had sexual relations during their ten-year relationship.
The Woy court held that the wife's same-sex activities "had noth-
ing to do with" the essential part of the marriage." The court reasoned
that because the marriage was sufficiently consummated, the wife's
"lesbian activities" did not interfere with her ability to engage in "nor-
mal" and "usual" sexual relations with her husband. 9 The court stated
72. UMDA § 208(a)(1), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 186 (1998). Courts shall also declare a union invalid
if a party lacked the ability to consent, the marriage was prohibited, or a party was not of the
appropriate age of consent. See id. § 208(a).
73. UMDA § 208(a)(2), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 1186 (1998). Consummate is defined as "to complete
[the] marital union by the first act of sexual intercourse after marriage." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986). The UMDA section governing marriage invalidity was
intended to replace the traditional common law of annulments. In fact, this section purported to
completely abolish the traditional grounds used to determine marriage fraud. UMDA § 208, 9A pt. I
U.L.A. 186 (presenting the purpose for this section in the Comment following the specific provision
of the act).
74. 737 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
75. Woy, 737 S.w.2d at 770.
76. Id. at 771.
77. Id. (stating that when he spoke with his wife about her relationship with another woman he
"realized that [his] wife was bisexual").
78. Id. at 773.
79. Id. at 774.
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that "the ... lesbian activities had nothing to do with the essential part
thereof of sexual intercourse."'
The court further determined that the wife did not have an affirma-
tive duty to disclose her same-sex sexual relationships prior to the mar-
riage.' This determination was based upon the fact that the wife did not
misrepresent her "lesbian" past, and mere non-disclosure did not rise to
the level of fraud entitling the husband to an annulment. 2 The court lik-
ened same-sex activities prior to marriage to unchastity, which a party
need not disclose to another party prior to marriage.83 In contrast, a party
must disclose pregnancy, venereal disease, sterility, and similar matters."
Notably, some of the things that must be disclosed (particularly venereal
disease or impotence) could affect the capacity for and desirability of
engaging in PVP. The court concluded that "annulment of marriage is the
exception and not the rule, and must be granted only upon extraordinary
circumstances."85
Woy demonstrates the centrality of PVP in defining a legal marriage
under the UMDA. First, the court in Woy disregarded the sexual orienta-
tion of the parties to marriage. While married, Ms. Woy engaged in bi-
sexual conduct by having sex with both men and women. The court mor-
ally condemned the wife's bisexuality (or bisexual conduct), stating that
"lesbian activities are reprehensible conduct not in accordance with the
normal mores of society," 6 but for legal purposes it decided that the sole
dispositive condition for the marriage was the existence of PVP.
The Woy decision further illustrates the dubious nature of the ar-
ticulated justifications for marriage laws that fence out gays and lesbians.
The UMDA purports to "strengthen the family" and "protect the institu-
tion of marriage." Yet the Woy court recognized that a woman can be
sexually active with women before and during her marriage, condemned
such behavior, but still upheld the marriage as valid, thus protecting the
union of opposite sexual genitals. The court overlooked adultery and
"homosexual" conduct because the necessary and dispositive element of
legal marriage-PVP-was present. Conservative groups, including the
Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family, however, would arguably
assert that the Woy court weakened the family unit.
80. Id. at 773.






87. See Al Knight, Primary System Distorts Christian Coalition Views, DENV. POST, Feb. 25,
1996, at DI (detailing the ideals of the Christian Coalition, an organization that was founded by
Republican Pat Robertson, that includes right-wing issues such as anti-choice, prayer in schools, and
anti same-sex marriage efforts); Michelle Mahoney, Focus on the Family Sets Compass by Bible,
DENV. POST, Nov. 28, 1995, at El (explaining the conservative, Colorado Springs based group and
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An additional insight offered by Woy relates to Ms. Woy's admis-
sion of engaging in sexual acts with both men and women while married.
Had Ms. Woy been in the military, her conduct and admission could
have justified her discharge. " Had Ms. Woy been a recent immigrant to
this country and admitted such conduct in a petition for permanent resi-
dency, the INS could have denied her petition.' The same conduct, how-
ever, did not preclude legal recognition of marriage because the only
relevant conduct was PVP.
Additional court decisions under the UMDA illustrate that marriage
is based upon the potential for PVP much more than any companionship
ideal. Courts uphold marriages when entered into solely for the purposes
of financial gain or under false pretenses of love and affection. In
Henderson v. Ressor,° for example, the court validated an ostensibly
heterosexual marriage despite the fact that the sole reason for the union
was to inherit property at the spouse's death." In Nebbitt v. Nebbitt,92 the
court held that a woman's failure to disclose her lack of love and affec-
tion for her husband did not give rise to a fraud suit in tort. Neither
Henderson nor Nebbitt required any showing of companionship between
the spouses. Parties can marry for financial gain or without love, com-
mitment, or affection as long as the parties are able to engage in PVP.
One additional case provides further support for the premise that
PVP is central to legal marriage. In Freitag v. Freitag,9' the court dis-
missed an annulment action filed by the wife who claimed that the hus-
band had concealed his "homosexual tendencies."' Three weeks after the
marriage, the husband became impotent.95 Two to three weeks following
the onset of impotence, the husband confessed his history of homosexu-
ality prior to the marriage.'
Despite both the husband's history of homosexuality and the onset
of impotence, the court refused to annul the marriage. 7 In reaching its
decision, the court noted that prior to the marriage, the couple had been
"intimate." Additionally, the couple cohabitated upon their return from
its central message of "preserving and strengthening the home" according to the Bible's teachings).
Arguably, these right-wing groups might like the PVP focus because of its essentialist and narrow
focus.
88. See infra note 108.
89. See infra Part I.
90. 126 S.W. 203 (Mo. 1910).
91. The Henderson case continues to be cited as good law. See Charley v. Fant, 892 S.W.2d
811, 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citing the Henderson case as an example of a legitimate marriage).
92. 589 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1979).
93. 242 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1963).




98. Id. The court, however, did not define "intimate."
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a honeymoon." Because of this cohabitation, the court implicitly as-
sumed that the couple consummated the marriage (i.e., the husband
penetrated the wife) when it stated that the husband was "incapable of
further fulfilling his marital contract. '' "° Thus it was not cohabitation (or
companionship) itself which mattered, but cohabitation as indirect proof
of prerequisite PVP.
The Freitag court dismissed the action for two related reasons. First,
the case did not present a "true case of homosexuality.' '0 ' Second, the
court did not believe that "the condition of the defendant [was] incur-
able."'0 2 These statements illustrate the preeminence of PVP in evaluating
the validity of marriage. The husband clearly acknowledged his previous
homosexuality, but the court took pains to overlook this declaration. In
doing so, the court ignored the sexual orientation of one spouse, focusing
instead on the sexual component of the relationship and the future poten-
tial for PVP in the marriage.
As with the other marriage cases, the basis for granting state sanc-
tion of a marriage relationship does not turn on love or companionship,
or even sexual orientation. Instead, courts labor to overlook and dismiss
evidence of non-heterosexual orientation and its impact, leaving PVP as
the most important factor in distinguishing valid from invalid marriages.
In short, courts focus more on sexual behavior (i.e., consummation
through PVP) than sexual orientation or love and commitment in decid-
ing whether to legally recognize marriages.
b. The Defense of Marriage Act
Congress passed DOMA in 1996 to counteract the possibility that
states might legally recognize same-sex marriage.' 3 Congress offered
five main goals and rationales for DOMA: (1) encouraging heterosexu-
ality; (2) preserving government resources; (3) defending traditional no-
tions of morality; (4) defending and nurturing the institution of tradi-
tional, heterosexual marriage; and (5) reserving the institution of mar-
riage for procreation.' Despite precluding federal recognition of same-
sex marriage, DOMA allows bisexuals to be legally married. Applying
99. Id.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id. at644.
102. Id.
103. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906
("[DOMA] is a response to a very particular development in the State of Hawaii.... [T]he state
courts in Hawaii appear to be on the verge of requiring that State to issue marriage licenses to same-
sex couples:") (referring to Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), thatset the stage for Hawaii
to become the first state likely to recognize same sex marriage).
104. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 7 n.21, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2911 n.21
("Upholding traditional morality, encouraging procreation in the context of families, encouraging
heterosexuality-these and other important legitimate governmental purposes would be undermined
by forcing another state to recognize same-sex unions."); id. at 12, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2916 (listing "four of the governmental interests advanced by this legislation").
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each of the congressional rationales to a legal marriage with at least one
bisexual spouse reveals the disingenuousness and ineffectiveness of
DOMA and its rationales, and the fact that it is based on PVP. The appli-
cation of the DOMA rationales to an opposite-sexed bisexual in a legal
marriage reveals that the sole determinative criteria for granting legal
recognition of marriage is not heterosexuality, but rather the potential for
PVP.
The first rationale supporting DOMA (encouraging heterosexual
orientation) can be easily discarded as illegitimate."5 The fact that oppo-
site-sexed bisexuals become legally unionized does not change their sex-
ual orientation. Therefore, DOMA fails to encourage heterosexual ori-
entation by allowing bisexuals to be recognized as legal partners in legal
unions. If anything, DOMA encourages what might be called heterosex-
ual conduct, which might be distinguished from what the congressional
record seems to treat as heterosexual status. Just as the UMDA cases
disregarded one spouse's non-heterosexuality, DOMA does not require
bisexuals to forsake their orientation to be legally married. Thus, it does
not provide any incentive for heterosexuality. While limiting the institu-
tion of marriage to opposite-sex couples may provide an incentive for an
identity bisexual to partner with the opposite sex, the law focuses on
sexual conduct, not sexual orientation. The second rationale for DOMA
is similarly problematic. If protecting scarce governmental resources
were a legitimate concern, bisexuals would also be fenced out of the in-
stitution in an attempt to preserve the institution's benefits for the truly
deserving (read heterosexual).'" Thus bisexuality exposes the incoher-
ence of DOMA's rationales.
105. while illigitimate, this rationale is not lacking in coercive power. See Adrienne Rich,
Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER
227 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993). Rich argues that there are many forces at work to coerce
women to partner with men. See id. at 227, 232-33. To the satisfaction of Congress, DOMA would
qualify as one of these forces. Rich, however, does not further argue that these forces convert
women into heterosexuals. In fact, she argues that women live on a continuum of lesbian identities
and that when women enter or live in a heterosexual union, it is not based upon their true or natural
"orientation" per se, but instead on the benefits of the union. See generally id. "A woman seeking to
escape such casual violations along with economic disadvantage may well turn to marriage as a form
of hope-for protection." Id. at 235.
106. Furthermore, current legally unionized couples with a bisexual member should face a
decrease or elimination of the financial benefits accorded by the government. There are many ways
to limit increased governmental spending on marriage without invidiously fencing out a group. The
justification of protecting government resources is clearly the only attainable, albeit circumspect,
goal. According to the GAO, marital status affects more than 1000 federal laws. See Letter from
Barry R. Bedrick, Associate General Counsel, General Accounting Office, to Henry J. Hyde, Chair
of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, (Jan. 31, 1997) (on file with the United
States General Accounting Office, available at <http://www.access.gpo.gov/su.docs/aces/
acesl60.shtml>, Report No. OGC-97-16). The GAO claims that conclusions cannot be drawn about
DOMA's overall affects on these laws because any particular law may disadvantage or advantage
married or single persons. See id. However, the summary of categories of laws affecting marital
status illustrates that marital status imparts far more financial benefits than disadvantages to married
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The third rationale for DOMA (defending traditional notions of mo-
rality) also proves illusory when analyzed through the lens of bisexuality.
The view of bisexuality as aligned with gay, and therefore morally re-
pugnant, permeates our society.'7 Many members of Congress express
this view.' 8 Therefore, by allowing bisexuals entry into legal marriage,
the institution becomes "morally contaminated." Yet DOMA fails to
exclude bisexuals from marriage. If those in Congress who supported
DOMA intended to uphold traditional morality, these members should
have required a sexual orientation litmus test upon. application for a mar-
riage license. But this practice, just like requiring a test to determine pro-
creative ability and desire, may well be unconstitutional.'"
Congress attempted to distinguish between moral and immoral un-
ions in DOMA's legislative history by distinguishing heterosexuality
from homosexuality. To do so, Congress juxtaposed heterosexuals with
homosexuals. For example, the legislation states that: "Civil laws that
permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a collective moral
judgment about human sexuality. This judgment entails both moral dis-
approval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality
couples. See id. Because all of the other justifications are unfounded and unattainable, protecting
heterosexual wealth remains as the only feasible justification. Preserving heterosexual economic
superiority exposes the intent to fence out a particular group simply because it threatens another's
economic situation. Also, this argument inaccurately assumes that the government would be unable
to extend resources. See generally John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in POWERS OF
DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 100 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983) (arguing the development
of capitalism provided the framework for the emergence of gay individuals and communities).
107. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
termination of a bisexual school teacher was constitutional), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009, 1017
(1995) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[n]othing in [Supreme Court] precedents requires that
result"); Timothy M. Tymkovich et al., A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and Prejudice in the Battle
over Amendment 2, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 287 (1997). Tymkovich represented the state of Colorado
in defending the anti-gay Amendment 2 before the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996). Amendment 2 fenced out gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from the political process. See
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (held unconstitutional in Evans, 517 U.S. at 635). The Tymkovich
article, mirroring the majority of Colorado voters, made no distinction between bisexuals and
"homosexuals" when discussing the validity of Amendment 2.
108. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994) (outlining the congressional Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy). This policy equates bisexuality with homosexuality in stating: "A member of the armed
forces shall be separated from the armed forces if .... the member has stated that he or she is a...
bisexual . I... "d  § 654(b)(2).
109. A sexual orientation litmus test would likely be unconstitutional under two theories. First,
if opposite-sexed bisexual marriage applicants were required to assert a heterosexual identity, and
refused legal recognition if they did not, they could allege their fundamental right to marriage was
violated. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding the right to marry as fundamental).
In this case, an opposite-sexed bisexual would argue that any restriction of this right must be
supported by a narrowly-tailored, compelling state interest, a standard nearly impossible for the state
to meet. The second approach for challenging such a test is based on the First Amendment. A
bisexual, gay, or lesbian person could allege that basing marital benefits on an assertion or statement
of sexual orientation is a content-based law that violates the First Amendment. See generally Nan D.
Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695 (1993) (arguing that an announcement
of homosexuality communicates an idea, not only a status or conduct).
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better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality." '
Bisexuals are conspicuously absent from this discussion. One may think
that it is not surprising for Congress to omit bisexuals, however, because
they are uniquely situated to fit the description of "heterosexual" by
choosing to marry a person of the opposite sex. While bisexuals may
choose to marry someone of the opposite sex, they, like gays and lesbi-
ans, are not legally allowed to not marry a partner of the same sex. As
previously discussed, the choice of partners is not determinative of bi-
sexual orientation."' In other words, when an opposite-sexed bisexual
becomes legally married, his or her sexual orientation does not change.
Identity bisexuals by definition retain their non-heterosexual sexual ori-
entation identity. Therefore, the institution is not exclusively "heterosex-
ual," calling into question Congress's traditional notions of morality. By
failing to require heterosexual orientation under DOMA, Congress failed
to meet its goal of preserving traditional notions of morality.
Bisexuality similarly reveals the bankruptcy of the fourth rationale
for DOMA. Congress and the President intended to defend "traditional,
heterosexual" marriage with DOMA. But if bisexuals can marry an op-
posite sex partner, the only tradition being protected is two people of the
opposite sex forming a legal union. The partnership at that point need not
be comprised of two heterosexuals and is not, therefore, a "heterosexual"
union in the sexuality sense."' Instead, the spouses would be legally un-
ionized and if they remained married, functional heterosexuals. Congress
and the President, however, apparently assume an opposite sex union
constitutes a "heterosexual" union (in the sexuality sense). To illustrate,
Congress stated that "society has made the eminently sensible judgment
to permit heterosexuals to marry." 3 Additionally, Congress stated:
"Civil laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a
110. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 15-16, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2919-20
(footnote omitted).
111. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
112. An argument can be made that when members of Congress use the term heterosexual, they
mean to invoke only notions of opposite sex pairings and never sexual orientation. One definition of
the term heterosexual is: "[O]f or relating to different sexes <[heterosexual] twins>." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1063 (1986). This definition supports the argument that
Congress meant only opposite sex couples. However, Webster's definition of heterosexual lists the
above definition last. The first definition listed under the term heterosexual is: "[O]f or relating to or
characterized by heterosexuality <sexual relationships between individuals of opposite sexes are
[heterosexual]>" Id. Heterosexuality is defined as: "[T]he manifestation of sexual desire toward a
member of the opposite sex." Id. Finally, one last definition for heterosexual is: "[A] heterosexual
individual." Id. These definitions, the ones implicating notions of sexual desire, occupy a more
central place in the dictionary. Therefore, it is likely that Congress did not divorce notions of sexual
orientation from the use of "heterosexual." Also, when ideas of opposite sex are implicated, they are
associated with non-sexual partners, such as twins. Furthermore, by allowing only "heterosexuals" to
marry, Congress implicates the definition of heterosexual, which is "a heterosexual individual"
which in turn necessarily implicates sexual desire and sexual orientation.
113. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2918 (emphasis
added).
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collective moral judgment about human sexuality. This judgment entails
both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-
Christian) morality.""'
The fact that bisexuals can marry their opposite sex partners shows
that DOMA fails to protect a "heterosexual" institution. Furthermore, the
fact that bisexuals legally can avail themselves of protected status and
financial benefits begs the question about what "traditional" union Con-
gress hoped to protect. What does it mean that despite congressional at-
tempts to reserve marriage for heterosexuals, bisexuals can and do
marry? This means, in part, that the ideal fails to achieve the desired re-
ality. The congressional ideal of only allowing state recognition of those
with a heterosexual orientation fails to play out in practice.
The fifth and final of DOMA's rationales, that DOMA reserves the
institution of marriage for procreation, is inherently empty. Congress
stated: "[Society] has a deep and abiding interest in encouraging respon-
sible procreation and child-rearing. Simply put, government has an inter-
est in marriage because it has an interest in children."" 5 This goal is illu-
sory in that fertility is not a prerequisite for legal marriage. Congres-
sional response to this fact is as empty as the ideal itself. "Surely no one
would propose requiring couples intending to marry to submit to a medi-
cal examination to determine whether they can reproduce, or to sign a
pledge indicating that they intend to do so. ' 6 Congress would likely
assert the same response to those who point out that bisexuals can marry,
thereby rendering the traditional and heterosexual ideals as illusory and
false. The appearance of tradition apparently matters to Congress, not the
reality that being partnered with a member of the opposite sex is not nec-
essarily synonymous with heterosexual status or identity.
Revealing bisexuals' ability to marry provides a trenchant critique
of DOMA. If all of the goals forwarded by Congress are incoherent,
there must be some unarticulated, additional reason for DOMA. This
unarticulated goal is certainly not to legally recognize love and compan-
ionship. Congress even specifically states that "it is not the mere pres-
ence of love that explains marriage.""' But not only is love insignificant,
it is nonexistent in DOMA and our marriage doctrine. Congress can point
to no provision in DOMA that codifies a "love" requirement. Congres-
sional analysis of marriage in DOMA shows that the real reason for
DOMA is to affirm PVP as a prerequisite for legal unions. First, Con-
114. Id. at 15-16, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2919-20 (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2917.
116. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2918.
117. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2917. The legislative history contains many
quotes about the lack of significance of love in the legal marriage relationship. One example is: "The
question of what is suitable for marriage is quite separate from the matter of love . I..." d. (quoting
Professor Hadley Arkes, Amherst College).
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gress uses "heterosexual" synonymously and interchangeably with "op-
posite-sex." For example, Congress defined marriage as the partnership
between one man and one woman,"8 and further set out its regulatory
purpose as "defend[ing] the institution of traditional heterosexual mar-
riage'.""9 Congress also contends that "the uniform and unbroken rule has
been that only opposite-sex couples can marry."'' " If opposite-sex pair-
ings neither guarantee nor represent procreative ability, an alternative
reason for the requirement must exist. As in UMDA case law, the oppo-
site-sex criterion must then be a euphemism for PVP. Logically, this
conduct-based understanding of opposite-sex pairings, then, is the poten-
tial for or actual occurrence of PVP.
Under DOMA and the UMDA, bisexuals enjoy state sanction of
their opposite sex relationships. Courts and legislators bestow such
privilege upon them simply because of their opposite-sex unions. Justifi-
cations for DOMA rest upon tradition and encouraging moral families.
Bisexuality, however, does not fit within commonly accepted societal
notions of "moral" or "traditional," as evidenced by societal discrimina-
tion against bisexuals. Bisexuals, nonetheless, are free to marry under the
UMDA, indicating that the only necessary criterion for marriage is geni-
talia deemed necessary to engage in PVP.
II. COMPANIONSHIP AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION MATTER IN
IMMIGRATION LAW
Although the general family law rule for granting legal recognition
to couples turns on the capacity for PVP, a different rule may apply in
other doctrinal areas. 2 ' Congress generally relies on the union of a man
and woman, or more accurately a penis and a vagina, as a basis to protect
the institution of marriage. Under DOMA and the UMDA, simply being
"opposite-sex" entitles a couple to marital benefits. Congress, however,
does not apply this conduct-based standard in all cases. Specifically, this
approach does not apply to immigrants who either marry upon arriving in
this country or who hope to join their spouses in the United States.'22 The
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments'" (IMFA) prevent an immi-
grant from attaining immediate permanent legal status in the United
118. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, sec. 3, §7, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. It 1996)); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 30, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2934.
119. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2906.
120. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2907.
121. The rule could be described as a "marriage-plus" situation. A "marriage-plus" situation
exists when litigants present a court with not only a marital, family law issue, but an additional issue
legislated by Congress or interpreted by the courts.
122. The treatment of marriage in the immigration context best illustrates this "marriage-plus"
situation. The marriage plus situation at issue here is marriage plus immigration.
123. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
1396 [Vol. 75:4
PENETRATING SEX AND MARRIAGE
States, even if s/he is married to a United States citizen."4 Instead, an
immigrant married to a U.S. citizen is only granted permanent residency
on a two-year conditional basis.'
In order to obtain permanent legal status, the immigrant must dem-
onstrate that the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of "pro-
curing an alien's entry as an immigrant."'26 The immigrant and her or his
citizen spouse are required to demonstrate a good faith marriage by filing
a petition detailing that the marriage was: (1) entered into in accordance
with state law, (2) valid at the time of petition, and (3) not entered into
for the purpose of gaining legal status for the immigrant.' 2 The immi-
grant and her or his citizen spouse also must meet personally with a rep-
resentative from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) so the
representative can determine whether the couple entered into the mar-
riage in good faith.'28 The statute further requires individuals to prove the
legitimacy of their relationship. Evidence of this legitimacy includes
pledges of commitment, cohabitation, and a disavowal of the purpose of
attaining legal status from the union. The interviews are quite invasive.
INS officials question the man and woman separately to determine
whether they each know the details about the other's daily lives.'" In
determining the legitimacy of the marriage, courts consider "evidence
relating to the degree of commitment by both parties to the marital rela-
tionship""'3 which includes considering all "relevant evidence.""' Courts
have interpreted the requirements of the "good faith" requirement to
mean, in part, that the parties intended to "establish a life together" at the
time of their marriage. 32 Thus, the IMFA, as interpreted, requires proof
of a genuine companionship.
124. 8U.S.C.§ 1186a (1994).
125. Id. § 1186a(a)(l).
126. Id. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i). The immigrant must also remain married from the time of entry
through the time of receiving his or her permanent status. Id. § 1 186a(b)(1)(A)(ii).
127. Id. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i). The petition must also include the address of each party since the
immigrant obtained permanent residence on a conditional basis. Id. § l186a(d)(1)(B)(i). This
requirement implies that it is essential for the immigrant and spouse to live together in order for the
immigrant spouse to attain permanent residence.
128. Id. § 1186a(c)(1)(B), (d)(3). The Attorney General, or designee, may waive the
requirement of an interview if s/he feels it is appropriate to do so. Even before the Amendments
were enacted, the INS met with immigrant spouses to determine the validity of the marriage. See
James A. Jones, Comment, The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments: Sham Marriages or
Sham Legislation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 679, 681 (1997).
129. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 804 n.227 (1995).
130. Chand v. INS, No. 96-70901, 1997 WL 415348, at *1 (9th Cir. July 24, 1997).
131. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(2) (1998).
132. See, e.g., Chand, 1997 WL 415348, at *1 (quoting Bu Roe v. INS, 771 F.2d 1328, 1331
(9th Cir. 1985)).
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In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments to curtail "fraudulent marriages."' 3 At that time the INS
asserted that close to 30 percent of petitions for immigrant visas involved
"suspect marriages."'' Since 1986, the INS disclaimed this statistic and
admitted that the number of people attempting to obtain legal status
through marriage was and is much lower.'35 Despite this acknowledg-
ment, the Amendments remain in force.
One example of the companionship requirement under immigration
law is found in Chand v. INS.'' Deciding that the marriage at issue was
not entered into in good faith, the court relied on the fact that the couple
did not see each other for eleven months after the wedding.33 Similarly,
in Gamboa-Garibay v. INS,'3 ' the court found a marriage to be fraudulent,
in part, because a spouse could not provide any documents of shared
residence.' In Gamboa-Garibay, the court also considered the fact that a
witness who often visited the couple could not give specific details about
what the couple did together during the these visits.'4 ' The court reached
its conclusion by disregarding the testimony of numerous witnesses who
testified on the petitioner's behalf as lacking credibility.'4'
Juxtaposing the INS amendments with DOMA illustrates the differ-
ent and contradictory federal approaches to marriage. DOMA accepts
without question the marriage of a man and a woman (both presumed to
be heterosexual) as a basis for social and legal entitlements. A couple
need do nothing more than present their opposite sex composition to a
court of law'42 to obtain legal recognition as a valid marriage.'3 Even that
133. H.R. REP. No. 99-906, at 1, 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.
Congress hoped to curtail such fraud while also supporting and encouraging the policy of family
unification. Immigrant spouses are given special consideration under our immigration laws in order
to achieve such a policy. This special policy, according to Congress, led to abuse and fraud when
used by immigrants who married solely to obtain United States citizenship or residency. Id. at 6,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.
134. Id. Congress adopted this statistic as one basis for enacting the Amendments.
135. See Michelle J. Anderson, Note, A License to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on
Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401, 1411 n.60 (1993) (stating that one of the highest rates of
"marriage fraud," according to the INS, is approximately 15 percent in the Los Angeles area but that
the INS estimates an average percentage closer to 8 percent). The Amendments primarily burden
female immigrants and have been amended to include waivers for battered women. See generally id.
(examining the effect of the INS amendments and subsequent regulations on immigrant women).
136. No. 96-70901, 1997 WL 415348 (9th Cir. July 24, 1997).
137. Chand, 1997 WL 415348, at *1.
138. No. 94-3399, 1995 WL 568347 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995).
139. Gamboa-Garibay, 1995 WL 568347, at *3.
140. Id.
141. Id. In another case, Chungong v. INS, the court mentioned as noteworthy that although a
party could supply a legal marriage certificate, the party could not produce any photographs or
invitations of the event. No. 96-2103, 1997 WL 295628, at *2 (4th Cir. June 4, 1997).
142. Presuming of course that the union was appropriately solemnized and registered.
143. An annulment, however, is always an option for a party to a marriage who has evidence
the marriage was not a valid one. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.a.
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declaration is not necessary in most circumstances since opposite-sex
couples usually just claim their marital status on hospital, tax, estate, or
other forms. In contrast, due to congressional concerns about marriage
fraud, immigration laws require much more than mere opposite sex un-
ions to form valid marriages. INS representatives are allowed to ask ap-
plicants about their companionship, and even their sexual orientation to
determine the validity of a marriage. ' "
For purposes of federal law, different regulations of marriage apply.
Under DOMA, when two opposite sex persons unite, there is not con-
templation of fraud. A man and a woman who are legal residents or citi-
zens in this country could arrive at the justice of the peace, declare that
they do not love one another and their sole intention is to get financial
perks, and still receive approval from the state.'45 A bisexual could simi-
larly arrive at the courthouse with an opposite sex spouse, denounce het-
erosexuality, pledge to live in an open manner as a bisexual, but none-
theless receive legal recognition and financial benefits based solely on
the genital match at the altar."4
Why then does federal law codify this inconsistency? One possibil-
ity is xenophobia. The disparate treatment of immigrants manifests not
only in the marriage context but also in welfare laws'4 and educational
systems.' A second possible explanation for the different approaches to
marriage is that heightened romantic or companionship requirements for
immigrants provide assurance that the immigrant also has a source of
financial support, and is, therefore, at a lower risk for burdening the gov-
ernment, or becoming a "public charge." However, this argument could
actually work in the converse; once individuals marry, even if their mar-
riage lacks commitment or romance, they are entitled to a wide range of
economic support from their spouse, including fair property division,
support, and maintenance. This fact might encourage, rather than dis-
courage, a lower threshold for legitimacy, so as to guarantee a source of
support. A third possible explanation is that the IMFA grants immigrants
144. See, e.g., Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
testimony offered at a deportation about an immigrant's homosexuality in an attempt td determine
the legitimacy of his marriage was not prejudicial).
145. See Henderson v. Ressor, 126 S.W. 203, 208-09 (Mo. 1910). But see Patricia A. Cain,
Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY: A REVIEW OF LESBIAN & GAY
IssuEs 97, 98 (1991) (finding that legally married couples do not always enjoy financial benefits,
specifically they have faced some tax burdens such as the "marriage penalty").
146. See supra Part I.B.2.
147. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1613 (West Supp. 1998) (prohibiting legal immigrants, with few
exceptions, from receiving means-tested public benefits for five years after their entry into the
United States). Congress also stated that legal immigrants should "not depend on public resources to
meet their needs." Id. § 1601(2)(A).
148. See generally Alaine Patti-Jelsvik, Note & Comment, Re-educating the Court: Proposition
187 and the Deprivation of Education to Undocumented Immigrants, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 701
(1997) (discussing the components of Proposition 187, one of which denied undocumented
immigrant children elementary and secondary public education access).
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a benefit, rather than punishes them. This argument rests on the fact that
immigrants usually do not receive any type of conditional residency or
expedited review, except in the marriage context. While this argument
frames the treatment accorded to immigrants as positive or privileged
because their petitions receive expedited review if they are married, the
reality still exists that compared to legal residents and citizens, immi-
grants must fulfill heightened and additional requirements in order for
their unions to be recognized as legally valid and deserving of financial
and societal privilege.
The divergent congressional approaches to regulating marriage
complicate the questions regarding marriage regulation and merit further
discussion. The IMFA focus on companionship in marriage, however,
does not invalidate this Note's conclusion about PVP in marriage due to
the unique nature of the immigration context.' 9
III. THE MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE PVP NATURE OF MARRIAGE
The previous discussion illustrates that legal marriage depends upon
actual or potential penis-vagina penetration. As the UMDA and trans-
gender cases show, neither sexual orientation nor love nor companion-
ship matters for most marriage regulation. The Woy court, for example,
treated a bisexual as heterosexual as long as she engaged in PVP. Under
that court's approach, as long as a person is willing to engage in PVP, the
PVP relationship (marriage) will be recognized, notwithstanding the
spouse's non-heterosexual sexual orientation. Woy, then, could be inter-
preted as furthering heterosexist principles by treating opposite-sexed
bisexuals more favorably than gays or lesbians. More fundamentally, the
court overlooked sexual orientation altogether. The court based its deci-
sion not on the sexual orientation of the parties, but on their capacity for
PVP.
The transgender cases similarly illustrate that legal marriage de-
pends on conduct (PVP) rather than heterosexual status. The transgender
individuals in these cases were never questioned about their sexual ori-
entation. Instead, their ability to marry rested on their physical ability to
perform one particular sex-act: PVP. Finally, Congress articulated the
opposite sex requirement for marriage in DOMA, which fronts for the
ability to consummate a union, i.e., engage in PVP.
Notwithstanding the doctrine that dictates that legal marriage de-
pends on sexual conduct-PVP-the courts and Congress attempt to
characterize marriage as status-based. The following discussion explores
two reasons for the mischaracterization of marriage as status-based. First,
the mischaracterization serves to reify and elevate heterosexual identity.
149. The unique nature is one of a "marriage-plus" situation. See supra notes 121-22.
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Second, the mischaracterization perpetuates the exclusivity of the insti-
tution of marriage.
A. How Courts and Congress Mischaracterize Marriage as Status-Based
Congress mischaracterizes marriage as status-based by equating the
opposite sex requirement-shown earlier to be the PVP requirement-
with heterosexual status, stating "society has made the eminently
sensible judgment to permit heterosexuals to marry.""'5 The institution of
marriage also gets characterized as status-based when the participation of
bisexuals in the institution is ignored and dismissed. In other words, mar-
riage can only be characterized as heterosexual by dismissing the reality
that bisexuals legally marry."'
In a related context, Janet Halley states: "Not knowing what sodomy
is, not naming it at all, not describing it accurately, not acknowledging its
presence, are all important parts of its historical profile. Obscurity is part
of what sodomy is, a means by which it attains its social effects."'5 2 The
same can be said about bisexuality in the context of legal marriage. Bi-
sexual invisibility perpetuates the myth that marriage is exclusively het-
erosexual and based on status rather than sexual conduct.
By not acknowledging bisexuality, legal marriage can be constructed
as purely heterosexual. A nuanced understanding of the bisexual
identity,' therefore, exposes the institution of legal marriage as one that
includes various sexual orientations. In essence, acknowledging that
identity bisexuals remain bisexual notwithstanding their participation in a
legal marriage reveals that legal marriage includes multiple sexual ori-
entations.
Failing to acknowledge bisexuals as active participants in legal mar-
riage also perpetuates the myth and conservative ideal that legal marriage
consists of two heterosexual partners. DOMA's legislative history re-
veals not only a lack of acknowledgment, but a labored attempt to con-
struct and present legal marriage as an exclusive union of two hetero-
sexuals. For example, Congress presents DOMA as a "heterosexual-only
marriage law."'" This "heterosexual" myth excludes gays and lesbians
from the institution. By being constructed as exclusively heterosexual,
the institution self-perpetuates as exclusively heterosexual. For example,
150. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2918
(emphasis added).
151. Just as Sedgwick argues the open secret of the closet has been central to the definition of
modem Western thought, the open secret of bisexuality has been central to the construction of legal
marriage. See Sedgwick, supra note 48, at 48-49. The open secret is this: bisexuals exist and exist in
both heterosexual and homosexual communities (as well as bisexual communities). The participation
of bisexuals in heterosexual communities, while known, remains unnamed and unanalyzed.
152. Halley, supra note 58, at 1757.
153. See supra Part I.B.1.
154. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 16, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2920 (emphasis
added) (stating that DOMA adheres to the moral teachings of heterosexual-only marriage).
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the law constructs marriage to be about heterosexuals. Because it is
about heterosexuals, it is thereby only for heterosexuals."' Halley ex-
plains how sodomy similarly conflates status and conduct:
"'[H]omosexual sodomy' has become homosexuals as sodomy."'' 6 Under
the legal institution of marriage, "heterosexual marriage" has, similarly,
become "marriage as heterosexuals." When one considers that bisexuals
enter the institution, however, it becomes apparent that the current insti-
tution of marriage is not only about heterosexuals but also about bisexu-
als.'57 The institution instead turns on the present or future acts of PVP,
not the sexual orientation status of the spouses.
Admittedly status and conduct cannot be cleanly separated as if dis-
tinct aspects of a person. Status can implicate conduct and vice versa: the
two are co-constitutive. A wealth of rich scholarship explores the com-
plexities of the relationship between status and conduct.'58 Most relevant
for the purposes of this Note is why the institution of marriage is socially
and legally constructed as status-based, specifically as heterosexual.'59
B. Why Marriage Is Mischaracterized As Status-Based
Strategically characterizing legal marriage as based on heterosexual
status serves a purpose. As Janet Halley argues, deconstructing like char-
acterizations "exposes the political nature of that equivocation."'" In
other words, Congress and courts further a political purpose by errone-
ously equating PVP conduct with heterosexual orientation. First, the
characterization perpetuates the myth that marriage is inherently or tra-
ditionally for heterosexuals-not gays and lesbians.'6 ' This equation is
intimately tied to both sexism and heterosexism:
155. This is the definitional approach used to fence out gays and lesbians from marriage. See
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (using definitional approach to uphold denial
of marriage license to two males). Singer defines marriage as the union between a man and a
woman. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191-92. Thus, because the union is only about men and women it can
only be for men and women. William Eskridge found that this is the most common articulated
approach for the defense of opposite-sex marriage. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-
Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1427-28 (1993).
156. Halley, supra note 58, at 1734.
157. See generally Bi ANY OTHER NAME: BISEXUAL PEOPLE SPEAK OUT (Loraine Hutchins &
Lani Kaahumanu eds., 1991) (presenting personal anecdotes of married bisexuals).
158. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA.
L. REv. 1551 (1993); Halley, supra note 58; Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military:
Charting the Constitutional Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 381 (1994).
159. The point I am arguing here is not that classification based upon acts is bad, undesirable,
or harmful per se. In fact, classifying based upon acts promises to offer opportunities for liberation
and equality. See Halley, supra note 58; Mezey, supra note 55. What this Note argues is that the type
of conduct-PVP--that marriage depends upon is unprincipled and illegitimate.
160. Halley, supra note 58, at 1733.
161. William Eskridge found that "[t]he main argument against same-sex marriage is
definitional: marriage is necessarily different-sex, and therefore cannot include same-sex couples."
See Eskridge, supra note 155, at 1427. Congress uses this definitional argument to further argue that
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For efficient subordination, what's wanted is that the structure not
appear to be a cultural artifact kept in place by human decision or
custom, but that it appear natural-that it appear to be a quite direct
consequence of facts about the beast which are beyond the scope of
human manipulation or revision. It must seem natural that individuals
of the one category are dominated by individuals of the other and that
as groups, the one dominates the other.
16
1
Since marriage is constructed as crucial to social ordering, it is es-
sential for equivocation to occur. This equivocation legitimizes the social
privileges afforded to heterosexuals in other contexts. For example, sex-
ual regulations harken back to traditional notions of morality and appro-
priate intimacy,63 the very notions that create and perpetuate the current
institution of marriage. Thus, without such equivocation, the privileged
nature of the heterosexual orientation in other contexts may be called
into question.'" In essence, if courts and Congress were clear that sexual
orientation fails to matter in marriage, then it could be argued that orien-
tation should not form the basis for discrimination in other contexts.
In addition, equating heterosexual identity with sex acts illustrates
the permeability and fluidity of the heterosexual status. Instead of con-
stituting a coherent status with essential attributes and characteristics that
justify the granting of legal subjectivity, heterosexuality depends upon
the union of opposite sets of genitalia, and nothing more. In recognizing
legal unions, the law does not care about who each partner had partnered
with, who they will partner with, or how they will order their intimate
relationship and how this constructs or impacts identity.'65 All the law
marriage is exclusively for heterosexuals by equating opposite-sex with heterosexual. See H.R. REP.
No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
162. MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 34 (1983)
(citing Paulo Freire's writings as the genesis for such a theory).
163. See generally Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 11 1996) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998)); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (utilizing, in part, the "ancient roots" of proscriptions against
sodomy to uphold anti-sodomy statute); H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12-18 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916-22 (setting forth governmental interests advanced by DOMA).
164. One obvious context is the military, wherein pronounced heterosexuals receive
preferential treatment. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). Even though the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
does not per se exclude gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from the military (instead it prohibits
"homosexual conduct"), those thought to be non-heterosexual must prove that they do not possess
the propensity to engage in homosexual acts. Heterosexuals obviously receive preferential treatment
in almost every other societal context as well, except where there are laws prohibiting against anti-
gay discrimination. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 363.02-03 (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting
discrimination against gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals).
165. This is not to say that the law does not involve itself with the marriage institution once it is
formed. In fact, most states, for example, impose a duty of support on spouses. See generally Amy
C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return: Its Implications for Women, 66 U.
CIN. L. REv. 535, 617 n.75 (1998) (discussing the varied obligations of spouses regarding property
and support). Also, states regulate divorce which necessarily involves a state determination as to the
continued legal viability of a union. An in-depth discussion of divorce law is beyond the scope of
this Note. Moreover, this Note seeks, instead, to investigate the legal rationales and rules for
allowing certain unions to access the marital privilege.
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cares about is "what" one can do with specific genitalia. This reveals that
there is nothing particularly elevated or sacred or socially beneficial
about heterosexual marriage, unless one says that PVP is essential to
social organization.
Constructing marriage as a purely heterosexual (status based) insti-
tution instead of based upon a particular type of sexual conduct (PVP)
legitimizes privileges afforded to those just because they assert the status
heterosexual. In essence, the construction of legal marriage as an institu-
tion based on heterosexual status serves not to describe the institution but
instead to prescribe privileged treatment for those who claim the identity
in society. This analysis shows the incoherence of fencing out gays and
lesbians based upon a status based ideal because, as shown, marriage is
not status-based. Instead, the institution is based upon the capacity for
PVP which is curious, and, as shown next, illegitimate.
IV. PVP IS AN ILLEGITIMATE BASIS FOR CONFERRING MARRIAGE
BENEFITS
Determining legal marriage benefits on the capacity for PVP is an
illegitimate basis for providing state marital benefits.'" The PVP re-
quirement perpetuates heteropatriarchy'67 and subordinates both women
and sexual minorities. The PVP requirement subordinates women be-
cause it reifies and encourages traditional gender roles (as symbolized
through the PVP sex act). One traditional gender role being reified and
encouraged is that it is appropriate (or natural) for men and women to
have sex with the opposite sex but not the same sex. If a woman or man
is not able or willing to perform this act then they are not a proper (or
true) woman or man. Requiring PVP for legal marriage encourages and
assures that traditional sex and gender roles will be continued. The first
and most fundamental of these roles is either penetrating or being pene-
trated by the opposite sex. Thus, a proper woman for the purposes of
marriage is a person who can be penetrated by a penis. A proper man is
the person who can penetrate the vagina.
Andrew Koppelman has argued that laws which discriminate
against gays and lesbians reinforce male hierarchy, thereby oppressing
women. '68 Koppelman argued, as have many writers and scholars, 69 that
166. Congress appears to implicitly agree that determining national policy on the basis of the
sexual act of PVP was illegitimate by the omission of any mention of such a requirement. Although
the omission also serves the purpose of legitimating the status of heterosexual, see supra notes 153-
57 and accompanying text, it also is a clear indictment of the illegitimacy of such a position. This is
further proven true because Congress relied on three rationales relating to sexual orientation and
marriage for DOMA, none of which were rational, true, or logical. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.b.
167. See Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex,
Gender, & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 162, 168-70 (1996).
168. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 198 (1994).
169. See, e.g., SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM (1988).
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the taboo against homosexuality is virtually synonymous with the taboo
against "sex-inappropriateness.""'7 The taboo against homosexuality,
thus, re-enforces traditional sex roles. This taboo, explains Koppelman,
"assumes the hierarchical significance of sexual intercourse and the pol-
luted status of the penetrated person."'7 ' Koppelman arrived at this con-
clusion based upon the similarities between the taboo against miscege-
nation and the taboo against homosexuality. Koppelman has shown that
the miscegenation taboo presumed that penetration possessed hierarchi-
cal significance, with whites dominating blacks and men dominating
women.' 2 Penetration signifies power; thus, being penetrated signifies
powerlessness. Disallowing mixed race marriage protected whites from
being penetrated by those who threatened the power structure. The ban
on same sex marriage, then, protects men from being penetrated by other
men. This legal scheme prevents men from inhabiting the place of the
polluted and protects men's status as the penetrator and powerful. In es-
sence, based on the homosexuality taboo, many segments of society ref-
use to tolerate sodomy because the penetration of a man reduces "men"
or "maleness" to the same polluted status as woman or female. Koppel-
man further states:
Implicit in [the] taboo are the premises-incompatible with equal
concern and respect for all citizens-that sexual penetration is a nasty
degrading violation of the self, and that there are some people (in the
case of the homosexuality taboo, women) to whom, because of their
inferior social status it is acceptable to do it . ... "'
In the marriage relationship, women necessarily occupy the polluted
position of the penetrated. This is so because legal marriage requires
PVP. Men then occupy an elevated position and women occupy a subor-
dinate position. Being penetrated also means any number of subordinat-
ing consequences. These consequences have been documented in case
law,"' journal articles,'75 and social science materials. 6 Some of these
consequences include the unequal division of labor in the home,'7 the
degree to which men are not held accountable for domestic violence and
170. Koppelman, supra note 168, at 235.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 224.
173. Id. at 236.
174. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment that
restricted Medicaid funds for medically necessary abortions).
175. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 168, 224.
176. See, e.g., JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO BE A MAN 91-100 (1989) (discussing and
documenting, as far back as the early eighties, the numerosity and consequences for women of
unplanned or unwanted pregnancies including financial hardship, lack of choice for abortions, and
lack of support from male partners for electing an abortion).
177. See Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex
Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1915 n.61 (1994) (citing numerous findings that
women perform a disproportionate share of the household work).
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marital rape, '78 and the financial ruin many women face upon the dissolu-
tion of the union.
79
Adrienne Rich also discusses the institution of heteropatriarchy and
urges that heterosexuality be recognized as a "political institution."'
According to Rich, heterosexuality is such an institution because of the
many forces which discourage women from associating with other
women (both socially and erotically) and possessing women-identified
values.' Thus, if not for the overwhelming number of forces that either
punish women for being without a man or make it difficult or near im-
possible for women to be without a man, women would more fully real-
ize their connection to or desire for other women.
While Rich's theory can be criticized on many fronts, particularly
for essentializing women in general and more specifically lesbians,' 2 it
provides a helpful context within which the PVP requirement can be
understood. Allowing only opposite sexed couples tO marry by itself
works as a force to encourage male and female coupling.'83 Rich states
that a "woman seeking to escape disadvantage may well turn to marriage
as a form of hoped for protection."" However, the PVP requirement
does even more; it perpetuates heteropatriarchy by providing financial
incentives to women to be penetrated by men. As discussed above, this
state sponsored penetration invokes and perpetuates the subordination of
women.
85
178. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape
Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 574 (1997) (finding that marital rape is still legal in one state and
treated less seriously than stranger assault); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARv.
L. REV. 1181, 1193 (1994) (discussing the role and limitations of the state in assisting women,
including women who are victims of domestic violence).
179. See Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's
Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998).
180. Rich, supra note 105, at 232 (emphasis omitted).
181. Id. at 232-34. Some of the forces which discourage women's identification with other
women but that support male power include: sexual terrorism (including rape and sexual
harassment), domestic violence, abortion and contraception laws, lack of compensation for work in
the home, and non and substandard education of women. Id. at 233.
182. Rich could be said to essentialize lesbians or lesbian desire as political. "[W]e may first
begin to perceive [lesbian existence] as a form of naysaying to patriarchy, an act of resistance." Id. at
239.
183. Congress agrees, although as previously discussed mistakenly focuses on the sexual
orientation instead of genitalia. See supra discussion Part I.B.2.b.
184. Rich, supra note 105, at 235.
185. 1 am not attempting to argue here that PVP is inherently oppressive for women. I could not
in good faith argue this position for this would minimize the pleasurable sexual aspect of such an act
for women, both heterosexual and opposite-sexed bisexual. I am not attempting to align myself with
writers like Andrea Dworkin who have argued that penetration of any kind is inherently oppressive.
See ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 63-67, 122-23 (1987). Instead, I am calling into question the
governmental practice and custom of focusing on this act as a basis for recognizing legal unions. For
despite the sex positive outlooks on PVP, it carries with it a history and social significance in the
law. Thus, I call into question the central place PVP occupies in marriage law.
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Additionally, PVP is an illegitimate basis to determine governmen-
tal benefits because it is based on certain sexual activity. The PVP-based
marriage requirement reduces the marriage participants to sexual actors
and objects. Men and women receive recognition and benefits for what
they can do in bed, rather than what they actually do with the rest of their
lives in their relationship. For performing the requisite sex act, PVP, the
government confers numerous and abundant financial benefits.' s6 Spouses
also receive social benefits. Because legal marriage has nothing to do
with companionship and love, none of these benefits has anything to do
with love or companionship. Instead, these benefits reward those who
can engage in PVP.
An irony lurks here. Marriage law elevates, reveres, and encourages
one type of sexual conduct (PVP) while characterizing the institution to
be comprised of exclusively those with a heterosexual sexual orientation.
Thus, marriage law contributes to the construction of the heterosexual
identity as equivalent to PVP.'87 Unlike heterosexuals, however, margi-
nalized groups must devote a considerable amount of time debunking the
myth that they are hypersexual.'85 Without such defense, these groups are
at risk for perpetual vilification and misunderstanding. This objectifica-
tion significantly impacts marginalized groups in the law by creating bias
and prejudice. For example, the myth that gay male identity is defined by
sex informed the Justices who decided the anti-gay case of Bowers v.
Hardwick."9
On the one hand, then, heterosexuals' benefits depend on PVP while
courts simultaneously refuse protections or privileges for gays and lesbi-
ans due to the characterization, albeit inaccurate and unfounded, that
gays and lesbians are all about sexual conduct. Thus, marriage law cre-
ates a double standard for gays and lesbians. This double standard is an
illegitimate basis to fence out gays and lesbians from marriage. The judi-
ciary and government cannot justify basing an entire legal scheme of
financial benefits and burdens, and societal rights and responsibilities, on
sexual conduct, penis-vagina penetration, which implicates an entire
history and future of the subordination of so many,' while simultane-
186. See supra note 106.
187. Admittedly, marriage is not the only societal force that defines the heterosexual identity.
See Susan Sterett, Husbands & Wives, Dangerousness & Dependence: Public Pensions in the
1860s-1920s, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 1181 (1998) (arguing that pension benefits given to widows
were instrumental in creating the heterosexual identity).
188. See generally Halley, supra note 58 (deconstructing the equivocation of gay and sodomy);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1437-45 (1991) (explaining that one prevalent image of
slave women, perpetuated today, is of the Jezebel, or "a woman governed by her sexual desires").
189. 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) ("It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Proscriptions
against that conduct have ancient roots."); see Halley, supra note 58.
190. By exposing the unprincipled nature of the PVP requirement, this Note risks prompting
reform that takes an even more punitive and discriminatory position against gays, lesbians,
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ously refusing legal protections to gays and lesbians because of their
erroneous conflation with sexual conduct.
CONCLUSION
The transgender marriage cases, the UMDA, and DOMA reveal that
formal, legal marriage does not require or even consider love, compan-
ionship, commitment, or sexual orientation. Instead, marriage depends on
sexual conduct, specifically the act of penis-vagina penetration. Despite
the PVP (act-based) nature of marriage, Congress and the courts charac-
terize marriage as status-based, which works to further reify the institu-
tion and heterosexual orientation itself. One way this is done is by ig-
noring or dismissing the participation of bisexuals in legal marriage. This
act-based requirement is an incoherent and illegitimate basis for granting
governmental benefits because it perpetuates the subordination of margi-
nalized groups and creates a double standard for gays and lesbians. Also,
it is dubious at best to have a central social, political, and cultural insti-
tution turn on a particular sex act.
Bisexuals occupy a unique position in queer theory, being stealth
interlopers into the institution of marriage and exposing the disingenuous
and illusory nature of the rationales that are used to construct the institu-
tion as exclusively by and for heterosexuals. DOMA and the UMDA are
not explicit about this act-based understanding of marriage; bisexuals are
uniquely situated to expose the PVP requirement in these contexts. This
analysis reveals the progressive potential of theorizing around bisexual-
ity. This Note reveals that legal doctrine looks to the capacity for PVP as
determinative of marital eligibility, surely an illegitimate requirement for
the plethora of benefits attached to marriage. Moreover, it shows the
progressive potential of theorizing around bisexuality. Future incorpora-
tions of bisexuality in queer theory offer further opportunity to decon-
struct and reconstruct legal regimes.
transgendered individuals, opposite-sexed bisexuals, and women. This is always a risk, however,
when advocating for change. The goal of this Note is to expose the true illegitimate nature of present
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INTRODUCTION
In this Afterword I situate this symposium against the past and pres-
ent landscape of sexual orientation legal scholarship, seeking thereby to
draw observations and arguments about the future of this field. Rather
than focus on the preceding articles,' I juxtapose events of special sig-
nificance to sexual orientation legal scholarship that have transpired
since the founding of this discourse in a 1979 symposium by the Hast-
ings Law Journal.2 In particular, I consider three phenomena that came
about immediately after, or since, the commencement of this field: (1)
the contemporaneous emergence of critical race theory and postmodern
methods of outsider jurisprudence during those same years; (2) the ar-
ticulation of Queer' consciousness and activism at basically the same
time; and (3) the onset, spread and impact of majoritarian cultural war.
These developments, I argue, require sexual minority legal scholars to go
beyond sexual orientation in the search for social and legal equality.
This Afterword also celebrates the remarkable coincidence that in a
single year two symposia on sexual orientation and "intersexionality"
were conceived, planned and held independently of each other.' This
coincidence is remarkable because sexual orientation scholarship never
before had witnessed any such effort-any programmatic effort to assess
features of identity other than sexual orientation to evaluate how law
affects this nation's multiply diverse sexual minorities.! Despite individ-
1. The Foreword provides a more complete summary of the symposium articles. See Julie A.
Nice, Foreword: InterSEXionality and the Strategy Question, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1131 (1998).
2. See Sexual Preference and Gender Identity: A Symposium, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
3. I adopt the capital "Q" to underscore distinction with, and distance from, the "queer" as
homophobic pejorative. The move to capitalize "Queer" responds to concerns over continuing asso-
ciations with "queer's" disgraceful and traumatizing past. By distinguishing Queer from queer in this
way, the move to capitalize invokes the shame of heterosexism while also underscoring that the
refashioned term represents a willful act of sexual minority self-determination-an act taken through
discursive reclamation and redeployment of the loaded term specifically and consciously on antisub-
ordination terms. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1, 346-50 (1995).
4. See Symposium, InterSEXionality: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Queering Legal
Theory, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1129 (1998); Symposium, Intersexions: The Legal and Social Con-
struction of Sexual Orientation, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1101 (1997). Although the Denver symposium
took place in February 1998, it was planned and assembled during 1997.
5. By "sexual minorities" I mean to highlight the diversity as well as the commonality of
lesbians, bisexuals, the trans/bi-gendered and gay men. It is plain that "differences" exist across
these various "sexual minority" populations. It also is plain that differences exist within these sub-
groups. Without disturbing recognition of those differences, or implying a false essentialism, it also
is plain that commonalities exist within and across these subgroups on the basis of mistreatment due
to the interplay of sex, gender and sexual orientation. Social and legal mistreatment on the basis of
this complex interplay is the continuity that makes it coherent to approach these multiply diverse
subgroups as a unit of social and legal analysis. Without reifying that mistreatment, the term "sexual
minority" signifies a level of generality in the analysis of so-called "sexual aberrations" that is well
grounded inthe social circumstances and legal classifications established by the current preferences
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ual or sporadic efforts to go beyond sexual orientation in gay and lesbian
scholarship,6 prior to 1997 critical legal inquiry into the condition of
multiply diverse sexual minorities remained fixed substantially on "sex-
ual orientation" as a unidimensional unit of critical legal analysis. This
coincidence is made even more remarkable by two other developments
of the same year.
Though not the focus of this Afterword, 1997 brought forth a pro-
gram on sexual orientation, race and ethnicity during the annual meeting
of the American Association of Law Schools.7 That program, also a first,
was sponsored jointly by the Association's Section on Gay and Lesbian
Legal Issues and Section on Minority Groups in response to the lack of
expansive critical analysis of the complex social and legal conditions that
disempower sexual minorities legally, and that disadvantage us socially.
That same year, an "internal racial critique" of gay and lesbian legal
scholarship also emerged in full force.8 This critique documented in
compelling detail the absence of multidimensional analysis in sexual
orientation legal scholarship, and persuasively explained the detrimental
consequences of that absence In each instance, these developments have
been overdue steps needed to secure the continuing development of sex-
ual orientation discourse as a field of legal scholarship relevant to social
life. This symposium and its 1997 counterparts, therefore, are a most
welcome sign of this field's continuing vitality.
However, this vitality also means that scholars in this field must
confront complex and difficult issues of identification, majoritarianism
and responsibility in the advancement of antisubordination goals through
critical legal scholarship. These issues stem in part from the need for
solidarity and the fact of diversity within and among traditionally subor-
or practices of majoritarian dominance--circumstances and classifications whose structuring we
must discern as we inspect and endeavor to dismantle them. See Valdes, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, HYDBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS
UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1996) (examining the complexity of identiy intermixture across various
sociolegal categories); Isabelle R. Gunning, Stories from Home: Tales from the Intersection of Race,
Gender and Sexual Orientation, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 143 (1995) (recounting
personal and general encounters with Eurocentrism in lesbian venues or discourses); Kenneth L.
Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 263 (1995) (comparing and contrasting constructions of personal and community identities
based on race and sexual orientation); Cynthia Petersen, Envisioning a Lesbian Equality Jurispru-
dence, in LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE POLITICS OF LAW 118 (Didi Herman
& Carl Stychin eds., 1995) (arguing that lesbian legal theory must be intersectional because lesbian
subordination is multifaceted); Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure of Recent
Lesbian and Gay "Victories," 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83 (1994) (questioning the benefits of lesbian
and gay liberation to lesbians and gays who are of color, and/or poor, and/or trans/bi-gendered).
7. This program, titled "Race, Ethnicity and Sexual Orientation: Crossing New Intersections
in Law and Scholarship," was held on January 9, 1998 during the Association's annual meeting in
San Francisco, California.
8. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Les-
bian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997).
9. See id. at 567-635.
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dinated outgroups. As experience to date illustrates, the development of
frameworks to embrace diversity and induce solidarity within and across
outgroups is a difficult and delicate task.'" Antisubordination progress
therefore always will be uncertain, perhaps sometimes impossible. But as
critical legal scholars devoted to the achievement of social justice for
sexual minorities and other disempowered outgroups, we cannot evade
the role we can play as legal scholars in a legalistic society."
The importance of immediate context bears stress at the outset be-
cause it underlies the analysis pursued in this Afterword: to make a dif-
ference in legal culture and throughout society, antisubordination schol-
ars must come to understand today's penchant for backlash lawmaking
through cultural warfare as a continuing and concerted act of domination
and subordination. Today's "cultural war" is a phenomenon that very
much affects contemporary law and lawmaking in a society wedded to
"government by law" and justified by the belief that its laws are pre-
sumptively just-and hence, justified-precisely because they are for-
mally "democratic."' 2 Yet the version of "democracy" that predominates
in this country accommodates subordination through cultural war and
backlash lawmaking because it valorizes and enforces majority self-
interest, even while it problematizes majoritarian power when it verges
on a formal, as opposed to a functional, form of cultural supremacy."
In a close call, and on other occasions, prevalent forms of majori-
tarianism strongly caution against the use of judicial power to upset the
arrangements put in place by those able to dominate the political
10. See generally Franciso Valdes, Latinafo Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-
Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 2-
7 (1996) (outlining ousider experiments and experiences with diversity and community through
critical legal theory).
11. By "legalistic" I mean simply a society that is highly devoted to "the rule of law" and that
highly touts "equal justice under law." Without doubt, in this sense, this society is highly legalistic.
See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994) (discussing the legalistic
spirit that has long been a hallmark of America's identity).
12. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980) (discussing the long-standing dispute in constitutional theory over the scope of judicial re-
view).
13. The standard rule is that courts should defer to legislative majoritarianism unless a "sus-
pect" classification is deemed to be involved in state action or unless state action impinges upon a
"fundamental" interest. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTTrUTIONAL LAW 374-
80 (4th ed. 1991). The purpose of this rule is to maximize majoritarianism and avoid the "counter-
majoritarian difficulty" that is attributed to judicial interference with majoritarian lawmaking. See
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16-23 (1962). Of course, the debate over "active" versus "restrained" exercises of judicial
review is a much larger and complicated phenomenon, a full discussion of which is beyond this
Afterword. For relatively recent expositions of this debate, see STEPHEN C. HALPERN & CHARLES
M. LAMB, SUPREME COURT ACrIsM AND RESTRAINT (1982); STERLING HARWOOD, JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM: A RESTRAINED DEFENSE (1996). See generally Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judi-
cial Review: The Retrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997); Sylvia Lazos Vargas, Democracy




process." This domination, both historically and presently, has consti-
tuted an essentialized form of identity-driven politics based on race, sex,
religion, class, sexual orientation and other sociolegal axes. Nonethe-
less, avoidance of the so-called "counter-majoritarian difficulty" is a
venerable and continuing rationale for judicial deference even to unjust
laws that favor essentialized majorities at the expense of essentialized
minorities.'" Thus, to succeed in lawmaking processes moved mostly by
essentialized majoritarian self-interest, legal scholars must employ our
skills and resources to imagine and help assemble collectivities with the
capacity for successful participation in such lawmaking-at least until
we are able to alter substantively these lawmaking dynamics. Through
our scholarship and other activities, we must imagine and implement
ways of mobilizing, practicing, harnessing and transcending identity
politics to promote antisubordination transformation in a multicultural
but majoritarian and essentialist society.
This challenge, as just noted, is made acute and urgent by the resur-
gence of majoritarian cultural traditionalism, which followed on the heels
of the 1979 symposium, 8 and continues today; since the triumph of
backlash politics in the 1980 presidential election, judicial rollback of
civil rights and "democratic" reconsolidation of majoritarian self-interest
via legislation and referendum have become established as the political
14. A recent and especially germane example is Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in
which the Court curtsied to the "presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia," to
uphold "majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality." Id. at 196. Splitting 5 to 4, a bare
majority held that "homosexual sodomy" did not constitute a "fundamental right," id. at 191-92, and
then used the occasion to signal the arrival of a new era of judicial majoritarianism, warning lower
courts and potential claimants that judicial discretion hence would side with majoritarian lawmaking
preferences. Cf. id. at 194-95. Justice Powell, whose wavering switched outcomes several times
during the course of the decision, finally cast the decisive vote that created a majority for that infa-
mous ruling; ironically, several years later he publicly singled it out as a key instance of error during
his time on the high bench. Anand Agneshwwar, Powell on Sodomy: Ex-Justice Says He May Have
Been Wrong, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3. Nevertheless, that pronouncement spawned similar
rulings, in which lower federal courts held that lesbians and gays do not constitute a "suspect classi-
fication" to uphold state actions in which members of the sexual majority discriminated with impu-
nity against sexual minorities. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
For critical reviews of these and similar rulings, see Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the
Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP.
143 (1988); Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988); Nan D. Hunter, Life After
Hardwick, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick,
Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648 (1987); John Charles Hayes, Note, The
Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Pro-
tection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REV. 375 (1990).
15. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
16. See generally BICKEL, supra note 13, at 16-23 (discussing the counter-majoritarian as-
pects of judicial review).
17. See generally Charles R. Lawrence 11I, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Juris-
prudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1995) (proposing a "transformative approach,"
which, in addition to remedying individual indignities, would focus on correcting group-level injus-
tices).
18. See infra notes 83-94, 101-38 and accompanying text.
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norm of these times.'9 This timing is telling; it tells us that, from its mo-
ment of origin, sexual orientation scholarship has been surrounded by
majoritarian cultural war and essentialized backlash lawmaking directed
against sexual and other minorities who somehow have reaped "too
many" rights.' The key linkage pressed in this Afterword therefore is the
relationship between antisubordination purpose through critical legal
scholarship and backlash lawmaking through cultural war.
More specifically, this Afterword focuses on the ways in which le-
gal scholarship devoted to social justice can be made more potent and
relevant through multidimensional analysis." This Afterword urges mul-
tidimensional legal scholarship as a promising means toward exploring
and combating how sexual and other majorities exert lawmaking power
through cultural war to perpetuate essentialized structural privileges.
Multidimensionality in antisubordination critiques of law and society
reminds "gays" or "women" or "blacks" or "Latinas/os" that the multiply
diverse members of each such group at all times help constitute and
complexify all of the other groups as well. Multidimensionality thereby
19. The norms of cultural war and backlash lawmaking have become entrenched through
various elections and developments spanning the 1980s and 1990s. See infra Part E (discussing three
lines of majoritarian backlash lawmaking). This entrenchment continues despite the 1998 midterm
elections, which have been interpreted as a rebuke of the extremism of backlash zealots in the Con-
gress; perhaps most notable among those was Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. See, e.g., How-
ard Fineman & Matthew Cooper, Newt Hits the Showers, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 1998, at 30, 30. Of
course, the 1998 results also were attributed more specifically to public disgust with the pursuit of
the Monica Lewinsky scandal to the point of formal presidential impeachment by politicians closely
affiliated with ingroup backlash. See Daniel Klaldman & Mark Hosenball, The Last True Believer,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 1998, at 36, 36. Of course, this election does not undo any of the tragedies
wrought already by cultural war. And despite the electorate's apparent rebuke, majoritarian cultural
warfare is unlikely to abate, as evidenced by post-election calls to redouble ingroup backlash efforts:
these calls argue in part that 1998's electoral rebuke was not the result of public distaste for over-
zealousness, but, rather, a failure to honor sufficiently the imperatives of majoritarian backlash.
These calls therefore urge intensification of practices and policies, such as the rollback of civil
rights, that are likely to reconsolidate ingroup privileges, which have become the hallmark of cul-
tural war. See, e.g, John Leo, GOP: Stop Running Away from Majority Opinion, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 9, 1998, at 1 A; see also Steve Berg, Simmering Preferences Controversy Nears a Boil, STAR
TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), March 12, 1995, at IA; Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of "We," ATLANTA
J. & ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 16, 1994, at G1; Too Many "Rights," NEWSDAY, Dec. 15, 1991, at 43.
20. See generally Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transfor-
mation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (discussing
recent attempts by neoconservatives and critical legal scholars to undo civil rights reforms); see also
supra note 19 and sources cited therein. In this symposium, Karen Engle examines one aspect of this
retrenchment effort, exploring the conflation of "civil rights" and "special rights" by majoritarian
legislators and judges to oppose the gay rights movement and the response to this conflation by gay
rights proponents. See Karen Engle, What's So Special About Special Rights, 75 DENV. U. L. REV.
1265 (1998).
21. By "multidimensional" I mean a kind of multi-intersectional analysis and discourse that
attempts cognition of multiple intersections at once. See Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 640-44; see
also Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Building Bridges: Bringing International Human Rights
Home, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 69, 71 (1996); Man J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Con-
sciousness as Jurisprudential Method, Keynote Speech Before the Yale Law School Conference on
Women of Color and the Law (April 16, 1988), in 14 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 297, 298-300 (1992).
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reminds all outgroups that all forms of identity hierarchy impinge on the
social and legal interests of their members: biases based on
race/ethnicity, sex/gender, sexual orientation and other identity features
are directly relevant to each of those overlapping groups' social and legal
interests because all of those biases impact members of every such
group. Multidimensionality tends to promote awareness of patterns as
well as particularities in social relations by studying in an interconnected
way the specifics of subordination.
The emphasis throughout this Afterword on the relationship be-
tween critical legal scholarship and social justice transformation should
not elide the equal importance of praxis to antisubordination method.22 I
focus on theory and scholarship in this Afterword chiefly because, as
legal scholars, we possess a unique structural capacity for theorizing
social reality and law's relationship to it: as critical legal scholars de-
voted to social justice, we have the responsibility to exercise that capac-
ity to articulate frameworks of effective antisubordination resistance. But
articulation is only the beginning; we also have a responsibility to prac-
tice and promote the lessons and insights of our scholarship. The respon-
sibility of all social justice scholars without a doubt includes praxis.23
However, as with theory, praxis requires multidimensionality. And
multidimensional praxis suggests that outgroup antisubordination inter-
ventions ranging from public lawyering to social activism should not be
tied exclusively or simply to unidimensional essentialist formations, such
as sexual orientation. Praxis-like theory and scholarship-should be
cognizant of, and responsive to, the intra- and inter-group diversities and
complexities addressed below with respect to theory and scholarship.
By responding to the gaps of the past in both theory and praxis, and
by contributing momentum to the expansion of this scholarship at a criti-
cal juncture in its development, these twin symposia perform an invalu-
able service. By showcasing "intersexionality," 1997's symposia demon-
strate how this scholarship can continue to mature. They invite and in-
spire more of the same in the years to come. Everyone associated with
this field thus owes a debt of appreciation to the editors, authors and ad-
visors of this symposium and its counterpart. In support of their efforts,
the aim and purpose of this Afterword is to fortify this field of antisubor-
dination scholarship as a key component in the continuing quest for
equality, safety, justice and dignity on behalf of the multiply diverse sex-
22. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Law-
yering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821, 828-29 (1997) (offering the
beginnings of a critical race praxis to help bridge both the gap "between progressive race theory and
political lawyering practice and the growing divide between law and racial justice").
23. This basic point has been well-established among RaceCrit and LatCrit scholars. See, e.g.,
Charles R. Lawrence In, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 2231, 2248-51 (1992); Laura M. Padilla, LatCrit Praxis to Heal Fractured Communities, 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 375 (1997).
19981 1415
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ual minorities that inhabit this nation, and that remain subordinated by its
Euro-heteropatriarchal laws and norms."
A. Sexual Minorities & Sexual Orientation Scholarship Since 1979
In 1979 the legal academy witnessed the first-ever symposium on
sexual orientation and the law." Since then this field of scholarship has
progressed tremendously: this scholarship decisively has interjected sex-
ual minority concerns into the consciousness and institutions of this na-
tion's legal culture.26 This scholarship has articulated nonheterosexist
viewpoints in doctrinal domains from constitutional to family law that
have exposed the heterocentric presumptions and prejudices that perme-
ate this society and its legal system." In conjunction with the work of
activists and scholars in other disciplines, this intervention gradually but
certainly has established the value and legitimacy of scholarly inquiry
into an aspect of human existence and sociolegal interaction that previ-
ously had been denigrated as mere prurience or deviance.
But since then, and until now, our work on its face has for the most
part reduced the lives and interests of sexual minorities virtually to a
single factor: apart from exploring the interconnection of sex and gender
to sexual orientation," our scholarship has been unidimensionally fo-
24. By "Euro-heteropatriarchy" or "Eurocentric heteropatriarchy" I mean the white, northern
European, Anglo-Saxonized fusion of androsexism and heterosexism that combines these ideologies
of identity to produce, and to sustain, white, male and straight privilege in law and society. This
"Eurocentric" version of "heteropatriarchy" is rooted in ancient times and cultures that are posited as
the antecedents of this society. See Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-patriarchy: Tracing the
Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 172-
201 (1996). Though androsexism and heterosexism drive other societies and cultures as well, critical
analysis is justifiably focused on the white and Anglo version because it is the one that predominates
structurally in the society under discussion. In this particular version of heteropatriarchy, white and
Anglo supremacy is a feature that distinguishes this country, for better or worse, from, say, the
fusion of androsexism and heterosexism in a Spanish or Latina/o society. See Francisco Valdes,
Notes on the Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual Orientation: A QueerCrit and LatCrit Perspec-
tive, in THE LATINO/A CONDMON: A CRITICAL READER 543 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 1998). For further readings on the emergent field of "LatCrit" theory, see infra note 161.
25. See Symposium, Sexual Preference and Gender Identity: A Symposium, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
799 (1979).
26. For a critical synopsis of this field's development, see Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins,
Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory and Politics of "Sexual
Orientation, " 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1997).
27. See id. at 1301-08.
28. The work on sex and gender, and their relationship to sexual orientation, has been spear-
headed by a variety of scholars. See, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas, Queens, and
Lezzies: The Construction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 33 (1995); Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory,
9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1994); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1
(1995); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereo-
types, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992); Katherine
M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gen-
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cused on the social and legal significance of sexual orientation. Happily,
this continuing exploration of sex-gender intersectionality continues in
this symposium.29 But since 1979, and until 1997, it was possible to read
sexual orientation legal scholarship and walk away from that effort
thinking that race, ethnicity, class, religion and other markers of identity
and opportunity were marginal, if not irrelevant, to sexual minority
lives." It was possible, for the most part, to assume that the heterogene-
ous sexual minority population was comprised substantially of male,
affluent WASPs; it was possible to conclude mistakenly that all was well
in the lives of this nation's nonheterosexual population but for the ex-
ception of majoritarian sexual orientation bias.
This narrowed approach may be explained by developmental cir-
cumstance and other factors, including the operation of white and similar
privileges in this society, well as within the legal academy and among
lesbian and gay communities.' As a first step, this focus has been salu-
tary because it has interjected into legal discourse a previously silenced
but socially relevant community. But the discourse cannot be allowed to
stall and remain there. This much has been made plain by the emergent
internal critique of sexual orientation scholarship, which notes our col-
lective failure to fan out beyond an overly simple or narrow focus on
der, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1995); Valdes, supra note 3; I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orienta-
tion) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1158 (1991). This ongoing investigation is presaged in Mary
C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the Male/Female Dichotomy,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (1979), and, more recently, in Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187.
29. For example, Mary Anne Case, in her contribution to this symposium, continues prior
explorations of sex, gender, and sexual orientation and their interaction under different cultural
models. See Mary Anne Case, Unpacking Package Deals: Separate Spheres Are Not the Answer, 75
DENv. U. L. REv. 1305 (1998). Taking exception to comparative benefits I had attributed to Native
American sex/gender arrangements elsewhere, Case argues that Native American arrangements at
this point "would contract, not expand, our present horizons. [They] would do little more than
substitute a package deal centered around gender for the one our culture has conventionally built
around sex." Case, supra, at 1306; see also Valdes, supra note 3, at 209-300 (describing indigenous
cultures' treatment of the sex/gender/sexual orientation model and comparing this to Euro-American
constructs).
30. Based on the substantial analogy literature produced during those years, it also was possi-
ble to draw numerous analogies between sexual orientation and other categories of identity. See, e.g.,
Odeana R. Neal, The Limits of Legal Discourse: Learning from the Civil Rights Movement in the
Quest for Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 679 (1996) (assessing the relevant
similarities and differences in the use of race and sexual orientation civil rights analogies to address
the failings of each movement); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and
"Passing": Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 65 (1997) (analogizing race
and sexual orientation in the context of the military's anti-gay exclusion policy); Margaret M. Rus-
sell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and "The Civil Rights Agenda," 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y
REP. 33 (1994) (comparing and contrasting sexual and racial minority civil rights quests to urge
careful and mutually beneficial coalitional projects); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate
in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994)
(examining and questioning analogies and distinctions between sexual orientation and other con-
structs, especially as used to promote anti-gay state referenda).
31. See Valdes, supra note 26, at 1315-18.
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"sexual orientation" as the singular feature of personhood that eclipses
all others in the social needs and legal experiences of sexual minorities.32
Moreover, that unidimensional construction, even if inadvertent, ob-
viously never was demographically precise. All along, the nation's gay
and lesbian communities have been beset by racism, sexism, poverty and
other blights that have yet to be engaged in a sustained and critical way
either by the legal academy or the nation's governing elites." By neces-
sary consequence, the scholarship since 1979 left virtually untouched the
various other features and fields of identity that impact sexual minority
lives, along and in conjunction with sexual orientation.
It follows from the record of mostly unidimensional inquiry pro-
duced since 1979 that the techniques and approaches of the past are less
than is needed to rectify social injustice among sexual minorities that
undeniably embody multiple diversities based on the interaction of
race/ethnicity, trans/nationality, class, sex/gender, dis/ability, religion
and other socially or legally relevant characteristics. Though momentar-
ily feasible as antidiscrimination method in the early moments of sexual
orientation scholarship, that narrow, unidimensional approach never
could be mistaken as timeless. Today, the conception and articulation of
equality analyses that center sexual minorities qua sexual minorities are
important but nevertheless must be understood as insufficient, especially
because much has changed jurisprudentially, politically and socially
since 1979, both within and beyond the legal academy. As discussed
more fully below,' these changes commenced formally, as if by lockstep,
following the 1979 sexual orientation symposium, and they continue to
unfold alongside the development of this field.
B. Sexual Orientation, Critical Race Theory & Postmodern Analysis
One change is the emergence and growth of outsider jurisprudence."
This discourse, devoted to social justice for traditionally subordinated
groups, has been pioneered by women and men of color and of all sexual
orientations. It offers much to sexual minority legal scholarship.
To ensure the relevance of the antiheterosexist social justice program
launched in 1979, sexual minority (and other outgroup) scholars must
transcend the limits of the single-axis past and embrace the jurispruden-
tial methods and consciousness pioneered in recent years primarily by
the women and men who formed the movement known as critical race
32. See Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 583-635.
33. For critical analyses of these additional yet simultaneous afflictions, see supra note 6 and
sources cited therein.
34. See infra notes 35-136 and accompanying text.
35. The term "outsider jurisprudence" was coined by Professor Mar J. Matsuda. See Mar J.




theory. A jurisprudential formation of even more recent vintage than gay
and lesbian legal scholarship, critical race theory came into existence
after the 1979 symposium-about ten years after, when law students and
professors joined in various settings during the late 1980s to forge that
movement. 6 But in its first decade, critical race theory has registered
formidable insights that now can serve sexual orientation scholarship.37
Dedicated principally to antiracist struggle, critical race theory in its
first decade has exposed the shortcomings of civil rights legal scholar-
ship and social reforms anchored to formal rather than substantive
change.18 In doing so, critical race theory has devised tools and tech-
niques of analysis that sexual minority scholars now should-must-
adopt and apply to move beyond the gains and limits of the past. Chief
among these innovations have been multiplicity 9 and intersectionality. '
Both multiplicity and intersectionality grapple with the complexities of
individual and collective identities as a social and legal phenomenon.
They both seek to curb the use of "identity" to create social hierarchies,
usually with the complicity of law. These two concepts, however, also
respond and contribute to larger scholarly developments that span several
disciplines and that, together, travel under the name of postmodernism.
Generally, "postmodemism" is the rubric associated with a recogni-
tion that social conditions and human understanding of them are com-
plex, contingent and contextual. " Postmodernism therefore resists uni-
versal or unidimensional generalization, searching instead for the shifting
details of nuance and particularity. It eschews ahistorical analysis and
emphasizes the specificity of situations and the fluidity of perceptions.
Postmodernism doubts categorization and demands qualification. It
challenges the imputation of innateness to any human phenomenon and
insists on documenting and critiquing the social construction of all reali-
ties. It accepts both the concentration and the diffusion of power, and the
relationship of discourse to knowledge, consciousness and power. Post-
36. For one historical account, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT at xvii-xxviii (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). For another account,
see Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory's Cutting Edge: Key Move-
ments that Performed the Theory, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: HISTORIES, CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS (Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. et. al. eds., forthcoming 1999).
37. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CuTrING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995)
(providing a collection of essays examining critical race theory).
38. See supra notes 36, 37 and sources cited therein.
39. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 608 (1990); see also Matsuda, supra note 21.
40. See Kimber16 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Iden-
tity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-44 (1991).
41. See generally Anthony E. Cook, Reflections on Postmodernism, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 751
(1992) (evaluating whether progressive legal scholars can focus the philosophies of postmodemism
toward the various purposes they envision).
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modernism highlights the instability, indeterminacy and interplay of eve-
rything and, perhaps most of all, human identities and relations. 2
In critical legal theory, postmodernism therefore stands in contrast to
essentialism. 3 Although it describes various presumptions and practices,
"essentialism" generally refers to discourses or projects that fail con-
sciously or consistently to excavate the particularity and contingency of
context and complexity in antisubordination critiques of legal relations
and social hierarchies." Unidimensional analyses of law and society
therefore are described as essentialist while intersectional and multidi-
mensional analyses that proceed from a postmodern perspective are de-
scribed as antiessentialist.45
Responding to postmodern tenets, multiplicity signifies embrace of
the fact that all humans embody simultaneously identities composed of
multiple features, such as (but not limited to) sexual orientation, race,
class and gender. Intersectionality complements multiplicity by recog-
nizing that these multiple features interact, or intersect, in both structural
and situational ways to produce multifaceted and multilayered, or multi-
dimensional, social hierarchies. Thus, multiplicity recognizes the com-
plexity of identities and intersectionality recognizes the concomitant
complexity of power relationships based on multiplicitous identities. In
tandem, these two concepts bring a postmodern and multidimensional
mindset to the analysis of law, power and justice.'
42. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 2 AFR.-AM.
L. & POL'Y REP. 207, 210-11 (1995).
43. See generally Robert S. Chang, The End of Innocence or Politics After the Fall of the
Essential Subject, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 687 (1996) (exploring an analytical movement from essential-
ism to societal positions and political relationships).
44. The tensions of essentialism and postmodernism have attracted sexual orientation schol-
ars' attentions. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the
Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 43 (1994) (discussing the problem of essentialism
within feminist legal theory, the effects of essentialism on lesbians, including the meaning and
construction of lesbian experience, and questioning whether it makes sense to develop a specific
lesbian legal theory separate from feminist legal theory); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Con-
structionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J.
333 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992)); Janet E. Halley, Sexual
Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 503 (1994) (suggesting that the pro-gay legal argument should focus not on immutability, but
rather on the shared notions that adequately represent the self-conceptions of the essentialists and the
constructivists); Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the
Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833 (1993) (discussing the constructivist debate and its
implications).
45. This point is the thrust of the racial critique of sexual orientation scholarship. See
Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 585 ("Gay and lesbian theorists embrace essentialism by excluding
issues of race from [the] analysis.").
46. See generally Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241 (1993) (sketching
these points in the context of Asian-American legal scholarship).
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As articulated within critical race theory, these concepts have fo-
cused mainly on the social and legal position of black women in antisex-
ist and antiracist projects. 7 Multiplicity highlights that black women em-
body both a minority race and a minority sex in a social and legal culture
that devalues both of these minority identities. Intersectionality high-
lights how the interplay of these devalued minority features combine to
displace the interests of black women in antiracist and antisexist venues:
black women are marginalized due to race in antisexist projects domi-
nated chiefly by white women and in antiracist projects dominated
mainly by black men. The combination of white privilege and male
privilege in each venue thus marginalizes the social position and legal
interests of black women in both antiracist and antisexist social justice
ventures. In this way, multiplicity and intersectionality stress how single-
axis or unidimensional approaches to social justice based on
race/ethnicity or sex/gender are intrinsically and unduly self-limiting as
antisubordination projects.
As applied to their original setting, multiplicity and intersectionality
have been strikingly successful interventions. They have managed not
only to produce new knowledge and to spawn a new discourse,48 but also
to affect for the better judicial approaches to antidiscrimination doctrine
regarding women of color more generally.49 But apart from isolated ef-
forts,"° these powerful concepts have not been extended by widespread
use to other key domains of life and law where multiplicity and intersec-
tionality also have significant value.51 One such domain is legal scholar-
ship on sexual orientation, which, until this year, has awaited a pro-
grammatic adoption of intersectional and multidimensional analysis to
overcome the limits of single-axis approaches to social injustice on be-
half of multiply diverse sexual minorities. 2 This belatedness, already odd
in light of demographic sexual minority diversities and parallel jurispru-
dential developments, is made more anomalous by the emergence of
Queerness within sexual minority culture and discourse in the few years
immediately following the 1979 symposium.
47. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Symposium, Women of Color at the Center: Selections from the Third Annual
Conference on Women of Color and the Law, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (1991); see also Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA.
Not!, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395 (1993).
49. See, e.g., Lam v. University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561-62 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting
intersectional analysis and applying it to the sex-and-race discrimination claim of an Asian woman).
50. See supra notes 6-8 and sources cited therein.
51. Ironically, one of these gaps has been within critical race theory itself, which on the whole
has been internally inattentive to multiplicities and intersectionalities that implicate minority sexual
orientation. For an analysis of this omission and its impact on critical race theory in light of the same
social circumstances addressed in this Afterword, see Francisco Valdes, Theorizing "OutCrit"
Theories: Comparative Antisubordination Experience and Postsubordination Vision as Jurispru-
dential Method, in CRITicAL RACE THEORY: HISTORIES, CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, supra note 36.
52. For a more detailed discussion of intersectionality's relative utility in sexual orientation
social analysis and legal analysis, see Valdes, supra note 26, at 1333-40.
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C. Queering Sexual Orientation Legal Scholarship
The move to intersectional and toward multidimensional analysis
pioneered by critical race theorists-and now advanced and foreshad-
owed in sexual orientation scholarship by the 1997 symposia-is impor-
tant because it expands the reach and insight of sexual orientation schol-
arship in the legal academy and beyond it. This move, and the expansive
scope of critical inquiry that postmodern outsider methods make possi-
ble, are better suited to uncover insights that are likely to elude single-
axis projects, which reduce sexual minority lives and interest to a single
dimension-typically sexual orientation.53 But the move toward multidi-
mensionality is counseled by more than internal critique, demographic
diversity and outsider jurisprudence. Multidimensionality is counseled as
well by social changes within sexual minority culture, politics and dis-
course.
Within a few years of the 1979 symposium, a formation known as
Queer identification was being constructed by sexual minority activists
and theorists to emphasize multidimensional approaches to social rela-
tions from a resolutely nonheterosexual viewpoint. Those theorists and
activists constructed and proposed Queerness specifically as a formation
that embraces antisubordination purpose and evinces multidimensional
method.5 While emanating from sexual minority opposition to compul-
sory heterosexuality, the Queer position was invented to counter from a
consciously outgroup perspective the traditionalist assumptions and cul-
tural practices of majoritarian self-interest across multiple categories of
identity.
53. Single axis approaches to social and legal issues may obscure various forms, levels or
dimensions of relevant particularities. For instance, such analyses may overlook the distinction
between "homo-sexual" and "homo-social" events, and related trans/cultural phenomena. In this
symposium, Katherine Franke powerfully illustrates this point in her examination of "sex" and
cultural notions of eroticism. Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENy. U. L. REV. 1139
(1998). Using ritualized semen practices in Papua, New Guinea and the brutal assault of Abner
Louima by New York City police officers, Franke examines the effects of these concepts and their
role in constructing and perpetuating power relations, and argues for the approach used by the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which treats sex-related violence as the actus
reus of other crimes, like torture or crimes against humanity, thereby avoiding the "essentialization
of certain body parts and human behaviors as fundamentally sexual." Id. at 1143. In so doing, Franke
resists single-axis conventions, extending her critique of these homo/sexualized events and phenom-
ena to transnational realms of race, culture, ethnicity, and religion.
54. See, e.g., Symposium, More Gender Trouble: Feminism Meets Queer Theory, 6
DIFFERENCES 1 (1994); Symposium, Queer Subjects, 25 SOCIALIST REV. 1 (1995); Symposium,
Queer Theory/Sociology: A Dialogue, 12 SOC. THEORY 166 (1994).
55. See generally FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (Michael
Warner ed., 1993) (presenting a collection of Queer theory, cultural studies and politics); Suzanna
Danuta Walters, From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace
(Or, Why Can't a Woman Be More Like a Fag?), 21 SIGNS 830 (1996) (articulating a self-critical
discussion of Queerness and its postmodern politics). For a discussion of Queerness and legal theory,
see Valdes, supra note 3, at 344-77.
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As crafted by the activists and scholars from other disciplines that to
this day are its primary exponents, Queerness signifies a politically pro-
gressive subject position in scholarly and public discourse: "Being
queer. . . means everyday fighting oppression; homophobia, racism,
misogyny, the bigotry of religious hypocrites and our own self-hatred. '6
This Queer credo avows a broadly-conceived antisubordination stance
that explicitly resists homophobic as well as other bigoted structures or
practices. The multidimensionality of Queerness thus poises Queer
analysis to confront the full range of Euro-heteropatriarchal tenets and
biases, both throughout American society and within sexual minority
communities.57 These tenets include Eurocentric biases, including prefer-
ences for attributes associated with white and Anglo cultures or identi-
ties, that predominate in the sexual majority as well as among sexual
minorities. These tenets also include patriarchal biases that prefer males
and masculinity over females and femininity, whether in sexual minority
communities or beyond them. Finally, these tenets include heterosexism,
which valorizes cross-sex over same-sex desire, intimacy and bonding-
tenets that prevail in society but that also swirl throughout sexual minor-
ity communities in the form of internal(ized) self-hate. As a set, these
biases encapsulate white, male and straight supremacies to structure
Euro-heteropatriarchal hegemony in American culture and society. 8
Queer multidimensionality stands purposefully in opposition to the mul-
tidimensionality of Euro-heteropatriarchy.
Consequently, Queerness is a formation for the times: it counsels in-
tra- and inter-group egalitarianism while demanding social justice soli-
darity and responsibility. Its ideals gainfully can be adapted for employ-
ment in sexual orientation legal discourse to promote constructive schol-
arly engagement of diversity and postmodernity. Queer cultural activism
and interdisciplinary theorizing therefore can provide the point of de-
parture for articulating and practicing Queer legal theory as a form of
multidimensionalized antisubordination praxis in sexual orientation so-
ciolegal contexts.
56. Anonymous Queers, Queers Read This, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 45-47
(William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
57. The range is wide, indeed. See generally Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation
and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508 (1989) (addressing an array of legal issues faced by gay men
and lesbians); Brendan F. Crowe et al., Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Recent Cases
Affecting The Rights of Gays, Lesbians and Bisexuals, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 379 (1993) (surveying
recent cases involving issues facing gays, lesbians, and bisexuals); Standing Comm. on Lesbian and
Gay Legal Issues, Soc. Responsibilities Special Interest Section, Am. Assoc. Law Libraries, Sexual
Orientation and the Law: A Selective Bibliography on Homosexuality and the Law, 1969-1993, 86
L. LIBR. J. 1 (1994) (listing a bibliography of books, journals, symposia, films, legal organizations,
and articles on the subject of homosexuality and the law).
58. See supra note 24.
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If Queerness is practiced with fidelity, 9 the move to intersectional
and multidimensional analysis in sexual orientation legal discourse may
be tantamount to the move from single-axis "gay" and/or "lesbian"
scholarship to a more expansive enterprise that may be denominated
"Queer legal theory"; it is the move signaling scholarly recognition that a
prospective abolition of sexual orientation discrimination would not ter-
minate social injustice against sexual minorities based on race/ethnicity,
class, dis/ability, sex/gender and other axes of social or legal status. It is
the move from a reductionist or unidimensional antidiscrimination schol-
arship to an intersexional and multidimensional anti subordination schol-
arship. It is the scholarly move that this symposium, like its counterpart,
heralds as the ideal and standard of the future in sexual orientation social
justice scholarship."
This move, however, cannot represent any relaxation of the focus on
sexual orientation as a unique and urgent unit of antisubordination analy-
sis, even as it becomes part of a multidimensional expansion in antisub-
ordination scholarship and praxis. This precaution is underscored by an-
other current event: the hate-murder of Matthew Shepard-a white, gay
male college student-in Wyoming the year after these twin symposia
were held. Matt's murder illustrates both the singularity and multidimen-
sionality of homophobia and straight supremacy.62
Possessing both whiteness and maleness, Matt likely was sheltered
from the ravages of white and male supremacy during his brief life. Un-
like lesbians, female bisexuals, women and all sexual minorities of color,
59. The articulation of Queerness remains controversial in part because it has been experi-
enced as a white, male and bourgeois formation. See generally Valdes, supra note 3, at 356-60.
60. See Valdes, supra note 26, at 1311 -13.
61. In this InterSEXionality Symposium, Martha Ertman takes this scholarly move to heart.
See Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75 DENy. U. L.
REv. 1215 (1998). Examining her proposal for the implementation of premarital security agree-
ments, Ertman addresses the multidimensional effects of that move: the potential results of under-
mining or entrenching compulsory heterosexuality; redefinitions of traditional gender roles and the
effects on gender performativity doctrine; potential to reverse the current law's conflation of sex,
gender, and sexual orientation; support for same-sex marriage; and responses to potential critiques
regarding the maintenance of racial or class inequities. It is this measured, multidimensional ap-
proach that these recent symposia attempt to bring to the forefront of antisubordination scholarship,
and is the approach I argue is a necessary component of effective antisubordination efforts now and,
increasingly, in the future.
62. Consider the events surrounding his murder: Matt's alleged murderers are reported to have
attacked two Latinos shortly after their fatal beating of Matt. The two Latinos fought back and re-
pelled their assailants, who were arrested as a result of this incident. See Betsy Streisand et al., A
Death on the Prairie, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 26, 1998, at 22, 25. Persons who know the
alleged assailants additionally reported to the media that Matt's alleged murderers were multidimen-
sional bigots, known for expounding "stupid stuff about black people and gay people" as well as,
apparently, attacking Latinas/os. Steve Lopez, To Be Young and Gay in Wyoming, TIME, Oct. 26,
1998, at 38, 39. The interplay of race, ethnicity, sex/gender and sexual orientation in the events and
communities surrounding Matt's murder thus provide a contemporary case-in-point for multidimen-
sional analysis of social and legal power relations. See infra note 69 and sources cited therein.
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he likely reaped white and male privileges, as his physical and cultural
features more likely than not buffered him from any extended or struc-
tural exposure to prevalent strains of racism and sexism: white suprem-
acy and male supremacy. But those awesome identity privileges-argua-
bly the most pervasive and entrenched of all social structures-were not
enough to safeguard Matt's life, nor even his pursuit of happiness." De-
spite the privileges of his race and sex, Matt was targeted for a horrific
demise on the basis of his minority sexual orientation. Without doubt,
our scholarship and activism must continue to labor for the protection of
Matt and others like him among us, and to denounce those that try to
deprive us-any of us--of life, liberty or happiness.
But our scholarship also must begin, finally, to show a similar and
equal concern for others like Matt who do not share his privileges. And
there are many such sisters and brothers among us: those who are non-
white or nonAnglo or women or poor or disabled or noncitizens; those
who are not Christian; those who are most noticeably gender-atypical;
those who suffer from HIV and AIDS. Each of these identity categories
represents many women and men who suffer the consequences of more
social ills than simple homophobia, and who therefore require more
than the end of just homophobia to claim the benefits proffered in princi-
ple by this nation's formal commitments to liberty, equality and justice.65
Matt's brutal end thus reminds us that the privileges of race and sex
cannot protect persons with a minority sexual orientation from social
savagery. But the diverse demography of sexual minorities simultane-
ously warns us that the abolition of sexual orientation discrimination
cannot protect all gays and lesbians from the ravages of sexism, racism,
nativism, ethnocentrism, antiSemitism and other similar scourges of
equality, justice, dignity and harmony.6 This conjunction of death and
63. For a now-classic exposition of both privileges, and the myriad settings in which they
operate, see Peggy Macintosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming
to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A
CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995); see also Devon W. Car-
bado, Straight Out of the Closet (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (developing a similar
connection between straight and white privilege from a black male heterosexual perspective). See
generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993) (arguing that
whiteness and the associated privileges act as a continuing form of property interest). For additional
critical readings on whiteness and its sociolegal impact, see infra note 99 and sources cited therein.
64. For a sampling of testimonials, see Valdes, supra note 3, at 359 n.1266. For critical analy-
ses, see supra note 6 and sources cited therein.
65. These formal commitments oftentimes are honored in the breach, but majoritarian betrayal
of national principles does not lessen the claim of outgroups to their fulfillment, even if belated and
incremental. See Valdes, supra note 3, at 123 n.330.
66. Patricia Cain alerts us to the dangers of excluding trans/bi-gendered people from "sexual
orientation" analyses by examining the lives of a number of transsexuals and showing us the impor-
tance of those lives to "our" issues. Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals
and Anti-Discrimination Law, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 1321 (1998). In this way, Cain underscores the
diversity of "sexual minority" communities that suffer under heteropatriarchy. See supra note 5
(addressing diversity and commonality within "sexual minority" populations).
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demography leads to the conclusion that underlies this symposium: no
feature of identity safely can be cabined for isolated, unidimensional,
decontextualized analysis within a Queer scholarship dedicated to anti-
subordination transformation.
To serve the communities of multiply diverse sexual minorities that
collectively form our diasporic tribes, we must craft agendas that reflect
both the uniqueness and intricacy of sexual orientation as a category of
social identity in a heterocentric and homophobic society. But in those
agendas we also must account for our multiple diversities, and for the
power of other identity bigotries that rage simultaneously within sexual
minorities and throughout society. To do so, as Matt's killing also illus-
trates, Queer and allied scholars must begin paying more attention to
another social change that has transpired since the 1979 symposium: the
onset, spread and impact of cultural war. To understand our role as cul-
tural warriors, Queer and allied scholars must begin to situate social jus-
tice legal scholarship within the current context of cultural traditionalism
and majoritarian lawmaking through backlash identity politics.
D. Cultural War, Cultural Traditionalism & Majoritarian Essentialism
Though not subjected to hate and bigotry based on race or sex,
Matt's life was robbed by the homophobia of our laws and lawmakers
who, in his case, had refused several times to enact state and federal stat-
utes designed to help protect Matt from his eventual fate." Because the
majoritarian governing elites of Matt's state and country declined to in-
clude sexual orientation in their hate crime statutes, they not only refused
to protect the vulnerable among their people specifically from hateful
murder and other bodily harms, they also indirectly signaled approval for
the practice of sexual orientation bias in civil society.' Despite his ma-
jority privileges, Matt's majoritarian society thus failed him; his govern-
ment, state and federal, in effect made Matt a more inviting target for
both structural and individual majoritarian malevolence. It is no wonder
that the media characterized Matt as a casualty of cultural war: '9 Matt's
67. According to media reports, the Wyoming legislature rejected sexual orientation hate
crime legislation at least three times. See Margaret Carlson, Laws of the Last Resort, TIME, Oct. 26,
1998, at 40, 40. No such federal legislation exists either. For instance, the Hate Crimes Prevention
Act of 1997 was rejected just this year. See Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997, H.R. 3081, 105th
Cong. Though hate crime statutes, like other criminal laws, cannot guarantee safety, they are impor-
tant to the social structure and progress of a just society because they promote and protect norms of
equality, dignity, and harmony.
68. These and similar acts of retrenchment help to re-legitimize bigotry, and to foster inequal-
ity. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 20 and accompanying text; Alan David Freeman, Legiti-
mizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MtNN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (discussing the regressive effects of rulings that effectively
validate racial discrimination); Yvonne L. Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Legiti-
mization of Homophobia in America, 30 How. L.J. 829, 830, 840-41 (1987) (noting that homopho-
bic rulings validate social bigotry).
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murder encapsulates the relationship between majoritarianism, lawmak-
ing and sexual orientation scholarship in the midst of cultural war."
The legislative failures preceding Matt's murder, like the killing it-
self, are far from isolated historical moments; they are encounters with
ongoing repercussions in a cultural war being waged through majori-
tarian essentialism,7' social terror, and formal legal process. This cultural
war is unlike simple public controversy about the relative wisdom of one
or another policy matter; it is a "war ... for the soul of America," ac-
cording to one leading ingroup warrior." From that standpoint, waging
cultural war has spawned a determined and conscious use of visceral
hate and physical violence to emote and aggravate social division be-
tween ingroups and outgroups through the persistent and hyperbolic slo-
ganeering of "wedge" issues;73 these wedge issues, as the various law-
making campaigns of this war have shown, tend to pivot for the most
part on sociolegal identities and interests derived from sexual orienta-
tion, race/ethnicity/nationality, socioeconomic class and sex/gender.
This sharp-edged cultural war has bred a stridency toward lawmaking
that professedly is justified by the "moral" imperatives of cultural tradi-
69. The grisly murder sparked international attention. According to media reports, the victim
was befriended in a straight neighborhood bar by two young men accompanied by their two girl-
friends. They then beat him into unconsciousness, took him to a "rocky ridge just outside of town"
and beat him again while he begged for his life. Lopez, supra note 62, at 39. They next strung him
up to a nearby fence pole and left him hanging there in subzero weather. Matt was discovered about
18 hours later, and died several days later without regaining consciousness. See Richard Lacayo, The
New Gay Struggle, TIME, Oct. 26, 1998, at 32, 33; Streisand et al., supra note 62, at 22, 24-25; The
Hate Debate, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 1998, at 7, 7-8; see also Andrew Gumbel, Gay Man Beaten
and Left for Dead in US, INDEPENDENT (London) (Nov. 12, 1998), at 12.
70. The term "cultural war" refers to majoritarian reassertion of "democratic" lawmaking
prerogative to reinvigorate cultural traditionalism throughout society, thereby containing or rolling
back the practice of pluralism in American law and society. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER,
CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991) (examining the historical significance
and political implications of the cultural war in contemporary America). A declaration of cultural
war was vituperated from the podium of the 1992 Republican National Convention by presidential
contender Patrick J. Buchanan. See Paul Galloway, Divided We Stand: Today's "Cultural War"
Goes Deeper Than Political Slogans, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1992, at Cl; see also Black, infra note 72,
at A12. The implications of this cultural war have been recognized by legal scholars for some time.
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in Constitutional
Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 677 (1991); see also Aoki, infra note 83.
71. The discussion of majoritarian essentialism in cultural war is taken up further below. See
infra Part E.
72. See Chris Black, Buchanan Beckons Conservatives to Come "Home," BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 18, 1992, at A12.
73. Wedge issues have become a standard feature of majoritarian electoral contests during the
past decade or so. See generally Elaine Ciulla Karmack, Nailing Down a Trap-Proof Platform, L.A.
TIMES, July 9, 1992, at B7 (describing the use of "family values" to foment wedge issues in the 1992
presidential election); "Gay Rights," Public Prayer Are Two of the Most Divisive Social Issues,
SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 14, 1996, at 12A (discussing sexual orientation equality as a wedge issue in the
1996 presidential election).
74. See infra notes 109-10, 124-26 and accompanying text.
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tionalism," but that has been executed with the plain aim of securing
cultural supremacy as a matter of law and regardless of the human toll
on outgroup communities.76 This cultural war, unlike the usual policy
controversy, consequently has encompassed meanspirited microagres-
sions' and hate crimes, as well as backlash lawmaking, to stigmatize and
beat back into submission-both literally and figuratively-outgroup
persons and communities."
75. The moralism of majoritarian cultural war is determined largely by the fact that key ma-
joritarian warriors identify as Christian fundamentalists with an evangelical passion for social policy;
in effect, the mission of these warriors is to infuse public policy and social life with their preferred
religious dogma through backlash lawmaking and cultural warfare. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Birnbaum,
Washington's Power 25: Which Pressure Groups Are Best at Manipulating the Laws We Live By? A
Groundbreaking Fortune Survey Reveals Who Belongs to Lobbying's Elite and Why They Wield So
Much Clout, FORTUNE, Dec. 8, 1997, at 144, 144. See generally SARA DIAMOND, SPIRITAL
WARFARE: THE POLITICS OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1989) (providing a comprehensive account of
the domestic and international political agenda espoused by Christian cultural warriors). Though
beyond the scope of this Afterword, a corrollary to the analysis presented here is that cultural war
also is about secularism versus sectarianism in this society. See generally Editorial, Church, Politics,
Abortion, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 21, 1998, at 24A (objecting to the "use of public office to translate
church doctrine into general law").
76. For example, it is no coincidence, in this state of cultural war, that teenage suicide rates
are highest among sexual minority teens; adolescence being the phase of maturation in which most
humans, regardless of sexual orientation, identify themselves sexually, sexual minority teenagers
tend to still lack the mechanisms for coping healthily with the omnipresent antipathy of institution-
alized homophobia. See, e.g., Lena H. Sun, Gay Students Get Little Help with Harassment; Chang-
ing Attitudes, Court Decisions Prod Schools to Confront the Problem, WASH. POST, July 20, 1998,
at Al (describing incidents of violence directed against sexual minority teenagers); see also Teemu
Ruskula, Minor Disregard: The Legal Constuction of the Fantasy that Gay Youth Do Not Exist, 8
YALE J.L. FEMINISM 269, 270-73 (1996). Various studies over the years have concluded that sexual
minority teens attemp suicide at higher rates than sexual majority teens, although these studies have
been disputed because "there is no general agreement on ... what constitutes a suicide attempt."
Delia M. Rios, Researchers Dispute Study on Gay Teen Suicide, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
May 17, 1998, at A10. Nonetheless, no one disputes that young members of sexual minorities feel
the impact of societal discrimination, including homophobia, even though their relative youth may
not have prepared them to deal with it effectively. In addition, of course, the human toll of cultural
war extends to harm inflicted on adults, harm that ranges from the physical and psychological to the
social, legal and economic. See, e.g., infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. See generally JOHN
D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA
(1988) (examining the changing constructions of American conceptions of sexuality over the past
350 years and the resulting effects on individuals and society); HOMOPHOBIA: How WE ALL PAY
THE PRICE (Warren J. Blumenfeld ed., 1992) (presenting a number of articles addressing the effects
of homophobia on individuals, the homosexual community and society as a whole); JONATHAN
KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 11-128 (1976) (docu-
menting numerous instances and manifestations of harms against sexual minorities).
77. The term "microaggression" refers to everyday social slights that represent and replicate
larger structures of subordination. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559,
1560, 1565-68 (1989).
78. The connection between the ongoing cultural war against sexual minorities and Matt's
demise was a notable feature of media reports. "Gay politics is more complicated now because what
seems like an irresistible force of cultural change is meeting an immovable object of political resis-
tance. For a long time, lesbians and gays have been defining themselves into the ordinary fabric of
life. All the while, conservatives have been field-testing homosexuality as a defining issue for the
Republican Party, especially for the next presidential election." Lacayo, supra note 69, at 34. Simi-
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The hate crimes, microaggressions and other acts of violation, har-
assment, and stigma committed annually against sexual and other mi-
norities during this cultural war menace daily the physical safety and
social wellbeing of outgroups?--a feature of the social landscape that in
turn helps to set the stage for supremacist identity politics in the more
sanitized venues of formal lawmaking processes. Packaged in democ-
racy and morality," one undemocratic and morally questionable objec-
tive of this cultural war is to paralyze the personal realization and social
manifestation of sexual minority identity, rendering sexual minorities
socially dysfunctional and invisible both as persons and as groups." In
this cultural war, everything adds up to uncivil animus enacted, and em-
bedded in the nation's sociolegal fabric, through the majoritarian pre-
rogatives of formal democracy. 2
This warfare has become increasingly institutionalized in govern-
ment, politics and law since the formal triumph of essentialized backlash
politics in the results of the 1980 presidential election.3 Although politi-
larly grisly hate murders of sexual minorities have been committed during this cultural war. See, e.g.,
Valdes, supra note 3, at 254-56 & n.915.
79. See generally VALERIE JENNESS & KENDAL BROAD, HATE CRIMES: NEW SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 49-108 (1997) (discussing violence against sexual
minorities and the enactment of anti-violence measures). Not surprinsingly, then, Matt's murder
triggered a cascade of articles, editorials and columns on hate crimes and the pressing need for
statutes designed to punish and stem them. See, e.g., Bettina Boxall, Long Arm of Hatred: Deadly
Assault on Wyoming College Student Stunned People Across the Country, Reminding Many South-
land Gays and Lesbians of Their Vulnerability to Attacks, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at B2; Jean
Buchanan & Diane Carroll, Recent Crimes Serve as Painful Reminder Homosexuals Face Fear of
Physical Attacks on Daily Basis, Some Say, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 14, 1998, at A 1; Editorial, A Tool
Against Terrorism: Georgia Needs Laws to Fight Hate Crimes, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 19, 1998, at
A6; Gregory Freeman, Hate Crime Laws Are Necessary to Send Clear Message, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 3, 1998, at B 1; Jose Martinez, Climate of Fear Haunts Gays; Wyo. Murder Puts
Anti-Bashing Laws on National Stage, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 18, 1998. This climate of cultural
intimidation through physical and social violence of course prevailed before Matt's murder, and the
media reported it periodically. See, e.g., Robert L. Kaiser, Gay Haven on Halsted Not Immune to
Violence: Homosexuals Fleeing From Prejudice Find They are Targets, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 1998,
at 1.
80. See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Sexuyal Orientation, Morality and the Law: Devlin
Revisited, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 237 (1996) (articulating two conceptions of equality to argue for
legislation aimed at ensuring the equality of sexual orientation minorities).
81. See Francisco Valdes, Acts of Power, Crimes of Knowledge: Some Observations on De-
sire, Law and Ideology in the Politics of Expression at the End of the Twentieth Century, 1 IOWA J.
GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 213 (1997); see also David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-
Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 325-30 (1994); Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal
Protection for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 946-63 (1989); Douglas
Warner, Homophobia, "Manifest Homosexuals" and Political Activity: A New Approach to Gay
Rights and the "Issue" of Homosexuality, 11 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 635 (1981).
82. See generally JAMES HUNTER: BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA'S CULTURE WAR (1994).
83. That election is viewed as the triumph of the straight, white, affluent man because that is
the identity category that was favored in policy and lawmaking. For readings on the identity ideol-
ogy and rhetoric of Ronald Reagan's election, see THE ELECTION OF 1980: REPORTS AND
INTERPRETATIONS (Marlene Michels Pomper ed., 1981). For a discussion of critical legal scholar-
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cians ranging from George Wallace to Richard Nixon had catered since
the 1970s to the incipient sense of majoritarian backlash that eventually
culminated in today's cultural war, the 1980 election was a watershed in
the flow of identity politics in contemporary lawmaking: that election
swept into power a president backed by savvy zealots dedicated to the
"social agenda" of cultural traditionalism, which frankly favored tradi-
tionally dominant identity groups and heavily targeted sexual minorities,
racial/ethnic minorities and women for social justice takebacks.' Rather
than mark an ephemeral interlude in the gradual social progression of an
enlightened and pluralistic society, 1980 marked the intensification of a
brewing demand for retrenchment, which since then has been waged
against the nation's "minorities" under the banner of "traditional values"
and through a righteous but self-interested deployment of majoritarian
power, rhetoric and ambition.
The continuation of that war, and its politics of self-interested cul-
tural majoritarianism, were confirmed in the second pivotal triumph of
backlash since the 1979 symposium: the 1994 election of a Congress to
enact the agenda of social traditionalism embodied by the so-called
"Contract with America" that served expressly as the platform of victory
that year.85 By 1994, the triumphant identity category was unabashedly
calling itself the "angry white man"-just the sort of human to be se-
duced by slogans appealing to majoritarian essentialism to push the
backlash agenda.86 Since 1980, the essentialized identity politics of ma-
joritarian cultural war have been introduced into all branches and levels
of government, as well as into all processes of lawmaking, bearing both
judicial and legislative social justice retrenchment in the name of tradi-
tional values."
ship and the backlash politics advanced and unleashed since then, see Keith Aoki, The Scholarship
of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996).
84. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, PORTRAIT OF AN ELECTION: THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN 188-92, 342-43 (1981).
85. See Inside Politics: Contract with America is Top Political Play of the Year (CNN televi-
sion broadcast, Dec. 23, 1994) (transcript #727-4), available in LEXIS, News Library, CNN file.
This "contract" has been published as a book. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP.
NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed
Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). For analysis of the 1994 elections, see MIDTERM: THE
ELECTIONS OF 1994 IN CONTEXT (Philip A. Klinkner ed., 1996) [hereinafter MIDTERM]; see also
Evan Thomas & Rich Thomas, A Guide to the First 100 Days, Newsweek, Jan. 9, 1995, at 20 (ex-
amining the events immediately following the midterm elections).
86. See, e.g., Grant Reeher & Joseph Cammarano, In Search of the Angry White Male: Gen-
der, Race, and Issues in the 1994 Elections, in MIDTERM, supra note 85, at 125.
87. A contemporary legislative example especially germane to sexual minorities in the legal
profession is congressional passage of the "Solomon-Pombo" amendment, also known as the
"Solomon 11" amendment, which denies certain federal funds to universities and law schools that
prohibit military recruiters from using on-campus facilities. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (1998); 32 C.F.R.
§ 216.4 (1997). This amendment was motivated by the specific intent to coerce retrenchment in law
school antidiscrimination policies aimed at reducing sexual orientation bias: because the military
formally discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, those antidiscrimination law school poli-
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This retrenchment is vitally important to Queer and allied legal
scholars because it has been secured in large measure through the fo-
cused, methodical and determined reassertion of control over electoral
contests, legal institutions and policy processes to impose cultural tradi-
tionalism by law throughout American society." The social agenda of
"traditional values" that essentialized and propelled majoritarian back-
lash both in the 1980 presidential election and in the 1994 congressional
elections installed lawmakers on the basis both of majoritarian identity
politics and formal commitment to the imposition of cultural tradition-
alism by law.' Though that agenda has only fitfully and partially been
realized, judicial nominations and rulings began increasingly to reflect
the demands of cultural traditionalism soon after the 1980 triumph of
majoritarian backlash in much the same way that congressional repre-
sentation and lawmaking became increasingly oriented to the same so-
cial agenda of "traditional values" after the second triumph in 19949-as
the 1996 flurry of backlash legislation well illustrates." The invidious
result of this ongoing cultural war is the institutionalization of a law-
making environment pervasively and actively hostile to outgroup or
"minority" interests.92
cies had the effect of barring the military from on-campus recruiting of law students. For a detailed
analysis, see Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues, Amelioration Report and Recommendations,
(Sept. 15, 1998); Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues, Supplemental Report, On-Campus
Military Recruiting-Balancing AALS Rules, Other Nondiscrimination Policies and the Solomon II
Amendment, (Dec. 15, 1998). Early drafts of these reports are published in Francisco Valdes, Solo-
mon's Shames: Law as Might and Inequality, 23 THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. (forthcoming
1999); see also Francisco Valdes, Justice Under Solomon: Sexual Orientation, the Spending Power
and the Takings Clause (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For accounts of similarly
regressive judicial action, see infra note 130 and sources cited therein on doctrinal retrenchment.
88. See generally JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE
THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA (1996) (addressing the
role of think tanks and foundations in initiating conservative retrenchment in 1968 and propelling it
to a national prominence in the mid-1980s).
89. See generally supra notes 83-86 and sources cited therein.
90. See generally LINDA KILLIAN, THE FRESHMEN: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE REPUBLICAN
REVOLUTION? (1998) (reporting on the Republican freshman class of the 104th Congress).
91. For instance, the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. H 1996) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998)), was passed
to undermine preemptively the legitimacy of same-sex marriages that might be recognized under one
or more state constitutions. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. Also notable among that
year's legislation are the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2015 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28 U.S.C.). These two enactments
constrict public benefits available for communities of color at high risk of social ills-ills which in
turn originate with, and continue to be exarcebated by, the existence and preferences of white su-
premacy in this country and its laws. See generally TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (1994) (setting forth the historical
development of white supremacy in California). For additional critical readings in white privilege
and power, see supra note 63; infra note 99.
92. See infra notes 102-36 and accompanying text (discussing three lines of backlash law-
making-direct referenda, spending restraints, and the restaffing of the judiciary).
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This political, legal and social drive for cultural traditionalism con-
tinues today, even after the 1998 midterm elections that were viewed by
many as a public rejection of backlash zealotry.93 As the most recent
post-election calls of majoritarian warriors-urging intensification rather
than rethinking of their supremacist efforts-indicate, no single election
is likely to undo the cumulative impact of nearly two decades character-
ized by cultural war and majoritarian belligerence.' Though the fact of
war signifies that the ultimate outcome of conflict remains unrealized,
the 1998 elections do not overturn any of the sociolegal regimes already
enacted and imposed via cultural war and backlash lawmaking.'5 Nor do
they alter the zeitgeist of warfare. Until such time, antisubordination le-
gal scholars must become, and remain, cultural warriors.
Thus, to be socially and legally relevant in these particular times,
Queer and allied legal scholars must begin to appreciate how cultural
war is not only a terror-backed contest for the "soul" of the nation, but
more specifically a campaign being managed through the excitation and
manipulation of majoritarian essentialism. By majoritarian essentialism I
mean the evocation and exploitation of ingroup identifications based on
race/ethnicity, socioeconomic class, sex/gender, religion, sexual orienta-
tion and other identity features to consolidate and galvanize structurally-
dominant groups around an essentialized sense of self-interested back-
lash based on majority identities. The "majoritarian" character of this
essentialism therefore does not refer exclusively or primarily to simple
numerical advantage, but to the leveraging of accumulated social and
economic power positions that empower and poise some social groups
effectively to control the structures and levers of "democratic" lawmak-
ing. And the "essentialist" character of this majoritarianism refers to the
practice of occluding ingroup diversities to create through the slogans
and jingles of "traditional values" a falsely homogenized sense of in-
group superiority, security and privilege, which in turn exaggerates in-
group feelings of common self-interest. Today's form of majoritarian
essentialism, most recently captured in the image, agenda and celebrity
of the "angry white male,"96 essentializes and activates majority identifi-
93. See supra note 19 and sources cited therein.
94. Indeed, cultural war has brought into the open a vicious and mean spirited form of tradi-
tional majoritarian values. In the name of traditional sexual majority values, some Americans
cheered the vicious murder of openly gay college student Matthew Shepard in Wyoming on October
12, 1998. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances surrounding
Matt's murder). One media report, for instance, describes "a Kansas minister with a website called
godhatesfags.com ma[king] plans to do a grave dance at [Matt Shepard's] funeral." Lopez, supra
note 62, at 38.
95. The forces of backlash continue to press retrenchment relentlessly even today. See, e.g.,
Anne Gearan, GOP Presidential Hopefuls Put to Test, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 5, 1999, at 8A
(reporting a "litmus test" questionnaire that asks presidential aspirants questions such as, "Would
you place a creche on the White House lawn if ordered to refrain from doing so by the Supreme
Court?").
96. See supra notes 85-86 and sources cited therein.
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cations to portray a solidarity of intra-majority sociolegal interests, even
though all ingroups, like all outgroups, are multiply diverse across mul-
tiple axes of identity and interest.
For instance, even though news reports indicate that Matt's alleged
murderers were not especially privileged in terms of, say, class, 7 the
continual agitation of majoritarian essentialism and the surrounding cries
of cultural warfare apparently emboldened them to kill brazenly in the
name of ingroup privileges accruing from straight supremacy.' 8 Even
though Matt's alleged murderers may in fact have little net cause to
celebrate personally the socioeconomic status quo, they apparently could
claim, and wield with at least momentary impunity, the heady power of
another privilege: straight supremacy based on sexual orientation. And,
in fact, they did. Despite their seeming lack of elite status or overall so-
cial and economic prospects, those two men allegedly asserted through
torture and murder an essentialized identity based on majority sexual
orientation, flexing a privileged status structurally and normatively prof-
fered to them under this society's identity hierarchies."
The essentialization of sexual orientation and other identity axes to
entice and intoxicate majority-identified persons and groups with the
sensation of privilege thus equips majoritarian elites to catalyze their
warriors, and to rationalize the perpetual oppression and abuse-and
even the occasional murder-of their "othered" neighbors under the ban-
ner of cultural traditionalism. Through the rhetoric and mentality of cul-
tural war, majoritarian warriors inflame essentialism among multiply
diverse ingroups, inciting oppressive and socially divisive assertions of
majority-identity privileges, even when the "average" ingroup person in
fact does not (or may not) enjoy the privileges concentrated specifically
in ingroup elites. Majoritarian essentialism, as our times attest, thereby
enables the crude but potent "us" versus "them" wedge issues and strate-
97. Though not detailed, news reports described one of the alleged murderers as "total red-
neck" and a "punk, like any other punk you see on the street" (characterizations offered by an ac-
quaintance), and both also were described as "high school dropouts." Lopez, supra note 62, at 39. In
addition, one was reported to be "awaiting sentencing for burglarizing a Kentucky Fried Chicken."
Id. Though inconclusive, these images collectively hint at less than elite class status.
98. News reports of the murder suggest that Matt's beating, and then his being left "hanging
on the fence on the rocky ridge just outside of town," evinced minimal concem for keeping the crime
secret. Lopez, supra note 62, at 39. See generally supra notes 62, 69 (outlining the events surround-
ing and media coverage of Matt's murder). For this reason, Time described the crime as not only
"unspeakably gruesome" but also "profoundly dumb." Lopez, supra note 62, at 39.
99. Of course, the attack on two Latinos following Matt's fatal beating was the exercise of
another form of identity superiority-white privilege-based on race and ethnicity. See supra note
63 (citing sources addressing both white and male privilege). See generally CRITICAL WHITE
STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) (providing
collection of articles addressing "whiteness" and its implications and manifestations in history, the
law, privilege, and cultural roles); STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How
INVIS1BLE PREFERENCES UNDERMINE AMERICA (1996) (examining the existence and perpetuation of
white privilege in the workplace, residential housing patterns, the media, law, and educational
structures).
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gies that backlash identity politicians have used throughout this cultural
war to conscript essentialized consciousness among majority-identified
ingroups for backlash lawmaking against "minority" outgroups. By
"majoritarian essentialism" I thus mean the practice of elites within tra-
ditionally dominant ingroups to energize ingroup-identified persons
around a social agenda of self-interested lawmaking based on the illusion
of uniformity among "majority" identities and interests. The cultural war
being waged today with majoritarian essentialism and through backlash
lawmaking therefore is highly relevant to postmodern social justice legal
scholarship.
Because the developments sketched " here have profound connec-
tions to law and lawmaking, the implications of these developments are
directly relevant to legal scholarship-and especially so for legal schol-
arship devoted to social justice transformation. While fostering a harsh
public climate conducive both to random and structural social intimida-
tion, this cultural war, as outlined in more detail below, also is a system-
atic orchestration of majoritarian power-numerical, structural and eco-
nomic-being marshaled and deployed specifically to arrest the civil
rights progress of this century through a series of contemporary law-
making campaigns concentrated methodically along three lines of si-
multaneous attack. To reassert majoritarian primacy, if not cultural su-
premacy, essentialized ingroup self interest has generated a form of
backlash "democracy" along three lines of lawmaking attacks that inter-
act to cut off fragile sociolegal life lines to some of the most vulnerable
individuals and communities of the nation.
E. Formal Democracy, Cultural War & Backlash Lawmaking
In this ongoing war, (at least) three lines of backlash lawmaking
seem to have emerged as majoritarian favorites, and sexual minorities
appear as prominent (though not exclusive) targets in each line of attack.
The first line is the organization of "direct" referenda that commandeer
governmental regulation of sociolegal issues simply by counting ballots.
The second is the surgically targeted exercise of federal (and state)
spending powers to disembowel programs that might aid outgroup sur-
vival and empowerment. The third is the doctrinaire restaffing of the
federal (and state) judiciaries with majoritarian ideologues, warriors and
sympathizers. These three lines of attack, slowly but steadily put into
place since 1980, have established the dominance of essentialized back-
100. The account unfolded in this Afterword does not attempt a comprehensive analysis of
cultural war and electoral politics that effectuate backlash lawmaking. This account oversimplifies a




lash as "democratic" lawmaking to wear down, if not destroy, sexual
minority and other outgroup social justice quests. ''
The first line of attack-classically majoritarian devices like
"popular" referenda-has been employed since the 1979 symposium to
legislate directly and definitively the impossibility or impracticability of
social justice reform on sexual orientation.' 2 These campaigns-in Ore-
gon,0 3 Colorado," Hawaii,"5 Alaska,'" Florida,' 7 California"s and else-
where-have been designed to remove sexual orientation entirely from
the universe of human or civil rights, much less social justice and trans-
formation, by codifying a self-serving version of "traditional values" as
formal law and cultural norm. While majoritarian cultural warriors ea-
gerly pursue direct takebacks in race/ethnicity"'9 and sex/gender" fronts
101. See infra notes 102-36 and accompanying text (outlining the three lines of backlash law-
making attacks on non-majoritarian positions).
102. See, e.g., Symposium, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gay Ballot Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 491, 491-93 (1994); John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened
Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 154-55 (1993); Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-
Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1905, 1905-06 (1993).
103. Illustrating that the outcome of cultural war is not a foregone conclusion, voters in Oregon
rejected the base appeals of majoritarian warriors for their endorsement of homophobia by law in
that state. See, e.g., Lisa Keen, Referendums and Rights; Across the Country, Battles Over Protec-
tion for Gays and Lesbians, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1993, at C3. See generally Hans A. Linde, When
Inititative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72
OR. L. REv. 19 (1993) (providing a constitutional analysis by the Senior Judge of the Oregon Su-
preme Court of the mis/use of majoritarian politics to formalize sexual orientation discrimination).
104. In Colorado, this use of state referenda to stymie sexual minority equality claims or gains
was successful, but eventually produced the Supreme Court's contrary ruling in Romer v. Evans. 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down on equal protection grounds Colorado's Amendment Two, which
had amended via referendum the state constitution to prohibit any state entity from enacting any
sexual orientation antidiscrimination policies); see also Colloquium, Romer v. Evans: The Decision
and its Impact, 2 NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 1 (1996) (visited Dec. 23, 1998)
<http://sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw> (this journal is the nation's first on-line law journal); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics, Morality and the Trial of Colorado's
Amendment 2, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1057, 1057, 1063-80 (1994) (recounting the legal activity
following passage of Amendment 2). See generally David W. Dunlap, Ruling Signals More Fights to
Come, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1996, at A21 (exploring the implications of the Romer v. Evans deci-
sion).
105. An anti-gay referendum was passed in Hawaii during the 1998 midterm elections, a reac-
tion to judicial recognition of same-sex marriage rights. See infra notes 115 and 116 and accompa-
nying text.
106. An anti-gay referendum also succeeded in Alaska in the 1998 midterm elections, and again
in response to a nonmajoritarian judicial ruling. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
107. In Florida, a measure was placed on the ballot, but then was struck from it by the state
supreme court prior to the voting because the measure as drafted violated state law requirements for
the presentation of policy questions to a mass vote. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen-
eral-Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018, 1019-21 (Fla. 1994).
108. In California, this kind of majoritarian contest has been concentrated chiefly on the ex-
pression and reinstituionalization of racism, nativism, classism and sexism, rather than homophobia.
See, e.g., infra notes 109 and 110 and sources cited therein (discussing the recent passage of ingroup
propositions in California).
109. The anti-immigrant and anti-affirmative action initiatives of California exemplify these
efforts, highlighting how public officials can be instrumental in whipping up majoritarian essential-
ism and fervor. For examinations of the California initiatives, see Ruben J. Garcia, Critical Race
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as well, the use of backlash referenda in today's cultural war suggests a
strategic choice of sexual orientation to draw a line against even bare,
formal equality in the cultural sands of the land."' Cultural war has fo-
Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial Politics of Immigration Law, 17 UCLA CHICANO-LATINO
L. REV. 118 (1995); Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L.
REV. 629 (1995); Jeffrey R. Marguiles, Closing the Doors to the Land of Opportunity: The Consti-
tutional Controversy Surrounding Proposition 187, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 363 (1995);
Eva Jefferson Paterson & Erica J. Teasly, California's Campaign for Equal Opportunity: A Re-
sponse to Governor Wilson's Open Letter, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 85 (1995); Note, The
Constitutionality of Proposition 209 As Applied, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2081 (1998). Illustrating the
interplay of democratic and judicial politics in the advancement of cultural war, these majoritarian
enactments in turn can be validated by ingroup judges when challenged by outgroups after their
passage. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding
Proposition 209's civil rights takebacks specifically on majoritarian grounds), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 397 (1997); see also League of United Latin-American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (upholding in part, and striking down in part, various provisions of Proposition
187). For discussion of judicial retrenchment and its convergence with backlash referenda in the
context of cultural war, see infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
110. Though backlash initiatives tend not to be framed vocally around gender, anti-immigrant
and anti-affirmative action initiatives of course take back incentives to social justice based on gender
as well as on race. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1572-73 (1995). The
social atmosphere of physical violence and microaggression associated with these referenda cer-
tainly extends to spheres in which gender is most salient. For instance, on October 23, 1998-sixteen
days after Matt's fatal beating--the "seventh casualty of anti-abortion violence since 1993" was shot
to death by a sniper. T. Trent Gegax & Lynette Clemetson, The Abortion Wars Come Home, TIME,
Nov. 9, 1998, at 34, 34. At roughly the same time, "five [abortion] clinics in three states received
powder-laced letters saying the recipients had just been exposed to anthrax," a deadly chemical
agent. Id. Understandably, public discourse on sex/gender issues for some time has reflected concern
over the fallout of cultural war and backlash identity politics. See, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH:
THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (1991); Nancy Gibbs, The War Against
Feminism, TIME, Mar. 9, 1992, at 50, 50-55. Consequently, social power and inequality are integral
to sex/gender antisubordination legal discourse. For examples of the use of the concepts within
antisubordination discourse, see AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY
(Martha Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAW:
SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992); Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Gendered Politics of
Identity: Who Owns the Label "Lesbian"?, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1997); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race
and Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Het-
erosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869 (1996); Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). Finally, the
economic impact of democratic initiatives that do pass into formal law typically are likely to fall
disproportionately on the poor within these identity outgroups, whether defined principally by ra-
cialized, ethnicicized and/or gendered relations. See generally Symposium, The War on Poverty:
New Perspectives, 1 D.C. L. REV. 1 (1992) (addressing the successes and failures of legal protec-
tions of the poor); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41; infra note 125 and sources cited therein (discussing the Legal Serv-
ices Corporation).
111. Current federal law provides no general antidiscrimination protection on the basis of
sexual orientation. See supra note 14 and authorities cited therein. For a review of rulings that deny
antidiscrimination protection under federal law to sexual minorities, see Valdes, supra note 3, at
cused on sexual orientation as the issue through which the concept of de
jure discrimination has been salvaged and revitalized.' 2
This stance is ominous, as it reintroduces into public affairs a notion
repudiated by basic principles of equality: that human dignity, legal pro-
tection or social opportunity may be denied blanketly to individuals on
the basis of mere membership in a disfavored identity group. Even the
dominant wing of the current Supreme Court seemingly stipulates to the
proposition that the Constitution's "simple command(s)" will not tolerate
"individuals" being treated as "simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual, or national class"" 3-yet this sort of invidious prejudgment based
on sexual orientation identity is exactly what de jure inequality through
cultural war and backlash lawmaking aims and achieves."' The revival of
this invidious, supremacist notion is trained formally on sexual minori-
ties today, but opens the possibility of similar formal stances against
other outgroups in years and battles to come. This practice represents,
implicitly at least, a substantive regression in the conception and trajec-
tory of civil rights more generally.
Significantly, these supremacist sexual majority referenda continue
with full force today: cultural war in Hawaii over a state supreme court
vindication of same-sex marriage rights resulted in a proposed constitu-
tional amendment being placed on the ballot for the 1998 midterm elec-
tions."' Passed by majority vote, the newly-amended state constitution
now empowers the Hawaii legislature to amend the constitution and
overturn the state supreme court."6 A similar campaign also succeeded
this year in Alaska; by a two-to-one margin, Alaskans voted to add to the
state constitution a ban on same-sex marriage, an expression of majori-
136-75. See generally supra note 28 (citing sources addressing sex and gender, and the relationship
to sexual orientation). Of course, local and state laws and other antidiscrimination policies provide a
patchwork of schemes that alleviate sexual orientation discrimination in specific locales or settings.
See Valdes, supra note 26, at 1335.
112. See Frank Rich, Protect All Families, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 14, 1999, at 25A (noting "the
right's obsession with homosexuality" and linking it to a "take-no-prisoners culture war").
113. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J. dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J.)
114. See generally supra note 57 and sources cited therein.
115. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993). For a critical account of this ruling,
see Danielle Kie Hart, Same-Sex Marriage Revisited-Taking a Critical Look at Baehr v. Lewin, 9
GEO. MASON Civ. RITs. L.J. (forthcoming 1999). The issues engaged in this litigation have been
controversial within sexual minority circles. For an account by the leading sexual minority lawyer in
that litigation, see Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and
Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567 (1995). For
analyses of the potential repercussions of that litigation, see Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and
Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WiS. L.
REV. 1033; Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 921 (1998); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997).
116. See John Cloud, For Better or Worse: In Hawaii, a Showdown over Marriage Tests the
Limits of Gay Activism, TIME, Oct. 26, 1998, at 43, 43. For a local post-election report, see Mike
Yuen, Same-Sex Marriage Strongly Rejected, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Nov. 4, 1998, at Al.
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tarian "outrage" that a state court had dared rule otherwise under the pre-
1998 constitution." 7 As in "undemocratic" societies that this nation criti-
cizes, these events illustrate how courts of law and constitutional provi-
sions are manipulated or altered through cultural war to preserve ingroup
privilege by force of law.
This resort to supremacist spectacle through majoritarian contest, in
which essentialized majorities can taunt and overwhelm essentialized
minorities in the name of democracy, has not always succeeded; some-
times voters rise above the base appeals of backlash initiatives, and
sometimes the severity of these propositions makes even the dominant
wing of today's Supreme Court recoil."8 Nonetheless, these formally
"democratic" spectacles spread cultural war from federal to state and
local levels. They embroil state and local governments in cultural war to
foreclose alternative social justice routes in the wake of the national gov-
ernment's capture by majoritarian backlashers."9 Since 1980, lawmaking
by backlash referendum has emerged as a fearsome and exhausting ma-
neuver of cultural war, used effectively to circumvent and trump the re-
luctance of governmental bodies or officials to lash out affirmatively at
sexual minority and other outgroup communities.
The second line of attack-the targeted exercise of the spending
power-spans numerous legislative enactments that fund and/or defund
programs specifically to hurt sexual and other minorities across a wide
range of social issues. For example, governmental spending power has
been used successfully since the 197.9 symposium to withdraw and deny
support for expression and performance by sexual minority artists, and as
a way of suppressing sexual minority social visibility and denouncing
publicly sexual minority culture and production of culture." Similarly,
the Defense of Marriage Act embraces the exclusion of sexual minorities
from federally-controlled social, legal and economic benefits that inhere
by law in formal marriage.'2' Funding for the HIV-AIDS pandemic, a
117. For a contemporary, local account, see Liz Ruskin, Gay Marriage Ban Approved,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWs, Nov. 4, 1998, at Al.
118. Perhaps the most notable example of ultimate failure was Colorado's Amendment 2,
which was approved by mass vote but failed to pass muster either before the Colorado Supreme
Court or the United States Supreme Court. See generally supra note 104 (discussing Colorado's
Amendment 2).
119. See generally Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a
More Perfect Union (Nov. 14, 1990), in 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723 (1991) (addressing search
and seizure, free speech, and education in the context of state constitutions); Paula Brantner, Note,
Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination: State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws,
19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 495, 509-21 (1992) (examining the shift from a reliance on the federal
Constitution to state constitutions in challenges to state sodomy laws following the Hardwick deci-
sion).
120. See, e.g., Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for
Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1499, 1534-35 (1996).
121. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). See generally Evan
Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, DOMA's House Divided: An Argument Against the Defense of
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gay-associated yet global health care crisis that erupted in the early
1980s alongside the rising tide of backlash, likewise has been belittled
and neglected by legislative and budgetary mandarins since the onset of
the plague, while funding for research and care remains today a contested
federal priority.'22 More recently, the federal spending power has been
used under the "Solomon I" amendment to mandate a loss of federal
funding for student financial aid at law schools that deny on-campus
access to at least one employer that discriminates both by policy and
practice on the basis of minority sexual orientation: the United States
Armed Services.'23 And, as with the organization of referenda, majori-
tarian misuse of governmental spending to wage cultural war is not tar-
geted exclusively at sexual minorities; in this respect, as well as in oth-
ers, control over the spending power extends to backlash lawmaking
against outgroups based on race/ethnicity,'24 socioeconomic class'" and
sex/gender'26 as well.
Marriage Act, 44 FED. LAWYER 30 (1997) (arguing that DOMA fails to comply with several provi-
sions of the Constitution); Scott Rusday-Kidd, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overex-
tension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435 (1997) (arguing that DOMA imper-
missibly "nullifies" the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
122. Governmental non/responses to the HIV-AIDS pandemic have been critiqued from various
quarters. See, e.g., RANDY SHtLTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS
EPIDEMIC (1987); Jean Reith Schroedel & Daniel R. Jordan, Senate Voting and Social Construction
of Target Populations: A Study of AIDS Policy Making, 1987-1992, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
107, 116-27 (1998). See generally GLOBAL AIDS POLICY (Douglas A. Feldman ed., 1994).
123. See supra note 87 and sources cited therein.
124. Reinforcing the withdrawal of access to public goods effected through backlash referenda,
see supra notes 111-19, legislative fiscal attacks against communities of color include the barrage of
backlash statutes passed in 1996, on the heels of majoritarian victories in the 1994 midterm elec-
tions, which jointly deprive federal aid to many persons and communities in socioeconomic distress
caused, in large part, by the legacies of racism, nativism, sexism or classism. See supra note 91 and
sources cited therein.
125. The poor of all races, ethnicities, sexes and sexual orientations have been targeted for
cultural war, in part by making them less able to exercise legal agency to pursue claims to rights. For
instance, in 1997 and 1998 new regulations and legislation prohibited the Legal Services Corpora-
tion from filing class actions suits, or engaging in lobbying on behalf of welfare recipients, prisoners,
migrant laborers and other vulnerable groups. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996f(b) (1994 & Supp. 1998) The
agency also is forbidden to provide any legal assistance in criminal proceedings, or in any proceed-
ing to safeguard abortion rights, or in any proceeding to desegregate public schools. Id. In the past,
legal services lawyers have been able to help poor persons vindicate some of these rights, but its
budget has been slashed and its mandate has been contracted progressively since the 1980s, making
this agency a less effective vehicle of social justice for the economically disadvantaged. See gener-
ally Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access, 25 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 631, 635-36 (1998) (discussing the decline in Legal Services Corporation funding); Douglas
J. Besharov & Paul N. Tramontozzi, Background Information on the Legal Services Corporation, in
LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: TIME FOR REFORM app. A, at 209-25 (Douglas J. Besharov ed.,
1990) (setting forth the legal, eligibility, funding, and procedural requirements of the Legal Services
Corporation); Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy, and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1277 (1993) (arguing against the judicial relegation of the poor to the "rationality" standard inquiry);
supra note 110 and sources cited therein on poverty law and social justice.
126. An early example in this identity category is the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439,
§ 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1994)) which cut off
Medicaid funds to women in search of an abortion, and which has been revised and reenacted every
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In these and other instances, majoritarian cultural elites have used
their essentialized warriors actively to redirect governmental spending,
aiming deliberately to dehumanize, stigmatize and invisibilize the na-
tion's sexual and other minorities in both material and symbolic terms.
The misuse of federal economic clout to dictate specifically sexual ori-
entation inequality in various social settings seeks not only to obstruct
the diffused experiments of varied institutions toward the ideal of a bias-
free sociolegal environment, this misuse effectively seeks to coerce af-
firmative societal complicity in homophobic, indeed antihuman, beliefs
and practices that work constantly to sow instability among sexual mi-
nority individuals, families and communities. The misuse of the federal
spending power since 1979 confirms that cultural war and backlash law-
making are bent on the sociolegal devastation and permanent repression
of Queer and other outgroup life both in "public" and "private" sectors of
society.
The third line of backlash attack-the reconfiguration of courts and
doctrines-also has been pursued aggressively since 1979. Even though
federal courts have been (and once again could be) run as principled in-
struments of social justice-specifically by protecting outgroups from
majoritarian self-interest based on essentialized identity politics 27-the
majority elites who control the nation's judicial machinery refuse right-
eously to exercise that discretion now.' Instead, backlash judges and
year in the annual appropriations bill(s) signed into law. This year's version is contained in the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. 105-277, § 103, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999). The original version was upheld in Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980), by the majoritarian majority of the Supreme Court installed as
part and parcel of cultural war. See also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (approving
legislation that provides governmental assistance for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic termina-
tions of pregancy). Just this year, in the current version of this legislation, backlash leaders in Con-
gress finished the task of choking off all federal funds that might facilitate women's access to repro-
ductive rights: the media recently reported that the 1998 budget bill finally eliminated all federal
funds for abortion. "Congressional anti-abortion forces, effectively, have cut off every path to abor-
tion that involves federal money without actually criminalizing the procedure." Raja Mishra, Pack-
age Cuts Back Federal Funds for Abortions, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 22, 1998, at 10A. This extin-
guishment is one of the social realities that cultural war produced legislatively this year, capping a
multi-year campaign to implement this portion of the social agenda associated with the 1980s and
1990s triumphs of cultural majoritarianism.
127. Indeed, this insight-the distinctions and tensions between formal democracy and func-
tional domination-was key to the landmark civil rights cases of this century. See, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-95 (1954). See
generally Neal Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court's historical and continued utilization of "color-blind" con-
stitutional analyses ignores the practical effects of racial subordination); William Wayne Justice, The
Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1992) (elucidating the relevance of
social reality to adjudication generally).
128. A recent, towering, and especially germane example is Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), in which the Supreme Court expressly opted for casual acquiesence to majoritarian prefer-
ences in the construction of sociolegal hierarchies. See supra note 14 (discussing the Bowers deci-
sion).
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politicians have striven mightily during this cultural war to engineer
majoritarian identity politics through judicial opinions;29 majoritarian
cultural warriors, including judges, have ensured that new judicial ap-
pointments most likely would yield new law through selectively "defer-
ential" and "active" applications of judicial review as part and parcel of
reclaiming ingroup cultural supremacy.'30
Despite intonations of majoritarian platitudes on neutrality and de-
mocracy,' ingroup judges earnestly have intervened in key cases to
align judicial authority and discretion with essentialized majoritarian
backlash, selectively employing procedural and doctrinal devices to
deny judicial relief for sexual and other minorities besieged by cultural
war. '32 With the judicial process effectively closed to social justice
129. Though judicial nominations and appointments always have been politicized, during the
1980s majoritarian backlash politicians have made them increasingly ideological. See Sheldon
Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318,
319-20 (1989). As recent rulings indicate, the appointments of the last two decades effectively have
reconstituted the federal judiciary, making it, and the law it produces, more hostile to antisubordina-
tion claims. See, e.g., infra note 130 and sources cited therein.
130. Judicial discretion has been used by ingroup judges appointed to serve as juridical cultural
warriors. These judges have tinkered with, and also revamped wholesale, doctrines and devices that
tend to redress outgroup misery, reducing overall the possibility of actual or effective legal redress of
outgroup social justice claims. See, e.g., William B. Gould, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment
Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TULANE L. REV.
1485 (1990) (addressing the Court's doctrinal civil rights retrenchment in its 1989 term); Nancy
Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraints and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (1989) (critiquing the deployment of jurisdictional and prudential barriers
to deflect civil rights claims); Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection,
the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191 (1997) (discussing
the judicial decontextualization of cases to arrive at judicially preferred results); Francisco Valdes,
Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Constitutional Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27
CREIGHTON L. REV. 381, 405-45 (1994) (reviewing judicial manipulation of equality cases in mili-
tary and governmental employment cases); Valdes, supra note 3, at 138-98 (questioning judicial
inconsistency in the application of Title VII and equal protection doctrines); Keith Wingate, A Spe-
cial Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REV.
677 (1984) (analyzing the relative strictness of federal courts in analyzing the sufficiency of civil
rights complaints). See generally DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING POINT: THE MAKING OF THE
REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992) (describing the jurisprudential politics of the present-day
Court).
131. A recent, transparent example is Justice Scalia's colorful dissent in Romer v. Evans, in
which he chides the majority for "taking sides" in a "Kulturkampf' by subjecting Colorado's
Amendment 2 to alive judicial review, and holding it unconstitutional. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 104 and sources cited therein (discussing
Romer). See generally Robert P. Smith, Jr., Explaining Judicial Lawgivers, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
153, 157 (1983) (reciting "the temptations of dishonest rationalization, misstatement of facts, disre-
gard of impediments to a desired result, deliberate misinterpretation of precedent, misleading em-
phasis, and silence when explanation is impossible" as among the "factors external" to a case that
nevertheless can help decide it).
132. The series of courtroom clashes over military policy during the 1980s and 1990s is a prime
example. These cases witnessed not only civil rights advocates working tenaciously to halt military
persecution of sexual minority servicemembers, but also ingroup judges gyrating doctrines, analyses
and procedures to justify intellectually dishonest outcomes. For a critical review of judicial politics
to preserve military homophobia in those cases and rulings, see Valdes, supra note 130, at 400-45;
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claims by the proliferation of ingroup-identified judges and clerks in-
stalled during the 1980s precisely for their majoritarian social ideology,
federal courts indeed have become increasingly aligned with majori-
tarian self-interest in the key issues of cultural war that they have chosen
to settle. In sexual orientation cases, as in race/ethnicity, sex/gender and
other categories of identity, cultural war has transformed courts into
custodians of backlash to facilitate the decimation of outgroup commu-
nities."'
The three lines of attack summarized here thereby come full circle:
majoritarian prerogatives over executives, legislatures and courts are
exerted to ensure that all branches and levels of government succumb to
their domestication as instruments of cultural war, and that they bow in
policy and practice to the imperatives of retrenchment and supremacy.
When any branch or government balks, resort to the spectacle of "popu-
lar" referenda can discipline hesitant officials. And when outgroups even
think of appealing the unjust results of "democratic" or juridical pro-
nouncements to a higher or supreme tribunal, they know that a majority
of today's judges and justices have been seated precisely to rebuff their
claims through rulings that etch onto the public record an ostensibly
authoritative ridicule of legitimate social justice aspirations." Perversely,
as the increasingly slim chance of judicial rulings that might alleviate
outgroup oppression is precluded, trivialized or nullified by backlash
Kurt D. Hennansen, Comment, Analyzing the Military's Justifications for its Exclusionary Policy:
Fifty Years Without a Rational Basis, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 151 (1992).
133. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 20; Freeman, supra note 68; see also supra note 130 and
sources cited therein (discussing judicial retrenchment through doctrinal and procedural maneuver-
ing). See generally Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical
Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REv. 265 (1984) (arguing that the courts have
improperly limited equal protection review in sex discrimination cases by failing to recognize par-
ticipatory discrimination as a valid avenue for relief). Judicial retrenchment forced by majoritarian
appointments and backlash politics was brought into jurisprudential relief by Justice Blackmun
shortly before his retirement from the Supreme Court. In his separate opinion in Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 803 (1992), Justice Blackmun begins by noting that "four Justices anxiously
await the single vote necessary" to rollback reproductive rights judicially, id. at 922, and alludes to
majoritarian backlash efforts designed to truncate reproductive rights through new judicial appoint-
ments: "I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down, the
confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue before [the Court in Casey].
That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice [over the preservation of privacy rights for women]
will be made." Id. at 943. This sentiment is made poignant by knowledge of the social climate of
violence and intimidation that increasingly has surrounded women's efforts to exercise reproductive
rights during the intensifcation of this cultural war. See, e.g., supra note 110 and sources cited
therein (discussing physical attacks against reproductive health care providers).
134. This knowledge leads to the abandonment of social justice efforts and experiments, or
legal claims based on them, due specifically and explicitly to this knowledge. For a very recent
instance, see Boston Drops Fight to Retain School Quotas, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 5, 1999, at 15A
(reporting the decision of the Boston School Committee to abandon litigation and dismantle equal
opportunity educational policies "because an unfavorable Supreme Court decision could have
undone such programs around the country").
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maneuvers, legislative and other majoritarian venues become correspond-
ingly crucial to the vindication of outgroup social justice claims.'
Since 1980, the coordinated attacks pursued along these three lines
of lawmaking have converged to reverse the advance of sociolegal ref-
ormation, endeavoring also to instill a general sense of permanent strati-
fication backed both by formal law and social terror.'36 Events since the
1979 symposium thus make plain that one concrete purpose of majori-
tarian backlash is to secure substantial dominion over lawmaking, ren-
dering law a compliant tool of supremacist identity politics. This pur-
pose, as the above synopsis illustrates, has been largely met: though
majoritarian retrenchment remains vigorously contested on various pol-
icy fronts, the current state of public affairs indicates that majoritarian
backlash politics now permeate every lawmaking process. Because this
permeation is sustained and driven by self-interested majoritarian essen-
tialism, social justice legal scholars must help to devise an outgroup
counter to that particular employment of ingroup identity in the specific
context of cultural war. This scenario makes it imperative for sexual ori-
entation legal scholars to reckon with the power of essentialized majori-
tarianism, and to maximize the potential of critical legal scholarship in
tranquilizing its deployment to wage cultural war through backlash
lawmaking.
F. Identity Politics, Majoritarian Subordination & Strategic Quasi-
Essentialism
To counter majoritarian essentialism, outgroup scholars should pro-
ceed from a clear understanding that today's cultural war is not the first
time that majoritarian identity politics have catalyzed sociolegal stratifi-
cation through lawmaking prowess. On the contrary, as this symposium
illustrates, this nation's social and legal history is replete with examples
that confirm the power and abuse of essentialized identities to use law for
the design and imposition of social hierarchy."' Indeed, identity politics
135. These and similar concerns have drawn scholarly attention, but no respite. See generally
Robin Charlow, Judicial Power, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 527 (1994); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
136. For instance, in each category of sociolegal identity sketched here, cultural war combines
daily microagressions with eruptions of physical violence, the hyperbolic rhetoric and aims of ma-
joritarian referenda, the ongoing legislative attack on governmental provision of social assistance,
and the selective exercise of judicial appointments and review to push retrenchment, thereby pro-
ducing a cumulative effect that literally conjoins social terror and formal lawmaking in the pursuit of
majoritarian backlash.
137. Susan Sterett explores the historical nature of essentialized identities and their use in
defining and imposing sociolegal hierarchy through her examination of state benefits. Susan Sterett,
Husbands & Wives, Dangerousness & Dependence: Public Pensions in the 1860s-1920s, 75 DENY.
U. L. REV. 1181 (1998). Avoiding the more common approach of addressing gay and lesbian iden-
tity issues through an examination of "sexual orientation," Sterett instead analyzes historically es-
sentialized "male" and "female" constructs within heterosexuality, as defined and strengthened by
public pension law. See id. Similarly, Karla Robertson examines and challenges the heteronormative
construction of marriage in her contribution to this symposium. Karla C. Robertson, Note, Pene-
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among both majorities and minorities were foreseen by key founders of
the nation as an inevitable source of factionalism in majoritarian law-
making within the new country.138 Since then, various majorities have
employed identity essentialisms to subjugate various minorities: white
supremacy, male supremacy and straight supremacy historically have
relied on essentialized identities to enact legal regimes that help(ed)
maintain social hierarchy, even while the targeted minorities employ(ed)
a similar counter-essentialism to rally resistance against subjugation.'39
trating Sex and Marriage: The Progressive Potential of Addressing Bisexuality in Queer Theory, 75
DENY. U. L. REv. 1375. Viewing case law and statutes through the lens of bisexuality, Robertson
uncovers the conduct-based centrality of penis-vagina penetration as the essential prerequisite for
legal recognition of marriage. See id. 1377-96. Robertson goes on to argue, notwithstanding this
conduct-based conception of marriage, that courts and Congress improperly essentialize "marriage"
through the status-based construct of heterosexuality, reifying heterosexual sexual identity and its
accompanying privileges. See id. 1400-08. The power of history and essentialism likewise is under-
scored in Jane Schacter's commentary in this symposium, where she argues that proposals such as
Ertman's, see supra note 61, may have the unintended consequence of reinforcing the essentialized
construction of heterosexual marriage that both Robertson and Sterett address. See Jane S. Schacter,
Taking the InterSEXional Imperative Seriously: Sexual Orientation and Marriage Reform, 75 DENV.
U. L. REv. 1255 (1998).
138. For instance, in the Federalist No. 10, James Madison addresses the "unequal distribution
of property" as the "most common and durable source of factions" that cause the division of society
among various groups. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 18 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1966). He notes: "Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct
interests in society." Id. When a majoritarian society uses law formally to correlate essentialized
identity features such as race or sex to the ability to acquire property, as has been the case for the
better part of this country's history, this sort of factionalism effectively is converted into a form of
majoritarian identity politics. Functionally, this correlation still is a fact of life in this society. See,
e.g., Roy L. Brooks, The Ecology of Inequality: The Rise of the African-American Underclass, 8
HARV. BLACKLETI'ER J. 1, 3-4 (1991). Madison also recognized more directly how identity politics
figure into factionalism; focusing on a particularly problematic identity feature of his era, religion,
Madison similarly notes in the Federalist No. 10 that "different opinions conceming religion," like
unequal distributions of property, disposed humans to "vex and oppress each other." ThE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 18 (James Madison). Similarly, but more nakedly, Benjamin Franklin prac-
ticed identity politics based on nationality, ethnicity and language when he sought to subordinate
German identity to English identity in the new nation. See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust:
An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269
(1992). Clearly, this nation was founded on a recognition, acceptance and practice of essentialist
identity politics by those in control of the founding.
139. Perhaps the most egregious example is race-based slavery and the Jim Crow regime that
followed racial slavery's formal abolition after the Civil War. In those essentialist schemes, all
persons of one "white" "race" were deemed innately and uniformly superior to all persons of other
"races." Pithily encapsulating racial essentialism from a white supremacist perspective, Chief Justice
Taney pronounced in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), that Africans and
blacks "had for more than a century before been regarded as beings.., so far inferior, that they had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407. Both
before and after slavery's formal end, essentialist concems about racial purity and hierarchy gov-
emed majoritarian identity politics. See generally Barbara K. Kopytoff & A. Leon Higginbotham,
Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J.
1967, 1968 (1989) (discussing the approach to racial purity and interracial marriage before and after
the Civil War); Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African
Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1997) (discussing racialized anxie-
ties defined by ancestry and blood line). However, the activation of essentialism in majoritarian
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Majoritarian essentialism that deployed law formally and with virtual
impunity through the first half of this century to subordinate vulnerable
minority groups easily ranks among the most abusive examples of iden-
tity politics yet recorded in this nation's history.
But history, like discourse, is not a static phenomenon. Though still
stratified, society is no longer frozen formally along strictly essentialist
lines that spotlight relatively simplistic identifications attributed to race,
sex/gender, sexual orientation or: other identity features. The erosion of
formalized majoritarian essentialist regimes, and the intricacy of social
forces associated with that erosion, have opened fissures that further
complicate identity politics among outgroups-complications that multi-
plicity and intersectionality effectively seek to highlight." Sociolegal
stratification based on identity, though still anchored to essentialist
structures and their vestiges, thereby has become a more complicated
phenomenon; even while essentialism continues to drive majoritarian
privilege and prejudice, the years since the 1979 symposium have seen a
gradual decline of identity essentialism as a reliable basis specifically for
social justice solidarity among outgroups. In a postmodern and hetero-
geneous society such as this one, sharing one or a few identity features
cannot provide a sturdy basis for antisubordination solidarity, much less
for social justice coalitions that span intra- as well as inter-group diversi-
ties.
More to the point, the activities and pronouncements of Clarence
Thomas blacks, Linda Chavez Latinas/os and Log Cabin Republicans-
who advocate analyses of law and society that belittle the present im-
portance of majoritarian power relationships based on essentialized iden-
tities-have demonstrated beyond any significant doubt how mere
"identity" is unreliable as a basis of outgroup antisubordination
identity politics to subordinate minorities extends to sex/gender and sexual orientation categories as
well. Thus, in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872), Chief Justice Reynolds essential-
ized sex (and gender) in concurring that the state could prohibit all married persons of one sex from
receiving a license to practice law because "divine ordinance" dictated that the "paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother." Bradwell, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141. To this day, the United States Armed Services, with the full complicity of the
nation's courts, continue to essentialize minority sexual orientation by effectively ordaining all
lesbian and gay persons as, innately unfit for military service. See Valdes, supra note 130, at 465-74.
140. See supra Part C. In this symposium, Nan Boyd's article on the commodification of gay
and lesbian identity illustrates how multiplicity and intersexionality may illuminate intragroup issues
of difference and diversity, thereby complexifying "sexual orientation" communities, issues, and
agendas. Nan Alamilla Boyd, Shopping for Rights: Gays, Lesbians, and Visibility Politics, 75 DENy.
U. L. REV. 1361 (1998). Boyd critiques the notion held by many within the gay rights movement
(including to some extent, myself, see Valdes, supra note 81) that increased visibility (through
means such as mainstream advertising) promises increased acceptability and, hence, increases in
civil rights. Id. at 1363-65. Without accepting or conceding that increased visibility must result in
Queer homogenization and hierarchy, Boyd effectively argues that mainstream advertising oblivious
to multiplicity and intersectionality may cause shortcomings tending to alienate members of the
movement based upon gender, race and class, thereby "deepening the gulf between privileged and
non-privileged queers." Id. at 1371.
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affinity."' By telling black people and other minorities, including sexual
minorities, that identity no longer matters much, either legally or so-
cially, Clarence Thomas and his ilk disable minority identities specifi-
cally as a means of forging antisubordination consciousness. Yet they
rarely pause to interrogate how entrenched majorities, including the (het-
ero)sexual majority, continue to play on majority identities and privileges
as a means of majoritarian bonding and essentialized domination. In this
way, identity has become a basis for enjoying the privileges of domina-
tion and a taboo for rallying resistance to domination.
The point of this critique is not to argue that all or most outgroup so-
cial justice analyses should agree with each other. The point is not the
promotion or acceptance of any essentialized analysis. The point is that
essentialized identifications inform all outgroup re/actions in the context
of today's cultural war precisely because essentialized identity drives
majoritarian backlash and cultural warfare; neither outsider legal schol-
ars-nor Clarence Thomas blacks, Linda Chavez Latinas/os and Log
Cabin Republicans--can extricate ourselves unilaterally from the cul-
tural conflicts that pervade our social and legal environments; we cannot
exercise social or legal agency without becoming implicated in the es-
sentialized and politicized conflicts of majoritarian cultural war. To act
as if we could is to be reckless with the sociolegal wellbeing of the out-
group communities from which we hale, and for whom we professedly
seek to make the world a better place.
On the contrary, Queer and allied scholars must recognize the reso-
nance of identity, and the reasons behind essentialist identity politics,
among outgroups: resilient presumptions of quasi-essentialist affinity
among outsider communities are reinforced precisely by the fact that
disfavored identity features still serve as a primary basis for the structural
and social mistreatment of humans by other humans.' 2 Outgroups exhibit
141. I employ these figures as tropes for a particular type of mentality about identity and posi-
tion in today's cultural war, which is described in the text above. See supra notes 67-100 and ac-
companying text. In each of these three instances, the essentialized figure is outgroup-identified but,
in each instance, the same figure aligns with majoritarian-identified positions on issues of cultural
war. In each instance, this mentality and its public expression have helped drive career advancement
and generate celebrity status. The identity and power dynamics suggested by this trio of figures
suggest that outgroup essentialism is a thin reed for expectations of social justice affinity during a
cultural war. See generally Ellis Cose, The Obligations of Race, TIME, Aug. 10, 1998, at 53. For a
sampling of identity/power tidbits about these figures, see Marching to a Different Drummer, TME,
July 15, 1991, at 18 (discussing Clarence Thomas's ascension to the Supreme Court and providing
excerpts of Thomas's remarks regarding issues such as racism and affirmative action); Clarence
Thomas Says: "I'm No Uncle Tom," JET, Nov. 14, 1994, at 4; Stephen Goode, Civil-Rights Conser-
vative Chavez Stirs Up the Melting-Pot Issue, INSIGHT MAG., July 21, 1997, at 18; Jack E. White,
Says He's Nobody's "Slave, " But Clarence Thomas Has a Master: The Right Wing, TIME, Aug. 10.
1998, at 64.
142. Of course, outgroup essentialism also can be fostered by a sense of shared culture or
similar points of connection that in some ways can be related to identity. This point is one area of
exploration within LatCrit theory. See generally infra note 161 and sources cited therein. Without
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essentialist susceptibilities in part because ingroup exploitation of essen-
tialized identities invites and requires it. This reactive affinity among
outgroup individuals and communities is, at least in part, a product of
majoritarian essentialism in today's cultural war.
For instance, majority-identified humans, such as those who alleg-
edly murdered Matt Shepard, mistreat and sometimes murder minority-
identified humans precisely because they are identified as "different" in a
way that still is imbued with social, legal and political essentialism.'43
This continued abuse of majoritarian identity in turn causes the mis-
treated humans to identify with each other on the basis not merely of the
targeted trait but, more importantly, on the basis of the social signifi-
cance given to it and the experience with mistreatment that it incites: this
experience can lead to struggle against continued mistreatment, and in
this struggle persons and groups who may have been similarly mistreated
due to a similarity of identity may tend to gravitate toward each other for
solace and alliance.'" Historically and presently, majoritarian essential-
ism directly fuels outgroup essentialism in the politics of identity and
equality. Thus, despite the rise of multiculturalism and postmodernism,
essentialist identities and outgroup experiences with majoritarian power
continue to be correlated in social life, thereby prolonging outgroup dis-
position to essentialism.
Of course, humans who share the sexual orientation of Matt' s alleged
murderers do not automatically share a murderously homophobic an-
tipathy for those who share Matt's sexual orientation. And similarly, not
all of those who share Matt's sexual orientation share his experience, or
fatal fate. Due both to the multiplicity of human identities and other va-
garies of life, the basic equation of identity, experience, consciousness
and reaction is much more volatile: identity, experience and politics,
though still substantially correlated in a multicultural and postmodern
society, are neither neatly nor necessarily one and the same. This dis-
junction helps to explain the existence of Thomas Clarence blacks, Linda
Chavez Latinas/os and Log Cabin Republicans, whose reactions to iden-
tity and experience in the specific context of cultural war illustrate and
magnify the uncertainty of simplistic correlations.'
But this complex interplay of identity, experience and consciousness
also helps to explain the present power of outgroup essentialism: A
slighting this observation, the point of this analysis is that supremacist majoritarian essentialism, and
mistreatment of outgroups based on that essentialism, specifically reinforce essentialist tendencies
within the similarly mistreated members of outgroups.
143. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
144. See generally Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769 (1992) (arguing for the revitalization of the "black commu-
nity" through a "politics of identification"); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741 (1994) (describing shared victimhood and struggle as a basis
for solidarity).
145. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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shared feature of identity continues to suggest, even if it does not make
certain, a shared experience with (or reaction to) the abuse of privilege
and infliction of injustice. The coexistence of Clarence Thomas blacks
and white privilege, as well as analogous phenomena, thus depict the
complexity of social experience and conscience in this society at this
time. In this postmodern era, a shared sexual orientation--or race and
gender-therefore can at best suggest only a strategically quasi-
essentialist presumption of collaborative inclination toward antisubordi-
nation goals.
By strategic quasi-essentialism" I mean a careful re/calibration, in
part through multidimensional critical legal scholarship, of group power
relations that recognizes the power of "identity" to ensure that "identity
politics" develop, rather than displace, antisubordination purpose. Strate-
gic quasi-essentialism is a method of legal scholarship and praxis that
recognizes the coexistence of essentialism and postmodernism in public
affairs, and which seeks to manage on behalf of social justice the com-
plexities of diversity and solidarity in a majoritarian order.'47 Strategic
quasi-essentialism is valuable both to intra- and inter-group antisubordi-
nation efforts that encompass varied and overlapping identity categories.
This form of outgroup quasi-essentialism is strategic precisely be-
cause it uses identity only as a point of departure for antisubordination
commitment and as the basis of outgroup collaboration. And antisubor-
dination purpose is elemental to multidimensional discourse because it
provides an organizing principle for social justice scholarship and
praxis-a principle with heightened importance in the midst of cultural
war. Multidimensional analyses that incorporate both antisubordination
purpose and strategic quasi-essentialism are crucial because, in time,
they also may come to elaborate a capacious vision of a postsubordina-
tion order that is not only a politically viable alternative to the majori-
tarian status quo but, more importantly, a regime of egalitarian justice
facilitated by law.1"
G. Multidimensional Scholarship's Relevance to Social Transformation
To be sure, this Afterword is not the first time that attention to ma-
joritarian lawmaking has been urged in sexual orientation legal scholar-
ship.' 9 But the key linkage stressed here is the relationship between es-
146. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Reflections on Whiteness and Latinalo Critical Theory, 2
HARV. LATiNo L. REV. 307, 311 (1997) (suggesting "strategic" essentialism as outgroup antisubor-
dination method).
147. See Harris, supra note 144, at 759-63.
148. For elaboration of postsubordination vision as jurisprudential method, see Valdes, supra
note 51.
149. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, Since When Is the Fourteenth Amendment Our Route to
Equality?: Some Reflections on the Construction of the Hate Speech Debate from a Lesbian/Gay
Perspective, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 19, 19 (1992).
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sentialist majoritarian lawmaking and multidimensional legal scholarship
in the specific context of today's cultural war: under prevailing sociole-
gal circumstances, multidimensional analysis is more likely than unidi-
mensional analysis to produce effective interventions in contemporary
lawmaking based on majoritarianism and essentialism because multidi-
mensionality can help to connect various "minority" aspirations that, on
their own, stand relatively little chance of success in majoritarian con-
tests dominated by essentialized backlash and elitist self-interest. Multi-
dimensionality is one means toward the social relevance of antisubordi-
nation legal scholarship, especially when operating under the political
onslaught of self-interested majoritarianism filtered through essentialized
appeals to the relevant majority.
Multidimensional analyses are better suited to the antisubordination
needs of diverse minorities seeking justice from a majoritarian "demo-
cratic" system because they can help to illuminate the bases for intercon-
nection and collaboration among minority outgroups to help all minori-
ties withstand the pressures of majoritarian cultural aggression. And by
"minorities" I mean both minorities within sexual minority communities
as well as beyond them; I mean, for instance, members of sexual minori-
ties who do not share Matt's race/ethnicity and sex/gender privileges as
well as women, racial/ethnic minorities, and other subordinated out-
groups who identify as members of the sexual majority. Multidimen-
sional frameworks are important in a society still gripped by majoritarian
essentialism as the dominant form of identity politics because they help
not only to map, but to explain, the ethics of a functional, as opposed to
merely formalist, social consensus on the principle that identity should
never be used to subordinate, whether identity is based on race/ethnicity,
sex/gender, sexual orientation or some other essentialized feature of per-
sonhood and regardless of whether it is secured by "democracy.""
By mapping and explaining the interconnected structuring of subor-
dination, multidimensional analyses can help to frame and justify a cor-
150. A similar consensus was previously organized around the antidiscrimination principle and
the notion of equal citizenship. Indeed, this nation regards itself proudly bound to, and the prime
champion of, principles of equality and nondiscrimination. See generally Paul Brest, The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1976) (examining the history of the "antidiscrimination principle" by which classifications and
decisions based upon race are disfavored); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-
Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1977)
(examining the constitutional origins and development of equality principles). These principles, even
as aspirations, certainly are incompatible with the brute exercise of majoritarian power through
backlash lawmaking and cultural warfare that includes social terror. See supra Part E. The tension
between democracy and equality therefore generally has been palpable in the controversies that
surround sexual minority social justice claims. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and
the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, U. CH1. L.
REv. 1161, 1170-78 (1988); see also supra note 14 and sources cited therein (discussing equality
law and sexual orientation).
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responding structuring of antisubordination resistance.' By showing
how different forms of bias travel together and combine in social opera-
tion," ' multidimensional analysis may begin to unite multiply diverse
outgroups and persuade skeptics that all forms of discrimination based on
essentialized identification are wrong for the same reason: they subvert
the national commitment to equality, liberty and justice, spreading in-
stead human suffering, as well as social dysfunction and disharmony.
15 3
Progress no doubt will be fitful and incremental, and sometimes perhaps
even mostly symbolic, but insisting on multidimensionality in sexual
orientation scholarship will better position Queer and allied scholars to
help ensure that majoritarian lawmaking on the whole will be more re-
ceptive to legal reform toward social justice for multiply diverse out-
groups. Without being sanguine about capacity, we can persist through
multidimensional scholarship and praxis in the accumulation of momen-
tary, but perhaps enduring, social justice gains. But the efficacy of the
prospective evolution toward multidimensionality in sexual orientation
discourse that is suggested by this symposium and its counterpart de-
pends ultimately on a recognition of both the need for solidarity and the
fact of diversity within and beyond sexual minority communities.
H. Diversity, Solidarity & Critical Coalitions in Multidimensional
Analysis
Despite their insight and promise, these symposia represent but a
first step toward a focused yet multidimensional legal discourse on sex-
ual orientation. The balanced evolution that these symposia indicate, and
hopefully initiate, bring to the fore serious and complicated issues: not
151. Karen Engle takes a step in this direction with her article in this symposium. See Engle,
supra note 20. Using gay rights issues as a case in point, Engle argues that backlashers' conflation of
"equal" and "special" rights affects not only the gay rights debate, but implicates all civil rights
struggles. Id. at 1270-81. Rejecting the implied premise of backlashers that "special" rights are
necessarily destructive, Engle's analysis shows why multidimensional antisubordination scholarship
must transcend the inherited boundaries of essentialist identity formations. See id. at 1291-1301.
152. The interconnected nature of social prejudice based on "different" identity features, such
as race/ethnicity and sexual orientation, is captured vividly in the multidimensionality of the bigotry
embodied by Matt Shepard's alleged murderers. See supra note 62-69, 143 and accompanying text.
For a sample of studies that document the interconnection of biases based on sexual orientation,
sex/gender and race/ethnicity, see Valdes, supra note 3, at 55 n. 148; see also Thomas J. Ficarrotto,
Racism, Sexism, and Erotophobia: Attitudes of Heterosexuals Toward Homosexuals, 19 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 111, 115 (1990) (finding that racism, sexism and erotophobia are "independent
and equal predictors of antihomosexual sentiment"). For a critical review of the same interconnec-
tion, see Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to "Anti-Semitism?": Generalized Discrimination,
Proof of Discrimination, and Social Science (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also
Clark Freshman, Note, Beyond Atomized Discrimination: Use of Acts of Discrimination Against
"Other" Minorities to Prove Discriminatory Motivation Under Federal Employment Law, 43 STAN.
L. REv. 241, 269 (1990).
153. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Inter-
racial Justice, 3 UCLA AsIAN-PAc. AM. L.J. 33, 35 (1995) (urging that a "multidimensional con-
cept of interracial justice is, in many instances, an integral, although often overlooked component of
peaceable relations and coalition-building among racial minorities").
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only must we balance a focus on "sexual orientation" with an
intersectional and multidimensional expansion of sexual orientation dis-
course, we also must do so in a way that balances diversity with solidar-
ity to produce social change in a majoritarian and "democratic" system.
We must, in other words, pursue a successful engagement with a thresh-
old postmodern issue that to date has eluded outsider legal scholars gen-
erally: balancing human complexity and social heterogeneity in a schol-
arship of antisubordination solidarity.
The move to multidimensionality thus conjures the lingering "same-
ness/difference" dilemma that has preoccupied outsider scholars in recent
years-a dilemma that has spurred attempts to accommodate diversity
and cultivate solidarity to advance social justice through increasingly
multidimensional analysis.' Solidarity in diversity has been elusive spe-
cifically within social justice discourse and projects because this balance
requires both the recognition and accommodation of relevant commonal-
ties and diversities to advance antisubordination discourses, projects or
agendas. To transcend this sense of dilemma, antisubordination scholar-
ship on sexual orientation must dedicate itself to the development of
means that will enable multiply diverse sexual minorities (and other
multiply diverse outgroups) to evaluate critically how claims of solidar-
ity and diversity may tend to advance social justice goals and/or replicate
existing patterns of privilege."' A panacea for this need to discern has yet
to be found but-again-the work of critical race and other outsider
theorists provides some promising, if imperfect, apertures.
Scholars identified with outsider jurisprudence have urged in recent
years that antisubordination projects must be "grounded" in social con-
text to ensure the practical relevance and transformative potency of criti-
cal legal scholarship. In addition to engaging multiplicity and intersec-
tionality, Queer multidimensional scholarship persistently and progres-
sively must "look to the bottom"'56 and "ask the other question(s)"' , to
154. See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 15 (1990) (exploring conceptions of "difference" within the American legal
system and advocating "a shift from a focus on the distinctions between people to a focus on the
relationships within which we notice and draw distinctions"); Regina Austin, Black Women, Sister-
hood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877, 878 (1992) (noting that
"sameness," "difference," and "deviance" are mechanisms or tools that women use to define the
black community); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992) (noting the implications of legally relevant differences between
men and women); Joan Chalmers Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-
Modem Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 299
(advocating a post-modem approach to sameness and difference as a stable set of "essential" differ-
ences will disappear in that analysis).
155. See generally Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Latinos, Blacks, Others, and the New Legal
Narrative, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 479 (1997) (arguing that outsider scholarship must not accept
the racial or identity status quo as a starting point for discussion).
156. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) ("[A]dopting the perspective of those who have seen and
felt the falsity of the liberal promise can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the phe-
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help contextualize social justice issues 4in intra- and inter-group frame-
works. Queer and allied scholars consciously must choose, and then con-
tinue, to engage sameness/difference issues with interconnective,'58 co-
synthetic,'59 wholisticn methods and mindsets. By practicing and dis-
seminating these and other postmodern techniques of critical analysis, we
can bring into existence a multidimensional sexual orientation legal dis-
course to help empower multiply diverse sexual minorities; through sex-
ual orientation multidimensionality, we can help to foster intra- and in-
ter-group appreciation of both outgroup similarities and differences in a
way that enables successful interventions in majoritarian and "demo-
cratic" lawmaking.'6' Despite our human faults and frailties, Queer and
allied scholars jointly can help to create a progressive balancing of diver-
sity with solidarity to promote and expand antisubordination transforma-
tion.
The methods of outsider jurisprudence thus should be applied not
only to ground critical theory generally, but also with the specific aim of
establishing viable frameworks of intra-and inter-group collaboration in
majoritarian and "democratic" processes or venues through the design of
nomenology of law and defining the elements of justice."). In this InterSEXionality Symposium,
Patricia Cain exemplifies both the application and the effectiveness of "looking to the bottom" in
"sexual orientation" context through her examination of the lives of individual transsexuals. See
Cain, supra note 66.
157. See Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition,
43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) ("asking the other question" as a method of understanding all
forms of subordination).
158. See Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities
and Interconnectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WoMEN's STUD. 25, 26 (1995) (defining interconnec-
tivity as "a call for a new found appreciation of the situational commonalties that frame the histo-
ries" of sexual minorities).
159. See Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
1257, 1280 (1997) (defuning cosysthesis as "a dynamic model whose ultimate message is that the
multiple categories through which we understand ourselves are sometimes implicated in complex
ways with the formation of categories through which others are constituted").
160. See, e.g., e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics 1: The Myth of the Protected
Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CoNN. L. REV. 441, 500 (1998) (defining wholism
as a "theory of radical individualism" without intersections).
161. This description is apt for the ambitions that LatCrit theorists have undertaken in recent
years. See Francisco Valdes, Foreword: Under Construction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community,
and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1111 (1997); see also Symposium, Comparative Latinas/os:
Identity, Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 1999); Symposium,
Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latina/o Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19 UCLA
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1998); Colloquium, International Law, Human Rights, and LatCrit
Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1997); Symposium, LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse
of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997); Colloquium, Representing
Latinalo Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996). For a compari-




critical coalitions.'62 By "critical'" coalitions I mean "alliances based on a
thoughtful and reciprocal interest in the goal or purposes of a coalition,"
as opposed to partnerships skewed in favor of one partner over others in
ways that are structural or persistent rather than strategic or
momentary."3 Critical coalitions therefore require a commitment to a
"rotation of centers" that ensures thoughtful distribution of attention and
energy to pursue efficiently the social justice interests of all coalition
partners as coalition partners. This rotation correspondingly requires all
partners to accept a partial and periodic de-centering of immediate or
unidimensional self interest: in this scheme, coalitional resources and
priorities rotate along with the center, and as part of a vision geared to
balancing and harmonizing the goal of social justice for all. Of course,
critical coalitions, like all human endeavors, depend on their execution
for their success. But the bedrock of a critical coalition is that no single
identity or interest ever will rise to the level of domination, much less
hegemony. This concept applies always and simultaneously both to the
intra-'" and inter-'" group aspects of these coalitions.'"
To articulate intra-sexual minority diversity and solidarity, Queer
and allied scholars must engage the process of discovering how
race/ethnicity, class, dis/ability, geography and religion, as well as
sex/gender, intersect and interact with sexual orientation to produce var-
ied layers and experiences of social life and legal opportunity for lesbi-
ans, gays and other sexual minorities. To mobilize intra-sexual minority
coalitions we must craft a scholarship that both maps points of connec-
tion and tempers axes of contention. We must emphasize how sexual
orientation discrimination affects us all while we recognize and interro-
gate how that discrimination is made variable for "different" members of
sexual minorities by the other identity factors that make us richly diverse.
Though delicate and daunting, our task is to register the ways and means
through which interlocking structures of subordination deprive multiply
diverse sexual minorities of social justice and legal rights both differently
and commonly. Only in this way can sexual minorities exert our full
power and potential to promote just laws and lawmaking.
To delineate inter-group coalitions, Queer and allied scholars simi-
larly must dedicate ourselves and our scholarly labors to understanding
and charting how straight supremacy, white supremacy, male supremacy
162. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Afterword-Religion, Gender, Sexuality,
Race and Class in Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis, 19 UCLA CHICANO-
LATiNO L. REV. 503 (1998).
163. Valdes, supra note 51; see also infra note 179 and accompanying text.
164. By intra-group aspects of critical coalitions I mean collaborative efforts that cross lines of
class, gender, color, geography and region within the internally diverse communities that make up
the sexual minority population of this country.
165. By inter-group aspects of critical coalitions I similarly mean collaborative efforts that
cross sexual orientation lines--those that help to coalesce sexual minorities and the sexual majority
around the project of social justice, equality and harmony for and among all sexual orientations.
166. Valdes, supra note 51.
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and other hierarchies supported by law directly and indirectly interlock to
produce the manifold injustices perpetrated by the continued domination
of Euro-heteropatriarchy within our communities, throughout the United
States and, ultimately, the world. The same substantive and strategic
considerations should help to inform and guide social justice scholarship
on intra- as well as inter-group issues.'67 To develop critical coalitions
that remain true to social justice transformation both within and among
traditionally subordinated groups, our scholarship must be informed by
knowledge of, and fidelity to, the lived conditions that materially repre-
sent the range of social injustices that we purport to combat and seek to
reform. Only in this way can overlapping outgroups combine strengths
and resources to make a difference on majoritarian and "democratic"
terms.
Thus, even while recognizing our limits, our responsibility as anti-
subordination scholars remains constant: to devise conceptual frame-
works that may help foster a culture of understanding and coalition
among multiply diverse and overlapping outgroups as one means toward
effective and efficient outgroup reform agendas. This responsibility is
recognized throughout this symposium. Indeed, much of the power and
promise projected by the works presented in this symposium come from
the fact that they respond to this responsibility-the responsibility to
activate the power of identity for social justice on behalf of multiply di-
verse sexual minorities." As in this symposium, Queer legal theory must
be animated and measured by its responsiveness to our collective respon-
sibility for advancing antisubordination collaboration among groups that
otherwise might not appreciate how critical outgroup coalitions are a
predicate for materializing social justice through legal reform. This re-
sponsibility can be met, as well as measured, on at least four levels of
discourse.
I. Levels of Multidimensionality to Ground Queer Legal Theory
The efforts of various outgroup legal scholars to construct an anti-
subordination discourse has produced insights, such as multiplicity and
intersectionality, that point the way toward multidimensionality.'" These
efforts, coupled with related insights produced since 1979 through out-
sider jurisprudence,'70 in turn suggest four levels of multidimensionality
that should be palpable in a Queer legal theory as a form of social justice
legal scholarship that incorporates both intra- and inter-group issues of
sameness and difference, and that engages these issues with antisubordi-
nation purpose. These are:
167. See Valdes, supra note 26, at 1321-25.
168. See Symposium, InterSEXionality, supra note 4; see also supra notes 20, 29, 53, 61, 66,
137, 140, 151, 156 (addressing ideas presented in this symposium).
169. See supra notes 21 and 39-40 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 158-60 and sources cited therein.
1454 (Vol. 75:4
AFTERWORD
1. The first is a focus on "sexual minorities"'7 ' as a distinct but
multiply diverse and transnational social group, and, more specifically,
on this diverse group's relationship to law or current legal re-
gimes/practices. This first level of multidimensionality flows directly
from well-established insights, like multiplicity and intersectionality."'
The idea, therefore, is to "center" sexual minorities qua sexual minorities
in legal discourse, but to do so in a way that recognizes and accounts for
the many axes of diversity that help to define sexual minority common-
ality and heterogeneity, both domestically and internationally. In this
way, this first level helps both to focus the discourse as well as to texture
it. Through this effort, the social and legal significance of intra-sexual
minority "sameness" and "difference" might come to be better under-
stood to aid antisubordination purpose. "3
2. The second level is geographic specificity, delineated by politi-
cal or sociolegal units such as a neighborhood, city, state, or nation, that
provide material frames for analyses of law and life."' This second level,
like all other schemes of analytical classification, is adjustable to varying
degrees of generality. The idea, however, is to use geographic or regional
specificity to promote critical awareness and comparative analyses of
different social in/justice histories, dynamics and conditions at different
sites or locales.' 5 Focusing on sexual orientation, this second level of
multidimensionality is counseled by the transparent disparities between
Matt's Wyoming and the sociolegal conditions prevailing in, say, San
Francisco's Castro District--or, for that matter, in other parts of the
globe."' This effort, like the first level of multidimensionality, produc-
171. For a brief explication of this category and its utility as a unit of analysis, see supra note 5.
172. See supra Part E.
173. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Darren Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual? Advancing Lesbian and Gay Inter-
ests Through Proportional Representation, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1996) (focusing on
New York City Council redistricting to argue for the viability of proportional representation to
support sexual minority interests). See generally Keith Aoki, Race, Space and Place: The Relation
Between Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699 (1993) (critiquing the gentrification of United States housing markets);
John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of Hope From
a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (1995) (advocating the building of a "culture of
resistance" through grass roots movements grounded in lived experience and concrete social condi-
tions); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces and the Role of Critical Race theory in
the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An Institutional Class Analysis, in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: HISTORIES, CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, supra note 36 (analyzing the role of law in
creating racialized social places and the role of critical theory in redressing the injustices thereby
perpetrated); Martha Mahoney, Note, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the Economy
in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251 (1990) (examining racisim through the location and con-
struction of public housing in New Orleans).
175. This idea is a key feature of the LatCrit conferences and symposia that were initiated in the
mid-1990s. See generally supra note 161 and sources cited therein.
176. News reports of Matt's murder generally described Wyoming as markedly inhospitable to
sexual minority life; it is, the media reports, "tough business ... to be gay in cowboy country."
Lopez, supra note 62, at 38. San Francisco's Castro District, on the other hand, is widely regarded as
one of the most developed sexual minority neighborhoods in the world. See generally RANDY
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tively can inform scholarly and activist understanding of sexual minority
sameness/difference issues, highlighting those that are caused or compli-
cated by geographic or regional dis/continuities in law and society.
3. The third level is a persistent exploration or elucidation of
cross-group histories or experiences with law and power, such as those
based on race/ethnicity, socioeconomic class, sex/gender, sexuality and
religion. The idea of this inter-group focus is to ensure that Queer legal
theory, in addition to incorporating intra-sexual minority diversities, also
contextualizes sexual orientation issues in inter-group frameworks.'77
This effort thus is related to the first, and similarly flows from well-
established outsider insights. However, this third level of multidimen-
sionality carries into cross-group terrain the effort to understand, and
then harness for antisubordination effect, sameness/difference issues with
contemporary sociolegal significance.
4. The fourth level of multidimensionality, like the third, attends
to inter-group issues. This level is a focus on connecting and/or con-
trasting Queer legal theory to other genres of scholarship, and, in par-
ticular, the various strands of outsider jurisprudence (critical race theory,
feminist legal theory, LatCrit theory) that critique race/ethnicity, class,
sex/gender and other categories of social-legal identities and relations.
This effort progressively can lead to expanding engagements with other
jurisprudential developments and communities that similarly are congru-
ent with social justice transformation.' This effort, in time, can help to
reveal the characteristics not only of outgroup histories and positions, it
also can help to reveal the strengths and shortcomings of pre/existing
discourses that help to construct those groups in contemporary law and
SHLTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE & TIMES OF HARVEY MILK (1982) (exploring
the development of the Castro District through an examination of the life and death of its unofficial
mayor, Harvey Milk). In the wake of Matt's murder, and in contrast to it, media reports also suggest
how regional and geographic considerations may affect antisubordination analyses of sociolegal
issues. For instance, within weeks of Matt's murder the media was reporting that "changing Euro-
pean attitudes toward homosexuality" in recent years had produced the enactment of "laws prohib-
iting discrimination against gays and lesbians" as well as laws recognizing the legitimacy of same-
sex unions. See Carla Power, Now It's the Gay Nineties?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1998, at 35, 35.
These kinds of laws do not yet exist in this country because they are still viciously, and successfully,
opposed by majoritarian cultural warriors. See supra Parts D, E. Of course, geography, like all else
can provide only a partial and shifting lens into sociolegal issues. For instance, only a few years ago
the media also was reporting that small-town America slowly but surely was enlightening itself on
sexual orientation issues. See, e.g., Debra Rosenberg, Homophobia, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 1994, at
42. The point, therefore, is that geography, as one level of multidimensionality can help critical
scholars to excavate structures of subordination for more comprehensive, and comparative, analyses.
177. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
178. For instance, discourses on dis/ability and law, and on therapeutic jurisprudence, are likely
candidates for engagement. See generally THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER (Lennard J. Davis ed.,
1997) (discussing disability theory in a manner similar to the way race, gender and class have been
theorized); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS




society. This level of multidimensionality thus turns the focus inward,
urging all scholars to consider not only inter-group issues, but to articu-
late each project consciously in the context of varied, and perhaps par-
alleling, multilateral discourses.
In tandem, these four levels of multidimensional analysis represent
a scholarly commitment to a continual and balanced "rotation of centers"
that permits a social justice discourse both to focus on particularity as
well as to induce knowledge that is part of a larger mosaic.'79 This rota-
tion, as noted above, values both specificity and generality, and values
most their synthesis and balance as antisubordination method. This mul-
tidimensionalized rotation of centers is designed to balance over time the
need for both micro- and macro- analyses of subordination in order to
allow critical understanding both of particularity in specific contexts as
well as of the patterns created through the accumulation of particularities
across specific, but perhaps recurrent, sociolegal arrangements. This ro-
tation thus represents a commitment to mapping both the continuities and
discontinuities of intra- and inter-group positions across various social
and doctrinal domains, but always vis-h-vis egalitarian social justice
goals that can be advanced through law and legal reform.
Of course, not every project need operate on all four levels of multi-
dimensionality at once. Given the need for focus and the limitations of
time and space, it is unclear whether doing so is warranted, much less
feasible. However, every social justice scholar consciously should con-
sider the propriety of doing so in light of the circumstances and condi-
tions that define these times. To do so, scholars will need to weigh fac-
tors like the context and mission of each project, as well as the relation-
ship of different identity constructs to a particular project's focus, con-
text and mission. The conscious decisions about multidimensional scope
and reach that each scholar then makes for every project should help both
to inform carefully, and to qualify explicitly, the parameters of each
project as a form of social justice intervention."0
Over time, the net result of the scholarly practices suggested by
these four levels should be a jurisprudential culture of enhanced aware-
ness of the multidimensional issues implicated by every project and
every discourse, even if not all such implications actually are engaged in
a particular project. This net result is possible because these four levels
of multidimensional analysis are transportable across fields of law and
life, and thereby can serve as a basic framework for the construction of
Queer and allied discourses organized around egalitarian fidelity to anti-
subordination purpose, both internally and externally. These four levels
can be applied to social or doctrinal issues that, like sexual orientation
179. See Valdes, supra note 51; see also supra notes 162-66.
180. See generally Valdes, supra note 26, at 1326-28 (noting that minority theorists must
articulate the position from which they "conceive and articulate" their analysis).
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scholarship, range from constitutional to family law.'"' As a set, these
four levels of multidimensionality, and perhaps others, can serve as a
template for critical antisubordination analysis that is adjustable and ap-
plicable to variegated social or doctrinal contexts and that can advance
outgroup interests in law and lawmaking contexts.
Fortunately, the twin symposia of 1997 jointly place us at the cusp
of realizing this linkage specifically in the context of sexual orientation
legal scholarship. These symposia project an unrelaxed concern for sex-
ual orientation and homophobia."' Yet, they also signal a newfound con-
cern for the interaction--or intersexion--of sexual orientation and other
aspects of gay and lesbian interests, ' which may help multiply diverse
sexual minorities to begin coalescing more effectively with racial/ethnic,
sex/gender and other outgroups to mount counter-majoritarian interven-
tions. These symposia set an example that amounts to a challenge for,
and ideally a beginning of, a multidimensional sexual orientation schol-
arship.
J. Internalization & Self-Critical Awareness in Antisubordination Projects
Practicing multidimensionality and strategic quasi-essentialism to
balance diversity and solidarity in a majoritarian society may help legal
scholars to galvanize social justice projects and discourses, but those
efforts are not enough to sustain a long-term antisubordination struggle.
As the Queer credo from above notes, appreciating and rejecting self-
hatred is a key component of effective antisubordination struggle.'" It
must be similarly so for scholarship that seeks to advance antisubordina-
tion goals: not only must Queer and allied scholars refrain from assum-
ing essentialist antisubordination affinity based on a commonality of
disfavored identities, we also must refrain from assuming that experience
with disfavored identity immunizes us from replicating essentialized
identity-related biases. Rather, the sort of Queer, multidimensional
scholarship envisioned here, and facilitated by this symposium and its
counterpart, necessarily entails a firm resolution to spot and excise the
operation of internal(ized) biases and essentialisms within our communi-
ties and ourselves. A threshold precaution therefore rises against the al-
lowance or trivialization of essentialist prejudice in our midst, especially
when it might serve to privilege us.
Social justice integrity requires self-awareness and self-critique be-
cause antisubordination scholars must resist social injustice both exter-
181. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
182. Without doubt, every article published in this symposium exudes a strong concern for
sexual orientation justice.
183. In particular, the arguments advanced by Boyd, supra note 140, Cain, supra note 66,
Ertman, supra note 61, and Franke supra note 53, pursue analyses that signal a multidimensional
expansion of "sexual orientation" and justice.
184. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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nally and internally.'" We must avoid deploying existing or new struc-
tures of subordination; we must interrogate our possible redeployment of
prejudice and privilege, including but not limited to situational rede-
ployments that entail self-hate.'86 This proactive commitment to self-
critical rejection of internal(ized) essentialist bigotry is a predicate for
multidimensional analysis because internalized homophobia, racism,
sexism and other forms of domination that depend on essentialized iden-
tities can blind our work to the ways in which these forces may hold
sway over us. If we indulge injustices that we should cognize, we oc-
clude in our minds the patterns of oppression that interconnect the social
realities that we inhabit. Blinded, we may become unconsciously com-
plicit in their operation within our immediate surroundings. We thereby
disable our critical ability to practice multidimensionality effectively. In
time we may bring into question the integrity of our antisubordination
principles and practices.
By licensing through ignorance or laziness the operation of biases in
ourselves and our midst, we sabotage our capacity for multidimensional
analysis as a means toward critical coalitions with the potential to make a
transformative difference in the lives of multiply diverse sexual minori-
ties. Consequently, to make the move from single-axis sexual orientation
scholarship to multidimensional Queer critiques of subordination, we
must investigate and resist the operation of Euro-heteropatriarchal biases
not only throughout the United States and beyond, but within our com-
munities and selves.'87 This effort, in turn, requires acknowledgement of
legal scholarship's place and power in this society, and of the responsi-
bility that antisubordination legal scholars thereby cannot avert.
K. Politics, Scholarship & Responsibility in Social Justice Struggle
Because material transformation through just laws and lawmaking is
the purpose of antisubordination legal scholarship, substantive social
justice in the everyday life of a multicultural nation is the measure of our
work's success: 8' being conscious of purpose, antisubordination scholar-
ship on sexual orientation or other identity categories cannot be oblivious
to effect."' For critical legal scholarship on sexual orientation to be rele-
185. See Margaret E. Montoya, Academic Mestizaje: Re/Producing Clinical Teaching and
Re/Framing Wills as Latina Praxis, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 349, 351 (1997) (arguing that LatCrit
academic discourse should include self-critique).
186. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Conflict and Complicity: Justice Among Communities of Color, 2
HARv. LATINO L. REv. 495, 495, 499 (1997) (arguing that greater understanding of intergroup
prejudice is a necessary precursor to developing an interracial jurisprudence).
187. See Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 162, at 1138, 1141-42.
188. See Lawrence, supra note 17, at 847 (suggesting the promise of antisubordination scholar-
ship lies in the possibility of renewing the vision of America as a nation strengthened by its diversity
and of "American life as a struggle for inclusion and belonging").
189. See, e.g., Sumi K. Cho, Essential Politics, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 433, 455 (1997)
(arguing that scholars should assess the "political impact" of our work); Culp, supra note 155, at 482
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vant in the lives of multiply diverse sexual minorities, our work therefore
must be not only responsive to the material conditions of oppression that
shape Queer life, but also must be causative in a majoritarian lawmaking
order. Thus, even though progress may be incremental and even ephem-
eral-secured, if at all, in fragments-the fundamental question for anti-
subordination legal scholars always is whether our work consciously
gauges the social justice effects that it can, or may help to, materialize.
To be purposeful and effective, the scholarship begun in these twin
symposia must not shy away from political consciousness and social
responsibility. Although multiply diverse antisubordination scholars may
arrive at varied views on any particular point-and even on fundamental
proposals-we always should be alert to the politics and effects of legal
scholarship. This vigilance is especially valuable when our work is con-
ceived and received as part of a continuing struggle for social justice. We
must, in short, accept responsibility for the purpose and effects of our
scholarship-even though social justice purpose in legal scholarship
sometimes is viewed, especially (but not surprisingly) among majori-
tarian circles-as being inherently at odds with scholarly investigation.
According to that view, the "political" can never be the "scholarly"
because the former is partisan and the latter objective." Under that view,
the scholar remains superficially oblivious to, and effectively never re-
sponsible for, the society that her work helps to conceive, conduce, jus-
tify and consolidate. It is a view that legitimates "scholarly" disclaimers
of responsibility and fosters a smug sense of academic immunity from
social accountability.
It also is a view with historical and renewed resonance, as the record
of critical race theory has shown in recent years: exhibiting a sharp po-
litical awareness since its founding, critical race theory has been smeared
by those among the already-privileged who cling to the convenient no-
tion that scholarly dedication aimed toward social justice can be deval-
ued to a mere subjectivity, while scholarly detachment that hovers above
social injustice can be elevated to a grand objectivity.9 ' Such attacks
(stressing that outsider scholars must work together to imagine reforms that avoid replication of
hierarchy).
190. This topic of course touches on the question of "objectivity" or "neutrality" in legal cul-
ture, which has a long and contentious history that is beyond the scope of this Afterword. See gener-
ally Valdes, supra note 3, at 126 n.333 (listing sources that deal with impartiality and neutrality in
legal principles). The limited point advanced here is that legal scholarship, in particular, has political
impact, and that this impact cannot be denied by simple disavowal or complacent detachment. The
inevitability of impact has prompted one social justice scholar to call for "political impact determi-
nations" in antisubordination legal scholarship. Cho, supra note 189, at 434.
191. This attack has focused chiefly on the use of narrative in critical race theory, which is
decried by some uncritical or mainstream observers as a lesser method of scholarship in part because
it is viewed by them as less "objective" or "neutral" in its recounting of social or legal experience
than traditional preferences would permit. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 809 (1993) (conceding
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hinge and insist on a peevish formulation of "scholarship" that, as ap-
plied to the field of law in a legalistic society, is unconscionable: in a
society where law is promised to justice, and where society maintains
itself through the use of law while professing its justice, the study of law
cannot long pretend detachment from the project of social justice through
law. In a society that denominates majoritarian and "democratic" law-
making as the only definitive formal mechanism for processing conflicts
over "competing" values or interests, the study of law cannot avoid im-
plication in the social and material consequences that law produces
through its decisive, if not definitive, participation in such conflicts.9
The political power and social responsibility of all legal scholarship,
though sometimes still denied from above, really is beyond credible
doubt.
Indeed, the existence and maintenance of a prestigious and comfort-
able legal academy is a patent and longstanding recognition that our
work-including our scholarship-does matter. Our work, and especially
our scholarship, matters because it helps, first, to create and disseminate
conceptual frameworks for understanding social phenomena, and, then,
to influence the formulation of public policy and legal regimes that, for
better or worse, respond to and help to re/shape such phenomena. Our
work matters because, incrementally but cumulatively, it helps to con-
struct the social and material reality of this nation. Thus, there is no such
thing as "scholarly" detachment. There is only social responsibility.
that storytelling can contribute to legal scholarship, but insisting that the stories must be accurate and
typical and should include an analytic dimension); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal
Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1749 (1989) (arguing that minority scholars "fail to support
persuasively their claims of racial exclusion or... [that they] produce a racially distinctive brand of
valuable scholarship"). These attacks have inspired spirited responses from scholars identified with
critical race theory, feminist legal theory, critical race feminism, and Queer legal theory. See, e.g.,
Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994) (defending storytelling
against the "sudden, and rather vehement, resistance" to its effectiveness and use); Colloquy, Re-
sponses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1844 (1990)
(setting forth critical and other views); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Schol-
arship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 543 (1991) (dis-
cussing the use of autobiography by blacks in law teaching to illuminate both scholarship and racial
justice); Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV.
95, 111 (1990) (noting criticisms of outsider scholarship and scholarship itself, and weighing how to
help society deal with its racial problems); Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-
Understanding: A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845, 1846
(1994) (discussing how credibility concerns about the storyteller can be misplaced in outsider narra-
tives); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of
Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 809
(1994). These responses likewise have elicited further replies from the skeptics. See, e.g., Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on Scholar-
ship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647, 650 (1994) (expressing concern over a perceived tendency to
subject "objective" legal scholarship to the demands of politics which will advance only the interests
or perspectives of a particular community).
192. See supra notes 100-38 and accompanying text.
I
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Of course, this defense of social relevance and responsibility is nei-
ther a call nor an excuse for scholarly sloppiness in legal discourse.'93
Relevance and responsibility do not entail any acquiescence to a less
rigorous production of socially relevant legal knowledge; this point has
been made by the impressive record of outsider or perspective jurispru-
dence produced to date.'" Indeed, sloppy legal scholarship can result
from complacent social insulation as much as from fierce social com-
mitment. This call for critical consciousness about purpose and effect
also does not invite conformist agreement among outgroup approaches to
social justice. Conformity, like sloppiness, can come from many
sources.
95
Instead, scholarly acknowledgment and acceptance of responsibility
for the social effects of legal scholarship merely-but crucially-shifts
the values and paradigms for the production of scholarship. This shift
tilts the enterprise toward a greater concern for, and involvement with,
social justice through lawmaking.196 It is a shift amply counseled for legal
scholars by the centrality of law to substantive social reformation within
this legalistic society.'97 It is a shift made imperative by the majoritarian
campaigns of today's cultural war, which focuses on lawmaking proc-
esses to reclaim and re-impose traditionalist cultural superiority as a
matter of formal law.'98
Thus, by looking the other way-by seeking to ignore the foresee-
able effects of our disengagement with the everyday lives of those whom
the law slights-legal scholars effectively take sides with the privileged
193. On the contrary, outsider status counsels self-critical awareness among antisubordination
legal theorists. See Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 162, at 583.
194. This record includes the gains since 1979 of sexual orientation legal scholarship as well as
the gains of other outsider discourses, including feminist legal theory, critical race theory and LatCrit
theory. See supra notes 25-27 and 35-52 and accompanying text; see also MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 11-12 (1995) (noting the evolution of new "perspective" scholarship that is built on the
study of relevant differences among people).
195. Additionally, there is nothing inherently incompatible between antisubordination purpose
and legal scholarship in a heterogeneous society formally and emphatically devoted to social justice
and harmony through law. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. On the contrary, in such a
society it would seem that critical fidelity to basic legal principles and national ideals would be a
beneficial characteristic of legal scholarship. Moreover, this benefit would increase if the legal
principles or national ideals in question had been formalized as a matter of law yet remained aspira-
tional as a social matter-in this case, the legal scholar could, and should, aid the nation in opera-
tionalizing, thereby realizing the integrity of, its professed principles and ideals. See generally supra
note 150 and sources cited therein. Because these conditions describe the American status quo, legal
scholarship with antisubordination consciousness and conscience is not only a legitimate and valu-
able discursive enterprise, it is a compelling social need. See generally supra notes 154-61 and
sources cited therein.
196. See generally Culp, supra note 191, at 546-47 (explaining how personal identity may
connect group experiences with the law study); Lawrence, supra note 23 (theorizing how antisubor-
dination purpose and method are interwoven in teaching, scholarship and community).
197. See supra Part B.
198. See supra Parts D, E.
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and powerful who prefer to sustain a status quo that favors them at the
expense of others.' In the current context of cultural war, this election
may comport to majoritarian self-interest, but not to antisubordination
purpose. By "letting the chips fall where they may," rather than by noting
where and how we choose to throw our chips, legal scholars may seek to
disavow the ripple effects that we (should) know our work generates. But
by acknowledging the political nature and effects of our work, legal
scholars self-consciously and self-critically assume responsibility for the
causative power that our positions of (limited but significant) influence
accord to us as members of this nation's privileged legal academy. By
joining antisubordination purpose with multidimensional analysis, the
nascent field of Queer legal theory heralded by the two intersexionality
symposia of 1997 can help to ensure that public discourse and legal re-
forms on "sexual orientation" will be socially grounded, socially relevant
and socially responsible.
CONCLUSION
Now, and the next several years, are a critical time for sexual ori-
entation legal scholars. Through our combined work we can show our-
selves able to develop the kind of multidimensional, antisubordination
legal discourse on sexual orientation that this symposium and its coun-
terpart invite. Doing so will require us to expand our intellectual and
political horizons. Not doing so will hamper our social justice efforts,
qualifying both the equality principles that we profess to uphold, and the
transformative aims that we seek to advance, through our work. For
me-as for the authors and editors of this symposium and its counter-
part-the better choice seems clear.
It thus is a happy coincidence that in 1997 not one, but two, unprece-
dented symposia on sexual orientation and intersectionality-or "inter-
sexionality"-were conceived and planned independently of each other
by the editors and advisors of two law reviews. By framing the symposia
in this manner, the Denver University Law Review ° and its counterpart
in this serendipity, the Hastings Law Review," have marked 1997 as the
199. This "passive" partisanship, buttressing ingroup domination of law and society, is pre-
cisely the pose of formal, official impartiality urged by majoritarian warriors that espouse ingroup
prerogatives through backlash lawmaking: "I think it no business of the courts ... to take sides in
this culture war," dissented Justice Scalia in Romer v. Evans. 517 U.S. 620, 636 (Scalia, J. dissent-
ing); see supra notes 104, 131 (discussing the decision in Romer). Though this pose failed in Romer,
it succeeded in Bowers. See supra note 14 (discussing the decision in Bowers). In these two in-
stances, this pose has been urged directly for "objective" judges, but it dovetails and helps to legiti-
mate the notion that "true" legal scholars are those who rise "objectively" above the ugliness of
cultural war. In both instances, it seems to me, a key flaw (or, for ingroup elites, virtue) of this
urging is that this pose relies on the assumption that the law and society produced via cultural war-
fare are segregatable from that phenomenon.
200. Symposium, InterSEXionality, supra note 4.
201. Symposium, Intersexions, supra note 4.
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year in which sexual orientation scholarship entered the postmodern age
in a programmatic, if only tentative, way.
Of course, we cannot tell now where these symposia ultimately will
lead. Nor can we tell whether our scholarship ever will be enough to
counter the sweep of majoritarian essentialism and cultural backlash. But
hopefully, the coincidence of the two 1997 symposia is a harbinger of a
coming expansion in the scope, depth and power of sexual orientation
legal scholarship as a form of social justice practice; hopefully, one day a
future generation of legal scholars will look back on this year, and on
these symposia, as the commencement of a second, more expansive and
enduring, wave of legal scholarship on sexual orientation. To help hasten
that day's arrival, this Afterword urges today's legal scholars to become
cultural warriors by adopting and extending in sexual orientation dis-
course the techniques and tools of multidimensional analysis and praxis.
